




Dar es Salaam

Histories from an Emerging African Metropolis

EDITED BY

*James R. Brennan,
Andrew Burton & Yusuf Lawi*

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Edited by
JAMES R. BRENNAN, ANDREW BURTON
and YUSUF LAWI



Mkuki na Nyota Publishers
DAR ESSALAAM

In association with



The British Institute in Eastern Africa
NAIROBI

First published 2007

Mkuki na Nyota Publishers
P.O. Box 4246
Dar es Salaam
Tanzania

in association with

The British Institute in Eastern Africa
P.O. Box 30710, 00100 GPO
Nairobi
Kenya

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Distributed worldwide outside N. America by African Books Collective
PO Box 721, Oxford OX1 9EN, UK
www.africanbookscollective.com orders@africanbookscollective.com
Tel: +44 (0)1869 349110

Distributed in North America by Michigan State University Press
1405 South Harrison Road, Suite 25 Manley Miles Building
East Lansing, MI 48823-5245, USA
www.msupress.msu.edu msupress@msu.edu
Tel: +1 517 355 9543

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 9987 449 70 5

Typeset in 10/11pt Baskerville
by the British Institute in Eastern Africa

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Acknowledgements

This book has its origins in a 2002 conference on ‘Dar es Salaam in the Twentieth Century’ organised by the British Institute in Eastern Africa and the Department of History, University of Dar es Salaam. We would like to thank both institutions for their support for the conference; and the presenters and participants who crowded into Dar es Salaam University’s Senate room for contributing to what was a highly stimulating exploration of Dar es Salaam past and present. While not all the conference papers were suitable for inclusion in a book on Dar es Salaam’s history, the presentations and the debates they provoked have nevertheless shaped this volume. Walter Bgoya expressed an early interest in publication of any proceedings arising from the conference, and we are grateful for his staunch support over the intervening years. Similarly, we would like to thank Paul Lane, the former Director of the BIEA, for his backing for this project. In acting as an informal (in other words, unpaid!) reader, Jim Giblin offered much appreciated feedback on the draft manuscript. We hope he was at least repaid by some insights into the city of his adoptive Segerea home. The editors would also like to thank our employers, the University of Dar es Salaam, the British Institute in Eastern Africa, and the School of Oriental and African Studies, alongside the British Academy, for their support during the editing of this volume. On behalf of the many contributors who have relied on their important collections on the city’s history, we would like to thank the staff of the Tanzania National Archive and the University of Dar es Salaam Library. In the preparation of the manuscript, and accompanying illustrations, we were most grateful for the desktop publishing and draftsman’s skills of Innocent Mwangi and Stephanie Wynne-Jones. Finally, as ever thanks must go to our spouses, Theresa Kircher, Paulette Jones and Firmina Raphael-Murru, for their patience, encouragement and support.

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Introduction

James R. Brennan and Andrew Burton

In the century and a half since its founding in the 1860s, Dar es Salaam has evolved from a minor mainland haven of Zanzibar's Sultan Majid to become a sprawling, socially diverse city of major regional importance. The past hundred and forty years have witnessed the initially fitful, though seemingly inexorable, growth of a Tanzanian metropolis. By the end of the second millennium AD, Dar es Salaam had expanded to become East Africa's largest urban centre.¹ It is currently enjoying a period of particular vibrancy. Large swathes of the city centre are being transformed in a construction boom unprecedented since independence. Residential estates, catering for all classes, are extending the built-up area to the north, south and west. Liberalization from the late 1980s has seen the reinvigoration of a previously moribund urban economy. While the distribution of profits may be as unequal as ever, the commercial face of the city has changed dramatically—from *machinga* hawking the latest electronic gadgets at roadside junctions, to the emporiums of Kariakoo crammed with imported goods, to the more sedate malls of Msasani catering for Dar es Salaam's old and new rich. The past decade or so has also witnessed something of a creative renaissance. Local media have flourished: electronic media such as radio and television stations, and the press in the shape of the plethora of conventional daily and evening papers, and a diverse array of magazines and other publications catering to local demands. Meanwhile, although the city has long been renowned for its vibrant local music scene, it has recently been at the heart of a regional phenomenon in *bongo flava* (deriving its name from the colloquial term for the city itself), an adaptation of western 'urban contemporary' music that has been exported with great success to other urban centres throughout East Africa and beyond.

The socio-economic and cultural vibrancy of contemporary Dar es Salaam is also reflected by an upsurge in academic interest. While Dar es Salaam, considering its national and regional role, was for long curiously neglected, over the past decade or so it has been the subject of research in a variety of social science disciplines, and a published literature on the city is now gradually proliferating. As one of Africa's fastest growing major cities in the second half of the twentieth century, it is an historical exemplar of socio-economic and cultural change associated with rapid urbanization. Moreover, both this historical context and dramatic political and (especially) economic liberalization

in the recent past makes the city equally representative of contemporary trends in urban Africa, notably those associated with ‘globalization’ and the indigenous response. The scholarly community that has been attracted by these conditions (alongside the relatively benign context for research) now focuses unprecedented attention on the city’s social, cultural and economic evolution. This book seeks to take advantage of this academic conjuncture by drawing together research, from scholars working in a number of social science disciplines, on Dar es Salaam’s twentieth century history. By so doing we seek to make a contribution not only to Tanzanian historiography, but also an emerging historiography of urban Africa, and to African urban studies more generally.

Dar es Salaam and African urban history

The study of urban Africa remains a rather disjointed field, despite efforts of scholars to impose theoretical priorities and typological order upon the subject.² Looming over more recent studies has been the failure and abandonment of modernization paradigms, which temporarily united the expectations of scholars and African urban migrants alike concerning the progressive improvements that city life would bring to young African nations emerging from colonial rule—industrialization, higher living standards, abandonment of ‘tribal’ identities for national ones, and steady salaried lives centred on the nuclear family.³ By the turn of the twenty-first century, most of these promises of modernization lay irrevocably broken, yet Africa’s urban growth continues at a blistering pace. The shift in Africa’s population distribution from rural areas to cities since 1940 has been the most dramatic development of human geography in the continent’s modern history. In 1900, it is estimated that less than 2 percent of Africans lived in urban areas; by the early 1960s that figure had risen to 20 percent, in 1980 it was 29 percent, and by 1999 it stood at 37 percent. It is set to reach 50 percent by 2025.⁴ Such exponential growth demands explanation, for which several rural ‘push’ and urban ‘pull’ factors have been posited—better food security in cities than in rural areas, greater urban educational and social services, as well as wage labour and trading opportunities, just to name a few.⁵

Since breaking faith with modernization paradigms in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars of Africa have generally become less interested in identifying the causes of urbanization than they have in accounting for its shapes and effects. Disciplinary priorities within African studies have tended to define the basic terms of what constitutes a city—be it urban geographers’ definition of a city as a site of human congregation, the political scientists’ definition as a centre of power, or the sociologists’ definition as a social process of cultural concentration and diffusion.⁶ More eclectic and ecumenical, historians of urban Africa have been less concerned with adopting typologies or establishing urban-focused theoretical points of departure than with using cities as sites to identify and explain larger themes of social history, most notably the development of capitalism and wage labour, the rise of specifically urban

social groups, the development of public health, policing, crime, and innovations in leisure and pastimes.⁷

This book continues in this eclectic vein of African urban history. Its starting point for understanding the historical contours of Dar es Salaam is in detailed accounts of social, political, and cultural efforts made by people to create pathways of urban belonging without recourse to idealized categories of urbanism. Careful examination of the history of Dar es Salaam demonstrates that earlier African urban studies' typologies of the 'colonial' versus 'indigenous' city, and such intermediate incarnations as the 'dual' and 'hybrid' city, should be finally laid to rest.⁸ From a city-biographical perspective, the lineage of Dar es Salaam initially suggests that it is indeed a 'colonial' city. First founded by Sultan Majid in the 1860s, it was a planned projection of Zanzibari imperial power upon a relatively neglected part of the Mrima coast.⁹ Following a period of decline in the 1870s and 1880s, it was revived as the capital of the German colonial state in East Africa in the 1890s. Both Zanzibar and Germany built the town's major original structures, etched a largely perpendicular layout into the urban landscape, and directed lucrative long-distance trade towards its custom tolls. Germany also segregated the town on racial lines through land laws and zoning regulations. All of these elements could be termed generic expressions of 'colonial' power.

Yet such quests to meet typological criteria are rendered fruitless when one confronts the specific and diverse experiences of Dar es Salaam's peri-urban areas and their incorporation into the city. Such interaction between the urban centre and its outlying settlements is nearly impossible to typify—some were incorporated into the town as affluent suburbs (Upanga, Oyster Bay), others became densely-settled African neighbourhoods (Kariakoo, Gereza, Ilala), others sisal plantations (Msasani peninsula), while others retained earlier functions as principally fishing (Msasani) or farming villages (Buguruni, Kijitonyama, Chan'gombe). Some urban and peri-urban neighbourhoods became remarkably representative of the larger territory. Serving as a territorial capital between 1891-1974, Dar es Salaam grew to become an authentically national city; in demography, social composition, culture and religion the most faithful representation of Tanzania as a whole. John Iliffe understood Dar es Salaam's development as a direct reflection of territorial-cum-national trends when he wrote: '[a]s the rings of a tree reveal ecological change, so each phase of Tanganyika's modern history was embodied in the human geography of its capital.'¹⁰ Yet other peri-urban areas of the capital remained remarkably parochial throughout the twentieth century, and do not neatly reflect stages of national growth.

In order to understand the development of Dar es Salaam's social structure and popular culture, one must bear in mind the historical coexistence and uneven distribution of local, national, and cosmopolitan forces. Twentieth-century Dar es Salaam was relentlessly cosmopolitan: a concentration of population of historically unprecedented socio-cultural heterogeneity, located at the forefront of international cultural trends affecting African societies. At the same time, it was the principal site where the political practice and ideology of the nation emerged; a society composed of peoples from the whole of

Tanzania; and a city which remained politically, economically and culturally pre-eminent even after losing its status as territorial capital in 1974. Despite such powerful external influences, however, urban society was equally shaped by many distinctly local factors. The various chapters in this volume demonstrate the dynamic interplay between these contending forces.¹¹

The historiography of Dar es Salaam

In the existing historiography of the town three themes are prominent. These themes are interconnected with each other and with issues arising from locality, territoriality and cosmopolitanism that lie at the heart of this collection. These are the organization of space and its socio-cultural, political and economic consequences; Dar es Salaam's association with the formation of political consciousness and its position in the nationalist movement; and its role as a locus of social struggles.

As in other African urban centres, the organization of space has been central to the city's history. The legacy of colonial rule remains abundantly clear in contemporary Dar es Salaam. Although it has, through its demographic and physical expansion, undergone radical transformations in the forty years since independence, the city's postcolonial development has occurred broadly along lines established in the years up to 1961. Nowhere is this more clear than in the allocation of residential space. Areas once known colloquially as Uzunguni and Uhindini, thanks to their predominantly European and Indian populations,¹² would no doubt remain familiar places to a 1950s resident of these areas visiting the city today. In spite of the substantial development that has occurred to the north of the town centre, the former European area of 'Uzunguni' remains an area of well-spaced detached houses, which although not racially segregated is home to a disproportionate percentage of Dar es Salaam's expatriate community. An influx of wealthier African and Indian residents since independence may be cited as evidence of change; however, the continuities are more apparent, with the informal colonial segregation that occurred along racial lines simply being superseded by a segregation effected by income after 1961. Continuity in 'Uhindini' is even more apparent, with the area remaining the principal business and residential quarter of Dar es Salaam's substantial South Asian immigrant community—in spite of various moves after independence to curtail urban property ownership among this section of the population. The division of commercial space in Dar es Salaam forms another striking aspect of the colonial legacy. The old African settlement of Kariakoo, which in recent years has become increasingly high-rise in form, remains the principal area where commerce with and between Africans is conducted. Mjini (the city centre), meanwhile, provides the main location for the large non-African owned financial and trading institutions, and for Government departments. In the scholarship on the town these physical aspects of the legacy of colonial urban planning have frequently been noted.¹³ Moreover, the functional relationship established by Dar es Salaam during the colonial period as an entrepot (for both primary exports and manufactured imports) linking its Tanganyikan hinterland with the international economy,

has been observed as having played a fundamental role in its postcolonial development as Tanzania's dominant urban centre, in spite of professed policies of 'self-reliance' and the reduction of urban primacy.¹⁴

The organization of space has also featured prominently in the historiography of colonial Dar es Salaam. Despite the absence of a substantial settler presence and Tanganyika's status as a League of Nations mandate (and later United Nations Trusteeship) territory, racial segregation exerted a powerful influence not only on the human geography of the colonial town, but also on its socio-political development. As Mbilinyi and others have observed, one important aspect of colonial segregation was the town-country divide, in which the rural areas were designated the proper place for African men and (especially) women, while the towns were perceived as 'non-native' spaces.¹⁵ Although rights of residence in the town were recognised for certain African groups from the outset of colonial rule, and in the later colonial period official hostility to African urbanization eased somewhat, legal restrictions on African urban residence were retained through to independence.¹⁶ Within the town, the way in which European concern about the social and health consequences of racial mixing resulted in racial segregation has also been noted by various authors.¹⁷ Allocation of resources between the three zones occupied predominantly by African, Indian and European communities remained fundamentally skewed—with African areas receiving the least investment in infrastructure and amenities.¹⁸ Segregation, and more generally colonial discrimination in the treatment of different races, also had important repercussions for the growth of political consciousness. In his magisterial *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, John Iliffe observed how interaction between Indians and Africans in the urban arena, and state interventions which appeared to favour the former, led to the racialization of African politics. This insight has been pursued in recent work which charts the manner in which colonial urban thinking and African-Indian interactions in Dar es Salaam combined to produce anti-colonial (and subsequently postcolonial) 'racial nationalism'.¹⁹

The manner in which this racialization of politics was in part an unintended by-product of colonial interventions aimed at asserting control over the urban population parallels other features of Dar es Salaam's historiography. As Tanganyika's capital and principal urban centre, the town has emerged as an arena in which both the transforming and regulatory impulse of the colonial state was most in evidence (as were the iniquities of colonialism),²⁰ and at the same time an arena in which Africans developed mechanisms to evade and contest colonial assertions and eventually to pose a successful challenge to British rule.²¹ As Iliffe observes in his preamble to a chapter predominantly concerned with the history of Dar es Salaam, '[i]t was in the towns that Europeans first lost control of Africa'.²² He goes on to discuss how the experience of urban work, and resistance to the demands of colonial employers, formed a crucible for the emergence of African nationalism in Tanganyika.²³ This political consciousness emerged not only as a result of the town being an arena of struggle between capital and the state and African labour, but equally significantly as a site of consumption. The allocation of

scarce resources in the urban context not only led to the racialization of politics and identity, but also—thanks to protectionist interventionism on the part of the colonial state designed to secure reasonable living conditions for urban Africans, as well as to forestall political protest by this group—to a consciousness of entitlements among urban Africans that could be demanded from the state, and to a determination to overturn existing political and economic inequalities. The colonial administration's resulting failure to meet rising African expectations contributed to the growth of nationalism.²⁴ For other writers too, the urban environment was a critical factor in the emergence of African political activism in Tanganyika. Geiger describes urban existence as being an important condition for the development of nationalist sympathies among African women.²⁵ Dar es Salaam also holds centre-stage in Mohamed Said's account of the Tanganyika African Association and its successor, TANU.²⁶ Meanwhile, David Anthony ends his thesis documenting Dar es Salaam in the *pre-nationalist* period with a conclusion stressing the subsequent role played by the Tanganyikan capital itself in the struggle against colonialism. 'It seems doubtful', he writes, 'that any other place... could have provided the means required for the movement to succeed'.²⁷

These accounts highlight the manner in which colonial authority was undermined as a result of growing political consciousness arising within the distinctive urban environment of Dar es Salaam. However, other social, cultural and economic processes were at play in the town that served to undermine colonial authority in a less overt way than political nationalism. The manner in which Dar es Salaam was for African women a space of unprecedented autonomy, and often prosperity, *contra* the expectations and desires of both colonial administrators and African men has been described.²⁸ The town also formed a location in which young Africans were able to evade the assertions of both elders and officials: where they adopted patterns of behaviour that subverted both the developmental hegemony of the late-colonial (and postcolonial) state and rural patriarchal authority.²⁹ Meanwhile, the resilience of indigenous cultures and spontaneous creativity of urban Africans resulted in the adoption of patterns of leisure that contradicted colonial visions of a wholesome, westernized urban class.³⁰ Nevertheless, while they might not conform to colonial 'expectations of modernity', socio-cultural manifestations such as the early *beni ngoma* societies, *dansi* clubs, *lelemama* dance groups or urban *waganga* (medicine men) have all been identified as playing an important acculturative and socially integrative (even political) role in the urban environment.³¹

Themes of political and social struggle have also been at the heart of more recent scholarship on Dar es Salaam since independence. In her account of the urban informal economy, Aili Marie Tripp attributes a pivotal change of Tanzanian governmental policy towards political and economic liberalization *circa* 1990 above all to socio-economic developments in Dar es Salaam.³² Increasing reliance of the city's residents upon the informal economy for urban livelihoods played a fundamental part in this shift. It represented a concession by government in the long-running struggle to resist the informalization of urban space.³³ However, more recent studies of Dar es

Salaam suggest this was in part merely a tactical retreat, as the city remains a contested arena in which struggles over the social occupation of space are ongoing. Attitudes (both official and non-official) towards processes of social and cultural change associated with urbanization that emerged during the colonial period have had a shaping influence on postcolonial policy: notably the perception of the town as a space in which rights of residence are delimited.³⁴ Youth and gender remain at the heart of these unresolved struggles. Unemployed or informally employed youth continue to be treated as a social nuisance which the state feels obliged to address, invariably through coercive action; both for its own sake and that of Dar es Salaam's 'respectable' citizenry.³⁵ They represent not only a socio-economic but also a socio-cultural menace. Urban youth have for long been exposed to 'modernity' in a way which their elders, frequently concerned with the integrity of 'traditional' (and often self-consciously 'African') culture, have viewed as a serious threat. The most recent expression of the phenomenon is Swahili rap, which forms both an outlet for the frustrations of marginalised young urbanites and confirmation to more elderly or respectable townspeople of the unruliness of urban youth, and their contamination by foreign influences.³⁶ Recent studies of gender in Dar es Salaam have likewise explored 'cultural appropriations' in the cosmopolitan urban arena and the threat these pose to social (and sexual) order.³⁷ As in the colonial period, thanks to both its demographic size and its socio-cultural diversity, contemporary Dar es Salaam is frequently perceived as exerting a potent and negative influence on wider African society.³⁸

This present volume emphasizes the culturally heterogeneous nature of Dar es Salaam, its role as the site where political practice and ideology of the nation meet, and finally the legacy of political, socio-cultural, and economic compromises between local, national, and cosmopolitan factors that structure this urban society. Among the chapters which focus on questions of urban and peri-urban policy in Part One, the colonial state appears less as a powerful and singular entity that created Dar es Salaam just as it liked, and more as a collection of (occasionally contradictory) policies and offices beholden to various group interests and ideological commitments. Just as published plans drawn up for Dar es Salaam by visiting urban planners tell us little about the city's actual history, these studies of the practice of urban governance reveal the utter lack of policy coherence and repeated reliance upon *ad hoc* measures. It became increasingly clear by the 1950s that the colonial state could no longer deny demands for greater representation as it tried to maintain a precarious urban order. Following independence, the state in Dar es Salaam had indeed become more representative, but in a peculiarly male way, supporting party and other vigilante activities against 'indecent' women. Although primarily concerned with the nature and consequences of state policy, chapters in Part One demonstrate how, by reading official sources against the grain, it is possible to obtain insights into the popular experience of urban life.

Chapters in Part Two reveal the richness and depth of Dar es Salaam's cultural history in the twentieth century. The interplay between regional and cosmopolitan musical trends on the one hand, and quite local traditions on

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the other, connects the history of city's music genres. Urban newcomers have found belonging and camaraderie within the cultural institutions of Dar es Salaam, be they football clubs or *ngoma* societies, but the rapid flux in Dar es Salaam's population growth over the twentieth century has meant that these institutions have had to regularly re-fashion themselves in order to remain relevant to new generations of migrants and (increasingly) those who come of age within the city. It is this constant renewal from both without and within that has made Dar es Salaam such a captivating city for residents, visitors and scholars alike.

Any book exploring the history of such a large and multi-faceted social organism as the city of Dar es Salaam will inevitably contain imbalances and omissions. As historians of the city we are especially aware of not only the limitations of this volume, but also of significant gaps in the existing historiography. Most prominently, discussion of the role of religion in Dar es Salaam society, notably Islam, is missing. This is perhaps the most pressing topic for future research.³⁹ Similarly, class does not figure prominently in most of the contributions herein, though shifting relations between socio-economic groups from the late-colonial years have been a distinctive feature of urban society; most notably in the recent post-liberalization period.⁴⁰ Readers may find that other themes such as urban politics, the economy or the built environment are also under-represented. In the opening chapter we seek to address such gaps, where possible, by drawing on existing scholarship on the town. This chapter offers a sustained historical overview of Dar es Salaam from its founding up to the present.⁴¹ It traces the growth of the city from the perspectives of political power, demographic and geographical expansion, urban policy, cultural innovations, class formation, gender relations, and changing modes of identity. As a reflection of existing historical scholarship on Dar es Salaam it represents a work in progress: we would like this chapter, and those that follow, to inspire fresh scholarship on the town. In the meantime, it is hoped that this book will provide not only an essential reference for those with a specific interest in Dar es Salaam, but also useful material for those with comparative interests in urban history and culture throughout Africa and the Indian Ocean world.

Notes

¹ Population statistics are notoriously imprecise. However, rapid postcolonial growth appears to have resulted in Dar es Salaam (2,347,000) overtaking Nairobi (2,310,000) in the 1990s. UN, *Cities in a Globalising World: Global report on human settlements 2001* (London, 2001), p.300. It is likely that these figures underestimate the true size of both cities.

² For a useful overview of this literature, see Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'The process of urbanization in Africa (from the origins to the beginning of independence)', *African Studies Review* 34:1 (1991), pp. 1-98.

³ See especially James Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley, 1999).

⁴ Keith Hart, *The African Revolution: Africa in the Twentieth Century world and now* (under review at Polity Press); James D. Tarver (ed.), *Urbanization in Africa: A handbook* (Westport, 1994), p. 52; UN, *Cities in a Globalizing World*, p. 271.

⁵ Useful summaries of the literature can be found in Anthony O'Connor, *The African City* (London, 1983), and Alan Gilbert and Josef Gugler, *Cities, Poverty and Development: Urbanization in the Third World* (Oxford, 1992). For Tanzania, see especially R.H. Sabot, *Economic Development and Urban Migration: Tanzania 1900-1971* (London, 1979).

⁶ Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Process of urbanization', pp. 16-17.

⁷ For a recent historians' overview, see the introduction of David M. Anderson and Richard Rathbone in their co-edited volume *Africa's Urban Past* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 1-17.

⁸ These typologies come from Anthony O'Connor's otherwise useful *The African City*, pp. 28-41.

⁹ The Mrima is the northern part of the Tanzanian coast, roughly from the Rufiji Delta to the Kenyan border.

¹⁰ John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 384.

¹¹ For further reflection on relations between the local, national and cosmopolitan, see Andrew M. Ivaska, 'Negotiating "culture" in a cosmopolitan capital: urban style and the Tanzania state in colonial and postcolonial Dar es Salaam', Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan (2003), pp.13-5 *et passim*.

¹² Uzunguni forms the northern suburbs from Sea View up to Msasani, and Uhindini the Indian 'bazaar' in the heart of the town. These terms were perhaps most commonly used in the colonial period, when racial segregation was especially noticeable. However, they are still occasionally employed to describe different quarters of the town, alongside Uswahilini (which refers to those – more geographically diffuse – areas of town occupied by the 'common man') and Mjini (which refers to the commercial and governmental quarter south of Uhindini and along the Azania Front).

¹³ See especially, J.M.L. Kironde, 'The evolution of land use structure in Dar es Salaam 1890-1990: A study in the effects of land policy', Ph.D. thesis, University of Nairobi (1994); cf. Allen Armstrong, 'Colonial planning and neocolonial urban planning: three generations of master plans for Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', *Uiafiti* 8 (1986), pp. 44-53.

¹⁴ A.R.L. Brain, 'A political economy of urbanization in Tanzania', Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia (1979); E. Soja and C. Weaver, 'Urbanization and underdevelopment in East Africa', in B. Berry (ed.), *Urbanization and Counter-Urbanization*, (Beverly Hills, 1976); Larry Sawers, 'Urban Primacy in Tanzania', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 37 (1989), pp. 841-859.

¹⁵ Marjorie Mbilinyi, '"City" and "Countryside" in colonial Tanganyika', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XX (1985); and 'This is an unforgettable business: Colonial state intervention in Tanzania', in J.L. Parpart & K.A. Staudt (eds.), *Women and the state in Africa* (Boulder, 1989), pp. 111-129. See also David Henry Anthony III, 'Culture and society in a town in transition: A people's history of Dar es Salaam, 1865-1939', Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin (1983), p. xviii; Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: gender and culture in the making of Tanganyikan nationalism, 1955-1965*, (Portsmouth NH, 1997), pp. 21-2; John Campbell, 'Race, class and community in colonial Dar es Salaam: Tentative steps towards an understanding of urban society', Section II, in Colin Creighton and C.K. Omari (eds.), *Gender, Family and Work in Tanzania* (Aldershot, 2000); Andrew M. Ivaska, 'Imagining Dar es Salaam: culture, morality and urban space in representations of a capital city', paper given at the conference from which this book has arisen, University of Dar es Salaam, 1 July 2002.

¹⁶ See especially, Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam* (Oxford, 2005).

¹⁷ E.g., J. Doherty, 'Ideology and town planning', *Journal of the Geographical Association of Tanzania* 14 (1976), p. 84; cited in Armstrong, 'Colonial planning', p. 45; Kironde, 'Land use structure', p. 206.

¹⁸ See Kironde, 'Land use structure', pp. 200-204, 244-5; Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 88-91.

¹⁹ Iliffe, *Modern History*, p. 375; Campbell, 'Race'; James R. Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1916-76', Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University (2002).

²⁰ See, e.g., Andrew Burton, 'Townsmen in the making: social engineering and citizenship in Dar es Salaam, 1945-61', *International Journal of African Historical Studies (IJAH)* 36:2

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(2004), pp. 331-65; *idem.*, *African Underclass*.

²¹ The fact that the strongest opposition to colonialism emerged in those places where its imprint was most marked has of course been well documented. 'The contradictory social forces of colonial society' were particularly evident in the urban arena, and throughout Africa it was here that 'nationalist parties found their first and greatest support'. Quotes from Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London, 1992), p. 141; and John Iliffe, *Africans: The history of a continent* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 249.

²² Iliffe, *Modern History*, p. 381.

²³ See also John Iliffe, 'A history of the Dockworkers of Dar es Salaam', *Tanzania Notes & Records (TNR)* 71 (1970), pp. 119-48; and *idem.*, 'Wage labour and urbanization', in *Tanzania Under Colonial Rule*, in M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed.) (London, 1979), pp. 276-306.

²⁴ See esp., Brennan, 'Nation'.

²⁵ See Geiger, *TANU Women*, pp. 66-9.

²⁶ Mohamed Said, *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968): The untold story of the Muslim struggle against British colonialism in Tanganyika* (London, 1998).

²⁷ Anthony, 'Culture', Conclusion.

²⁸ See especially, Ivaska, 'Negotiating "culture"'; *ibid.*, "'Anti-mini militants meet modern misses": urban style, gender and the politics of "national culture" in 1960s Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', *Gender and History* 14:3 (2003), pp. 584-607. See also, Mbilinyi, 'Unforgettable business'; Geiger, *TANU Women*, p. 44; Inez Sutton, "'Rich enough to pay for what they want": Independent townswomen in colonial East African' (ms. in prep.).

²⁹ Burton, 'Urchins'; Ivaska, 'Negotiating culture'; Mbilinyi, 'Unforgettable business'.

³⁰ Burton, 'Townsmen in the making'.

³¹ For *beni* see Terence Ranger, *Dance and Society in Eastern Africa: The beni ngoma* (London, 1975); for *dansi*, Tadasu Tsuruta, 'The development process of dance bands in urban Tanzania – in connection with changes in socioeconomic and political circumstances from the colonial period to the 1980s', *Nilo-Ethiopian Studies* 5:6 (2000), pp. 9-24, 'Music as a profession: dance band musicians in Dar es Salaam and their urban networks', *Cultures Sonores d'Afrique* II (2001), pp. 127-47, and 'Popular music, sports, and politics: a development of urban cultural movements in Dar es Salaam, 1930s-1960s', *African Study Monographs* 24:3 (2003), pp. 195-222; and Werner Graebner's chapter below; for *ilemama*, Geiger, *TANU Women*; for the *waganga*, Lloyd Swantz, *The Medicine Man among the Zaramo of Dar es Salaam* (Uppsala, 1990).

³² Aili Mari Tripp, *Changing the Rules: The politics of liberalization and the urban informal economy in Tanzania* (Berkeley, 1997).

³³ See Andrew Burton, 'The Haven of Peace purged: tackling the undesirable and unproductive poor in Dar es Salaam, ca. 1950s-1980s', *IJAHS*, 40:1, pp. 119-51.

³⁴ After independence, the urban presence of 'idle' youth and 'depraved' unmarried women in particular was identified as undesirable – indeed, as anti-developmental. See *ibid.* and *idem.*, *African Underclass*; James R. Brennan, 'Blood Enemies: exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958-75', *Journal of African History (JAH)* 47:3 (2006), pp. 389-413; and Ivaska, 'Negotiating "culture"'.
³⁵ Eileen Moyer, 'In the shadow of the Sheraton: Imagining localities in global spaces in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam (2003); Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 278-81. For the late-1970s/early-1980s, see A.G.M. Ishumi, *The Urban Jobless in Eastern Africa* (Uppsala, 1984).

³⁶ See Alex Perullo, "'The life that I live": Popular music, agency, and urban society in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University (2003); and his chapter below. Although it should be noted that some Swahili rap propagates locally generated middle class ideology and culture.

³⁷ See Ivaska, 'Negotiating culture' and his chapter below; Richard Sherrington, 'Developing disparities: consumption and social differentiation in post-adjustment Dar es Salaam', Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester (2005); Anne Lewinson, 'Going with the times: transforming visions of urbanism and modernity among professionals in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1999).

³⁸ Such 'anti-urbanism' is not unique to Tanzania, for similar phenomena in Kenya and Zimbabwe, see Lonsdale, 'Town life in colonial Kenya', and Tsuneo Yoshikuni, 'Linking

urban history with precolonial/rural history: From the Zimbabwean experience', both in Burton, *Urban Experience*.

³⁹ Though see Anthony, 'Culture and society', chapter 6; and Lawrence E. Y. Mbogoni, *The Cross versus the Crescent: Religion and politics in Tanzania from the 1880s to the 1990s* (Dar es Salaam, 2004).

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Burton, 'Haven of Peace purged'; Tripp, *Changing the Rules*; Moyer, 'Shadow of the Sheraton'.

⁴¹ This chapter follows two other chapter-length attempts to tell the history of Dar es Salaam from its beginnings to contemporary times—Clement Gillman's 1945 article 'Dar es Salaam, 1860 to 1940: a story of growth and change', *Tanganyika Notes & Records* 20, pp. 1-23, and John Sutton's 1971 article 'Dar es Salaam: a sketch of a hundred years', *Tanzania Notes & Records* 71, p. 1-19. In the thirty-five years since Sutton's article, the academic literature relating in one way or another to Dar es Salaam's history has expanded exponentially, and the present authors are enormously indebted to this work, in particular John Iliffe's *A Modern History of Tanganyika*.

Chapter One

The Emerging Metropolis: A history of Dar es Salaam, circa 1862-2000

James R. Brennan and Andrew Burton

This chapter offers an overview history of Dar es Salaam. It proceeds chronologically from the town's inception in the 1860s to its present-day status as one of the largest cities in Africa. Within this sequential structure are themes that resurface in later chapters. Dar es Salaam is above all a site of juxtaposition between the local, the national, and the cosmopolitan. Local struggles for authority between Shomvi and Zaramo, as well as Shomvi and Zaramo indigenes against upcountry immigrants, stand alongside racialized struggles between Africans and Indians for urban space, global struggles between Germany and Britain for military control, and national struggles between European colonial officials and African nationalists for political control. Not only do local, national, and cosmopolitan contexts reveal the layers of the town's social cleavages, they also reveal the means and institutions of social and cultural belonging. Culturally Dar es Salaam represents a modern reformulation of the Swahili city. Indeed it might be argued that, partly due to the lack of dominant founding fathers and an established urban society pre-dating its rapid twentieth century growth, this late arrival on the East African coast is *the* contemporary exemplar of Swahili virtues of cosmopolitanism and cultural exchange. Older coastal cities of Mombasa and Zanzibar struggle to match Dar es Salaam in its diversity and, paradoxically, its high degree of social integration. Linguistically speaking, it is without doubt a Swahili city; one in which this language of nineteenth-century economic incorporation has flourished as a twentieth-century vehicle of social and cultural incorporation for migrants from the African interior as well as from the shores of the western Indian Ocean. Swahili in Dar es Salaam has served as the *lingua franca* in the mosque, the church, the recreational club, the football team, and the musical group. Wage labour and trade, prime motors of the city's growth, have also brought together producers, middlemen and consumers in the marketplace and employers and employees in the workplace; from areas as diverse as the surrounding Uzaramo countryside, the floodplains of the Rufiji

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River, the foothills of Kilimanjaro and Meru, the shores of Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika and Malawi, the farms and bazaars of Gujarat and Kutch, and the cities of Western Europe.

We chart how these cleavages and incorporations unfolded in the ever-growing urban space of Dar es Salaam. Among the principal actors, the most important in this story is the colonial and post-colonial state. Yet the state was never as important as its architects desired. The urban contours of Dar es Salaam, particularly in its colonial years, bear plain hallmarks of racialized urban planning. But as this and subsequent chapters will show, the state constantly lacked the means, and at times even the will, to create a truly segregated city. The colonial state's reliance upon African labour and Indian investment capital opened up considerable, if often contested, space for these groups to exercise economic, cultural, and political agency. As the significance of race dissolved with the African nationalist victories of the 1950s and 1960s, the state's incapacity to manage extraordinarily rapid urban growth became ever more apparent. The informal economy took over the shaping of urban space; providing a livelihood to the majority of the urban population by the 1980s. The privatization programmes that began in that decade acknowledged these developments while doing little to address the increasingly desperate condition of the city's infrastructure. Indeed, the only thing that seems certain of Dar es Salaam's future is the continuation of its blistering growth and its unrivalled role as a national, and regional, centre of cultural innovation.

Origins: Mzizima and the Mrima Coast

Dar es Salaam was first imagined by Sultan Majid of Zanzibar in 1862. The eponymous harbour site upon which it would soon be located then stood unoccupied, but lying adjacent along the sea-facing coast was a small fishing village called Mzizima, perhaps an altered pronunciation of *Mji Mzima* or 'complete town'. In the early 19th century, Mzizima and the surrounding area had become a meeting point between local ethnic Zaramo inhabitants who traced their origins to the Uluguru mountains some 200 kilometres inland, and self-styled Shomvi, a Swahili or 'Shirazi' people who traced their origins to the northern coastal town of Barawa in present-day Somalia. Shomvi, a term best understood as both a claim to status or title as much as membership in a descent group, had farmed like their neighbouring Zaramo, but also specialised in fishing, boat-building, and slave trading. Traditions differ on how communal identities among Zaramo and Shomvi crystallized in the 19th century, but a common theme centres on mutual aid given each other following external raids from Kamba interlopers sometime around 1800. Such mutual aid however seems not to have extended far. Zaramo developed a reputation for hostility—embodied in the Zaramo *Pazi* (chief) Mazungera, an elusive caravan raider—which discouraged traders from settling in the region from the mid-1840s to early 1860s. Situated some forty miles south of Bagamoyo, Mzizima and its environs stood on the margins of long-distance commerce in

ivory and slaves that decisively shaped this region during the nineteenth century.

The nineteenth century was a period of unprecedented commercialization along the Mrima coast, an area stretching from the modern Kenya/Tanzania border to just south of present-day Dar es Salaam. Coastal towns formed the meeting point between inland and overseas trade, and several—most notably Bagamoyo and Zanzibar Town—experienced substantial growth. Mzizima and other Shomvi-dominated ports nearby, such as Kunduchi, Msasani, Mjimwema and Mboamaji, occasionally benefited from passing caravan trade, but in general were peripheral to the principal commercial networks closer to Zanzibar.² Rather than relying upon long-distance trade, most Shomvi and Zaramo survived through farming millet, maize, sorghum, cassava and rice, harvesting coconuts, fishing, hunting, and crafts-making (termed *kazi ya kushiba*, or ‘work to fill one’s belly’) such as embroidery, wood-carving, metal and leather work. Political power rested with a chief or *jumbe* (pl. *majumbe*), the secular and religious head of the community. Mzizima was a society divided between master and slave—the latter working four or five days per week for



Fig. 1.1 *Dar es Salaam and environs* (Based on a copy of a map which was probably drawn in 1891 and prepared from an Admiralty Chart dated 1874)

Source: A. Gibb & Partners, *A Plan for Dar es Salaam* (Dar es Salaam, 1949)

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the former, while cultivating their own food supply for the rest of the week.³ Slavery along the coast was neither simply an ‘absorptive’ clientelist system nor a ‘closed’ plantation system but rather the product of struggles between slave and master, in which the former fought to belong to coastal society, and the latter sought to defend exclusive ‘Shirazi’ social institutions from the former while extracting as much labour as possible.⁴ The trajectory of nineteenth century developments also led to increased indebtedness and commercial marginalization of Shomvi and other Shirazi ‘patricians’ to Indian creditors, as well as their loss of effective sovereignty to Arab political power centred in Zanzibar. The sudden projection of political power by the Sultan of Zanzibar, in part to circumvent the commercial power of Indian traders and creditors centred in Bagamoyo, marks the beginning of Dar es Salaam’s history.

The founding of Dar es Salaam, 1862-87

Conceived in 1862, the construction of Dar es Salaam finally began in 1865 or 1866.⁵ The town’s name, likely contracted from the Arabic for ‘Harbour of Peace’ (*bandar as-salâm*), reflects not only the town’s most striking feature, its large natural harbour, but also its aspiring status as a place of refuge for Sultan Majid from the growing pressures of courtly and diplomatic politics in Zanzibar. Modelled on his island experience, Majid envisioned a town economically driven by plantation agriculture and long distance caravan trade, and accordingly encouraged Arabs from the Hadramaut (contemporary southeast Yemen) and Indian traders to relocate there in order to develop coconut plantations and trading houses.⁶ The Sultan’s representative Selimani bin



Fig. 1.2 *Panoramic view of Darra Salaam*

Source: G.L. Sullivan, *Dhow Chasing in Zanzibar Waters* (London, 1873)

Hemed visited Mzizima in order to negotiate the establishment of Dar es Salaam, giving to the local *majumbe* 'clothes and rice and a lot of money and gifts', until they agreed to let the Sultan settle there.⁷

The new town's biggest problem, apparent almost immediately, was its lack of labour. A report by Dr. Seward, the acting British Consul in Zanzibar who accompanied Majid to the city in 1866, observed that the 'conception is good but the one want of labour appears to be fatal to its realization', as '[n]o



Fig. 1.3 *The harbour front of Dar es Salaam, 1879*

Source: MacKinnon Papers, Box 76, File 59, SOAS Special Collections



Fig. 1.4 *The unfinished centre of Dar es Salaam, 1879*

Source: MacKinnon Papers, Box 76, File 59, SOAS Special Collections

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considerable body of slaves could be kept together there'. Unless slave labour could be supplemented or replaced by free labour, Seward opined, there was 'no hope of any extension of this projected mainland settlement and of the seeming prosperity which on the considerable island of Zanzibar is sustained by violent and purely artificial means'. Sufficient coercion and economic opportunity, the combination of which generally underwrote systems of labour and clientage in the more successful trading towns of the Mrima coast, proved elusive in Dar es Salaam and were slow to arrive. Furthermore, the town had already gained a reputation for ill health, though the consul (and others later) found the place quite healthy by Mrima coast standards.⁸ Such serial rumours disparaging the town may have been cast by Indian traders seeking to protect their position in the commercially dominant Bagamoyo to the north.

Sultan Majid died in 1870, and the new Sultan Barghash, Majid's brother, left Dar es Salaam to decay as he pursued more direct conflicts with recalcitrant merchants, *majumbe*, and brigands in and around the far more important Bagamoyo. Père Leroy, a French Spiritan missionary based in Bagamoyo, offered this description of Dar es Salaam in 1886:

Situated on the shore of its harbour, like an Arab woman in rags in the ruined home of her former husband, Dari Salama appears to mourn its isolation and poverty. To the left, the palace of Said Majid is still to be seen, half concealed by mass growth... returning to the right, on a flagstaff... the red flag of the Sultan of Zanzibar affirms his authority modestly, and here, before us, two large square houses to which dilapidated staircases give access and pierced with two rows of windows worn down by the wind... Between these three edifices, formerly whitewashed with lime and still habitable, behind, on the side, more or less all over, stand enormous walls covered with vines and where the goats come to climb up and graze: attempts at houses, built in haste and interrupted by death. This is the misfortune of being Sultan!⁹

The years between 1870 and 1887 would be recorded in a language of decline and decay, although this belies the town's steady economic growth. The Sultan's Palace was never completed; a hurricane in 1872 dislodged the town harbour's buoys, which were not replaced for ten years; in 1873, Indian traders relocated to nearby villages to barter for copal from local Zaramo who had boycotted Dar es Salaam following a dispute with the town's *akida*; large houses fell in value from US\$500 in 1871 to US\$200 by 1873. The construction of the Mackinnon Road,¹⁰ intended to connect Dar es Salaam to Lake Nyasa, revived trade somewhat by attracting rubber and copal from Zaramo producers. The road had reached only 81 miles inland when it was abandoned in 1881.¹¹ Poignant photographs of the town taken in 1879 depict half-built structures without roofs being overtaken by sprawling vegetation.¹² Worse was to follow—an outbreak of smallpox in 1882 killed perhaps three-quarters of the town's inhabitants; and in late 1884 a drought and famine took the lives of hundreds of local Zaramo, and brought increased slave trading, inter-village kidnapping, and the pawning of children for food.¹³ Carl Peters did not even feel it necessary to visit Dar es Salaam on his tragi-comic land buying tour of Usagara in 1884, going no further south than Saadani.¹⁴




Fig. 1.5 *Construction of the harbour wall*

Such portrayals of decay by visitors in the 1870s and 1880s—wholly in agreement about Dar es Salaam’s unrealized potential and sad decline—reflect the high expectations that projecting imperial power might bring, and bemoan the successive failure of Zanzibaris, British, and even Germans to take hold and thrive on these sandy soils by seizing the region’s commercial trade. They also implicitly revealed the power and persistence of Bagamoyo to resist imperial plans for its replacement.¹⁵ Despite this ubiquitous language of failure and disappointment, Dar es Salaam nonetheless grew in its regional economic importance during these years, particularly as an exporter of rice to Zanzibar.¹⁶ Grand Arab houses may have fallen, but overall population increased, and the town had become a well-established secondary urban centre to Bagamoyo by the 1880s. Leroy had opined in 1886 that Dar es Salaam could only achieve its promised glory ‘at great cost and effort’ by making it an exit point to the Indian Ocean for the Zambezi and Shire areas of the interior.¹⁷ Such efforts would shortly begin afresh, but would only be realized some twenty years later.

Dar es Salaam under German rule

Having first acquired trading rights in Dar es Salaam from Sultan Barghash in 1885 through gunboat diplomacy, the *Deutsch Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft* (DOAG, or German East African Company) obtained formal rights to collect custom duties in the town through agreement with Barghash in 1887.¹⁸ It was not a




Fig. 1.6 Plan of Dar es Salaam

Source: Deutsche Kolonialblatt, 15th August 1891

smooth transition. As DOAG representative, August Leue insisted on taking over the residence of the Sultan's appointed *livali* in Dar es Salaam upon his arrival with Carl Peters in May 1887.¹⁹ The *livali* refused to step down after Peters demanded that he relinquish control of the town. Subsequently, Peters and Leue 'purchased' the land between Dar es Salaam and Msasani after putting guns to the heads of *majumbe* in two outlying villages, including the Zaramo *jumbe* Tambaza. They arrived at a 'settlement' of fifteen rupees each.²⁰ Shomvi *majumbe* considered the exchange illegitimate because it bypassed their authority.²¹ The customs office was upgraded to a full military station under Hermann von Wissmann in 1889 following the outbreak of the Abushiri Rebellion,²² and was finally transformed into a district office on the 1st January 1891, when it became the new capital of German East Africa.²³

Under the Sultanate, Dar es Salaam had been structured in three concentric zones – at its centre, the stone buildings of administration and business nearest to the harbour along what is now Sokoine Drive; beyond this, *shamba* fields, mainly coconut plantations, owned by the Sultan or his Arab allies and worked primarily by unfree labour; and finally outlying Zaramo and Shomvi villages.²⁴ While the German government eventually abolished the slave trade around the new capital (particularly thriving at Kunduchi in the late 1880s²⁵), it famously never abolished slavery.²⁶ Nevertheless, the tenuous plantation economy of Dar es Salaam effectively collapsed with the turmoil of the Abushiri Rebellion, leaving a new method of organizing urban space through German administrative incorporation.

In contrast to nineteenth-century patterns of urban growth along the East African coast, Dar es Salaam's colonial expansion was driven by state investment in administration and military security, rather than by private commerce. Imperial confidence in the new capital ran well ahead of the town's economic viability, at least until railway commerce began to bear fruit in 1907. Much of Dar es Salaam's economic activity in the 1890s revolved around major public works projects. Compared to Mombasa and Nairobi, Indian capital investment played a smaller role in Dar es Salaam's state-led urban development projects; both because Bagamoyo remained a more vibrant commercial centre, and German administrators were slower to cultivate relationships with wealthy Indian investors.²⁷ State edifices were central to the German colonial vision for the territorial capital. Dar es Salaam's new architecture loudly announced this imperial confidence, characterized by 'the heavy hand of German officialdom, modified in some cases by Islamic feature and the use of simple materials'.²⁸ Two German churches near the harbour marked the upper reaches of the town skyline until the 1960s—the Lutheran Church, begun in 1898 in a Bavarian Alpine style, and the Catholic St. Joseph's Cathedral, completed in 1902 and built in a Gothic style. State House and the equally imposing European hospital were sited facing the Indian Ocean. Along Azania Front, adjacent to the harbour, lay the government's main office buildings, all built in a simple classical style.²⁹ European visitors waxed lyrical about this urban jewel in the German colonial crown.³⁰ Hermann Paasche, a conservative Reichstag member visiting Dar es Salaam in 1906, stated he was 'completely intoxicated' by the cleanliness and unusual beauty of the town's



Fig. 1.7 *Unter den Akazien [now Samora Avenue] in 1905*

Source: Gibb, *Plan for Dar es Salaam*



Fig. 1.8 *Dar es Salaam harbour in the early 1900s*

Source: M.F. Hill, *Permanent Way Vol.II: The story of Tanganyika Railways* (Nairobi, 1957)



Fig. 1.9 *German troops on Azania Front*

Source: Hill, *Permanent Way*

landscape of tropical trees and stately government buildings.³¹ This substantial architectural investment served as an advertisement for foreign investment. Dar es Salaam was, according to Clement Gillman, ‘an outward emblem of Germany’s growing colonial strength, designed also not only to catch the eye of the admiring patriot but of the more critical foreigner’.³² Yet stone buildings formed a small minority of urban structures at this time—in 1898 there were 196 stone buildings and some 1,000 *makuti* or thatch huts; and the ratio had only decreased to one stone building for every four *makuti* structures by 1905.³³ Outside of domestic servants, few if any Africans lived in stone buildings; *makuti* homes were also occupied by poorer Indians and Arabs. Such was the demand for *makuti* materials that the north of Dar es Salaam consisted of a series of swamps, most of which were ‘borrow pits’ caused by the harvesting of daub and wattle for building construction.³⁴ This created ideal conditions for mosquitoes, raising public health concerns among German officials. Indeed, public health itself was a major issue of urban policy as it affected the physical health of Germans directly—in a revealing example of colonial *Gesundheitspolitik* (public health politics), the German administration quartered ‘coloured’ prostitutes frequented by Europeans by financing a more hygienic brothel for their workspace.³⁵

The defining feature of the town under German rule was its role as the centre of colonial military power. During the Abushiri Rebellion, rebel fighters had attacked the Lutheran and Benedictine mission stations at Dar es Salaam in January 1889, but were defeated later that month at a battle at Ras Chokir to the north of the town.³⁶ Compared to other coastal towns, Dar es Salaam

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survived the rebellion relatively unscarred, although ‘disloyal’ villages nearby were treated no less harshly—Magogoni, a village lying across the harbour from which rebels had launched a raid, was razed by German forces.³⁷ Following the decisive defeat of the rebels, the Germans garrisoned a large portion of its thousand-odd *Askari Schutztruppe* in the capital, most of whom were either Sudanese mercenaries hired in Cairo or so-called ‘Zulu’ (i.e., Shangaan) mercenaries hired in Inhambane in Portuguese East Africa. These soldiers and their descendants would form a core population group of the colonial town. The substantial military presence underlay imperial confidence in the capital, though, unlike the *boma*-centred fortified towns of Arusha and Tabora, defensive considerations proved a secondary concern for German urban planners in Dar es Salaam.³⁸ As the town’s administrator between 1887 and 1890, August Leue insisted upon wide roads radiating from the harbour front to allow for quick communication between the centre and policemen posted near the outskirts.³⁹ Military power was concentrated west of the harbour, where a permanent armed flotilla was stationed on the water, and on land lay the *Askarikaserne* barracks, which in the 1890s included government-built huts for 172 *askari* families.⁴⁰ In 1905 the *Askarikaserne* held some five hundred soldiers and their hangers-on. Adjacent to this stood the town’s *boma* (fort), built in the 1860s but now a jail holding some 200 African prisoners.⁴¹

The focus of administration shifted away from the Sultan’s palace to the eastern side of the harbour. In this European governmental and residential quarter, German officials enjoyed separation from the town’s core population as well as welcome ocean breezes. The major administrative dilemma facing officials was to integrate the peri-urban land and economy with the town through guiding local investments, while simultaneously guarding against land speculation. They inherited right-angled streets from the Sultan’s town, and over the first half of the 1890s created a road network radiating from the harbour that is still in use today. A number of key legislative acts formed the framework for German-era urbanization. The 1891 Building Ordinance arranged structures for future investment. It also outlined the town’s tripartite racial division through separate building standards of European, Indian, and African homes, rather than through biological definitions of race.⁴² However, there appears to have been little will to effect strict racial segregation before 1906. German administrators were more concerned with designating sites for new stone buildings owned by Indians and Arabs than with African residential communities, which were comparatively easier to relocate if required. The Land Ordinance, passed in November 1895, was another key piece of urban legislation, creating guidelines for determining which peri-urban lands were communally owned and which were ownerless (*herrenlos*). It also determined a method for European purchase of peri-urban land from local Africans, subject to government approval. Between 1895 and 1912, the German colonial state was relatively permissive in allowing such transfers, motivated by the hopes of creating a plantation economy. Local African *majumbe* were key actors in authorizing these transactions. They had to maintain a balance between retaining loyalty from their subjects on the one hand, and obtaining investors’ money by authorizing land expropriation on the other. A few, such as




Fig. 1.10 *Plan of Dar es Salaam in the early 1900s*

Source: Gibb, *Plan for Dar es Salaam*

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Mwinyikuu Shindo, became wealthy planters themselves through land sale profits.⁴³

The earliest Indian and African neighbourhoods of Dar es Salaam were relatively close to the business and administrative quarters. Rising rents scattered poorer Africans away from the centre, thus rendering moot German discussions (from 1905) about creating an isolated African residential quarter.⁴⁴ Housing for the town's core population expanded westward. Adjacent to the 'militarized' western end of the harbour lay Dar es Salaam's Indian neighbourhood, centred around Inderstrasse (still India Street), and bordered to the south by Unter den Akazien (now Samora Avenue) and to the north by Marktstrasse (Indira Gandhi Street) and Wissmannstrasse (Makunganya Street). This was a densely built-up area containing stone buildings that let in little light or air. To the southwest, where the railway was commenced in 1905, lay Gerezani, at that time a mixed neighbourhood of Asians and Africans presently joined by Greek and Italian immigrants taking up residence for construction work. To the north of Marktstrasse and south of both Sultanstrasse (now roughly Bibi Titi Mohammad Road and Libya Street) and Ringstrasse (Jamhuri Street) lay an overwhelmingly African neighbourhood of *makuti* huts, with a handful of Indian residents inhabiting stone buildings next to the town market (roughly at Indira Ghandi between Mosque Street and Morogoro Road). Finally, in what is today Mnazi Mmoja, lay the periphery of Dar es Salaam in 1905, a completely unplanned area of *makuti* huts that housed many of the domestic servants or 'boys' of European households.⁴⁵

The population of Dar es Salaam grew in spurts. Although figures are not wholly reliable, they suggest it expanded from as little as 3,000 in 1887 to around 10,000 in 1894, and then to 13,000 by 1898. By 1900 it had leaped to 20,000, but after this increased slowly to reach 22,500 by 1913.⁴⁶ It remained a modest urban centre. Bagamoyo had almost as large a permanent population (18,000) as Dar es Salaam in 1900, and was considerably larger when caravans were in town, surging to as high as 50,000.⁴⁷ Waged employment drew African immigrants to Dar es Salaam, who spent more and more time in or near the town. The economic incorporation of peri-urban areas offered economic and residential opportunities for immigrants. Nearby villages such as Kisutu immediately to the north of town, Magogoni across the harbour, and Kurasini to the southwest grew in population, as did settlements along the Msimbazi creek. Africans could also build structures on Indian- and Arab-owned land near the town, but rarely could on European-owned land.⁴⁸ Zaramo, who form the overwhelming majority of the surrounding areas and constituted 47 percent of the urban unskilled workforce in 1894, were particularly identified with outlying villages such as Buguruni, Tabata, and Ubungu; likewise Shomvi with coastal villages such as Kunduchi and Msasani. Protestant Missions helped Sukuma to settle in Msasani and Magogoni; the expansively-defined 'Nyamwezi', who by 1905 purportedly comprised 27 percent of Dar es Salaam's African population, made homes in Kinondoni and along the Msimbazi Valley; Ngoni came to settle in Keko and Kijitonyama; the Nubi or Sudanese settled in Gerezani, and Manyema lived near the city centre until they were relocated to Bagamoyo Road in 1906.⁴⁹

Community life in Dar es Salaam centred on dance and, in particular, worship. *Ngoma* festivities enlivened the African quarter at night, with a range of dances accompanying nocturnal rhythms, notably *lelemama*—a pan-ethnic dance performed by urban African women.⁵⁰ Worship was organised along communal lines. In the late 1880s, August Leue reported that the ‘Muscat Arabs’ and their ‘Viroboto’ (literally ‘fleas’, referring to the mainly Baluchi mercenary troops of the Sultan) attended their own mosque, separate from Indians and Africans, who each had their own mosques, and largely confined themselves to these spaces. Education was similarly a ‘community’ matter. Muslim African children could gain a basic Islamic education at a local *madrasa*



Fig. 1.11 *Sewa Haji Hospital* (1908)

Source: *Medizinal-Berichte über die Deutschen Schutzgebiete*, reproduced in J. E. G. Sutton (ed.), *Dar es Salaam: City, port & region* (Dar es Salaam, 1970)

— in 1898 there were three private *madrasa* with a high reputation — for learning quranic recitation and rudimentary Arabic. A government school was established in 1895, and by 1897 was attended regularly by some forty students ranging in age from 7 to 35; additionally some 39 Indian students took advanced courses in Gujarati at this school.⁵¹ Failing to attract many African followers in the city centre, Catholic and Protestant missions deliberately moved into peri-urban and rural areas to pursue their work. The Benedictine mission established at Kurasini both an African girls’ boarding school and African boys’ school in 1896, which attracted 73 girls and over 100 boys, respectively.⁵² The Lutheran Evangelical mission had already relocated its school (and students) to Kisarawe by 1893. In terms of converts to Christianity, German-controlled Dar es Salaam proved to be ‘a barren area’.⁵³

Alongside its strategic military and political functions, the town’s economic importance slowly grew. Despite the surprising tenacity of Bagamoyo to remain

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the centre of regional trade and finance until around 1907, a number of commercial houses, such as *Deutsch Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft*, Oswald & Company, and Hansing & Company relocated their businesses from Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam, and the *Deutsch Ost Afrikanische Bank* opened in the capital in 1909.⁵⁴ Trade stood at the centre of most people's livelihoods—be it a shopowner, a hawker, or visiting farmer. The Indian bazaar and two market halls, all in the Indian quarter, stood as the focal point of local business—the market halls were taken over by the *Kommune* or municipal administration established in 1899.⁵⁵ Others came for wages. Race, more than skill, determined wage differentials among the town's workforce. In the late 1890s, a Goan skilled builder could earn between 2.5-3 rupees per day, while a Hindu and Muslim Indian doing the same work would earn between 2-2.5 rupees per day. A 'Swahili' skilled worker could earn 40 Pesa per day (64 Pesa = 1 Rupee), twice that of a Swahili unskilled worker (at 15-20 Pesa per day), but only about one-fourth of that earned by Indian skilled workers.⁵⁶ Wealthy Indian and Arab investors, such as Sewa Haji and Suleiman bin Nassor, circulated money made in towns back into peri-urban areas, and vice-versa.⁵⁷ The German government in particular had a conflicting relationship with the Indian community, which grew in size from 100 in 1891, to 900 in 1900, and leaped to 2,600 by 1913. On the one hand it was reliant upon Indian capital for key urban investments—including Sewa Haji's gift of 12,400 rupees to build a school and hospital. Yet the state was also pressured by European settlers, businessmen, and some of its own officials—who criticised Indians on grounds of unfair trading and unhygienic practices—to restrict Indian immigration and commercial penetration.⁵⁸ This tension would remain a major theme



Fig. 1.12 *The Governor's Palace, Dar es Salaam, as it appeared after British naval forces had captured the town*

Source: Hill, *Permanent Way*

throughout Dar es Salaam's history.

By 1912, with the railway now amply supplying Dar es Salaam's food requirements, the German state no longer felt the need to encourage European settler development in the peri-urban areas, and instead sought greater control over how land was acquired in the interests of future urban planning based on racial segregation. To realize this, the administration imposed limits on land transactions in Msimbazi, Msasani, Mtoni, and Kitschwele between 1912 and 1913, and began to purchase Indian and Arab lands in Upanga for European development. Most importantly, the state acquired Schöller's shamba (formerly owned by the Sultan) in 1913 to create a planned African neighbourhood (now Kariakoo) and an adjacent *cordon sanitaire* (now Mnazi Mmoja) that would separate it from the rest of the town.⁵⁹ Such plans entailed enormous investment—land prices had been rising rapidly since 1900, increasing ten-fold between 1900 and 1908 along Acacia Avenue, and sixteen-fold between 1903 and 1913 at the Berlin Mission site.⁶⁰ The 1914 Building Ordinance outlined a future of closer administration based on racial segregation, and augured greater state investment in urban infrastructure—as late as 1914 the town lacked an efficient sewerage system.⁶¹ However, these plans were cut short by the outbreak of war.

The First World War transformed Dar es Salaam into a full-scale military encampment. Upon the war's outbreak, Governor Schnee ordered the implementation of standing war plans to sink Dar es Salaam's floating dock in order to block the harbour. Fleeing the insecurities of warfare breaking out along the northern and western borders as well as on the coast, white settlers and Indian traders relocated to the capital, where they were joined by African carriers and soldiers. By early 1916, there were over 1,000 African *Schutztruppe* in the capital.⁶² The British Navy bombarded Government House and the railway workshops in December 1914, but otherwise the town itself did not figure in military action until British forces moved in unopposed to occupy Dar es Salaam on 4 September 1916 after a protracted siege.⁶³ The former German capital became the principal military cantonment of allied forces in East Africa, supporting the campaign against the famously elusive German military. It also became a veritable infirmary. The city's European hospital, Kaiserhof Hotel and government buildings served to care for over 2,000 Europeans; tent hospitals accommodated over 3,500 Africans.⁶⁴ The strain of feeding and housing military forces and interned enemy subjects, a massive drought in 1917-18, and the collapse of local German currency and hinterland trade networks, together brought economic breakdown and severe food shortages to the town and surrounding areas that did not abate until 1920.⁶⁵ Interned German families at least enjoyed guarantees of sustenance provided by humanitarian conventions; Dar es Salaam's African population did not, forcing many to migrate upcountry. Civilian administration returned in January 1919, and during the latter half of that year, another four thousand Africans in Dar es Salaam, mostly demobilized military soldiers and porters, 'were forced out of town'.⁶⁶ Combined with the decampment of thousands of Europeans, the net result was a massive decrease in the town's population, perhaps as dramatic as from 34,000 in 1914 to 16,886 by 1921.⁶⁷ Rapid

depopulation afforded the incoming British greater freedom to take up German plans and remake Dar es Salaam along segregationist lines.

Dar es Salaam between the wars

The inter-war period was a time of transition for Dar es Salaam, though it was marked more by continuity than change—with the British at this time reluctant to bear the cost, or responsibility, for radical interventions. German plans for urban segregation were adopted and put into effect in 1924 amendments to the Township Rules, when the town was split into three zones. Broadly reflecting the pre-existing social geography of Dar es Salaam, this planning legislation had a profound effect on its future development; resulting in a town of racially and/or socially segregated neighbourhoods that in some cases have existed up to the present. Through their prescription of differing building standards in each of the three zones, the new rules were mostly successful in entrenching segregation. European inhabitants were overwhelmingly located in Zone I, which included the old German quarter, northeast of the city centre, and embryonic coastal suburbs to the north. Indians were concentrated in Zone II, the congested bazaar which provided both residential and commercial quarters for what was, between the wars, Dar es Salaam's fastest growing community. The core of the African population was in Kariakoo and, from the late 1920s, in Ilala; though a number of urban 'villages' were also incorporated within the township boundary, notably Gerezani (demolished in the 1920s/30s) and Keko. British intentions to effect racial zoning are amply demonstrated by the removal of houses occupying a so-called 'neutral zone' that was to act as a sanitary buffer between the African township and Zones I & II. This area of racially mixed housing was by the 1930s cleared to form the 'Open Space', colloquially re-named Mnazi Mmoja after an urban locale of the same name in Zanzibar Town.⁶⁸

The different residential and commercial quarters of Dar es Salaam were by this time evolving a familiar character. Comfortable suburbs of well-spaced houses with large, tropically lush gardens spread north from Kivukoni through Sea View to—from the 1930s—Oyster Bay. This upmarket area of tree-lined avenues and surfaced roads acquired the colloquial name of Uzunguni, or place of the Europeans. African entry was restricted to those in European employ, notably servants, though, to the consternation of officials and the convenience of local residents, itinerant salesmen would periodically hawk their goods there from house to house.⁶⁹ Acacia Avenue, stretching from Kivukoni towards the railway station, formed the main European shopping area, though most businesses here were owned by Indians. These blended in with the principal concentration of Indian businesses in the contiguous 'bazaar', an area also known as Uhindini. By the 1920s, this area consisted of two- and three-storey stone buildings, alongside more numerous makeshift single-storey structures doubling as both home and *duka*. Living conditions and sanitation were poor, a fact frequently bemoaned by European officials.⁷⁰ The high demand for limited accommodation exacerbated the situation,



Fig. 1.14 *Post Office, Main Avenue (1929)*

Source: Gibb, *Masterplan*

resulting in exorbitant rents and overcrowding.⁷¹ However, the growing prosperity of the Indian community resulted in the transformation of this neighbourhood. From the mid-1930s especially, more humble dwellings were demolished to make way for stylised buildings incorporating a diverse array of architectural influences from classical to Indian. There was a degree of residential differentiation, with concentrations of religious groups in areas surrounding their communal religious buildings—notably Ismailis in the vicinity of their *Jamaat Khan* on Mosque Street, and Hindus around Kisutu Street—although communities tended more generally to be mixed.⁷² It was a bustling location, the commercial hub of the capital. An influx of African workers entered this ‘commercial zone’ daily; others came to hang around and see what work they could pick up; still others engaged in petty crime such as pickpocketing and bag snatching.⁷³ Indian anxiety over the African presence in Uhindini was often expressed,⁷⁴ and tension between the two communities periodically resulted in unrest.⁷⁵

Such tension also existed in neighbouring Kariakoo. Although this was the principal African residential area, and technically off limits for Indian housing, officials turned a blind eye to Indians who moved to Kariakoo to take advantage of lower prevailing rents.⁷⁶ In addition, Indian traders dominated in the area surrounding the central market.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, it remained an overwhelmingly African area (‘non-natives’ occupied just over 8 percent of houses there in 1931⁷⁸), forming the heart of a growing indigenous urban community. Kariakoo was organised in the late days of German rule on a grid pattern, with rows of mostly ‘Swahili’ style, single-storey, six-room houses constructed from mangrove poles and mud, with palm-frond roofs—though over time, as finances allowed, these were converted into more permanent structures.⁷⁹ The town’s main produce market was located at its heart; a ‘large

and lofty building constructed of iron girders and roofed with corrugated iron and glass' that was open for business from '7am to 8pm for the sale of fish, meat, country produce and refreshments'.⁸⁰ Cooked food items were also available for sale from people's verandahs, and from itinerant hawkers perambulating Kariakoo's dusty streets. Living conditions were poor. Streets were mostly unsurfaced and ill-lit, and access to clean water restricted.⁸¹

Uzunguni, Uhindini and Kariakoo (also known as Uswahilini) formed the principal residential locations for the town's European, Indian and African communities as defined in the township rules. However, equally consequential as colonial segregationist instincts for the future evolution of the town was the emergence of communities beyond official supervision, located on either side of the township boundary. These included the 'Swahili' fishing village at Msasani, growing residential suburbs at Kinondoni and Keko, alongside a string of other villages fringing the township that included Magomeni, Kigogo,



Fig. 1.15 *The Dhow Harbour, Dar es Salaam (1920s?)*

Source: Gerald F. Sayers, *Handbook of Tanganyika* (Dar es Salaam, 1930)

Buguruni, Chang'ombe and Temeke. Few records survive on these communities in the inter-war period, and their relationship to the town at this stage remains unclear. Many peri-urban villages were no doubt simply agricultural or maritime communities interacting only intermittently with the nearby metropolis.⁸² However, villages also provided homes and services for the growing urban population. Many contained significant 'upcountry' communities: in 1930 Magomeni and, remarkably, Msasani contained larger upcountry than coastal populations.⁸³ Meanwhile, villages such as Kinondoni, Segerea and Temeke represented havens for unmediated African leisure, frequented as they were by African imbibers evading the strict municipal regulations on consumption of alcohol.⁸⁴ In 1938, the unplanned growth of Kinondoni into a large residential area forced the government to zone the area as quarters for African servants employed by Europeans in nearby Oyster Bay.⁸⁵ The incorporation of such communities into the town after the Second World War was to have a shaping influence on Dar es Salaam's social geography.

In the inter-war period Dar es Salaam's position as economic, political and cultural capital of Tanganyika was entrenched. Its infrastructural links with its

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substantial hinterland were consolidated by the extension of the central railway to Mwanza in 1928. The vast majority of the territory's imports and exports passed through the port.⁸⁶ With the construction of a new lighterage wharf in 1929 the volume of traffic reached 273,000 tons in 1930/1—up from 56,000 tons in 1923.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, the principal territorial political institution, the Native Administration, was inevitably based in Dar es Salaam; *through* which European officials passed and *to* which African chiefs and notables from throughout the territory were occasionally invited. More significantly, stirrings of African political consciousness were also first evident in inter-war Dar es Salaam, with the *ca.* 1927 formation of the African Association, headquartered from 1931 at New Street in Kariakoo. The organization spread from its Dar es Salaam base to towns throughout Tanganyika, laying a foundation for the later Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).⁸⁸ Meanwhile, *Kiwetu*, the first African-owned newspaper was established in Dar es Salaam by Erica Fiah in 1937, providing an important sounding board for African Association members and fellow intelligentsia.⁸⁹ The territory's main foreign-owned newspapers were also published in and distributed from the capital.⁹⁰

The inter-war years also saw the formation of significant African urban cultural institutions. As described by Tadasu Tsuruta in this collection, football evolved as an important leisure pursuit culminating, by the Second World War, in the emergence of two teams, Yanga (originally New Young) and Simba (originally Sunderland) who were to go on to dominate Tanzanian football. David Anthony, meanwhile, stresses the central role that *hoteli* and *mikahawani* (tea and coffee houses) played in the social life of the town, acting as venues for social organization, politics and gossip.⁹¹ Music and dance were also central to African urban life. *Beni* dance organizations, at their peak in the 1920s, were the prime expression of urban consciousness, noted for 'their proud modernity and multi-tribalism'.⁹² By the 1930s *beni*'s star had waned; though, reflecting Dar es Salaam's role as trendsetter, it had become 'the dance of men in deprived rural areas who aspired to be modern'.⁹³ In town, *dansi*—'international, individualistic ballroom dancing whose personalised sexuality shocked the elderly'—was now *de rigeur* among the New Street *beau monde*.⁹⁴ So-called 'tribal' *ngomas* (drumming and dancing) also remained popular, though in the urban environment were not necessarily ethnically exclusive. In 1931 E. C. Baker, a district official and author of an important survey of the town, observed that 'young men sometimes dance in the *ngomas* of tribes other than their own and the dance tends to regroup society into guilds rather than tribes'.⁹⁵

Dar es Salaam's highly cosmopolitan population reflected the town's territorial and even regional importance. By 1931 the European community had grown to over 1,300. It included representatives from a number of European nations. The Asian community included a handful of Chinese, Arabs and a substantial population of Indians from the sub-continent, many originating from Gujarat. Indians were the fastest growing community in the inter-war period, rising from 2,600 in the closing years of German rule to almost 9,000 in 1937. In the 1931 'native census', members from 167 different African ethnic groups were identified.⁹⁶ They came from throughout

Tanganyika and beyond. There were substantial immigrant communities from Uganda (Ganda numbered 213 in the census), Nyasaland (Nyasa numbered almost 1,000, although many would have originated from the Tanganyikan side of the lake) and Portuguese East Africa (Yao [1,268], Makonde [492] and Makua [237] came from southern Tanganyika and adjacent Portuguese territory). Nyamwezi (846) and Ngoni (540) were the principle groups from the Tanganyikan interior. However, peoples from the coastal hinterland were numerically predominant: Ndengereko (642), Kami (941), Rufiji (2,022) and above all the Zaramo (6,642).⁹⁷ The best established urban community was that of the Manyema (1,221), a group consisting of former-slaves and their descendants, principally from either side of Lake Tanganyika, who had settled in the town after their emancipation—although the term ‘Manyema’ may have also been shorthand used to describe runaway slaves who chose to live on the coast.⁹⁸ There was the first mosque to be built in the town; they were the only ethnic group to own a freehold cemetery; they were also substantial urban property-owners.⁹⁹ Although there was some ethnic concentration in communities along those arteries connecting Dar es Salaam with ethnic homelands, urban settlements were mostly ethnically mixed.¹⁰⁰

An urban Swahili culture noted for its cosmopolitanism formed an important integrative influence. Swahili itself was universally spoken, whilst Islam was the dominant religion. Although strict adherence was by no means universal, adoption of the ‘social aspects of Islam’ in particular formed an important adaptive response to the urban environment. ‘[T]he donning of a *kanzu*’, observed Leslie in his post-war survey, ‘is a simple but effective membership card enabling the country bumpkin to be accepted as a civilized man’.¹⁰¹ At the same time, however, Islam could also provide expression for emerging social cleavages in the town. The most obvious divide existed between Muslims of African and Indian origin, though there were divisions too within the African community. A 1930s tussle over leadership of a local Islamic institution, the Jamaitul al-Islamiyya Umumiyya, for example, arose from tensions between local coastal Muslims and African immigrants including the Manyema.¹⁰²

While Dar es Salaam was (and is) rather more socially cohesive than many African cities (most notably in its ethnically mixed residential communities), a number of notable cleavages were already apparent in the inter-war period. For example, behind the tussle over the Jamaitul lay Zaramo and Shomvi resentment over the manner in which they, as the town’s self-styled indigenes, were being superseded by immigrant communities with a firmer foothold in the urban economy.¹⁰³ This found expression in a *wenye mji* (‘owners of the town’)/ *watu wa kujia* (‘immigrants’) divide, that was especially apparent in competition over appointments to urban administrative positions.¹⁰⁴ However, this social dichotomy formed only one source of identification for the Dar es Salaam resident. Tension also existed between, on the one hand, *watu wa pwani* (‘people of the coast’), a broader coastal community that could include not only Zaramo and Shomvi but also peoples from Dar es Salaam’s hinterland such as Rufiji and Ndengereko, and Islamized urban communities such as the Manyema; and, on the other hand, *watu wa bara* (‘mainland people’), upcountry immigrants less well integrated into Dar es Salaam’s dominant Islamic Swahili

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urban culture.¹⁰⁵ The latter included highly visible individuals with close links to the British administration, whose position of influence, affluence and/or responsibility antagonised members of more established urban communities.¹⁰⁶ Most resented were upcountry Africans engaged in the local police force.¹⁰⁷

Such ethnic and religious tensions overlapped with other social cleavages emerging in the town. Most prominent was that dividing the young and old. The demographic profile of Dar es Salaam was overwhelmingly youthful. '[T]here are so few old men', complained Baker, 'that the young ones have no focus round which to gather'.¹⁰⁸ Elders present in the town, moreover, generally lacked a western education and resented the influx of younger educated Africans, whose economic and professional progress undermined their authority.¹⁰⁹ The 'younger generation', by contrast, considered themselves 'more competent to deal with present day affairs than they [elders] are and openly scoff them as inefficient and out of date'.¹¹⁰ The rise to prominence of the so-called *wahuni* ('hooligans' or 'loafers') in commentary on African urban society, meanwhile, reflected generational *and* economic differentiation, in this case uniting both elders and more established *watu wa kujia*. Youthful immigrants entered the town in great numbers (though did not necessarily remain there long), thereby evading rural parental and customary control. Concern over their ill-discipline, and the social and administrative consequences of the limited economic outlets for their youthful energy, found expression in their demonization as *wahuni*. With an increase in rates of urbanization from the late 1930s this social category was to become increasingly prominent in Dar es Salaam.¹¹¹

There were substantial disparities in the livelihoods provided by the town to different sections of the urban population. The 1931 census recorded a variety of occupations adopted by urban Africans, though the economy was dominated by three forms of labour in particular: dock labour (which accounted for 1,642 out of a workforce of 13,754); casual labour (2,425); and domestic service (the largest single category at 2,873).¹¹² Young, uneducated immigrants demonized as *wahuni* occupied the bottom rung in the urban economy, adopting a variety of poorly comprehended means to subsist; from the legitimate, such as casual labour, to the illegitimate, such as petty crime. Formally employed blue-collar workers were marginally better off, though the miserable wages that prevailed offered them little comfort. Malnutrition and indebtedness—pawn-brokers conducted a thriving business in the town—were rife, a situation exacerbated by the depression which impacted severely on urban livelihoods.¹¹³ Numerous reports, from the late 1920s on, uncovered desperate living conditions for the majority of the urban workforce, which struggled to get by on the starvation wages provided. The informal sector appears to have offered an essential supplement to waged work. Women were particularly active, both on their own account and to help supplement a partner's wages; engaging in a variety of petty commerce including the sale of charcoal and firewood and the preparation and sale of foodstuffs.¹¹⁴ Peri-urban agriculture also helped supplement negligible urban incomes. The onset of depression in the early 1930s saw both a sudden increase in itinerant trading and heightened agricultural activity in the surrounding countryside.¹¹⁵



Fig. 1.16 *The Colonial Secretariat on Azania Front (1950s?)*

Source: Sutton, *Dar es Salaam*

However, the most striking impact of the depression was a substantial outflow of population, indicating low prevailing levels of urbanization and proletarianization.

Other sections of the urban population were considerably better off. Those Africans with sufficient education to obtain white-collar work—a fraction of the population¹¹⁶—noticeably so. In 1939 the highest-paid African clerks received incomes of Shs. 200/- a month at a time when sixty percent of the workforce received under Shs. 60/-, some receiving as little as Shs. 7/-.¹¹⁷ Another route to urban prosperity was through property. Apart from servants' quarters that might be provided by wealthier employees, provision of African housing in inter-war Dar es Salaam was left up to Africans themselves, many of whom took up the opportunity with alacrity, profiting handsomely from high prevailing rents. According to Baker: 'A house takes the place of the cattle of the backward tribesmen—it is the one form of investment of the urban native'. Interestingly, women were amongst the highest profile property-owners.¹¹⁸ Many were Manyema, who superseded the pre-colonial Zaramo *mavinyi* ('landlords') much to the resentment of their *wenye mji* descendants.¹¹⁹ However, resentment over the more considerable disparities of wealth between different racial communities in the town was rather more common. If better-off Africans derived incomes their more humble fellow townsmen could only dream of, the apparent riches obtained by many Indian and European residents was barely conceivable. Indians bore the brunt of this resentment,¹²⁰ though the community was by no means universally well-off, incorporating as it did

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humble street traders alongside middling skilled artisans and affluent merchant families such as the Karimjees. The European community was more economically homogeneous, consisting predominantly of salaried professionals, either working in the Tanganyikan government, mercantile commerce or local services such as the port, railway, schools and hospitals.

Administrative structures to govern Dar es Salaam's heterogeneous population were erected shortly after World War One. A Township Authority was established under the Township Ordinance of 1920, which between the wars was composed solely of European and Indian representatives. It was responsible for the provision and maintenance of urban infrastructure and amenities, sanitation and the regulation of trade. Meanwhile, a district administration was also established whose primary responsibility was African affairs, under the supervision of the District Officer (later, District Commissioner). The *livali*, a coastal Arab, was the most senior non-European, acting as an arbitrator in most civil matters but performing no direct supervisory role. In 1921, the German administrative system of unpaid headmen was overhauled and five paid officials were installed—still called *majumbe*—who were supervised by an *akida*. Establishing the authority of African intermediaries in the township was problematic and the Native Administration was to undergo a number of changes—notably the scrapping of the *akida* and the later introduction of three *wakili* to supervise the *majumbe* in 1942. Complications arose from the heterogeneity and sophistication of the urban population. Colonial administrators failed to identify individuals who had sufficient legitimacy amongst urban African communities, and at the same time were willing, and able, to carry out unpopular measures demanded of them by the District Office.¹²¹

World War Two and its aftermath

The Second World War had a dramatic impact on Dar es Salaam, as it had for the wider territory.¹²² While the inter-war period was characterised largely by administrative neglect, conjunctural circumstances prompted increasing colonial intervention from 1940. This was occasioned above all by a significant acceleration in urban growth that slightly pre-dated the outbreak of war. Between 1938 and 1944 Dar es Salaam's African community increased by over 50 percent, from 26,000 to 40,000.¹²³ This signalled a lasting shift in both the scale *and* nature of urbanization. Up till the Second World War downturns in the urban economy had occasioned significant African out-migration, such as occurred during World War One and in the early 1930s. By contrast, worsening urban living conditions in the 1940s were actually accompanied by accelerating urbanization. A serious problem of unemployment had re-emerged by 1939, while the miserable wages received by those in employment were increasingly inadequate at a time of spiralling inflation. Nevertheless, a combination of poor conditions in the town's rural hinterland, an increasing need for access to cash and the opportunities the town provided for formal *and* informal sector work, alongside the intrinsic

glamour of life in the capital, influenced an upsurge in rural-urban movement.¹²⁴

Conditions in the capital in the late 1930s and early 1940s prompted unprecedented official attention.¹²⁵ Reports uncovered an increasingly impoverished urban African population, whose access to basic necessities such as food, clothing and housing had deteriorated thanks partly to wartime austerity measures that restricted imports into Tanganyika. Rapid urban growth intensified demand, thereby stoking serious inflationary pressure. Recognizing the potential political and social consequences of inaction, government intervened. In 1940, government wage rates were increased. The following year, the Economic Control Board was established in order to counter inflation by exerting some influence over the supply and demand of commodities. Finally, in 1943 a system of rationing was introduced in Dar es Salaam (and other towns) to restrict over-consumption and ensure that basic necessities were available at an affordable price. These innovations had unforeseen consequences. By institutionalising an ensured urban food supply, they actually encouraged rural-urban migration, thereby exacerbating the situation in the town. They stimulated awareness among the African population of entitlements to basic necessities that the government was at least in part responsible for. Moreover, the manner in which rationing was differentiated along communal European, Asian and African lines resulted in heightened racial consciousness among Africans. This was further stimulated by the growing economic power of an expanding urban Indian population, which was increasingly apparent in part through the continued existence of a thriving black market in scarce commodities which government intervention had done little to curb, and through an influx of Indians living in the nominally African quarter of Kariakoo.¹²⁶ Deteriorating conditions in the African township, upon which colonial initiatives had minimal impact, further heightened African grievances.¹²⁷ These were powerfully expressed in a dramatic strike shortly after the war, in 1947, that paralysed the capital for over a week, and spread throughout Tanganyika.¹²⁸

In the wake of the strike, concerted efforts were made to address what was considered the protesters' most serious grievance, the shortage and consequent high cost of housing. Up to circa 1940, sufficient accommodation had been constructed by African landlords to house an urban population undergoing only slow (and occasionally negative) growth. In 1931 Baker had observed that 'nowhere [wa]s overcrowding common'.¹²⁹ However, the upsurge in urban influx from the late 1930s occurred at a time when, thanks to wartime conditions, building materials were in increasingly short supply. This had serious repercussions, with the cost of housing spiralling in relation to wages, and overcrowding and even homelessness assuming growing seriousness.¹³⁰ The need for government intervention was acknowledged as early as 1942, though a plan was not initiated until 1946, and by the end of 1947 just 41 new houses—in Ilala—were available for occupation. Further houses were built in Ilala in the late 1940s, though the most consequential response to the strike was an ill-considered attempt to build 1,000 houses in temporary materials at Jangwani, north of Kariakoo—in the event only 79 were erected at

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Fig. 1.17 *Dar es Salaam and environs in 1941*

Source: Tanzania National Archive File 61/643/3



Fig. 1.18/19 *Junction of Arab Street and Kichwele Street (now Nkrumah/Uhuru Streets) in 1905 and 1949*

Source: Gibb, *Plan for Dar es Salaam*



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considerable expense. Such minimal progress meant the housing crisis persisted into the 1950s. As a result, peri-urban settlements expanded apace, some of which were now merging with the town proper to become Dar es Salaam's first urban shanties—notably Buguruni. Meanwhile, government land closer to town at Makaburi, Gerezani and Keko 'filled with what promised to be a series of slums dangerous to health and order'.¹³¹

The mounting urban crisis evident from the early 1940s also elicited revisions in administrative policy. The most striking response to deteriorating conditions was actually stillborn. This involved a 1940 proposal to excise Zone III from the remainder of the town and declare it the autonomous African settlement of Kariakoo. It was envisaged this would address problems arising from European and Asian economic and political dominance in Dar es Salaam, and at the same time present opportunities to introduce structures of African urban governance. However, such a bold initiative turned out to be politically unfeasible. In the event, more modest reforms were made to the system of municipal governance. In 1941 and 1943, one then two African representatives were introduced onto the Township Authority.¹³² After the war, three 'Ward Councils', covering Ilala, Kariakoo, and Kisutu, Upanga, and Kinondoni, were established as an outlet for urban African opinion.¹³³

Late-colonial Dar es Salaam

In the fourteen years between the dockworkers' strike and independence, Dar es Salaam was transformed from the modest colonial town of the inter-war period into an emerging metropolis whose economic and political significance to the wider territory was greater than ever. This transformation was influenced by a number of factors. While it was recognized during the war that the neglect suffered by the urban African population was no longer sustainable, it was not until the late 1940s that the shift in policy had a tangible impact. The numerous infrastructural and administrative initiatives enacted thereafter were also influenced by a broader policy context, in which the notion of development had become paramount, resulting in a significant expansion in investment in the socio-economic potential of colonial territories. Simultaneously, conditions within Tanganyika were conducive to Dar es Salaam's growth. Local capital built up during and immediately after the war sought avenues for investment. Moreover, rising commodity prices and burgeoning exports/imports resulted in boom conditions that lasted up to the mid-1950s.¹³⁴

Accelerating urbanization was maintained throughout the closing years of colonial rule. All three racial communities grew apace. A European population of just over a thousand in 1940 was by 1957 approaching five thousand, consisting of an expanded official community alongside representatives of commercial interests attracted by more propitious post-war conditions. An Asian community, dominated by those originating from the Indian sub-continent, rose from under nine thousand in 1940 to almost thirty thousand in 1957. This was partly fuelled by renewed recruitment of Indian civil servants



Fig. 1.20 *Street scene, Ring Street (now Jamhuri Street), 1949*

Source: Gibb, *Plan for Dar es Salaam*



Fig. 1.21 *African tailor in front of a khang/kitenge stall (no date)*

Source: Tanzania Information Services

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following the Second World War, but above all by increased birth rates among Indians already resident in Dar es Salaam.

Over the same period the urban African population grew from 34,750 to 93,363. For educated Africans the lure of Dar es Salaam grew ever stronger. It was at the cutting edge of political, social and cultural trends; and as the commercial and administrative capital provided opportunities for the bright and ambitious from throughout Tanganyika. In 1957 Molohan observed in the town 'the nucleus of a middle class which enjoys a relatively comfortable standard of living and regards itself as a different and superior stratum of African society', comprising of 'mostly higher paid clerical workers, small-scale entrepreneurs, traders etc.'¹³⁵ However, the workforce remained overwhelmingly blue-collar and the bulk of migrants were poorly educated. In his 1956 survey, Leslie found that only 25 percent of the male urban population had completed primary education (and a mere 7 percent of urban women). An increasing proportion were from Dar es Salaam's hinterland—in the 1931 census groups from Eastern Province had made up 48 percent of the total urban population, by 1955 they made up 55 percent of a significantly larger population.¹³⁶ While for the educated African urban prospects were good, for most migrants getting by through informal economic activities, or poorly paid, and often irregular, unskilled labour, life remained a struggle.

A submission received by Leslie from an African resident—in response to questions posed in the course of his survey—attempted to explain the conundrum of rapid urbanization occurring at a time when urban living conditions were poor. The scene is set in a village, as an educated African with urban employment returns to his rural home:

[E]veryone comes to welcome the conquering hero... they can smell Lux on him, see his stockings girt about him, a watch on his wrist to tell the time, rhumba records rend the air, a cycle carries him, small change jingles in his pockets, coppers are tossed out as worthless; what, you live in a village without electricity? No cinema? No dance hall? No bands? What a dump!

...[I]n the morning, then he rises, a fine *khanga* at his waist, a vest proudly flying at the mast, towel over his shoulder, a toothbrush in his mouth... he washes for a full hour and a half, while scented soap stings the nostrils of the young men waiting outside.... [He] combs his hair and the mirror testifies to his handsomeness—cor! His parting shows up like Kichwele Street.¹³⁷

[T]hose young men in the room... they know nothing of the dark days to come, but counsel each other, 'This is too much, I *must* go to town'; they are all saying this from the bottom of their hearts. 'Just look at his room, the headman is poor compared to this...' Another: 'These townfolk mix so with Europeans they live like them too, only their skin's a bit darker.' The first says 'Whatever happens, when he goes back I have just got to go with him: here in the country we live, but what a life! It is nothing but work.'¹³⁸

This account seriously underplays more mundane 'push and pull' factors which lay behind rural-urban migration. Nevertheless, its depiction of the allure of life in the capital is revealing of Dar es Salaam's relationship to wider African society.

The economic boom and accompanying infrastructural development that occurred from the late 1940s resulted in a substantially larger, more diversified and dynamic urban centre, now assuming the dimensions of a true city. Substantial housing construction considerably expanded the physical extent of the town. The 1940s and 1950s saw the emergence of Oyster Bay/Msasani as the principal European residential area. Upanga, to the north of Uhindini, experienced rapid development of Indian housing from the early 1950s (in order to ease conditions in the overcrowded bazaar). African estates, containing government quarters and privately built housing on plots set aside for 'self-development', emerged as northern (Kinondoni), western (Magomeni) and southern (Temeke) suburbs of the town.¹³⁹ The 'Swahili' type house remained the favoured design for those building their own houses. They also provided a home for the vast majority of the population—72 percent according to Leslie's survey—whether on the new estates at Tandika, Magomeni and Kinondoni, or in the older planned areas of Kariakoo and Ilala. Faced with a post-war accommodation crisis, government encouraged self-construction and, with rents high, Dar es Salaam residents responded with alacrity. Leslie found over 12,000 houses were African-owned—with 18 percent of men and a remarkable 47 percent of women owning one house or more.¹⁴⁰ Alongside planned housing developments, the 1950s also witnessed the emergence of substantial un-demarcated 'shanty' settlements. Many had their origins in the peri-urban villages that fringed the town in the inter-war years; others arose from prevailing circumstances of rapid urban growth and accommodation shortage. The former included Msasani, Mikoroshoni and, the biggest of all, Buguruni, where 'a sudden [post-war] tide of settlement' had swamped an 'original nucleus of landowners who... permitted others to settle around them'. The latter included Toroli, and parts of Kipawa and Mtoni. According to Leslie, both types of settlement, in contrast to the planned suburbs which had 'hardly any cohesion at all', 'evolve[d] in such a way, based on priority of settlement, that the community has a certain "structure", an order in society, into which the newcomer can fit himself in the appropriate place'.¹⁴¹

African settlement was characterised by socio-economic differentiation. Government-built housing, known as quarters, was favoured by 'better off' Africans 'in the more responsible, the clerical, and the artisan classes of job', who were also more likely of upcountry origin. Christians constituted 57 percent of the occupants of quarters, as opposed to just 12 percent of the total population. Population density was much lower here, and quarters enjoyed better access to services. Leslie observed a cultural preference for quarters which 'in particular appealed to the man who wanted to live with his own family, and to have some of the modern amenities... they have not appealed to the traditional Coastal man who is not so interested in privacy as in company who prefers to live with others of his kind in the traditional areas and housing of Dar es Salaam'.¹⁴² Zaramo, Rufiji and Ndengereko were barely present in quarters, housing themselves instead in Swahili or village accommodation. Meanwhile, unsurprisingly, a disproportionate amount of unemployed were to be found in un-demarcated settlements.¹⁴³

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While such differentiation characterised settlement patterns, at the same time a marked feature of Dar es Salaam from this stage of its development was a relative lack of distinct segregation, in contrast to the inter-war years. Different forms of housing could be found occupying adjacent areas throughout the town. To the south, to either side of Kilwa Road, were the shanty settlement of Keko, police quarters, and detached housing for European port employees at Kurasini. Along the Morogoro Road, to the west, were shanties such as Kigogo and Magomeni kwa Hanna, alongside substantial government quarters and Swahili estates at Magomeni. Most striking of all, though, was the location of the major shanty of Mikoroshoni, sandwiched between Oyster Bay and Regent Estate, two of Dar es Salaam's most prosperous suburbs. While urban plans, both between the wars and afterwards, had envisaged residential areas developing along broadly—if not explicitly—racial lines,¹⁴⁴ the lack of resources to enforce strict segregation through either prohibition and/or the construction of segregated African housing resulted in the organic growth of a town whose spatial geography was much more socially diverse than neighbouring capitals such as Nairobi or Lusaka. Mikoroshoni forms a perfect example of this organic growth. It had emerged as a residential location for Africans working nearby, in Msasani's quarries



Fig. 1.22 *Lighterage quays (c. 1950s)*

Source: Hill, *Permanent Way*

and as European domestics in particular, for whom convenient and affordable accommodation was non-existent.¹⁴⁵

The post-war economic boom was in part driven by the building industry, which thrived thanks not only to suburban housing development, but also construction projects in central areas, and industrial and infrastructural development. Throughout Dar es Salaam between 1949-51 nearly £1 million

worth of new residential buildings were completed, £750,000 worth of commercial buildings and over £600,000 worth of industrial buildings. The following year the value of buildings under construction, or planned, was as high as £7 million.¹⁴⁶ The construction of the new Morogoro/Tanga road west through Magomeni provided much needed employment in the mid-1950s, and influenced settlement patterns in its vicinity. The hiatus in Uhindi's growth that had occurred during the war years was ended in the late 1940s, with substantial re-development occurring into the 1960s resulting in the congested but architecturally rich quarter familiar today; the diverse array of buildings now incorporating modernist (notably art deco) influences. The port was also extended with deep water quays constructed in the early 1950s and opened in 1956. The tonnage of goods passing through it increased from 297,000 in 1946 to almost one million in 1956.¹⁴⁷ Unprecedented industrial development also occurred, at the newly established industrial area between Chang'ombe and Ilala, and elsewhere in the town, notably the Tanganyika Packers factory whose imposing, abandoned shell remains one of contemporary Kawe's more eerie sights.¹⁴⁸ Dar es Salaam's labour force—under 14,000 in 1931—had by 1952 reached 36,000, not including those engaged in peri-urban industries such as quarries and sisal estates.¹⁴⁹ Domestic servants, numbering almost five thousand in the late 1940s, predominated, though dockwork was most sought after, thanks to the low qualifications required, the flexibility of the work routine and the relatively high level of wages.¹⁵⁰ In general, however, wages remained low. While work was available, unskilled workers, who constituted a majority of the workforce, were numerous. Official investigations in the early 1950s uncovered miserable living conditions suffered by the bulk of the African population.¹⁵¹

Nevertheless, in the course of the 1950s conditions for urban Africans were improved through a number of colonial initiatives. Alongside planned suburbs, health clinics were introduced at Mnazi Mmoja, Ilala and Magomeni in the mid-1950s; and the old 'native' hospital at Sewa Haji was replaced by the modern Princess Margaret (after independence, Muhimbili) hospital in 1956. After significant expansion had already occurred in primary education in the early 1950s (there were sixteen primary schools in 1956),¹⁵² between 1955 and 1958 the number of African children attending primary schools was increased by 72 percent from 2,500 to 4,400.¹⁵³ Space for an additional 1,600 children was created—the total of 6,000 approximating to the number of children in the primary age group. New middle schools were opened at Magomeni in 1958 and at Temeke shortly afterwards, which boosted Dar es Salaam's existing record of providing places for 38 percent of those attending primary—already the highest in the territory. Compulsory secondary education for all urban children was a long-term goal.¹⁵⁴ Adult education was also proliferating in the town at purpose-built centres run by the Social Development department. The same department was also responsible for the establishment of a number of community centres which provided associational and leisure facilities as part of the late-colonial state's social engineering initiatives aimed at creating 'good citizens of the newly urbanised class of Africans'.¹⁵⁵ While these were not necessarily utilised in the manner hoped for by officials, the

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centres provided welcome institutional space for recreational, social and even political activities for urban Africans, with the main centre on Mnazi Mmoja, named the Arnautoglu Centre after its benefactor of Greek-Turkish origin, becoming—both before and after independence—one of Dar es Salaam's most important social institutions.

Increased provision of social services formed a component of the late-colonial policy of 'stabilization', which envisaged a class of more settled urban Africans enjoying better infrastructure and amenities, and better working conditions. The latter was partly initiated through the imposition of an urban minimum wage in April 1957, which resulted in a swift improvement in the terms of engagement of formally employed workers. However, both higher wages and improving amenities simply stoked the administrators' principal headache by providing further incentives for rural-urban migration at a time when employment was actually contracting. The situation had been exacerbated by economic downturn from 1952 which, alongside the termination of a number of major infrastructural projects in the mid-1950s, had significant repercussions for the urban workforce. By 1958, in spite of undiminished urban growth rates, the number of people in recorded employment had actually declined to 32,000. A problem of urban unemployment assumed increasing seriousness.¹⁵⁶ The colonial administration responded by organising campaigns against those persons without formal employment and/or accommodation who were deemed to have no place in the town. These were colloquially known as '*wahuni* raids', after their principal target: young male migrants predominantly from Eastern Province who entered the town in ever-increasing numbers. In 1956 Leslie found that over 93 percent of the population was 45 or under; and most strikingly that men between 16 and 45 constituted as much as 39 percent of the total population. With waged employment scarce, these migrants contributed to a burgeoning informal economy which colonial officials were at best antipathetic towards; they were also held responsible for rising crime. Officials considered they had no place in the town, repatriating up to 2,000 individuals annually to their rural homes. This did little to stem the flow, and the presence of unemployed, underemployed and informally employed youth remained an enduring headache for colonial administrators and their postcolonial successors.¹⁵⁷

To try to assert more effective control over the burgeoning population, the district administration was extended. The District Office was moved from the administrative centre of Uzunguni to the heart of the African town in 1958 and European officials were posted to offices in the African wards. Moreover, additional European and African staff were employed. By 1960 the number of *wakili* had increased to eleven, and *majumbe* to sixteen. However, the complicated and often contradictory tasks they were asked to perform undermined their position. Diligence in their policing and revenue-collecting roles undermined their support and thus hindered their effectiveness in the other tasks demanded of them.¹⁵⁸ Partly in an attempt to—unsuccessfully—forestall increasing African politicization, half-hearted attempts were also made to democratise local government. The ward councils were expanded in number to seven, made over to elective representation, and were eventually given

some administrative and financial responsibility.¹⁵⁹ However, executive power remained vested in the European and Indian dominated Municipal Council, which had replaced the Township Authority when Dar es Salaam was declared a municipality in 1949.¹⁶⁰

Lacking meaningful local representation in government, various African organizations in Dar es Salaam began to take up organised anti-colonial politics during the 1940s. The most overlooked and initially influential of these movements was the Wazaramo Union, which was formed in 1938 'for all Wazaramo tribes, to be in one unit, in Dar es Salaam and other outside Dar es Salaam in the Uzaramo Districts'.¹⁶¹ Taking advantage of popular antipathy towards Indian traders and government rationing schemes, the Wazaramo Union gained enormous support in and near the capital after World War Two by promising agricultural cooperative and social welfare services to its members, gaining a membership as high as 30,000 by 1948. Foreshadowing the political strategies of the TANU, the Wazaramo Union pursued party-building by selling membership cards at a series of *baraza* or public meetings held in villages and peri-urban locations, where a parade of automobiles would bring popular speakers and *ngoma* bands to attract large crowds of supporters. The Union demanded, unsuccessfully, that government grant them a paramount *Zaramo Pazi* (chief) and cede significant control over urban local government. Following a major embezzlement scandal, the organization waned



Fig. 1.23 Aerial view of Kariakoo/City Centre/Harbour circa Independence

Source: Tanzania Information Services




Fig. 1.24 Dar es Salaam circa Independence

Source: Based on *City of Dar es Salaam Guide Map* (Dar es Salaam, 1962)

in significance by the early 1950s, yet had blazed many of the political trails for TANU to follow. The other major trailblazers for TANU in Dar es Salaam were labour activists, who had formed in particular around the docks in the late 1930s.¹⁶² Dock strikes in 1939 and 1943 over pay, benefits and living costs disrupted harbour commerce and taught casual and permanent workers the value of solidarity. In September 1947, dockworkers again struck for higher pay, and were joined by African railway workers throughout Tanganyika in what was, according to John Iliffe, 'the most widespread protest in Tanzanian history between the end of the Maji Maji uprising and the formation of TANU'.¹⁶³ A subsequent and disastrous dock strike in 1950, however, ended in riot and destroyed trade union activity in Dar es Salaam until government lifted its prohibition in late 1954.

It was during this lull in labour activism that TANU formed in Dar es Salaam on 7th July 1954. It was the lineal successor to the African Association, which had emerged in Dar es Salaam around 1927 and during the 1930s was divided between 'those who favoured a territorial alliance of educated men and those who sought unity between different social strata in the capital'.¹⁶⁴ While the Wazaramo Union was gathering supporters and confronting the colonial government in the 1940s, the African Association in Dar es Salaam remained an ineffective petitioning organization, ceding political initiative to provincial branches such as Dodoma and Mwanza. Shortly after it transformed itself into the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) in 1948, the Dar es Salaam headquarters had 'apparently collapsed entirely'.¹⁶⁵ The organization revived in the wake of proposed constitutional reforms in 1950, when the TAA demanded a stop to further alienation of land to immigrants, as well as to abolish 'the imposition of Arab Liwalis' and replace them with African *kadhis* or Muslim judges.¹⁶⁶ With organized labour outlawed and the Wazaramo Union failing, the TAA filled the political vacuum in Dar es Salaam by honing a message that systematically criticized racial discrimination, and called for increased expenditure on education, loans, Africanization of the civil service, and constitutional development that emphasized 'the paramountcy of native interests'.¹⁶⁷ In April 1953, Julius Nyerere defeated Abdulwahid Sykes in an election held at Arnautoglu Hall to become TAA President, and thereafter strengthened party headquarters' control over provincial branches.¹⁶⁸ Nyerere was aided immeasurably not only by the support of Abdulwahid Sykes and other members of Dar es Salaam's largely Muslim urban elite, but also by formidable women in town such as Bibi Titi Mohamed, who used her celebrity and immense energy for grassroots party-building.¹⁶⁹ It was during the year 1955 that TANU managed to secure widespread support in Dar es Salaam and surrounding peri-urban areas, with membership leaping from 2,000 in March to 25,000 by September—that same month some 40,000 people attended TANU's first public meeting in the town. The capital served as TANU's territorial springboard for rapid growth in 1956.¹⁷⁰ By 1957, when Leslie wrote his survey of the town, he observed that '[i]t should be understood from the first that African Dar es Salaam is almost 100 percent a Tanganyika African National Union town'.¹⁷¹ As the site where TANU was born and blossomed, and where the peaceful transfer of power occurred on 9 December

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1961, Dar es Salaam represented territory-wide political ambitions with a success that few other African capital cities equalled.

Dar es Salaam after independence

Independence brought significant change to the town. Most importantly, the racial thinking that informed colonial governance was abandoned. From 1960 seats on the Municipal Council were made elective, and the first African mayor, Amri Abedi, was duly appointed. Residential segregation that had influenced urban planning was now untenable, as were colonial laws that restricted African mobility.¹⁷² However, postcolonial Dar es Salaam was fundamentally influenced by trends that were well-established long before 1961. Socio-economic and, in the case of Uhindini, even racial differentiation remained a marked feature of urban space. Mass rural-urban migration, a shaping factor on Dar es Salaam from the late 1930s, continued to exert a powerful influence on urban society and its administration. Similarly, the town's



Fig. 1.25 *The planned Mnazi Mmoja Parliament. In 1967 London architects Anthony R. Davies & Partners designed a new Parliament, planned for construction on Mnazi Mmoja. It had been anticipated that envisaged costs of £1,000,000 were to be met mostly from a British Government loan. However, the loan was frozen after Britain-Tanzania relations were suspended in 1965 and no alternative source of funds appears to have been identified as the Parliament was never built.*

Source: *Tanzania Standard*, 29th April 1967

postcolonial physical evolution was influenced by late-colonial urban development, both planned and unplanned.

Between the last colonial census of 1957 and the first after independence ten years later, Dar es Salaam's African population almost tripled from 93,363 to 272,821. Early postcolonial growth was fuelled principally by rural-urban migration as opposed to natural increase through town births: in his analysis of the 1967 census, Adolfo Mascarenhas puts the ratio at 2:1. Migration into the town still occurred predominantly from Dar es Salaam's hinterland. Approximately two-thirds of the migrants over the 1957-67 period (63,150) originated from Coast Region (the districts of Bagamoyo, Kisarawe and Rufiji in former Eastern Province), though the capital also contained rapidly expanding populations originating from throughout Tanzania and further afield.¹⁷³ Both push and pull factors influenced the phenomenon. Village conditions in Coast Region were poor. A 1978 survey found protein malnutrition rates among children of 62 percent in Bunju (a village twenty miles from the capital) and an average of 31 percent among children in eight other rural areas, as opposed to 2.5 percent in Manzese, one of the capital's poorer suburbs.¹⁷⁴ Meanwhile, in 1967 as much as 81 percent of Coast Region's employment was concentrated in Dar es Salaam.¹⁷⁵ As the African population grew exponentially other communities shrank, with both the Indian and European populations declining: respectively from 29,986 and 4,479 in 1957 to 29,192 and 3,547 ten years later.¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, in the following decade overall urbanization accelerated with Dar es Salaam's growth rate rising from an annual 7.5 to 9.8 percent per annum, the total urban population reaching 769,445 by 1978. It remained a strikingly youthful town. In 1967, 78 percent of the population were under 35 (82 percent in 1978), with a concentration in the young working age bracket: 44 percent were aged between 15-34 (43 percent in 1978). By contrast, those aged 35 or over represented just 22 and 18 percent of the 1967 and 1978 populations. Like other eastern African cities, the proportion of women in Dar es Salaam increased after independence, rising from 42 percent in 1957 to 45 percent in 1967, and 46 percent in 1978.¹⁷⁷

The town's early postcolonial physical growth occurred along and between the major arterial routes already constructed by the 1950s. To the north, along Bagamoyo Road, substantial residential development took place. Towards the coast, Dar es Salaam's upmarket suburbs continued to develop, initially to the south and west of Msasani, then up through Mikocheni reaching Mbezi by the 1980s. In the midst of such affluent areas, Mikoroshoni remained a major shanty settlement. To the west of Bagamoyo Road was perhaps the town's most diverse area of residential settlement, encompassing the expanding colonial planned settlement of Kinondoni, later planned areas at Kijitonyama and Sinza, laid out in the 1970s, and shanty communities at Hanna Nasif and Mwananyamala. Further west, along the Morogoro Road, were the major planned and unplanned settlements of Magomeni and Manzese. The former had been an important area of middle-income housing since its foundation in the mid-1950s. The growth of Manzese, originally a peri-urban village, was stimulated by the construction of the Morogoro Road in the 1950s and by the

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establishment of an industrial area at nearby Ubungu in 1968. Its population grew from under 5,000 in 1967 to 60,000 in 1988, becoming in the process Tanzania's largest unplanned settlement. It gained notoriety as a location of illicit services, notably the area known as Uwanja wa Fisi ('the Field of Hyenas') where prostitution and the illegal manufacture and sale of alcohol were important commercial activities.¹⁷⁸ Dar es Salaam's other major shanty settlement, Buguruni, expanded to the southwest of the city centre, along Uhuru Street past Ilala and towards the parallel Pugu Road. It grew from around 10,000 in the 1960s to almost 50,000 in 1988; and continued to house an unusually large concentration of Zaramo.¹⁷⁹ South of the Pugu Road lay the original industrial area, and out towards the airport the shanties of Yombo and Kipawa. Towards the Kilwa Road, the most southerly arterial route along which residential communities emerged, lay planned and unplanned settlements in Chang'ombe. The former had been constructed for Indian occupation in the 1950s, but in the postcolonial period the Chang'ombe estate was occupied by African residents. Closer to town lay the venerable shanty settlement of Keko, which had provided accommodation for the urban poor since the town's early days, and remained an important residential location in close proximity to the port, Kariakoo and the town centre. Further down from Keko, the Kilwa Road was dominated by employer-constructed quarters originating in the late-colonial period, with a substantial estate devoted to police housing, and former European quarters attached to the docks at Kurasini which were increasingly occupied by Africans. The southern reaches of the Kilwa Road housed a growing population in planned communities at Temeke and Tandika, and the substantial and rapidly expanding unplanned settlement of Mtoni. Mzinga Creek, to the south of Mtoni, provided a barrier to further southward expansion until the growth of Mbagala in the 1980s.¹⁸⁰

Dar es Salaam's social geography continued to display characteristics of both integration and differentiation. As can be seen from the preceding paragraph the town did not exhibit a strict zonal form of socio-economic differentiation, with settlements of all kinds nestling in close proximity to one another. Nevertheless, the various types of residential community that emerged after independence were characterised by widely differing living conditions. Those suburbs located close to the coast and north of the city centre, notably Oyster Bay and the Msasani peninsula, remained exclusive; comprising of detached houses in substantial gardens and enjoying good infrastructure, amenities and services. Population density was low, at just 8.1 persons per acre in 1978.¹⁸¹ Although now more racially mixed, the area was still colloquially known as Uzunguni—with some literal and metaphorical justification, as it boasted both the highest concentration of 'European' residents and the high quality of living associated with them. Other planned suburbs, such as Upanga, Kinondoni or Sinza, while considerably more densely populated, were also blessed with better infrastructure and more accessible services and amenities. Upanga (which along with Kurasini and central parts of town had a population density of 42.4 per acre in 1978) remained an important area of Indian settlement, though increasingly members of other races also came to live there. Outlying suburbs like Kinondoni (population density around 106 per



Fig. 1.26 *Kariakoo street scene (Swahili houses) (1950s/1960s?)*

Source: Tanzania Information Services

acre in 1978) and Sinza housed an emerging African middle class. Conditions in Dar es Salaam's burgeoning shanties were rather worse. These often labyrinthine settlements were generally hidden from the view: external buildings lining the roadside tended to be of better quality construction than those in the interior of a settlement and were generally commercial rather than residential.¹⁸² Often located in low-lying areas shanties were prone to flooding; though lack of access to clean water was a greater problem, leading to poor sanitation and a high prevalence of disease. Other infrastructure and services, including roads, electricity and health facilities were similarly basic or lacking.¹⁸³

Kariakoo remained the largest concentration of population in Dar es Salaam. Already overcrowded in 1957, when its population numbered 29,000, at a density of 116 persons per acre (in an area designed to accommodate just 76 per acre), by the end of the following decade it had reached 50,000 at 183 per acre.¹⁸⁴ It was not only the residential but also the commercial heart of the African town. By the 1960s Uhuru and Msimbazi Streets were lined with three- to five-storey commercial enterprises. More modernist blocks made their appearance from the 1960s, not least the Ushirika (Cooperative) building on Lumumba Street that loomed over Mnazi Mmoja and eastern Kariakoo, and the brutalist structure erected to replace the colonial market building in 1972. The streets surrounding the market remained the busiest in town; alive



Fig. 1.27 *Aerial view of St. Joseph's Cathedral and city centre (ca. 1960)*

Source: Tanzania Information Services

with commercial and other activity, where, according to one 1960s observer, '[t]he roar of many... languages is mixed with the drone of the Beatles or the latest Swahili hit'.¹⁸⁵ The residential areas retained a familiar character, composed mostly of unmade roads with sandy surfaces and poor drainage. The single-storey 'Swahili' houses that lined the streets were still predominantly constructed from semi-permanent materials in the late 1960s (just ten percent were made with cement blocks). Only half the houses had electricity and a mere third had piped water.¹⁸⁶

The bazaar formed the other major central concentration of population. As in the colonial period, the area remained the prime business, residential and communal neighbourhood for Dar es Salaam's Indian population. The building boom which had occurred on and off from the mid-1930s, and which had transformed it into a congested quarter of mostly three- or four-storey tenements, continued into the early independence years. In the 1960s substantial modernist apartment blocks were constructed, such as the Investment Promotion Services (IPS) building on Samora Avenue and Azikiwe Street opened by the Aga Khan in 1971—just days before the announcement of the Acquisition of Buildings Act (see below). Communal trusts such as the Aga Khan's Diamond Jubilee Trust Fund played an important part in this area's post-war development.¹⁸⁷ However, in the early 1970s the thirty-odd year construction boom was brought to an end by postcolonial legislation that threatened the city centre's character as the communal heart of Tanzania's Indian population. The 1971 Acquisition of Buildings Act, announced on 22



Fig. 1.28 *Trade Union procession through Dar es Salaam to mark May Day (1960s)*

Source: Tanzania Information Services

April 1971 to bring greater equality in Tanzania's highly differentiated housing sector through the nationalization of second homes, resulted in the acquisition by the National Housing Corporation of nearly 3,000 buildings in Dar es Salaam between 1971-3, of which 96 percent belonged to South Asians.¹⁸⁸ Alongside its economic levelling effect, it was anticipated that this would result in the de-segregation of Uhindini. However, although in the wake of the act

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more Africans did come to reside there, few stayed long and the community remained overwhelmingly Indian. Its lasting impact was rather on this neighbourhood's communal character, with a substantial exodus (from Tanzania) of the formerly predominant Ismailis, who as the principal property-owners lost most from nationalization. They were replaced by an influx of mainly Ithna'Asheri and Hindu Indians, amongst other things fleeing increasing rural insecurity and the consequences of the 1971 act in smaller upcountry urban centres.¹⁸⁹

Dar es Salaam's position as hub of Tanganyika's (from 1964 Tanzania's) socio-economic, cultural and even—despite Dodoma becoming capital in 1974—political life was entrenched after independence. With the achievement of nationhood it attained an international profile. Ambassadorial and consular representatives flooded into the city during the 1960s, from nine consulates in 1960 to forty-four embassies, high commissions, and consulates by 1967. As the capital of a frontline state, over the next two decades Dar es Salaam played host to liberation movements from throughout Southern Africa, and also served as the headquarters of the Liberation Council for the Organization for African Unity. The rapid influx of political refugees, students, and freedom fighters introduced a new element into Dar es Salaam's population.¹⁹⁰ In 1969, it was the location of the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, leader of the Mozambican nationalist movement Frelimo. Dar es Salaam's popular culture was also influenced by and attracted musicians from neighbouring countries, notably the musical dynamo that was the Congo.¹⁹¹ Meanwhile, the university, established in 1961 and a hotseat of radicalism in the late 1960s and 1970s, attracted scholars and students (including current Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni) from throughout East Africa and further afield. Regional economic links were also strengthened. A substantial increase occurred in the transit trade from Zambia in particular, after Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. In 1966, 44,000 tons of Zambian copper were exported through Dar es Salaam port; by 1968 this had risen to around 200,000 tons.¹⁹² Increased Zambian trade accelerated the construction of new deep-water berths in 1970 and eventually led to the construction of the Tazara Railway in the mid-1970s, providing an important infrastructural link to Dar es Salaam's southwestern hinterland.

While its industrial development remained modest by international and even regional standards, Dar es Salaam became the nation's economic powerhouse. This was reflected by activity at the port. In 1967 it handled around 63 percent of Tanzania's main export crops, and the total annual exports and imports passing through the port had doubled since 1957 to around two million tons.¹⁹³ Elsewhere in the city substantial postcolonial investment occurred. Major industrial developments included the Wazo cement factory, an oil refinery and the new industrial estate at Ubungu, where the Friendship Textile Mill alone employed over 3,000 workers when it opened in 1967.¹⁹⁴ In the first decade after independence the construction industry also remained buoyant, with over 8,000 houses built by the National Housing Corporation, and substantial development occurring in the city centre in the private and state sectors. There was also a significant expansion in government

employment—between 1966-76 the civil service expanded at an average annual rate of 13.3 percent—which Dar es Salaam in particular benefited from as the administrative and (until 1974, at least) political capital.¹⁹⁵ In 1967 Dar es Salaam's share of national formal employment was almost twenty percent, and over the following decade wages earned there constituted on average over one third of the national wage bill.¹⁹⁶ Recorded employment in Dar es Salaam grew from around 33,000 in 1959, to 65,720 in 1967, and to around 130,000 in 1978 (see Fig. 1.29).¹⁹⁷

Fig.1.29 *Employment in Dar es Salaam, 1966 & 1979*

Sector	1966	%	1979	%
Manufacturing	13,219	22.4	37,410	29
Commerce	6,937	11.7	14,000	10.8
Public services & utilities	16,529	28	33,000	25.6
Transportation & communication	11,655	19.7	26,000	20.1
Construction	10,028	17	16,000	12.4
Agriculture	653	11.1	2,600	2
Mining & quarrying	49	0.1	90	0.1
Total	59,070		129,100	

Source: 1978 Masterplan cited in De Boer, 'Urban renewal', p. 39

While there was significant growth in formal employment in the first post-independence decades, however, more striking was the dramatic expansion of both the informal economy and unemployment—despite an official urban policy that resolutely opposed both. Even with the relatively benign economic conditions that prevailed up to the mid-1970s, the formal economy's capacity for job-creation was swamped by rapid urban growth. A serious problem of structural unemployment which had first manifested itself in the late-colonial period, influenced by a complex mix of demographic, socio-cultural and economic factors, continued to deteriorate after independence.¹⁹⁸ A social survey conducted in Kariakoo in the late 1960s recorded male unemployment at 11 percent and those men who identified themselves as engaged in petty trade or as self-employed artisans at 14 percent: a combined total of 25 percent non-waged.¹⁹⁹ Collier calculated national urban rates of 10.2 and 12.2 percent




Fig. 1.30 *Dar es Salaam's urban growth, 1945-1998*

Source: Based on map in John Briggs & David Mwamfuye, 'Peri-urban development in an era of structural adjustment in Africa: the city of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', *Urban Studies* 37 (4): 797-809. The authors thank Mike Shand, John Briggs and David Mwamfuye for making this map available for this book.

respectively in 1969, and of 16 and 21 percent in 1975.²⁰⁰ Deteriorating economic conditions from this time, and particularly post-1979, had a dramatic impact on the situation. In a 1978 survey Ishumi found a quarter of those aged 16-40 identified themselves as unemployed.²⁰¹ Half of them depended upon relatives or friends to get by; a quarter engaged in occasional petty trade, notably the sale of fruits—a perennial standby for those on the economic margins.²⁰² A third originated from Coast Region, and 13.3 percent from Dar es Salaam itself. Around the same time a dramatic decline in the real value of wages—which fell between 1974-88 by 83 percent—led to an efflorescence of informal economic activity, as even those in salaried employment were no longer guaranteed a subsistence. By the mid-1980s those entirely reliant on some form of self-employment (including urban agriculture) had increased dramatically to around 60 percent of the adult population; whilst two-thirds of those with waged work were also reliant on self-employment to get by.²⁰³

The process of informalization was even more pronounced in relation to urban housing. The expansion of unplanned settlements that had been a feature of the late-colonial town, accelerated after independence. Public housing construction, which entailed a programme designed to address both demand and, theoretically at least, socio-economic residential differentiation, was swamped by rapid urban growth.²⁰⁴ By 1979 a majority of the urban population was housed in unplanned settlements—478,489 out of a population of 769,445. These included not only impoverished communities such as Manzese or Mikoroshoni, but also middle class residential areas like Kimara and Mlalakua.²⁰⁵

This informalization of residential and economic urban space flew in the face of official policy which sought both to exert control over the urban arena and to restrict urbanization. Indeed, as in the colonial period, governmental policy remained resolutely anti-urban. This was especially so after the Arusha Declaration. *Ujamaa* philosophy fortified official suspicions of urban populations, Dar es Salaam's above all, as thriftless idlers engaging in unproductive activities that contributed little to nation-building. An ILO report from 1967 that identified a significant shift in the terms of trade between urban wage-earners and agriculturalists, served to confirm the view of urbanization as a process resulting in the essential exploitation of a primarily rural nation. The most dramatic administrative expression of such attitudes saw the city stripped of its status as both capital, which was moved to the significantly smaller if more central Dodoma in 1974, and municipality, the city being divided into three districts of Temeke, Ilala and Kinondoni in 1972.²⁰⁶ They found more pervasive expression in an official rhetoric of anti-urbanism that sought to de-legitimize occupation of urban space, and an accompanying policy of purges in the form of campaigns against the unemployed, underemployed and informally employed who, as we have seen, constituted a growing proportion of the urban population. Through such measures, TANU (renamed *Chama cha Mapinduzi* or CCM after 1977) officials sought to guide urban development. However, Dar es Salaam's evolution as a rapidly growing city in which the informal was in the ascendant had by the 1950s already developed a momentum that both colonial and postcolonial administrators proved powerless to resist.²⁰⁷

Dar es Salaam since *mageuzi*, 1984 – present

When Julius Nyerere handed over office to Ali Hassan Mwinyi in November 1984, the Tanzanian economy was in a shambles. Real GDP per capita had declined for four consecutive years, compared with a 5 percent average growth during the 1960s; the country's debt-service ratio stood at 70 percent.²⁰⁸ Mwinyi agreed to the adoption of conventional liberalization reforms required by the International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Programme, and *ujamaa* soon gave way to *mageuzi*, or the capitalist 'transformation' deeply felt among Dar es Salaam's population. State retrenchment meant the steady replacement of education and health care subsidies with cost-sharing. The subsequent quality of schooling depended increasingly on a family's ability to pay rising school fees, particularly at the sought-after private institutions, while patients were required to provide payments for treatment as the state introduced charges for health care during 1993-95.²⁰⁹ The full effects of more recent (since 2000) privatizations of garbage collection and domestic water provision in Dar es Salaam remain unclear, except that women continue to bear a disproportionate burden in the organization of environmental health management within the home.²¹⁰ Cost-sharing in health care came at a time when the AIDS epidemic (which first reached Dar es Salaam in 1984) was fast accelerating throughout Africa. A study conducted around this time determined that over 48 percent of women's deaths in Dar es Salaam were AIDS-related. In 2002, the HIV prevalence among those attending antenatal care clinics in Dar es Salaam was 11.5 percent, the second highest rate in Tanzania behind Mbeya; that same year over 50 percent of all inpatients in Tanzanian hospitals were infected with HIV. The state's privatizing health care system has come to rely heavily on bilateral and World Bank aid to manage the spread and treatment of this disease.²¹¹ Social security similarly moved towards privatisation, with 85 percent of Dar es Salaam's poor covered by informal social security systems such as *upatu* rotating credit associations, compared to 15 percent covered by formal ones.²¹² In many ways the state's retrenchment under *mageuzi* simply acknowledged, if not positively recognized or secured, the informalization of the urban economy that had dominated the *ujamaa* years.

Among the many things lifted with the liberalization of Tanzania's economy was the socialist stigma of urbanization. Middle-class anxiety towards the urban migration of unemployed and under-employed male youth has certainly persisted—directed in particular towards *machinga* street hawkers—but in the era of *mageuzi* there is no longer a guiding ideology to explain why these men should remain in rural areas, nor a state commitment to carry out their repatriation. The *ujamaa* veil that had tempered and concealed, if not quite wiped out, the conspicuous consumption of Dar es Salaam's elite was lifted to reveal a starved appetite for consumer goods and luxury items of all sorts provided by the 'container economy' centred in the Persian Gulf. This unleashing of *tamaa* (lust or desire) has resulted in a competitive consumerism²¹³

which has not only allowed a growing business elite to flaunt their wealth, but paradoxically has enabled poorer people to dress and otherwise fashion themselves in a middle class style. Such developments sharply challenge the conventions of Dar es Salaam's established middle class, who 'nostalgically long for the lost days of egalitarianism' while failing to recognise that *mageuzi* has helped 'to create spaces of hope for young men from the rural areas that would never have been available under the socialist regime'.²¹⁴ The most visible change that privatization has brought to Dar es Salaam has been in urban transportation. The rapid expansion of relatively affordable *daladala* buses during the 1990s has considerably enlarged the scope for—as well as dependence upon—urban travel among commuters, sellers, consumers, and schoolchildren alike.²¹⁵

Mageuzi heralded changes in gender as well as class relations. The relentless informalization of economic activity in Dar es Salaam brought with it a significant shift in earning power away from male salary-earners and towards women traders engaged in private income-generating activities in many Dar es Salaam households. It was a remarkable change—R. H. Sabot had found that 66 percent of women had no source of income in 1970-71; by the late 1980s, Aili Marie Tripp found that 69 percent of the women she surveyed were self-employed and 9 percent wage-employed; in the early 2000s, Brigit Obrist found 69 percent of the women she surveyed in Ilala to be involved in generating income.²¹⁶ Tripp explains this transformation:

These [household-level] changes radically undermined the direction of existing dependency relationships and ties of obligation. At the societal level the former household dependence on wage earners was reversed, making the wage earners dependent on the informal incomes of other household members. Similarly, the dependence of urban women on men, of children on their parents, and of parents on their adult children was altered radically and resources began to flow in the opposite direction because of the way in which the crisis undermined wage incomes.²¹⁷

Luce Cloutier found that most of the women she interviewed were making more money than their husbands, while nearly two-thirds of them shouldered 'all responsibilities for the maintenance of the family'.²¹⁸ Female immigration to Dar es Salaam sharply rose during the 1970s, and by 1988 demographic equality between the sexes was finally achieved.²¹⁹ It is important, however, not to presume that these shifts associated with economic informalization has led to a full collapse in male-dominated bureaucratic earning power: Briggs and Mwamfupe found in 1997 that around two-thirds of houses under construction in peri-urban Dar es Salaam were for middle-class state employees, some 20,000 of whom enjoyed a Shs. 100,000/- monthly housing allowance in addition to their salary.²²⁰

Although Tanzania is still overwhelmingly a CCM country, the same can no longer be said about Dar es Salaam. Opposition parties, re-legalized in 1992 after a nearly thirty-year ban, remain based almost entirely in the capital, building their political support from the centre outward.²²¹ With higher levels of education, communications, and expectations compared with rural regions,

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the population of Dar es Salaam—like many other African cities—nurtures oppositionist politics, particularly among the young, although this trend was slow to register in votes cast. National opposition peaked early in the first presidential election in 1995, when ex-CCM Minister Augustine Mrema received nearly 28 percent of the vote against Benjamin Mkapa. Yet Mrema, the country's leading opposition figure, took only 21 percent of the vote in Dar es Salaam.²²² This figure hardly reflected his enormous (if fleeting) popularity in the capital. The following year Mrema dramatically captured the vacated Temeke parliamentary seat in a by-election, chasing Dar es Salaam's latent anti-establishment vote by stressing CCM corruption scandals, the need for *uzawa* or African 'indigenisation' of local businesses, and the promise to tackle urban poverty and growing lawlessness. Mrema proved enormously popular with urban unemployed youth, and even courted the hitherto estranged Muslim youth vote by donning a *kofia* (Muslim cap) and campaigning alongside the controversial Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda.²²³ Although Mrema's moment quickly passed, the disparate streams of political opposition that he tried to unite – anger at corruption,²²⁴ the popularity of vigilante justice,²²⁵ *uzawa*,²²⁶ Muslim distrust of CCM and government, and the contradictory desires both to liberalize the economy and redistribute wealth to the poor—have endured in Dar es Salaam's populist rhetoric. Support for the opposition grew in Dar es Salaam in the 2000 and 2005 elections, awarding the leading non-CCM candidate in the 2005 presidential election, Ibrahim Lipumba, nearly 22.8 percent of the vote, compared to the 11.7 percent of the vote he received nationwide.²²⁷ Yet much of this opposition remains only potential—the capital simply cannot turn out the vote like its rural or provincial town counterparts. In the 2005 election, only 61.2 percent of registered voters in Dar es Salaam turned out to vote, the second lowest turnout in the country.²²⁸ Surpassing elections, religion has increasingly served as a vehicle for expressing political dissatisfaction, particularly among Dar es Salaam's Muslim population. Riots broke out in Kariakoo in 1993 following rumours that Christian butchers had secretly sold pork as beef to their Muslim customers. A more serious riot occurred at the Mwembechai mosque in Magomeni in 1998, following the arrest of the mosque's Imam for blasphemy against Jesus Christ in his sermons. Many Muslims in Dar es Salaam, as elsewhere in the country, feel under-represented in government and ill-served by national educational institutions.²²⁹ Christianity also continues to attract the disaffected and dispossessed who live in Dar es Salaam, particularly Pentecostalism.²³⁰

Mageuzi also brought a profusion of media outlets and entertainment forms, one of the undeniable boons of liberalisation for Dar es Salaam. Privately-owned newspapers and magazines proliferated from 242 in 1992 to 693 just two years later. A significant number of these new publications were 'tabloid' journals that criticized political leaders through sexual innuendo, many of which were shut down by government. Newspapers remain overwhelmingly urban in their creation and audience—in 2004, 90 percent of Tanzania's licensed papers were circulated in urban areas, 50 percent in Dar es Salaam alone.²³¹ Radio, particularly FM radio, has exploded since its liberalization in 1993, ending a 32-year long state monopoly over radio broadcasting, although

the Tanzania Broadcasting Commission still retains (and exercises) the right to revoke licences for failing to comply with the Broadcasting Act—namely to avoid vulgarity. By 2001 there were ten independent radio stations operating in Dar es Salaam, and 33 nation-wide by 2004, most of which were owned by wealthy individuals and dedicated to music broadcasting.²³² Television arrived in Dar es Salaam only as late as 1994, serving as the final death knell for the city's ailing cinema business already weakened by the video tape revolution.²³³ Four privately-owned stations were launched in 1994—Independent Television (ITV), Dar es Salaam Television (DTV), Coastal Television Network (CTN) and Cable Entertainment Network (CEN)—all of which were based in the capital and focus primarily on events in the capital. It has truly been a *mageuzi* medium, as Tanzania was (until 2000) one of the very few African countries without a state-owned television station. Although radio remains the main medium for people to get news, television has been quickly making gains, and its full success has yet to be measured.

Like most African cities, the urban infrastructure of Dar es Salaam has long been eclipsed by population growth. The 2002 national census placed Dar es Salaam's population at just under 2.5 million people, though this figure seemed low to many observers; current estimates place the figure at over 3 million people. Such population growth has hastened the transfer of peri-urban land from traditional landowners (*mawinyi*), most of whom are Zaramo, to more recently arrived immigrants, mainly from the salaried or trading middle-class.²³⁴ This type of urban growth relies heavily on bilateral aid projects to create trunk roads into and around the city to facilitate commercial and commuter transport. Such projects have deeply affected the recent shape of Dar es Salaam, with ribbon-style development reaching 30 kilometres to the west and north by the early 1990s into 'rural territory pierced by finger-like projections of urban land use, especially residential'.²³⁵ Lack of planning is no longer synonymous with poverty—robust middle class neighbourhoods have emerged in unplanned areas such as Segerea and Makongo. While the capacity of major urban roads has undoubtedly improved since the 1980s, smaller streets have suffered severe deterioration, a development met with the private-sector response of increased reliance on durable four-wheel drive vehicles. Amidst a profusion of high-investment building construction in the city centre, Kariakoo, and the northern suburbs of Oyster Bay, Msasani and Mikocheni, the 1990s witnessed the relentless expansion of unplanned and unserviced squatter developments. Due to the dangers of flooding, neighbourhoods lying along the Msimbazi Creek such as Hanna Nasif and Vingunguti are home to mostly poor housing structures, which rely on pit latrine for waste disposal and the nearby creek for water. A survey done in these areas found that 71 percent of households had no electricity, 96 percent had no telephones, and 77 percent of houses were made of temporary building materials.²³⁶

Dar es Salaam today offers the paradox of unprecedented economic growth despite a plainly failing infrastructure. The decade of Mkapa was a strong one measured in conventional economic terms, with GDP growth rising from 3.7 percent in 1995 to 6.7 percent in 2005, and inflation falling over the same period from 27.1 percent to 4.3 percent.²³⁷ Dar es Salaam acquired a growing

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appearance of a major economic centre. On account of the country's political stability and the city's relative personal security, Dar es Salaam has become an attractive site for the offices of both profit and non-profit organizations. One striking example of this is the sudden profusion of banks in the capital following the banking sector's liberalization in 1995. The city today hosts offices of major international firms such as Standard Chartered Bank, Standbic Bank, Citibank, and Barclays Bank, as well as significant local operations such as Exim Bank and Akiba Commercial Bank. The Dar es Salaam stock exchange, founded in 1996 and opened for trading in 1998, held the distinction of being—in an echo of *ujamaa*—the only African stock market that banned non-citizens from participation. Dar es Salaam's harbour remains very much the second commercial port of East Africa, importing and exporting roughly 40 percent of what Mombasa traffics in any given year. Nevertheless, with eleven deep-berth ports modernized in mid-1990s and its container terminal privatized in 2000, the port of Dar es Salaam continues to serve as the consumer goods gateway of lower East Africa. Import volume held steady throughout the 1990s at around 3.2 million tons per annum, rising to 4.25 million tons in 2003. Export volumes continue to lag far behind imports, falling from 0.9 million tons in 1994 to 0.76 million tons in 2003.²³⁸

Dar es Salaam's recent economic, as well as demographic, growth highlights the gross inadequacy of the city's infrastructure. The biggest infrastructural crisis facing Dar es Salaam today, which hardly discriminates between its wealthier and poorer neighbourhoods, relates to water and energy.²³⁹ Poor urban water supplies and distribution are endemic and growing problems that lead to self-destructive strategies such as vandalising water mains to avoid payments. Urban electricity provision remains in the precarious hands of a national grid system that relies on hydroelectricity generated by dams along the Rufiji River, which suffered chronically low water levels by 2006 and can hardly be expected to meet future increases in projected energy demands. Off-grid households continue to rely on charcoal for fuel, which has led to serious deforestation around Dar es Salaam which, in turn, weakens the ability of regional soils to retain much-needed water. The city's virtuous circle of economic growth unleashed in the age of *mageuzi* appears inextricably linked to its vicious cycle of environmental and infrastructural deterioration.²⁴⁰

For all of its economic difficulties, the value of land and property in Dar es Salaam is reaching unprecedented heights. Kariakoo, the former 'native quarter' once dominated by thatch-roofed, mud-and-wattle houses, became a most unlikely 'skyscraper' development area in the 1990s, and now boasts some of the highest land values in East Africa. Meanwhile, high land values are also resulting in the destruction of the rich architectural heritage of the commercial quarter as old—often listed—buildings are demolished to make way for unsightly high rise apartment blocks.²⁴¹ Also at stake today in Dar es Salaam is the future of the city's public space. Urban public lands are constantly under threat of seizure, by wealthy developers and space-hungry squatters alike. In late 1993, part of Mnazi Mmoja was fenced off for the construction of shops after local authorities secretly granted an Arab businessman a building concession. A few days later a mob turned out to destroy the embryonic

construction, ending the development and making the sale of this invaluable public space politically impossible thereafter, or at least thus far.²⁴² More typical have been the perennial struggles between planning authorities and squatters over the rights of the latter to occupy unused public land, such as Jangwani and other floodplains along the Msimbazi Creek (see above), as well as innumerable buildings along major thoroughfares such as Morogoro Road.

Dar es Salaam continues its seemingly inexorable growth. In one sense, this city's history is part of a wider urbanization that represents the greatest spatial-demographic development of 20th century Africa, a development that shows little sign of slowing down. In another sense, it represents the specific history of the region. As a planned city of Zanzibari imperialism, it has transformed into an important site of European colonial power, African engagement with and seizure of that power, and finally a post-colonial metropolis that seeks to become a major economic and cultural centre of Eastern Africa. Earlier local layers of the town's history, represented by conflict between local indigenes on the one hand and outsiders on the other, has since been enveloped in a wider territorial history where Dar es Salaam merely represents the centre stage of nationalist ambitions and disappointments. Since the demise of *ujamaa*, Dar es Salaam has become a truly global city, connected to the world as never before yet beset with seemingly intractable difficulties of environment, infrastructure, and widening disparities between rich and poor. Such a place requires a particular sharpness of mind to thrive, and therefore it is fitting that the most enduring nick-name given to post-colonial Dar es Salaam has been Bongoland (literally, 'brain'-land).

Notes

¹ See John Gray, 'Dar es Salaam under the Sultans of Zanzibar', *Tanganyika Notes & Records* (hereafter *TNR*) 33 (1952), pp. 1-3; E. C. Baker, 'Note on the Washomvi of Dar es Salaam', *TNR* 23 (1947), pp. 47-48. For a rich ethnographic history of the Shomvi, see Geoffrey Ross Owens, 'The Shomvi: a precursor to global ethnoscaping and indigenization in precolonial East Africa', *Ethnohistory* 53:4 (2006), pp. 715-751.

² For Mboamaji, see Stephen J. Rockel, 'Forgotten caravan towns in 19th century Tanzania: Mbwanaji and Mpwapwa', *Azania* XLI (2006), pp. 1-25.

³ E.C. Baker, 'Memorandum on the social conditions of Dar es Salaam', 4 June 1931, pp. 2-4, copy in SOAS special collections.

⁴ Jonathon Glassman, *Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888* (Portsmouth, 1995), pp. 79-114.

⁵ J.E.G. Sutton, 'Dar es Salaam: a sketch of a hundred years', *TNR* 71 (1970), p. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁷ Carl Velten, *Prosa und Poesie der Suaheli* (Berlin, 1907), p. 291.

⁸ Description of Dr Seward, in report to Bombay Government, 10 November 1866, cited in Gray, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁹ Père LeRoy, 17 April 1886, 2K1.1b7, Archives Générales Spiritains, Chevilly-la-Rue, France. The authors are indebted to Steven Fabian for his notes on this source, and to Gerard Vieira and Vincent O'Toole at the Archives Générales Spiritains for permitting us to use this material.

¹⁰ The Mackinnon Road (commenced in 1877) was an attempt, led by Britons William Mackinnon and Thomas Foxwell Buxton, to open up the East African interior to 'legitimate commerce'.

¹¹ Gray, 'Dar es Salaam', pp. 10-17.

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¹² MacKinnon Papers, Box 76/File 59, correspondence to MacKinnon, 14 May 1879, in SOAS special collections. The authors again thank Steven Fabian for bringing this source to our attention.

¹³ Leroy, *op. cit.*; Gray, 'Dar es Salaam', p. 17.

¹⁴ Clement Gillman, 'Dar es Salaam, 1860 to 1940: a story of growth and change', *TNR* 20 (1945), p. 3.

¹⁵ For a convincing presentation of this argument, see Steven Fabian 'Curing the cancer of the colony: Bagamoyo, Dar es Salaam and socio-economic struggle in German East Africa', article currently under review for publication and in the authors' possession.

¹⁶ Deborah Bryceon, 'A century of food supply in Dar es Salaam', in Jane Guyer, ed., *Feeding African cities: Studies in regional social history* (Manchester, 1987), p. 158.

¹⁷ Leroy, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ Glassman, *Feasts and Riot*, p. 183.

¹⁹ The *livali* was the Sultan's official representative in Dar es Salaam.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

²¹ Velten, *Prosa*, pp. 292-3.

²² For a full account of the Abushiri rebellion, named after Abushiri bin Salim, an 'Arab' plantation-owner, see Glassman, *Feasts and Riot*.

²³ The DOAG meanwhile remained curiously distant from Dar es Salaam, only moving its headquarters from Zanzibar to the German colonial capital in 1905. Juhani Koponen, *Development for Exploitation: German colonial policies in mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914* (Helsinki, 1994), pp. 116, 187.

²⁴ Franck Raimbault, 'L'évolution de l'espace péri-urbain à Dar-es-Salaam durant la colonisation allemande (1890-1914)', in Bernard Calas (ed.), *De Dar es Salaam à Bongoland* (Nairobi/Paris, 2006), p. 38. The ongoing work of Franck Raimbault, currently dissertating at the Sorbonne, promises to make an exceptionally important contribution to our knowledge of Dar es Salaam during German colonial rule.

²⁵ *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 25 (1889), p. 211.

²⁶ Slaves instead would obtain their freedom on an individual basis, usually either through official manumission by government or voluntary manumission by their owners. Thaddeus Sunseri, *Vilimani: Labor migration and rural change in early colonial Tanzania* (Portsmouth, 2002), p. 36. See also Jan-Georg Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa, c. 1884-1914* (Oxford, 2006). By 1898, 197 slaves had been officially emancipated by the government in Dar es Salaam. A. Seidel, *Dar-es-Salaam: Die Hauptstadt Deutsch-Ostafrikas* (Berlin, 1898), p. 26. However, the actual number emancipated in the District of Dar es Salaam during the 1890s may have exceeded one thousand slaves. Franck Raimbault, personal communication, 17 June 2006.

²⁷ For the role of Indian investment in the development of colonial Mombasa and Nairobi, see Zarina Patel, *Challenge to Colonialism: The Struggles of Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee for Equal rights in Kenya* (Nairobi, 1997).

²⁸ W. T. Casson, 'Architectural notes on Dar es Salaam', *TNR* 71 (1970), p. 183. See also Janet Berry Hess, *Art and Architecture in Postcolonial Africa* (Jefferson NC, 2006), chapter 5.

²⁹ Casson, pp. 181-3.

³⁰ Koponen, *Development*, p. 623; David Henry Anthony, 'Culture and society in a town in transition: a people's history of Dar es Salaam, 1865-1939', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1983, p. 81.

³¹ Hermann Paasche, *Deutsch-Ostafrika* (Berlin, 1906), p. 75.

³² Gillman, 'Growth and change', p. 14.

³³ Seidel, *Hauptstadt*, p. 1; *Medizinal-Berichte über die Deutschen Schutzgebiete für das Jahr 1904/05* (Berlin, 1905), p. 26.

³⁴ Gillman, 'Growth and change', p. 15.

³⁵ Jürgen Becher, *Dar es Salaam, Tanga und Tabora: Stadtentwicklung in Tansania unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft (1885-1914)* (Stuttgart, 1997), p. 42.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5; August Leue, *Dar-es-Salaam: Bilder aus dem Kolonialleben* (Berlin, 1903), pp. 25-48.

³⁷ Seidel, *Hauptstadt*, p. 9.

³⁸ Karl Vorlauffer, *Koloniale und nachkoloniale Stadtplanung in Dar es Salaam* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), p. 15.

³⁹ Raimbault, 'L'évolution de l'espace péri-urbain', p. 45.

⁴⁰ Seidel, *Hauptstadt*, p. 16.

- ⁴¹ *Medizinal-Berichte über die Deutschen Schutzgebiete für das Jahr 1904/05*, p. 26.
- ⁴² Vorlauffer, p. 13. Cf. chapters by Kironde and Brennan in this volume.
- ⁴³ Raimbault, 'L'évolution de l'espace péri-urbain', pp. 72-3.
- ⁴⁴ Vorlauffer, *Stadtplanung*, pp. 18-19.
- ⁴⁵ *Medizinal-Berichte über die Deutschen Schutzgebiete für das Jahr 1904/05*, p. 26-27.
- ⁴⁶ Sutton, 'Dar es Salaam', p. 19; Seidel, *Hauptstadt*, p. 1.
- ⁴⁷ Fabian, 'Cancer'.
- ⁴⁸ Raimbault, 'L'évolution de l'espace péri-urbain', p. 101.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*; John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 161; J.A.K. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam* (London, 1963), pp. 44-47.
- ⁵⁰ *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 25 (1889), p. 197. Leue termed this dance 'lailailala'. On *telemama* in German East Africa, see Iliffe, *Modern History*, p. 238. See also Graebner's chapter herein.
- ⁵¹ Seidel, *Hauptstadt*, pp. 34-5, 37.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- ⁵³ S. von Sicard, *The Lutheran Church on the Coast of Tanzania, 1887-1914* (Uppsala, 1970), p. 88.
- ⁵⁴ Fabian, 'Cancer', Gillman, 'Growth and change', pp. 7, 15.
- ⁵⁵ Gillman, 'Growth and change', p. 9.
- ⁵⁶ Seidel, *Hauptstadt*, pp. 29-30.
- ⁵⁷ Raimbault, 'L'évolution de l'espace péri-urbain', p. 43ff.; *idem.*, 'La communauté indienne à Dar-es-Salaam durant la domination allemande (1891-1914): position et positionnement au sein d'une société coloniale d'un groupe en situation de diaspora économique', unpublished paper delivered at Lisbon Conference on Indian Ocean, September 2003, copy in authors' possession; and *idem.*, 'Les stratégies de reclassement des élites arabes et indiennes à Dar-es-Salaam durant la colonisation allemande (1891-1914)', *Hypothèses* 5 (2001), pp. 109-118.
- ⁵⁸ Raimbault, 'Communauté indienne'.
- ⁵⁹ Raimbault, 'L'évolution de l'espace péri-urbain', p. 90.
- ⁶⁰ Becher, *Dar es Salaam, Tanga und Tabora*, p. 55.
- ⁶¹ Gillman, 'Growth and change', p. 15.
- ⁶² Ross Anderson, *The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign, 1914-1918* (Stroud, 2004), pp. 31, 108.
- ⁶³ The German civil administration had moved to Tabora in 1915. Gillman, 'Growth and change', pp. 15-16.
- ⁶⁴ C.P. Fendall, *The East African Force 1915-1919* (Nashville, 1921), pp. 156-57.
- ⁶⁵ Bryceson, 'Century of food Supply', pp. 162-63.
- ⁶⁶ Dar es Salaam District Annual Report for 1919/20, Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) 1733/1.
- ⁶⁷ R.R. Scott, 'Public health services in Dar es Salaam in the 'Twenties', *East African Medical Journal* 40 (1963), p. 351. But compare this to Gillman's figures Dar es Salaam's population: 22,500 in 1913, and 24,600 in 1921. Gillman, 'Growth and change', p. 22.
- ⁶⁸ According to a post-independence article in *The Nationalist* (9 July 1966), it was so named because the first Maulid prayers were uttered here, as they were at Mnazi Mmoja in Zanzibar. For a more detailed analysis of colonial urban planning, see the chapter by Kironde.
- ⁶⁹ Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam* (Oxford/Dar es Salaam, 2005), pp. 65-7, 158.
- ⁷⁰ Indeed, only the high cost of purchasing existing property had prevented the administration from establishing a second 'cordon sanitaire' along the lines of Mnazi Mmoja, between Zones I and II. See J.M.L. Kironde, 'The Evolution of the land use structure of Dar es Salaam 1890-1990: a study in the effects of land policy', Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nairobi (1994), pp. 169-73; James R. Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 1916-1976', Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University (2002), p. 27.
- ⁷¹ Baker, 'Memorandum', pp. 10, 15; cf. chapter by Brennan below.
- ⁷² Sutton, 'Dar es Salaam', p. 12; British Institute in Eastern Africa (BIEA), 'Uhindini Building Survey, 2004' (data stored in BIEA library).
- ⁷³ Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 136-7; 166; 180-1.
- ⁷⁴ Notably in the Indian newspapers, the *Tanganyika Herald* and the *Tanganyika Opinion*.
- ⁷⁵ Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 179-81.
- ⁷⁶ See chapter by Brennan below.

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⁷⁷ The main market was moved from the Indian quarter to occupy a prefabricated structure imported from Germany in 1914. Gillman, 'Growth and change'.

⁷⁸ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 16.

⁷⁹ The 'Swahili' house is a rectangular building usually containing six rooms opening off a central corridor.

⁸⁰ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 31.

⁸¹ Iliffe, *Modern History*, p. 386; Burton, *African Underclass*, p. 62.

⁸² See e.g., Leslie, *Survey*, p. 92.

⁸³ Magomeni had 105 Zaramo taxable males as opposed to 120 Nyamwezi (63) and others; in Msasani the ratio was 170:235. The surprisingly high proportion of 'outsiders' in Msasani may be accounted for by the proximity of the Msasani Sisal Estate and local quarries. It also probably reflects the embryonic settlement of Mikoroshoni, which was to become one of Dar es Salaam's most significant post-war 'shanty' communities (see below). Leslie dates houses here back to 'the early thirties and beyond'. District Officer (hereafter DO) Fryer to Provincial Commissioner (hereafter PC) Eastern 11 April 1930, TNA 12801/1; Leslie, *Survey*, p. 95.

⁸⁴ Burton, *African Underclass*, p. 155.

⁸⁵ Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', p. 62.

⁸⁶ In addition, extra-territorial trade was also important. Trade from the Belgian Congo constituted as much as a third of the port's exports in the 1920s. Adolfo C. Mascarenhas, 'The port of Dar es Salaam', p. 111, in Sutton, *Dar es Salaam*, pp. 85-118.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 94-5.

⁸⁸ See Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp. 406-12 *et passim*.

⁸⁹ For Erica Fiah and *Kivetu*, see *ibid.*, pp. 377-9, 393-5; Nicholas Westcott, 'Erica Fiah: an East African radical', *Journal of African History* (hereafter *JAH*) 22:2 (1981), pp. 85-101; Anthony, 'Culture', chapter 5.

⁹⁰ These included the *Tanganyika Times* and *Tanganyika Standard*, both European papers, and the Indian-owned *Tanganyika Herald* and *Tanganyika Opinion*. In addition, the official Swahili publication *Mambo Leo* was based in Dar es Salaam.

⁹¹ Anthony, 'Culture', chapter 4. In contemporary Swahili *hoteli* translates as restaurant, and *migahawa* is more commonly used than *mikahawani*.

⁹² Iliffe, *Modern History*, p. 391.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 392.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 392. For *beni* see Terence Ranger, *Dance and Society in Eastern Africa: The beni ngoma* (London, 1975). Cf. Graebner's chapter below.

⁹⁵ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 74.

⁹⁶ DO Fryer to PC Eastern, 10 July 1931, Native Census Results, TNA 61/167.

⁹⁷ Shomvi (121) were probably under-reported in the 1931 census.

⁹⁸ Jan-Georg Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition*, p. 217.

⁹⁹ Leslie, *Survey*, pp.49-50; Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', pp. 107-8.

¹⁰⁰ Leslie, *Survey*, p. 38.

¹⁰¹ Leslie, *Survey*, p. 11.

¹⁰² Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', pp. 139-50.

¹⁰³ Though tensions over who should properly be accorded true indigene status also existed between Zaramo and Shomvi.

¹⁰⁴ Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', pp. 103-6.

¹⁰⁵ For a recent analysis of 'Swahili' integration in Dar es Salaam focusing on Manzese, Buguruni and Ilala, see Adrienne Polomack, 'Mixité et territorialité dans une ville en pleine expansion: les banlieues dans la formation de Dar es Salaam', in Bernard Calas, *De Dar es Salaam à Bongoland*, pp. 131-197.

¹⁰⁶ Baker, 'Memorandum', pp. 7, 69; Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp. 266, 407; Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 59-61.

¹⁰⁷ See Burton's chapter below.

¹⁰⁸ Baker, talks of an 'alien intelligentsia and a diehard aristocracy living on the memories of its past'. 'Memorandum', p. 69. See also, Andrew Burton, 'Urchins, loafers and the cult of the cowboy: urbanization and delinquency in Dar es Salaam, 1919-61', *JAH* 42:2 (2001), pp. 200-6; Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 57, 59, 72-3.

¹⁰⁹ Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', pp. 104-5 *et passim*.

- ¹¹⁰ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 69.
- ¹¹¹ See Burton, *African Underclass*.
- ¹¹² DO Fryer to PC Eastern, 19 August 1931, TNA 61/167.
- ¹¹³ See Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 65-9.
- ¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- ¹¹⁵ For hawkers, see correspondence in TNA 22243; for peri-urban agriculture, see Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', pp. 57-76 and TNA 57/2/57.
- ¹¹⁶ Out of a workforce of 13,754 recorded in the 1931 census, just 2,639 were registered as literate.
- ¹¹⁷ A.H. Pike, 'Report on Native Affairs in Dar es Salaam Township', p. 8, TNA 18950/Vol.II.
- ¹¹⁸ Baker observed that 'old women... will embark on the building of a house with no ostensible means at their disposal but what they can make from the sale of rice cakes and fried fish'. See also, Leslie, *Survey*, pp. 117, 168; Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', pp. 107-8.
- ¹¹⁹ Anthony, 'Culture', p. 23.
- ¹²⁰ See Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', pp. 119-139.
- ¹²¹ See Burton, 'Adjutants, agents, intermediaries: the Native Administration in Dar es Salaam township, 1919-61', in Andrew Burton (ed.), *The Urban Experience in Eastern Africa* (Nairobi, 2002), pp. 98-118.
- ¹²² For Tanganyika as a whole, see Nicholas Westcott's important (though unpublished) Ph.D. thesis, 'The impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika', University of Cambridge (1982).
- ¹²³ A.H. Pike, 'Memorandum on the Development of African areas of Dar es Salaam Township', 12 July 1944, TNA 61/643/3.
- ¹²⁴ See Burton, *African Underclass*, chapters 4 & 5.
- ¹²⁵ See e.g., Pike, 'Report on Native Affairs'; E.C. Baker, 'Proposals for the re-organization of Dar es Salaam Township and District', 3 July 1940, TNA 20795; M.J.B. Molohan, 'Report on unemployment and wage rates in Dar es Salaam', 27 Sept. 1941, TNA 61/443/1.
- ¹²⁶ See Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', chapter 3; and Brennan's chapter below.
- ¹²⁷ Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 88-91.
- ¹²⁸ For accounts of the 1947 strike, see John Iliffe, 'A history of the dockworkers of Dar es Salaam', *TNR* 71 (1970), pp. 131-4; Issa G. Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania*, London (1986), pp. 171-4; Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 184-5.
- ¹²⁹ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 18.
- ¹³⁰ Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 90, 207-8.
- ¹³¹ Leslie, *Survey*, p. 22. Although these were initially tolerated to ease the house crisis (see Burton, *African Underclass*, p. 90 (fn. 40)), it appears they were subsequently demolished – Leslie (p. 262) makes reference to evictions from Makaburi and Gerezeni.
- ¹³² See Burton, 'Adjutants'.
- ¹³³ See Andrew Burton, 'Townsmen in the making: social engineering and citizenship in Dar es Salaam, 1945-60', *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36:2 (2003), pp. 331-65.
- ¹³⁴ Cyril Ehrlich, 'The poor country: the Tanganyika economy from 1945 to independence', in D.A. Low & Alison Smith, *History of East Africa Vol. III*, (Oxford, 1976), pp. 290-330; Martha Honey, 'Asian industrial activities in Tanganyika', *TNR* 75 (1974), pp. 55-69.
- ¹³⁵ It was to be distinguished 'from what has elsewhere been described as the *bourgeoisie* such as lawyers, doctors, property owners which are to be found in small numbers in West Africa—a class which is virtually non-existent in Tanganyika but will grow as university education expands.' M.J.B. Molohan, *Detribalization* (Dar es Salaam, 1959), pp. 49-50.
- ¹³⁶ Leslie observed that most migrants' homes were within a day's bus ride. *Survey*, p. 23. See also Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 194-8.
- ¹³⁷ Kichwele Street (now Uhuru Street) was the main street passing through Kariakoo, across Mnazi Mmoja and into Uhindini.
- ¹³⁸ Leslie, *Survey*, pp. 24-5.
- ¹³⁹ For post-war housing see Kironde, below. See also, Kironde, 'Land use structure', pp. 270-300; Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 205-13; Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', chapter 4.
- ¹⁴⁰ Leslie, 'Survey Appendices'.
- ¹⁴¹ Leslie, *Survey*, pp. 3, 97-8.
- ¹⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 173-6.
- ¹⁴³ Leslie, 'Appendices'.

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¹⁴⁴ Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 50-2, 205.

¹⁴⁵ Leslie, *Survey*, p. 95.

¹⁴⁶ J.F.R. Hill & J.P. Moffett, *Tanganyika: A review of its resources and their development* (Dar es Salaam, 1955), p. 805.

¹⁴⁷ Mascarenhas, 'Port'.

¹⁴⁸ This meat-packing factory had strong links with the remainder of the territory. Upcountry field staff included a Chief Cattle Buyer, stationed in Tabora, and other buyers at 'appropriate buying centres'. They also owned holding grounds (for cattle) in various parts of Lake and Western Provinces (and outside Dar es Salaam). See Hill & Moffett, *Tanganyika*, pp. 633-5.

¹⁴⁹ N.H. Bull, 'Enquiry into wage rates of African industrial workers in Dar es Salaam, Nov.-Dec. 1952', Colonial Office, The U. K. National Archives (Public Records Office), Kew (hereafter PRO) CO 822/660.

¹⁵⁰ Leslie, *Survey*, pp. 119, 121, 131.

¹⁵¹ See e.g., Bull, 'Enquiry'.

¹⁵² Up to the 1940s there were just three government primary schools (of which one was for girls) and one secondary school for Africans in Dar es Salaam.

¹⁵³ A jump in African girls' attendance from 300 to 1,564 was particularly noteworthy.

¹⁵⁴ Molohan, *Detribalization*, p. 54; Speeches by Deputy PC and Governor Twining at the opening of Ilala Boma, 21 May 1958, TNA 540/27/11/A; G.J. Ebrahim, 'Development of Medical Services in Dar es Salaam', in Sutton, *Dar es Salaam*, pp. 173-4; J.E.F. Mhina, 'Education in and around Dar es Salaam', in *ibid.*, pp. 175-80.

¹⁵⁵ See Burton, 'Townsmen'. Quote from UN Report on Tanganyika Territory for 1958, para. 563.

¹⁵⁶ Andrew Burton, 'Raw youth, school-leavers and the emergence of structural unemployment in late-colonial urban Tanganyika', *JAH* 47:3 (2006), pp. 363-87.

¹⁵⁷ Burton, *African Underclass*, esp. chaps 12 and conclusion.

¹⁵⁸ See Burton, 'Adjutants'.

¹⁵⁹ See Burton, 'Townsmen'.

¹⁶⁰ In 1950 there were 10 Europeans, 7 Asians, 6 Africans and 1 Arab on the Municipal Council. Municipal African Affairs Officer to DO Coast, 7 July 1950, TNA 540/3/75A.

¹⁶¹ Ali Mwinyimadi to Chief Secretary, 28 July 1938, TNA 26027/1. For the Wazaramo Union, see Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', pp. 230-247; and Tadasu Tsuruta, 'Urban-rural relationships in colonial Dar es Salaam: some notes on ethnic associations and recreations, 1930s-1950s', *Memoirs of the Faculty of Agriculture of Kinki University* 36 (2003), pp. 63-69.

¹⁶² Iliffe, 'Dockworkers'.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

¹⁶⁴ Iliffe, *Modern History*, p. 408. On the African Association see *ibid.*, chapter 13; on dating its founding, see Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', p. 117.

¹⁶⁵ Iliffe, *Modern History*, p. 434.

¹⁶⁶ Petition of Tanganyika African Association to Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Development, 21 May 1950, PRO CO 691/208/42496/3; Memorandum on the Constitutional Development for Tanganyika, by TAA, 21 May 1950, Rhodes House (Oxford) MSS Brit. Emp. 365, Box 123/3/3; Iliffe, *ibid.*, p. 507.

¹⁶⁷ These arguments are best captured in the TAA memorandum to Cohen, excerpted in Tanganyika Political Intelligence Summary - May, 1951, PRO CO 537/7225/9.

¹⁶⁸ Iliffe, *ibid.*, pp. 507-513. For a contentious but important account of Nyerere's election to the TAA presidency, see Mohamed Said, *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968): The Untold Story of the Muslims Struggle against British Colonialism in Tanganyika* (London, 1998), pp. 110-147.

¹⁶⁹ Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965* (Portsmouth NH, 1997), chapters 3 & 5.

¹⁷⁰ See extract from Tanganyika Political Intelligence Summary for October 1955, PRO CO 822/859/39; Iliffe, *ibid.*, pp. 517-518; Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization', p. 303ff.

¹⁷¹ Leslie, *Survey*, p. 268.

¹⁷² Under British rule Africans were restricted to certain parts of the town at night, and were legally required to carry a light in all areas at night. For a discussion of this legislation,

see Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 164-5.

¹⁷³ Adolfo Mascarenhas, 'Urban growth', p. 90, in Bertil Egero & Roushdi A. Henin (eds.), *An Analysis of the 1967 Population Census* (Dar es Salaam, 1973).

¹⁷⁴ Andrew Coulsen, *Tanzania: A political economy* (Oxford, 1982), p. 199.

¹⁷⁵ Mascarenhas, 'Urban growth', p. 93.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* Communal data is unavailable from later censuses.

¹⁷⁷ Tanganyika Territory, *African Census Report* (Dar es Salaam, 1957); United Republic of Tanzania (URT), *1967 Population Census Vol. 2: Statistics for urban areas* (Dar es Salaam, 1970), Table 2a; URT, *1978 Population Census Vol. V* (Dsm, 1982), table 6. For the gender balance in postcolonial eastern Africa, see Andrew Burton, 'Urbanization in eastern Africa: an historical overview, c.1750-2000', pp. 23-4, in Burton, *Urban Experience*. For a more detailed assessment of women in post-war Dar es Salaam, see Andrew Ivaska's chapter in this volume.

¹⁷⁸ See W. Mashisa, 'Urbanization in Dar es Salaam: the case of Manzese', BA History dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1978/9; Tripp, *Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania* (Berkeley, 1997), pp. 37-9; Eileen Moyer, 'In the shadow of the Sheraton: imagining localities in global spaces in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam (2003), pp. 216-222.

¹⁷⁹ Tripp, *Changing the Rules*, pp. 35-7.

¹⁸⁰ John Briggs and Davies Mwamfupe, 'Peri-urban development in an era of structural adjustment in Africa: the city of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', *Urban Studies*, 37:4 (2000), p. 802.

¹⁸¹ All population densities in this paragraph are from H. Schmetzer, 'Housing in Dar es Salaam', *Habitat International*, 4 (1982), p. 500.

¹⁸² For example, in contemporary Dar es Salaam commuters taking in the well-stocked *dukas* along Rashidi Kawawa road, have no idea of the vibrant though impoverished settlement of Mikoroshoni that lies behind them. For Kipawa and Shimo la Udongo, see Joe Lugalla, *Crisis, Urbanization, and Urban Poverty in Tanzania* (Latham MD, 1995), p. 76; see also, Moyer, 'Sheraton', p. 212.

¹⁸³ See Lugalla, *Crisis*, pp. 75-7.

¹⁸⁴ Burton, *African Underclass*, p. 212; Eva Olenmark & Ulla Westerberg, 'Kariakoo: a residential area in central Dar es Salaam', University of Lund Department of Architecture (1970?), p. 3.

¹⁸⁵ Merete Teisen, 'Dar es Salaam', p. 85, in Knud Erik Svenson & Merete Teisen., *Self-Reliant Tanzania* (Dsm, 1969).

¹⁸⁶ Olenmark & Westerberg, 'Kariakoo', *passim*.

¹⁸⁷ By the late 1960s the Jubilee Trust had invested up to \$40 million in property in Dar es Salaam. John Campbell, 'Culture, social organization and Asian identity: difference in urban East Africa', in J. Campbell and A.R. Rew (eds), *Identity and Effect* (London, 1999).

¹⁸⁸ Richa Nagar, 'The South Asian diaspora in Tanzania: a history retold', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 16 (1996), p. 70.

¹⁸⁹ Sayyeda Salaam, 'The politics of nationalization and denationalization of Asian properties and businesses in Dar es Salaam, 1971-2005', MA History dissertation, SOAS (2005); BIEA, 'Uhindini Building Survey'.

¹⁹⁰ A. Mascarenhas, 'The impact of nationhood on Dar es Salaam', *East African Geographical Review* 5 (1967), p. 42.

¹⁹¹ See Graebner's chapter herein.

¹⁹² Mascarenhas, 'Port', pp. 112-4.

¹⁹³ Mascarenhas, 'Port', tables 9 & 11.

¹⁹⁴ Coulsen, *Tanzania*, pp. 172-3; Adolfo Mascarenhas, 'The growth and function of Dar es Salaam', p. 130, in L. Berry (ed.), *Tanzania in Maps* (London, 1971).

¹⁹⁵ Rwekaza Mukandala, 'Trends in civil service size and income in Tanzania, 1967-82', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 2 (1983), p. 254.

¹⁹⁶ Mascarenhas, 'Urban growth', p. 93; *Survey of Employment and Earnings* (Dar es Salaam, various years).

¹⁹⁷ Burton, 'Raw youth'; Mascarenhas, 'Urban growth', p. 95; Wilt de Boer, 'Urban renewal and rehabilitation in Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam', Ardihi Insitute (1984), p. 39. The 1978 masterplan puts the total at 129,100, as cited in de Boer; by adding the 1967 census total to data on job creation in *Survey of Employment and Earnings* (Dar es Salaam, 1968-77) one arrives at a total of 131,590.

¹⁹⁸ For the emergence of the problem and discussion of the early TANU government's

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response, see Burton, 'Raw youth'.

¹⁹⁹ Olenmark & Westerberg, 'Kariakoo', p. 4. Census data on the phenomenon are opaque at best: when the state technically proscribed the presence of urban unemployed, respondents were no doubt reluctant to identify themselves as such. In 1967 just 5,924 respondents of 15 and over were designated unemployed, and a further 10,974 were ambiguously categorised as 'others not working'. However, while male residents between 15 and 49 numbered 93,296, the census enumerated recorded employment at just 65,270. If we subtract those men who identified themselves as homemakers (404), students (6,091) and income recipients (2,133), we are left with a shortfall of 19,398 (the same calculation for women comes to 4,083): around 21 percent of men aged 15-49. This is probably a truer reflection of unemployment and informal employment (the boundary between the two was complex and constantly shifting) – including those engaged full or part-time in urban agriculture. URT, *1967 Population Census Vol. 2*, Table 6; Mascarenhas, 'Urban growth', Table 5.13.

²⁰⁰ P. Collier, 'Labour market allocation and income distribution', Annex III, in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Basic Economic Report, 1977*, cited in Coulsen, *Tanzania*, p. 196.

²⁰¹ Abel G.M. Ishumi, *The Urban Jobless in Eastern Africa* (Uppsala, 1984), Tables III.2/III.3.

²⁰² For the 1950s see e.g., Leslie, *Survey*, p. 286; J.C. Cairns, *Bush and Boma* (London, 1959), p. 140.

²⁰³ This reliance on non-wage activities to supplement low urban incomes was actually historically the rule, the early postcolonial period being unusual for the provision of living family wages. Tripp, *Changing the Rules*, pp. 31-2, 40; Saitel Kulaba, 'Local government and the management of urban services in Tanzania', in R.E. Stren & R.R. White (eds.), *African Cities in Crisis* (Boulder, 1989), pp. 203-45; Anna K. Tibaijuka, 'The impact of structural adjustment programmes on women: the case of Tanzania's economic recovery programme', Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, 1988.

²⁰⁴ R.E. Stren, *Urban Inequality and Housing Policy in Tanzania: The problem of squatting*, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, Research Series No.24 (1975).

²⁰⁵ Lugalla, *Crisis*, p. 63.

²⁰⁶ In 1978 it regained its municipal status and was administered by a re-constituted city council, though the district divisions remained. Kironde, 'Land use structure', pp. 92-5.

²⁰⁷ See Andrew Burton, 'The Haven of Peace purged: tackling the undesirable and unproductive poor in Dar es Salaam, ca. 1950s-1980s', *IJAHS*, 40:1, pp. 119-51; James R. Brennan, 'Blood Enemies: exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958-75', *JAH* 47:3 (2006), pp. 389-413.

²⁰⁸ T.L. Maliyamkono & M.S.D. Bagachwa, *The Second Economy in Tanzania* (London, 1990), p. 139; Tripp, *Changing the Rules* pp. 62-63.

²⁰⁹ Lene Buchert, *Education in the Development of Tanzania 1919-1990* (London, 1994), p. 149; Vinay Ramnath Kamat, 'Negotiating illness and misfortune in post-socialism Tanzania: an ethnographic study in Temeke District, Dar es Salaam', Ph.D. Thesis, Emory University (2004), p. 52. For an interesting snapshot of the Tanzanian intelligentsia's views on *mageuzi* in its early days, see Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka (ed.), *The Social Service Crisis of the 1990's: Strategies for sustainable systems in Tanzania* (Aldershot, 1998).

²¹⁰ Brigit Obrist, *Struggling for Health in the City: An anthropological inquiry of health, vulnerability and resilience in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania* (Bern, 2006), pp. 256-260.

²¹¹ John Iliffe, *The African AIDS Epidemic: A History* (Oxford, 2006), p. 26; *The Guardian*, 18 April 2000; WHO Assessment of Epidemiological Situation, 2004, Tanzania Country Information, hosted at www.web.worldbank.org, 20 May 2006; *The Guardian*, 14 March 2002.

²¹² Luce Cloutier, *Income Differentials & Gender Inequality: Wives earning more than husbands in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 2006), p. 37, fn. 15. Also cf. Tripp, *Changing the Rules*, pp. 117-118.

²¹³ Three studies that consider *mageuzi* from this perspective are Anne Sydney Lewinson, 'Going with the times: transforming visions of urbanism and modernity among professionals in Dar es Salaam', Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1999); Moyer, 'Sheraton'; and Richard Sherrington, 'Developing disparities: consumption and social differentiation in post-adjustment Dar es Salaam', Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester (2006).

²¹⁴ Moyer, 'Sheraton', p. 57.

²¹⁵ On this very important topic see Matteo Rizzo, 'Being taken for a ride: Privatisation of the Dar es Salaam transport system 1983-1998', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40:1 (2002), pp. 133-157, and Pascal Pochet and Lourdes Diaz Oliveira, 'Les transports urbains sur les voies du libéralisme',

- in Bernard Calas, *De Dar es Salaam à Bongoland* (Nairobi/Paris, 2006), pp. 229-246.
- ²¹⁶ Sabot, *op. cit.*; Tripp, *Changing the Rules*, p. 108; Obrist, *Struggling for Health*, p. 115.
- ²¹⁷ Tripp, *Changing the Rules*, p. 105.
- ²¹⁸ Cloutier, *Income Differentials*, p. 44.
- ²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- ²²⁰ Briggs and Mwamfupe, 'Peri-urban development', p. 805.
- ²²¹ Max Mmuya, *Tanzania: Political reform in eclipse* (Dar es Salaam, 1998), pp. 149-151.
- ²²² TEMCO, *The 1995 General Election in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 1997), p. 320.
- ²²³ T.L. Maliyamkono, *Tanzania on the move* (Dar es Salaam, 1997), pp. 12-19; Mmuya, *Tanzania*, pp. 24, 38, 156; C.K. Omari, *The Right to choose a leader* (Dar es Salaam, 1997), pp. 51, 59; *The Express* (Dar es Salaam) 2-8 March 2000.
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- ²²⁷ National Electoral Commission Report of 2005 elections, at www.nec.go.tz on 19 May 2006.
- ²²⁸ *Ibid.* The national average was 69.72 percent. Only Mara region had a smaller turnout, with 46.49 percent of registered voters.
- ²²⁹ For post-colonial religious politics to 1994, see Nestor N. Luanda, 'Christianity and Islam contending for the throne on the Tanzanian mainland', in Adebayo Olukoshi & Liisa Laakso (eds.), *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa* (Uppsala, 1996), pp. 168-182.
- ²³⁰ See Marc Sommers, *Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania* (New York, 2001), pp. 155-180.
- ²³¹ 'Attacks on the Press 2002', Committee to Protect Journalists, hosted at <http://www.cpj.org/attacks02/africa02/tanzania.html>, 20 May 2006; Tanzania Government Economic Survey 2004, located at <http://www.tanzania.go.tz/economicsurvey1/2004/part4/information.htm>, 20 May 2006.
- ²³² Alex Perullo, "'The Life That I Live": Popular Music, Agency and Urban Society in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', Ph.D. Thesis, Indiana University, 2003, pp. 178-193; Tanzania Government Economic Survey 2004, *op. cit.*
- ²³³ On cinema in Dar es Salaam, see James R. Brennan, 'Democratizing Cinema and Censorship in Tanzania, 1920-1980', *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36:2 (2005), pp. 481-511.
- ²³⁴ For two excellent case studies that chart this development, see Sherrington, 'Developing disparities'; and Geoffrey Ross Owens, 'On the edge of a city: an historical ethnography [sic] of urban identity in the northwestern suburbs of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison (2004).
- ²³⁵ Briggs and Mwamfupe, 'Peri-urban development', p. 802.
- ²³⁶ Joe L. P. Lugalla, 'Economic reforms and health conditions of the urban poor in Tanzania', *African Studies Quarterly* 2:1 (1997).
- ²³⁷ 'Tanzania witnesses steady economic growth', Xinhua News Agency, 30 July 2005.
- ²³⁸ Statistics taken from the official port website, <http://www.tanzaniaports.com>, on 20 May 2006.
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- ²⁴⁰ 'TANZANIA: Energy and water strain economy' (by James R. Brennan), *Oxford Analytica*, 1 May 2006.
- ²⁴¹ See BIEA, 'Uhindini Building Survey'.
- ²⁴² Kironde, 'The evolution of land use structure', pp. 443-4.

Part One

Administering Urbanization: Regulation and its failures in colonial Dar es Salaam

The five chapters in Part One examine colonial policies, administrative structures, and socio-economic developments. Thaddeus Sunseri's contribution offers valuable insights into the relationship between Dar es Salaam and its peri-urban hinterland through an analysis of colonial forestry policies and practices. Sunseri finds that relentless urban consumer demand and lack of a pliable labour force to manage prescribed forest reserves fatally undermined colonial efforts to create any peri-urban system of sustained forest management. Peri-urban colonial forestry proved an unsolvable conundrum; today, an ongoing environmental catastrophe is occurring in the rapidly vanishing woodlands of Dar es Salaam's hinterland. Joseph Kironde's chapter on Dar es Salaam's changing land use structure highlights the intended and unintended consequences brought in the wake of state intervention into an urban land market. Kironde shows how the colonial manipulation of land laws has formed the physical shape of Dar es Salaam today in terms of its layout and building structures. Class, he argues, came to replace race by the 1950s and 1960s as the ordering principle of Dar es Salaam's land use structure. Continuing with themes raised by Kironde, James Brennan examines the intersection between urban policy, economics and politics in colonial Dar es Salaam through the lens of relations between the city's Indian and African inhabitants. Racial consciousness sharpened at the borders of interaction between these two communities, in particular at the line of Indian-led gentrification that extended into Kariakoo's housing and trading sectors between the 1920s and 1940s. Brennan shows the unintended consequences of a muddled urban policy that attempted simultaneously to segregate the city while encouraging higher building standards through capital investment. Andrew Burton's chapter offers a revealing look into the administrative and social history of Dar es Salaam through an account of the town's police force under British rule. The police were agents of estrangement as much as agents of order. Hailing from far-flung regions of eastern Africa, the typical police

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officer was a stranger in town whose principal loyalty lay with his comrades and employers. African police enforced an urban legal code suffused with segregationist thinking. They later became prime agents in a policy of round-ups and repatriations targeting young unemployed men (*'wahuni'*), which exacerbated already strained relations with the urban public. The history of this local police force highlights the coercive aspirations yet paradoxical vulnerability of the urban colonial state. In the closing chapter of Part One, Justin Willis examines the history of alcohol consumption in Dar es Salaam through the case of the British administration's failed attempts to regulate brewing of *pombe* (beer) through a single, state-regulated beer market. Taking issue with Marjorie Mbilinyi's contention that this event marked a moment of anti-colonial resistance, Willis shows instead that colonial officials were more at odds with themselves by moving always in an *ad hoc* fashion, unwittingly abetting a consumer shift away from *pombe* and towards *tembo* palm wine.

A number of themes arise from this group of chapters. Most prominent is that of the inability of the colonial state (both German and British) to control the social, economic and cultural ramifications of forces it had unleashed. Imperial aspirations to order and control were ambitious, but officials in Dar es Salaam were engaged in a constant struggle against the unintended consequences of their actions, as well as against an urban society evolving independently from colonial designs. As the various contributors demonstrate, colonial attempts to regulate economic and social behaviour, or to define urban space, were often contradictory and even counter-productive. Most dramatically, the imposition of discriminatory forestry, planning and by-law regulations resulted in the alienation of urban Africans and the growth of nationalism. The role of race in Dar es Salaam's history also lies at the heart of several chapters, most explicitly in Brennan's, though the deeply racialized structure of colonial urban society is similarly evident in contributions by Kironde, Burton and Willis. The (at best) paternalistic interpretation of League of Nations Mandate responsibilities to protect the 'native' interest resulted in an urban society in which the African was a third class citizen; denied the freedoms available to European and Indian co-residents, and the privileged access to resources and infrastructure they enjoyed. Race is interconnected with an organising theme of the collection as a whole: Dar es Salaam as a nexus of the local, national and cosmopolitan. The arrival in Dar es Salaam and its hinterland, from the late 19th century, of growing numbers of African, Asian and European interlopers occasioned diverse forms of struggle evident in this group of chapters: over land and its uses between indigenes and migrants and between different races; over state authority and its legitimacy between officials and Africans; over the politics of identity; and over forms of social behaviour arising in the novel context of a major emerging urban centre.

Issues of periodization also emerge from these chapters. Dar es Salaam experienced major spurts of growth in the 1890s-1900s and the 1940s-1950s. In the earlier period, Germans invested considerable effort and resources into moulding what was the capital of their most important overseas possession, resulting in the transformation of what had been a Busaidi backwater prior to their arrival. Similarly, influenced by the prevailing post-Second World War

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developmentalist ideology that encouraged investment in African futures, the late colonial British administration oversaw the emergence of a modern city from the neglected township of the inter-war years. Interestingly, though, it is this very period of neglect, sandwiched between eras of urban growth and improvement, which emerges as a crucial era in several chapters. With its future as a British colony uncertain, and with more pressing demands from neighbouring territories such as Kenya and Uganda, British investment in Tanganyika between the wars was negligible. The neglect suffered by the town at this stage had important long-term repercussions for politics, race relations and urban development: above all in the growth of nationalist politics after World War Two, upon which the (relative) splurge in colonial expenditure in the 1940s and 1950s arrived too late to have any significant impact.

Chapter Two

Fueling the City: Dar es Salaam and the evolution of colonial forestry, 1892-1960

Thaddeus Sunseri

'If we cannot conserve the Pugu Forest right on our doorstep, then we cannot conserve a forest anywhere in Tanzania'.¹ This quote by a Tanzanian government official in reference to a coastal forest located 22 km. west of Dar es Salaam encapsulates two faulty premises that are fundamental to modern environmental policy making. First, that close proximity to an urban complex and centre of state power should directly benefit forest conservation. It is precisely the close proximity to Dar es Salaam that has endangered Tanzania's coastal forests in the last century owing to the energy and construction needs of the city and the state's power to wrest control of forests from peasants near the city. The second faulty assumption is that forest conservation is coterminous with forest preservation. While the latter term refers to protecting forest biodiversity from human destruction, the former refers to managing a forest in a sustainable way so that it can provide state fuel and timber needs indefinitely, the basis of so-called scientific forestry. From the onset of German colonialism in 1891 to the present, successive states have sought to manage the land's forests for the goals of development, with the growth of Dar es Salaam city itself as the most important factor shaping forest use in Tanzania.

While urban development has been the main factor in the transformation of Tanzania's coastal forests, modern environmental policy making has been based on a degradation narrative that views peasants using shifting agriculture as the main historical threat to the region's forests.² There was little doubt about the development goal of scientific forestry during the colonial period. In 1951, for example, a British forestry official stressed that Pugu forest existed in order to provide Dar es Salaam with its necessary pole, firewood, and charcoal supplies.³ While some foresters believed that African farmers were also steadily encroaching into Pugu forest, gradually eroding its extent, others believed that peasant settlement in the forests was localized in river valleys and of minor concern.⁴ Early colonial forest policy evolved largely from the interface between urban growth and peri-urban agriculture, creating a

contradictory relationship from the outset. For whereas an early colonial goal was to remove Zaramo farmers from the city's forest environs in order to scientifically manage coastal forests for urban growth and colonial revenue generation, that same urban growth drew people to the city as wage labourers and as sellers and consumers of food and forest products, especially charcoal and timber. Scientific forestry itself is a labour-intensive undertaking, and even as peasants were evicted from coastal forests to make room for state management, colonial-era labour shortages led the German and British administrations to settle squatters in forests to act as a labour force. By the 1950s the conflict-ridden relationship that developed between the Forest Department and licensed and illegal forest squatters dovetailed with the nationalist movement led by TANU.

This chapter examines how Tanzanian forest policy evolved in large part owing to the development needs of Dar es Salaam. Because the management of forests also entailed the management of people, as the colonial state learned to control forests, it also learned to control the farmers living in their proximity. The steady rise in the town's population coupled with industrial growth and railway development resulted in heightened demand for timber and fuel, requiring wood supplies from the periphery and the colonization of hinterland landscapes as fuel and timber reserves for the city. Under German rule the Rufiji delta was an integral part of Dar es Salaam's economy, while under the British the coastal forests and *miombo* woodlands played a much more pronounced role in meeting the city's needs. The priority given to the city's growth led to a practical abandonment of principles of scientific forestry in the interwar years. After the Second World War, development priorities of the 'second colonial occupation' put even greater pressure on forests around Dar es Salaam, even as much greater attention was given to reserving forests in other parts of Tanganyika. In spite of the clear connections between colonial development, urbanization, and deforestation, foresters repeatedly pointed to the problem of peasant encroachment to justify state control of the forests.

The early forest history of Dar es Salaam

German colonizers selected Dar es Salaam as the colony's capital because of its natural harbour rather than for its suitability for the construction and fuel needs of a growing town.⁵ The town's population grew from about 3,000 in 1888 to 10,000 in 1894 to 25,000 or more at the outset of World War I, driven largely by African migration for wage labour or to market rural commodities.⁶ Wood was needed for harbour construction, housing, cooking fuel, and industry. The Central Railway, begun at the city in 1905, demanded ongoing timber supplies for trestles, railway sleepers, and fuel. Steam ships docking at Dar es Salaam demanded wood fuel in preference to expensive imported coal. Private industries, most notably the Schultz beer brewery after 1898, consumed immense amounts of wood fuel by the turn of the century. Europeans had a predilection for sawn lumber for European-style houses. Yet available timber - mostly mangroves of the coastal river mouths - was much

denser and harder to work than imported softwoods, so that expensive timber imports burdened the colony for some time before Germans and British targeted Tanganyikan hardwood species, notably *mvule* and *mninga*, for their lumber. In 1893 a German forester observed that in order to construct the capital 'every board, every strong beam has to be imported from Europe at high prices.'⁷ In contrast, Africans relied on mangrove and hardwood poles for their houses. Mangroves bore far more weight than pine, resisted insects and water, were marketed in a variety of sizes and lengths, and were ideal both for the Swahili-style houses that town dwellers favoured, as well as for the pole-frame houses of rural people. Town construction also made use of coral, held together with lime that required a great deal of wood fuel for its burning.⁸

The new colonial capital was situated in a region that was relatively sparse in tree cover, a Zone III eco-climate defined as 'land not of forest potential.'⁹ In addition, the town's site had been significantly deforested by the time the German East Africa Corporation (DOAG) arrived to set up a trading station in 1888. By then the town had long been used by Indian traders to procure copal from Zaramo farmers, who seasonally dug the resin of the *msandarusi* tree from nearby coastal forests that they controlled. Since about 1880 Zaramo also extracted and traded *Landolphia* wild rubber to Indian traders, like copal subject to the export tolls of the Sultan of Zanzibar. While German officials and modern foresters attributed the early deforestation of Dar es Salaam in part to these extractive and trade activities, it was the expansion of coconut plantations under the aegis of the Sultan of Zanzibar, already underway in the 1870s to take advantage of a European demand for copra, that was responsible for the wholesale denuding of much of the area's forests.¹⁰ By the time formal German rule was established in 1891, only one forest parcel, which Germans dubbed the Sachsenwald, still remained on the town's western periphery. By the end of the century efforts would be made to reserve the Sachsenwald for scientific forestry.

Germans arrived in East Africa with a template for scientific forestry that had been developed for over a century in Germany and Asia, where Germans often ran European colonial forest administrations. Scientific forestry emerged in the eighteenth century at a time of increasing European industrialization, which brought with it concern that a wood shortage would hinder development.¹¹ The goal of forestry was to assess the availability of wood so that schemes of rotational planting and harvesting could be developed in order to ensure a steady timber and fuel supply. Scientific forestry was not interested in biodiverse forests, rather in trees of uniform variety, height, and girth that could be easily quantified and exploited. Such managed forestry enabled German states to pay for their forest administrations and bring in substantial additional revenue. Thus, timber marketing was an essential component of scientific forestry. The policy of forest reservation, which built on a centuries-old practice of royal forests, entailed emptying forests of peasants and circumscribing communal practices of using forests for fuel, timber, fodder, and food reserves. A policing infrastructure was established to enforce state forestry. In Europe and elsewhere, great social upheavals often accompanied state control over the forests.

By the time Germans began their conquest of East Africa, they had half a century's experience as managers of forests in India, Indonesia, and Burma, and it is in the Asian context that German scientific forestry was adapted to colonial conditions.¹² European colonizers in Asia especially desired to make use of teak forests for ship construction. Toward this end they attacked peasant and pastoral use of forests, especially the use of fire to open up forest lands for agriculture or to facilitate grazing. As in Asia, the colonial attitude to African peasant land use was encapsulated in the attack on bush fallowing, whereby peasants used fire to clear and fertilize land that was to be used for short durations, perhaps four or five years, before another parcel was cleared in the same way. Germans believed that this 'wild burning' (*Wildbrennen*) was the chief reason why Dar es Salaam and its environs were particularly devoid of 'extensive, closed high forests'. According to one report, 'The conditions for afforestation in Dar es Salaam district are very sad [since] the [forest] stands have been almost completely devastated by the age-old custom of destructive forest use (*Raubbau*) and by wild burning.'¹³ Apart from bush fallowing, colonial officials viewed the rapid pace of colonial development as straining available forests in proximity to towns. In 1894 the forest assessor Krüger warned that in light of growing building activity around the colony's towns, forests were disappearing.¹⁴

This view of rapid deforestation was the basis of the first German East African forest ordinance in 1893, which prohibited field burning in a 1-2 mile radius of administrative centres, and required Africans to cut and rake grass and trees into central locations before burning.¹⁵ The ordinance also curtailed African wood cutting in the vicinity of government stations by requiring a five-rupee permit and allowing wood to be sold only on prescribed days when sales could be monitored. Clearing of trees and brush along river valleys, such as the Msimbazi River valley in Dar es Salaam, was prohibited, depriving farmers of important seasonal famine lands. By monopolizing forests as the exclusive domains of administrative centres through these ordinances, the forests around Dar es Salaam came under early colonial control.

In seeking to protect Dar es Salaam's forests from commercial use and peasant encroachment, colonial officials turned to the distant periphery for the bulk of the town's timber and fuel needs. The Rufiji Delta had for centuries been a source of mangrove poles for the Indian Ocean and Zanzibar markets, with a well-established mangrove cutting and marketing infrastructure, and easy access by way of the coastal trade.¹⁶ Rufiji peasants had occupied Delta islands in response to this demand, where they farmed and cut mangroves that they transported to Delta stations controlled by Indian trade middlemen. Throughout the year, but especially with the onset of the northeast monsoons, dhows arrived from overseas to pick up mangrove cargoes. While mangrove stands were available in proximity to Dar es Salaam, notably at Shungubweni, German forestry officials quickly took over the Rufiji marketing infrastructure and targeted the Delta as a timber and fuel reserve for the capital. Toward this end, in 1898 they facilitated the construction of a sawmill at Saninga to process mangroves into lumber, and set up a forest administration that divided the Delta into three forest districts. Thereafter the state took over the cutting and

marketing of all Rufiji timber, prohibiting Africans from using the forests for commercial purposes. While efforts were made to market timber to Zanzibar and South Africa, and the Arab dhow trade remained important, Dar es Salaam was the major consumer of Rufiji mangroves, soon overburdening the forest administration. In 1899 the government flotilla switched from expensive imported coal to use of mangroves to fuel its ships. This decision created an escalating demand on the Rufiji forest administration. In a five month period from 1902 to 1903, for example, the flotilla required some 14,000 *coria* of *boritis* (mangrove poles), altogether 280,000 logs of varying lengths. By January 1903 the Salale forest district, which accounted for about half of all Rufiji delta mangrove stands, was preoccupied exclusively in supplying firewood to the flotilla, with a standing order to supply 1200 *coria* (of 1 m. length) per month.¹⁷ Meanwhile the Rufiji forest district was expected to supply firewood to government trial plantations at Kurazini and Usimbe, the hospitals in Tanga and Dar es Salaam, and other government branches. Seventy-two percent of Rufiji wood provided to government sectors was used for fuel rather than timber. The Rufiji forest administration was furthermore contractually bound to supply a daily quota of timber to the Saninga sawmill, and had a steady demand for mangrove poles from Indian Ocean dhow traders. Largely owing to the forest administration's inability to muster the necessary labour to fell, transport, and saw mangrove trees in a difficult terrain, the Rufiji could not effectively act as the sole fuel and timber reserve for Dar es Salaam.¹⁸ This shortfall forced the colonial administration to turn to its own forest-scarce hinterland to help meet its wood requirements. In so doing, it shaped German colonial scientific forestry, rural production, and labour relations in Dar es Salaam district, and contributed to the outbreak of the Maji Maji war in 1905.

Reserving forests in Dar es Salaam District

In Dar es Salaam's environs, the forest reservation policy that evolved after 1900 was intended to secure timber and fuel supplies for the city's growth. Perhaps more importantly, it gave the state the tool it needed to channel Zaramo farmers of the hinterland to colonial development pursuits. Evacuating forests of people enabled the state to shape agriculture and to tap into the rural population for wage labour. These three goals - providing the city with fuel and timber, transforming peasant agriculture, and creating a reservoir of wage labourers - belie portrayals of imperial environmentalism as basically preservationist.¹⁹

At the turn of the century several forest parcels in Dar es Salaam were targeted as reserves, backed up by the Crown Land ordinance of 1895. Kurazini 'forest', which would be declared a reserve in 1905, was located west of the southern harbour and Mzinga creek.²⁰ Kurazini actually was a complex that included a former coconut and sisal plantation, as well as a variety of fruit trees, including coconut palms, mangoes, lemons, and oranges. People of Mtoni village used it to obtain *makuti* palm leaves for the roofing of their huts, and illegally tapped the palms to make *tembo* palm wine. In 1900 the government

annexed 1000 hectares of land from Mtoni villagers to expand the plantation, compensating the villagers with 5,800 Rupees, since sufficient unoccupied land was no longer available. While officially a forest reserve after March 1905, the government leased the fruit trees to an Indian contractor. Its main claim to being a forest, apart from mangroves growing along Mzingu and Gereza Creeks, was that German foresters created a 10 hectare botanical garden where they experimented with trials of exotic and domestic tree species with the intention of creating a plantation forest.²¹ Already by 1909 the government had begun to allow Kurazini to give way to urban growth. It was subjected to constant fires from nearby peasant *mashamba* (agricultural plots) at Mtoni, pilfering by government agencies, and finally, in 1912, the Chief Forester Holtz gave permission for the *Schutztruppe* to use Kurazini's mangroves for their barracks construction.²² Kurazini appears to have been eliminated as a forest reserve by 1912.

The second parcel to be targeted as a forest reserve was the Pugu forest. Pugu was a Coastal Forest west of Dar es Salaam in a hilly region long exploited by Zaramo farmers for copal and wild rubber, which they marketed to the coast in exchange for cotton textiles, muskets, gunpowder, and glass beads.²³ In 1888 the DOAG agent Leue started a plantation at Pugu, on which he unsuccessfully attempted to domesticate wild *Landolphia* rubber. The same year the Benedictines started a mission at Pugu. Both the mission and the DOAG station were destroyed during the 1888-90 coastal uprising that ushered in formal German rule, but other missionaries and German planters arrived over the next decade. Pugu forest had therefore long been exploited by various parties before a land commission demarcated a 2000 hectare parcel of the forest as a government reserve in 1902.²⁴ By that time the Pugu forest was interspersed with African settlements and *mashamba*, and a German rubber and coconut planter named Greiner also farmed land in the forest. The forest reserve declaration carved out two reserves for the villages of Kigogo and Dibwe, and Greiner was allowed to keep his estate. A further 10 African *shamba* owners were compensated for their land and directed to leave the forest after the subsequent harvest. Because foresters initially allowed a German plantation and peasant reserve to remain in the forest, Pugu was not a reserve in the classic sense. However, this changed by 1904, when colonial officials advanced a concerted forest reservation policy. Already in 1904 people began to leave the reserve because of the arbitrary rule of the German-appointed *akida* Kawamba bin Kawamba, and it seems likely that the remaining *mashamba* were destroyed during the Maji Maji war. Jumbe Mwiniwaziri of Kisserawe, who was required to sit on the land commission that declared the Pugu Reserve, was described by local Berlin missionaries as especially recalcitrant during the uprising.²⁵ Captain Fonck, sent to bring the region under control during the uprising, burned down huts of villagers who fled into the forest or who were suspected of abetting rebels. By 1910 the forest department formally erased both Pugu peasant reserves and extended the Pugu forest north of the Central Railway line.²⁶

Kurazini and Pugu forests were the first steps toward a policy of forest reservation that was launched in full force in 1904. In that year forest policy

in German East Africa was perceived to be in a state of crisis when missionaries reported to the Foreign Office in Germany that in much of the colony cutting of tree stands was not followed by re-afforestation.²⁷ Admitting that to date replanting had yet to be undertaken while Africans continued to destroy the forests unabated, Governor Götzen and forest officials laid out a plan for a thoroughgoing state control of the colony's forests which was 'a matter of life and death for the colony'.²⁸ The new policy would be based on a system of forest reserves, islands of forests throughout the colony where the state hoped to muster the oversight necessary to evacuate Africans and prevent fresh incursions into the forests. Forest reserves would enable a sustained forest use to meet the colony's (notably Dar es Salaam's) timber and fuel needs, and hopefully facilitate an export trade in timber. Finally, forest reserves often encompassed sources of rivers and streams, and thereby aided in the creation of a landscape suitable to intensive agriculture. The new policy defined closed forests with a canopy cover as proper forests, excluding *miombo* savannah forests that made up half of the colony's landscape. With these goals in mind, colonial officials set out to assume control over as many forest parcels as rapidly as possible, beginning with mangrove and coastal forests.

The forest reserve policy had an immediate impact on the people of Dar es Salaam district. In August 1904 administrative and forestry officials assembled *maakida* sub-district officials and *majumbe* headmen of the most important coastal towns to declare all the coastal mangroves as a forest reserve, a move that was mirrored in districts north and south along the entire coast of German East Africa.²⁹ Thereafter villagers needed government approval to use the mangroves for fuel or hut construction. Inhabitants of Dar es Salaam and the coast were effectively deprived of wood access by this move, and myriad local industries - lime burning, iron smelting, salt, sugar, and coconut oil production - were curtailed. While the mangroves were effectively closed to African exploitation, the government established a wood cutting station at Ras Ndege in order to promote the 'continuous economic exploitation' of the forests to supply Dar es Salaam with timber and fuel, and to promote the mangrove export industry to Zanzibar and other Indian Ocean markets.³⁰ Initially a concession was granted to a German firm to cut mangroves and market them outside the colony.

The declaration of the mangroves as a forest reserve was followed rapidly in Dar es Salaam district by the creation of forest reserves at Sachsenwald, Vikindu, and Massangania, alongside the preexisting Pugu and Kurazini forest reserves. The Sachsenwald was most important for the immediate growth of Dar es Salaam. Located between km. 9 and 12 on Pugu road west of the harbour, between the villages of Mbaraksruh, Yambo, and Kitschwele, the Sachsenwald had been set up in 1898 as a forest 'preserve' to protect the tree stands closest to the city from African use and to experiment with forest regeneration on a trial tree plantation.³¹ Continued incursions into the forest by villagers around the city led the 1904 land commission to demarcate a parcel of some 2100 hectares that also enlarged the forest boundaries.³² Some fifty-six hut and field owners who grew palms, mangos, bananas, rice, and cassava were forced out of the forest with compensation ranging from 32

pesas (about three days' wages) for a 1/4 hectare plot of land to 7 Rupees 32 pesas for 5 palm trees.³³ Mama Pasi, one of those expelled, received only 16 pesas for her 1/5 hectare cassava plot, and all the peasants were obligated 'to cease all land clearing and to abandon all cultivated fields after the harvest and to leave their huts by the end of the year'.

The creation of the Vikindu (1600 hectares) and Massangania (2600 hectares) forest reserves likewise resulted in the expropriation from local inhabitants of their huts, land, trees, and labour for marginal compensation.³⁴ In Vikindu reserve just 10 kms south of Dar es Salaam, for example, 104 people were compensated for land and fruit trees, others for having cleared the land of trees in preparation of farming before they were expelled to carve out the reserve. Some villagers retained the right to care for the graves of their ancestors and to bury future deceased in the forest, a right that virtually disappeared from forest reserve declarations following the Maji Maji war. While the four inland forest reserves of Dar es Salaam district were of small extent compared with the entirety of the district, their creation sent a strong message to rural inhabitants that the colonial state was intent on curtailing forest use. In 1904 the forest administration in Dar es Salaam district also planned for a more comprehensive state usurpation of thirteen forests along the major road networks leading to Dar es Salaam and to other coastal towns.³⁵

Even in these few forest islands, the colonial administration struggled to muster the necessary labour to cut and replant trees according to established principles of scientific forestry. The forest department competed with other sectors of the colonial economy for a limited labour supply. In 1902 the colonial administration inaugurated a massive campaign to promote cash crop production in coastal districts of the colony. Alongside settler plantation production concentrated in the northeast highlands, the cash crop campaign strained available labour supplies. In Dar es Salaam district local Zaramo people were expected to participate in the cash crop schemes while providing labour for forest work, there being no clear distinction between forest reserves and government cash crop plantations. A government plantation was located in the middle of the Vikindu reserve, for example, and forest workers were used to tend its fields.³⁶ The forester of the Pugu reserve, Reich, oversaw a cotton plantation on which he employed 60 people seasonally in addition to 27 adults and 9 children employed for forest work.³⁷ Hundreds of workers were demanded for forest work in Dar es Salaam reserves, but, as the pressure to increase cash crop production intensified by 1905 while people struggled to maintain their own household fields, some *maakida* informed forestry officials that no people were available for forest work. *Akida* Kirumbi bin Kirumbi's response to the request for workers for the Pugu reserve was representative: 'Presently all of our people are guarding against pigs ... but we are making great effort to look for people ...'³⁸ In October 1904 the forest assessor Eckert requested that 50 to 100 Nyamwezi families from western Tanzania be settled west of Dar es Salaam to work on the forest plantation.³⁹ For forest work they would receive the proceeds of the harvest and a payment at the end of the year. While awaiting the arrival of the Nyamwezi the forester at Pugu ordered local *maakida* to supply 'fifty or more people to work on the government [forest]

shamba'.⁴⁰ While some local Zaramo were mustered, by May 1905 many deserted, complaining that their wages were too low and that they hadn't been paid promptly.⁴¹ By that time regular work building the Central Railway at good wages with a daily food ration was an option that many preferred. So desperate was the forest administration for workers that late in August 1905, at a moment when the Maji Maji rebellion was erupting to the south, the district forest assessor Eckert directed his subordinates to retain workers he considered to be 'rabble' in spite of their demands for higher wages because 'there is no alternative but to use them as workers because there are no other people to be had'.⁴² The colonial effort at scientific forestry that aimed to create a sustainable wood reservoir for the growth of Dar es Salaam and for export was undermined by the labour shortage that plagued the colony and brought many other government and private development projects to an end.

Maji Maji and the forests

The pressure on the forests that was created by the outbreak of the Maji Maji war late in July 1905 demonstrates the close relationship between state power and deforestation, a relationship that would be replicated at other moments of crisis in twentieth century Tanzania, including the two World Wars. Dar es Salaam, as always, was at the centre of the state demand for timber and fuel during the war. The need to land German marines and members of the *Schutztruppe* at Mohoro, Kilwa, and Lindi during the war exacerbated the fuel shortage of the flotilla, which was the single biggest consumer of Rufiji mangroves. On August 10 the commander of the flotilla requested an additional 1200-1500 cubic metres of Rufiji fuel.⁴³ Unable to meet this request owing to the stagnant labour supply, the flotilla turned to Dar es Salaam forests with the blessing of the forest administration. The Holzmann firm that had several months previously begun construction of the Central Railway was asked to allow for daily shipments of wood from the Sachsenwald to Dar es Salaam, a request that the firm apparently was not able to honour without hindering the progress of the railway. In October the firm agreed that each month two to three special trains would supply wood to the city from the Sachsenwald.⁴⁴ By 1906 the wood scarcity exacerbated by the rebellion also led to the more intense exploitation of the mangrove forests of Shungubweni on the coast south of Dar es Salaam, where the Mogo forest station was relocated owing to the 'greater demand for mangrove wood on the part of Dar es Salaam wood consumers'.⁴⁵ The wood cutting station at Ras Ndege increased its production of mangroves to supply dhows bound for Dar es Salaam.⁴⁶ Military needs were not the only pressures on Tanzanian forests at this time. The government interceded specifically to ensure that the Schultz beer brewery in Dar es Salaam had sufficient wood for its needs.⁴⁷ In December 1905 the government requested that the Rufiji forest administration supply Schultz with 150 cubic metres of wood and 5 *coria* of *boritis*, and by May of 1906 Schultz required 80-100 cubic metres of Rufiji mangroves monthly to brew beer. While conservationist rhetoric had stressed the need for forest reserves to protect

them from African depredations, the demands of Maji Maji quickly led to a level of wood cutting in reserves that had no relationship to sound forest management.

There is compelling evidence that colonial control of the forests was a motivating factor for the rebellion itself.⁴⁸ Although state efforts at scientific forestry appear modest in Dar es Salaam district on the eve of Maji Maji, they nonetheless affected rural dwellers there dramatically. This came out in the report of the commission sent to investigate the causes of the uprising late in 1905. Because the war was still spreading south of the Rufiji, the commission spent most of its time in Dar es Salaam district. One commission member was the beer brewer Schultz, who knew about forest matters owing to his need for fuel wood. Schultz argued that the forest reserves created in the district were too large, 'especially in the vicinity of a growing city', because there was far too little wood left for African (or his own) use.⁴⁹ Near the city, especially along the railway line, it was hard for Zaramo villagers to determine which land they could use for field expansion and which was reserved as a railway concession or Crown Land/forest reserves, all of which were off limits. It was necessary to obtain permits to cut wood even for household use, and if one wanted to market wood it was necessary to pay for a permit. Authoritarian forest wardens prevented Africans from the city's hinterland entering the city to sell their wood, and sometimes confiscated the wood whether or not a permit had been acquired. Even the District Officer of Dar es Salaam, Boeder, believed that the wood cutting ordinances had gone too far in encumbering African forest use, adding to 'the general discontent' that predated the rebellion.⁵⁰ The Sachsenwald was completely off limits to African wood procurement, as were all of the coastal mangroves, meaning that Dar es Salaam residents had no way to obtain cooking fuel or timber for construction except by paying inflated prices at the market or by smuggling. Yet the time and expense needed to obtain cutting permits made the wood-supply business unprofitable. As a result of forest policies, according to Schultz, businesses inside the city, including small-scale African industries, had to deal with 'almost insurmountable difficulties in procuring fuel wood'.⁵¹ As a result of the wood shortage, African construction in the city was strongly impaired and 'to some degree brought to a halt'. Schultz agreed with the District Officer Boeder that the closing of forests to free access was a strong ground for discontent leading to the Maji Maji war.

Dar es Salaam forests in the era of (re)construction, 1907-1915

The declaration of new forest reserves in Dar es Salaam district awaited the end of the rebellion. The nine forests of southern Dar es Salaam that had been projected as reserves before the rebellion were abandoned in favour of several parcels along the Central Railway. After the war wage levels in the colony doubled, in part because of demand for workers for the railway, further encumbering the forest administration's efforts to create scientific forest

management and regenerate the region's forests.⁵² Since forced labour had been considered one of the causes of the uprising, the new administration also backed away from using force to obtain workers, a move that directly affected the forest department in Dar es Salaam district because it had a particularly poor reputation for its treatment of workers. Indeed, in October 1904 the German warden of Pugu forest had specifically requested the right to use the whip to instill 'the correct obedience and fear' in his forest workers, a request that was approved by District Officer Boeder.⁵³ After Maji Maji the administration no longer countenanced unbridled force for fear of another uprising. This was seen in an exchange between the Forest Assistant Jungfer and Boeder over the mustering of workers to work in the Shungubweni mangrove forest. When local people refused to work, Boeder informed the foresters that as long as people paid their taxes and fulfilled annual *corvée* obligations they were free to refuse work and move about as they saw fit.⁵⁴ This was also the understanding of a local resident, Kombo, who stated, 'It is true that I have not helped before to cut forest roads, and I am not obligated to do so since the work is done for a wage, and every inhabitant can freely choose to accept [wage] work or not'.⁵⁵

The exigencies of Maji Maji also temporarily moderated proscriptions on African wood use in the coastal mangroves. In mid-1907 residents of the villages of Puna and Mpafu just east of the Shungubweni mangrove forest, whose two hundred huts had been burned down during the uprising, requested access to the mangroves to rebuild since adequate wood was not available near their villages.⁵⁶ Although the forest department estimated that some 95 hectares of mangroves would be needed to rebuild the villages (1500 poles for each hut), the government approved the request as long as the forests were not clear cut. The aftermath of the rebellion also left the city of Dar es Salaam with a pent up demand for construction materials and fuel that was met in part by smuggling wood cut in the forests of Mbwamaji and Kilete just south of the city.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, merchants, such as the Indians Jussa Dewji and Meralji Murji, opened up standing orders for Rufiji wood to supply the Dar es Salaam construction industry, requests that the forest department promoted so as to increase colonial revenue.⁵⁸ By 1907 a colonial official advised against creating new forest reserves near Dar es Salaam since in light of population growth in the city the existing reserves - Sachsenwald and the mangroves - hemmed in existing settlements and impaired African industries that were dependent on wood.⁵⁹ Once more scientific forestry gave way to colonial exigencies.

Perhaps the biggest threat to the forests of Dar es Salaam district and further west toward Morogoro was the progress of the Central Railway. The 1904 concession agreement with the railway corporation gave it the right to take from forests free of charge wood that was needed for the maintenance and extension of the railway as long as it did not contradict 'the principles of orderly forest management'.⁶⁰ In 1909 the East African Railway Corporation (OEG) attempted to assert its rights over vast forest parcels along the railway line from the outskirts of Dar es Salaam to Morogoro, including Sachsenwald and Pugu.⁶¹ The governor's response was to send a forester to survey and

demarcate forest reserves along the entire stretch so as to ward off the OEG's unbridled exploitation. In this way the Kisserawe, Mpigi, Tongoro, and Mkonore forest reserves were established north and south of the railway line between 30-45 kilometres west of the town, encompassing several thousand hectares.⁶² Although the railway corporation still retained rights to extensive forest parcels along the railway, it was forced to turn to the Rufiji forest administration to purchase fuel wood for its locomotives.⁶³ The railway corporation also contracted the *Akida* of Kunduchi to supply it with wood, who in turn directed villagers near the Pande coastal forest north of Dar es Salaam to cut and procure timber and fuel wood.

By the end of German rule only about 16,000 hectares of forest reserves existed in Dar es Salaam district compared to some 75,000 in Rufiji district and 750,000 in the entire colony.⁶⁴ The consensus among colonial officials was that Dar es Salaam district did not have much to offer in the way of forests, only 'very few and completely scattered' woodland parcels with valuable timber that were suitable as forest reserves.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, foresters still believed that they could make forests out of bush through tried and true German methods 'after only a few decades' as long as they closed parcels to African cultivation.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the pressure that the growth of Dar es Salaam created on existing forests, and the inability of the forest administration to create true plantation forests capable of rotational cutting and planting, led some officials to call for the elimination of the forest reserves on the city's outskirts. In 1913 the Dar es Salaam District Officer Eggebrecht reported that it was becoming difficult for Africans and Europeans to procure fuel wood and timber for construction. Because of the city's wood shortage, prices had 'no relationship to the actual value of the wood', which two or three years previously – when 'everyone was able to obtain fuel wood without burdensome cost' – was not the case.⁶⁷ Eggebrecht predicted that, with the city's rapid growth, wood procurement would be almost impossible in the near future, and therefore he argued that the mangroves of the district should be reserved for the city's use rather than exploited for export industries. It was at about this time that Kurazini-Temeke 'forest', which still enclosed some mangroves, was eliminated as a reserve.

The struggles over the fate of the Sachsenwald forest reserve on the western outskirts of the city encapsulated many of the conflicts over colonial development, including African land use, labour shortage, settler expansion, urban growth, and forest conservation (and presaged the pressures that Pugu forest would face for the rest of the century). In 1910 officials came across a lone widow living in the forest, Binti Sura Fundi, who several years previously had carved out a *shamba* in the forest undetected.⁶⁸ Though she was relocated, Binti Sura's case illustrated the pressure to settle in the forest created by the migration of several thousand wage workers to Dar es Salaam, who remained dependent on subsistence gardens to supplement their wages. Even members of the *Schutztruppe* occasionally slipped into the Sachsenwald to obtain the wood necessary to build their barracks owing to the 'immense difficulties in obtaining building materials' in the city; thereby incurring the ire of the forest department for cutting wide swaths that destroyed the work of almost a decade

of forest management.⁶⁹ Local Zaramo also made incursions into the forest to cut wood for construction or to smuggle to the city for sale.⁷⁰

Discussion of the Sachsenwald's fate came to a head in 1913 when an article in the settler-friendly *Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung* suggested it was time to give the forest over to African cultivation since the land was unsuitable for European interests.⁷¹ In so doing it would eradicate a large tsetse 'herd' that nested in the forests (impairing a local cattle industry), and would also destroy the habitat of wild pigs that had plagued the region for a decade. Allowing Africans to farm in the forest, the newspaper argued, would also create a local labour pool for the city and the few German planters of the district, helping to ease the incessant labour shortage. While government officials in German East Africa had long since learned to ignore the opinions expressed in the newspaper, the article elicited great consternation among scientific circles in Germany, who immediately protested to the Colonial Secretary that the reputed 'botanical jewel' of the Sachsenwald was under assault.⁷² The government simply responded that in the interests of science and as a source of wood Sachsenwald would be preserved as a forest reserve. The debate over the fate of the Sachsenwald continued during World War One, when wartime exigencies opened the forest up once again to defence needs, as it had during the Maji Maji rebellion.⁷³ In 1915 the chief of the city's defence works received permission to obtain over 180,000 *boritis* and *fitos* (poles) from the Sachsenwald, while the flotilla harvested mangroves from Dar es Salaam creeks at will. The intense activity that accompanied the British seizure of Dar es Salaam in 1916 surely accelerated pressure on the forest.

British colonialism and the fate of the forests

During the interwar years British colonial policy was to prioritize agricultural development, including peasant production. This meant that policies which interfered with agricultural production, including scientific forestry, were put on the back burner. Policy was also to encourage export of forest products, including timber, mangroves, copal, rubber, and beeswax, especially after the onset of the depression in 1929 diminished colonial revenues. Furthermore, continued railway construction, urban growth, and the beginning of electricity generation in Dar es Salaam in the interwar years demanded millions of cubic feet of wood fuel, timber, and construction poles. The result was that the British colonial administration allowed a much more open exploitation of Tanganyika's forests. Besides greater pressure on German-era forest reserves, a start was made in the exploitation of *miombo* woodlands, whose hardwood species, especially *mwile* and *mninga*, were beginning to find a market for fuel and construction timber in Dar es Salaam. The interwar years thus witnessed a clear retreat from scientific forestry as the British administration not only tolerated but encouraged forest exploitation in forest reserves and on non-reserved Public Lands.

Most pressure was placed on coastal forests near Dar es Salaam and *miombo* woodlands along the line of the Central Railway. For the first few years of

Fueling the City

British rule the Railway Department was allowed free issue of timber and charcoal from reserves and Public Lands. In 1926, for example, some 6.5 million cubic feet of fuel wood was issued free from Tanganyikan forests, virtually all going to the Railway Department.⁷⁴ In the 1920s it was reported that *mvule* and *minga* timber was becoming scarce along the line of rail. Meanwhile, the city itself exerted a demand for domestic fuel, timber, and poles. In 1930 the Assistant Conservator of Forests estimated that a small Dar es Salaam household consumed 3-5 cubic metres of wood fuel monthly.⁷⁵ Owing to a growing timber and fuel wood scarcity near Dar es Salaam, the Forest Department started fuel wood plantations in coastal forests near the city. In the Mogo forest—the old Sachsenwald of German times—located on the western outskirts of the city, a fast growing exotic species called Ironwood (*Cassia Siamea*) and a slow growing indigenous species, *mkongo*, as well as 4000 *mvule* saplings were planted for fuel and timber needs on about 300 acres from about 1923.⁷⁶ In 1927 the Pugu coastal forest to the southwest was added to the department's afforestation efforts, growing about 100 acres of Ironwood for fuel. Both Pugu and Mogo forest were opened up to licensed forest squatters, on whose cultivated lands the Forest Department would begin fuel wood plantations.⁷⁷ The interwar period thus saw a steady conversion of coastal forests near Dar es Salaam into tree plantations growing exotic species, farmed by forest squatters.

World War II inaugurated a major change in Tanganyikan forest policy that would continue to independence and beyond. The cutting off of Asian sources of colonial timber reserves coupled with wartime demands for military construction led to an escalating demand for Tanganyikan hardwoods, especially for railway sleepers. At the same time, the dramatic decline in timber imports made Tanganyika more dependent on its own timber resources. Following the war, Cold War priorities, particularly the construction of new railways in Tanganyika and the Middle East, exerted a great demand on Tanganyikan forests. Development projects associated with the 'second colonial occupation', especially the Groundnut Scheme, and financing that came from the Colonial Development and Welfare Corporation, put the Forest Department on sound economic footing and at the centre of Tanganyikan development projects. On the eve of World War Two a little more than one percent of Tanganyika's landscape had been reserved as forests. The Forest Department's goal in the 1950s was to reserve fourteen percent of land cover for scientific forestry, a goal that was virtually achieved by independence in 1961. This meant that the 1950s witnessed the rapid surveying and declaration of forest reserves, especially targeting *miombo* woodlands that had previously been dismissed as unworthy of managed forestry. It also meant evicting thousands of peasants, including licensed forest squatters who provided labour for the Forest Department, from forests and woodlands to make way for reservation. Eviction of peasants and pastoralists from the expanding forest estate became a major political issue in the 1950s that helped feed the nationalist movement led by TANU.⁷⁸

While pressure from forest squatters was notable in the Vikindu, Mogo,

and Pugu forests near Dar es Salaam, the main threat to these forests came from the expansion of the town itself.⁷⁹ In the early 1950s parts of Mogo forest were excised to begin construction of Dar es Salaam airport and Ukonga prison. In a decade when the Forest Department was plagued by labour shortages throughout Tanganyika, the labour of forest squatters in Mogo and Vikindu forests was replaced with labour from prison as well as from 'youths from Dar es Salaam of no fixed occupation'.⁸⁰ New Consolidated Goldfields was allowed a kaolin mining concession in Pugu forest, and six stone-quarrying concessions were granted in Pugu forest to help construct Dar es Salaam airport. By 1951 the Forest Department reported that 'the greater part of what little remains of the Mogo reserve will have to be surrendered for the expansion of Dar es Salaam, and even Pugu reserve is threatened'.⁸¹ In spite of the diminishing of coastal forests that came with the city's expansion, the Forest Department cited peasant encroachment as the chief threat to Tanganyikan forests.

Conclusion

The vision of scientific forestry that existed at the outset of colonial rule in East Africa was one of a symbiotic relationship between managed forests and economic growth. By insulating forests near the city from the incursions of African peasants, German foresters expected to enlarge the forest domains while providing a fuel and timber reserve for urban growth and possibly for export. This vision failed due to the pressures created by the rapid growth of the city coupled with the inability of the colonial government to muster sufficient labour to create a sustained forest management. German officials in the colony often cited the lack of trained foresters and adequate funds to attract and retain forest workers as the limiting factor in creating scientific forestry in the colony.⁸² The British initially solved the question of obtaining labour for reafforestation by licensing forest squatters to reside in forest reserves where they cleared trees and farmed land that the Forest Department would eventually take over as tree plantations. By the 1950s such forest squatting was viewed as untenable, and evictions followed.

In spite of these attacks on forest squatters and other peasants, British officials did not disguise the fact that the forests around Dar es Salaam existed primarily to serve the development needs of the city. In 1955 the Forest Department wrote that the forests of Kisarawe District, the 'home county' of Dar es Salaam, 'has as its main objective the supply of firewood and poles to the municipality both by licensing the cutting of indigenous trees in forest reserves and on public lands outside them, and by sowing or planting in five forest reserves to ensure future supplies'.⁸³ There was no question by the 1950s that the forests in proximity to the city had long since been reshaped by and for human use, especially for the city's own firewood, building pole, and timber needs. At the same time, the Forest Department revived the German-era degradation narrative that depicted peasants as the chief cause of Tanganyikan deforestation. Since taken up by international conservationists,

the myth of peasant-caused deforestation has been used to justify massive population relocation in twentieth century Tanzania. Meanwhile, twenty-first century Dar es Salaam remains fundamentally dependent on its forest periphery to meet urban fuel and timber needs.

Notes

¹ W.A. Rodgers, 'Why a book on Coastal forests', in Neil D. Burgess and G. Philip Clarke (eds.), *Coastal forests of Eastern Africa* (Gland and Cambridge, 2000), p. 7.

² For an overview of how such degradation narratives have influenced modern conservation policy in Africa see James C. McCann, *Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land: An Environmental History of Africa, 1800-1990* (Portsmouth NH, 1999), chapter 4.

³ Eastern Province Forest Reserves, Morogoro Forest Dept. to Regional Mines Officer, Dept. Land and Mines, DSM, 21 December 1951, Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) 18982 Vol. II.

⁴ Tanganyika District Books (hereafter TDB), Kisarawe District Book, Vol. II, 'The Physical Background and its Influence on Settlement,' n. d. (1950s), pp. 4, 10.

⁵ Adolfo Mascarenhas, 'The Port of Dar es Salaam', *Tanzania Notes & Records* (hereafter TNR) 71 (1970), pp. 85-118.

⁶ J.E.G. Sutton, 'Dar es Salaam: a sketch of a hundred years', *TNR* 71 (1970), p. 19; August Leue, *Dar-es-Salaam: Bilder aus dem Kolonialleben* (Berlin, 1903), p. 5.

⁷ Explanation of the Decree of 12 December 1893, Bundesarchiv-Berlin (hereafter BAB) R1001/7680/9-11.

⁸ For a description of early building techniques in colonial Dar es Salaam see 'Bautätigkeit des Gouvernements', *Deutsches Kolonial-Blatt* (1894/95), pp. 276-78.

⁹ L.A. Lewis and L. Berry, *African Environments and Resources* (Boston, 1988), p. 227.

¹⁰ J.F. Elton describes this deforestation in 'The African Gum Copal Tree', *Indian Forester* I (1876), pp. 36-40.

¹¹ On German scientific forestry and its origins see Henry E. Lowood, 'The Calculating Forester: Quantification, Cameral Science, and the Emergence of Scientific Forest Management in Germany', in *The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century*, (eds.) Tore Frängsmyr, J.L. Heilbron, and Robin E. Rider (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 315-42; Ravi Rajan, 'Imperial Environmentalism or Environmental Imperialism? European Forestry, Colonial Foresters and the Agendas of Forest Management in British India 1800-1900', in *Nature and the Orient: The Environmental History of South and Southeast Asia*, (ed.) Richard H. Grove, Vinita Damodaran and Satpal Sangwan (New Delhi, 1998), pp. 324-71; James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, 1998), pp. 11-12.

¹² Germans served as inspectors-general of the Indian Forest Department from 1864 to 1917. On the role of German foresters in Asia, see Indra Munshi Saldanha, 'Colonialism and Professionalism: A German Forester in India', *Environment and History* 2 (1996), pp. 195-219; Nancy Lee Peluso, *Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java* (California, 1994), pp. 63, 65; Peter Boomgaard, 'Forest Management and Exploitation in Colonial Java, 1677-1897', *Forest and Conservation History* 36 (1992), pp. 4-14; Raymond L. Bryant, *The Political Ecology of Forestry in Burma 1824-1994* (Honolulu, 1996).

¹³ *Anlagen zum Jahresbericht über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebieten in Afrika und der Südsee im Jahre 1904/05. Beilage zum Deutschen Kolonial-Blatt 1906* (Berlin, 1906), p. 81 (hereafter *Jahresbericht*); *Jahresbericht 1905/06*, p. 75.

¹⁴ Krüger report, 3 October 1894, BAB R1001/7680/30b.

¹⁵ Forstwesen in Deutsch-Ostafrika, BAB R1001/7680/3-5.

¹⁶ For the Indian Ocean trade in mangrove poles (including discussion of Rufiji), see Erik Gilbert, *Dhows & the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar, 1860-1970* (Oxford, 2004), chapter 5.

¹⁷ Grass to KG, 7 January 1903 and Grass to KG, 11 March 1904, both in TNA G8/529. A *coria* is the equivalent of a score of poles or logs.

¹⁸ Grass to Referat VIII, 10 March 1904, TNA G8/529.

¹⁹ The preservationist goal of imperial environmentalism in general, and German forestry in specific, has been advanced by Gregory Barton, *Empire Forestry and the Origins of Environmentalism* (Cambridge, 2002); Hans G. Schabel, 'Tanganyika Forestry under German Colonial Administration, 1891-1919', *Forest and Conservation History* (July 1990), pp. 130-141, here 138.

²⁰ Kurasini Forest Reserve, 1904-1912, TNA G8/629.

²¹ *Jahresbericht 1904/05*, pp. 80-81.

²² Holtz to Kommando der Schutztruppe, 28 Dec. 1912, TNA G8/882.

²³ Coastal forests are recognized as a distinct habitat that differs from rainforests because of their annual 3-5 month long dry season. They possess continuous stands of trees with a high canopy layer over a sub-canopy, ranging in altitude from sea level to 750 m. There are about sixty-six Coastal forests in Tanzania and some two hundred along the east African coast from Somalia to Mozambique. Neil Burgess, Clare FitzGibbon and Phillip Clarke, 'Coastal forests', in *East African Ecosystems and their Conservation*, (ed.) T.R. McClanahan and T.P. Young (New York & Oxford, 1996), pp. 329-359; G.P. Clarke, 'Defining the eastern African Coastal forests', in *Coastal forests of Eastern Africa*, (ed.) Neil D. Burgess and G. Philip Clarke (Gland and Cambridge, 2000), pp. 9-26.

²⁴ Waldreservat Pugu, 4 August 1902, TNA G58/44; Michels report, 4 August 1902, TNA G8/631.

²⁵ BM-Kisserawe, II Quart. 1905, 31b; Bericht der Station für 1904, 7a, 8a.

²⁶ Holtz to BA-Dar es Salaam, 12 August 1910, TNA G8/631.

²⁷ Foreign Office, Colonial Department to Imperial Government DOA, 31 May 1903, TNA G8/609.

²⁸ Eckert report, 16 January 1904, TNA G8/609.

²⁹ Crown Land Hearing No. 6, 6 August 1904, TNA G8/630.

³⁰ Eckert to District Officers of Bagamoyo, Dar es Salaam, Kilwa and Lindi, 26 June 1904, TNA G8/630.

³¹ Pugu and Sachsenwald were referred to as 'Reviere' instead of 'Waldreservate' before 1904. Memorandum to Götzen, 15 May 1903, TNA G8/508; 'Forstwirtschaft', *Jahresbericht 1902/03*, pp. 31-32.

³² *Jahresbericht 1902/03*, 30-31; TNA G8/630, Sachsenwald Land Commission, 15 April 1904.

³³ Landprotokoll No. 4, 15 April 1904, TNA G58/43.

³⁴ Vikindu Forest Reserve, TNA G8/632; Massangia Forest Reserve, TNA G8/633; Pugu Forest Reserve, TNA G8/631.

³⁵ Forstwirtschaft Bezirk Dar es Salaam, 1898-1915, TNA G8/581/40.

³⁶ A map of the Vikindu reserve showing the 'serkali shamba' is found in TNA G58/45, Waldreservat Vikindu.

³⁷ Reich to Referat VIII, 14 May 1905, TNA G35/1.

³⁸ Kirumbi bin Kirumbi to Reich, 11 May 1905, TNA G35/1.

³⁹ Eckert to Government, 24 October 1904; Götzen to Tabora Military Station, January 1905, both in TNA G35/1.

⁴⁰ Reich to Akida, Kisserawe, 13 February 1905, TNA G35/1.

⁴¹ Pugu Forest Station, 3 May 1905, TNA G35/1/50.

⁴² Eckert to Mogo Forest Station, 30 August 1905, TNA 35/1/56.

⁴³ Berndt to Referat VIII in DSM, 10 August 1905, TNA G8/529.

⁴⁴ Grages to Government, 7 September 1905, TNA G8/529/53-55; and 19 October 1905, TNA G8/529/65.

⁴⁵ Forstbezirk DSM, Eckert report, c. 1906; *Jahresbericht 1905/06*, p. 75, TNA G8/514.

⁴⁶ Mangrove Forest Reserve Dar es Salaam, 12 September 1905 and 25 September 1905, TNA G8/630.

⁴⁷ Government to Grass, December 1905; Grass to Government, 30 December 1905; Government to Forest Administration Rufiji, May 1906, all in TNA G8/530.

⁴⁸ I have argued this point at greater length with respect to Rufiji and Kilwa districts in 'Reinterpreting a Colonial Rebellion: Forestry and Social Control in German East Africa, 1874-1915', *Environmental History* 8:3 (2003), pp. 430-51.

⁴⁹ Schultz report, 21 December 1905, BAB R1001/726/121b.

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- ⁵⁰ Boeder report, 21 December 1905, BAB R1001/726/119.
- ⁵¹ Schultz report, 21 December 1905, BAB R1001/726/121b.
- ⁵² *Jahresbericht 1905/06*, p. 75.
- ⁵³ Bieberstein to Referat VIII, 24 October 1904, TNA G35/1.
- ⁵⁴ District Office Dar es Salaam to Referat VIII, 9 July 1906, TNA G35/1.
- ⁵⁵ Michels report, 26 June 1906, TNA G35/1.
- ⁵⁶ District Office DSM to Government, 9 July 1907 and 21 September 1907; Government to KB DSM, 4 November 1907, all in TNA G8/630.
- ⁵⁷ Lobo to Government, 27 May 1909, TNA G8/630.
- ⁵⁸ Eckert to Forest Administration Salale, 18 November 1907; Grass to Government, 5 May 1909, both in TNA G8/531.
- ⁵⁹ Wächter to Rechenberg, 15 February 1907, TNA G8/581.
- ⁶⁰ Auszug aus der Bau- und Betriebskonzession der OEG, Statute 16, 1904, TNA G8/850.
- ⁶¹ Theologe to Government, 26 October 1909 and 28 October 1909, TNA G8/581.
- ⁶² Mkonore, TNA G8/634; Tongoro, TNA G8/635; Kisserawe, TNA G8/637; Mpigi, TNA G8/638.
- ⁶³ Salale Forest Reserve, Verkaufsliste, 23 December 1913, TNA G8/589/39-40.
- ⁶⁴ T. Siebenlist, *Forstwirtschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika* (Berlin, 1914), p. 7.
- ⁶⁵ Forstwirtschaft Bezirk Dar es Salaam, 1898-1915 TNA G8/581; von Wächter, 20 March 1907, TNA G8/581/58.
- ⁶⁶ *Jahresbericht 1907/08*, p. 157.
- ⁶⁷ Eggebrecht to Schnee, 20 October 1913, TNA G8/581.
- ⁶⁸ Holtz to District Office, 21 February 1910, TNA G8/882.
- ⁶⁹ Leopold report, 27 November 1912, TNA G8/882.
- ⁷⁰ Holtz to District Office, 21 March 1911, TNA G8/882.
- ⁷¹ *Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung*, No. 9, 29 January 1913.
- ⁷² Staatliche Stelle für Naturdenkmalpflege in Preussen to Colonial Office, 20 March 1913, TNA G8/882.
- ⁷³ Lt. Allmann, Chief of Defensive Works, to District Officer Dar es Salaam, 6 September 1915, TNA G8/882.
- ⁷⁴ *Sixth Annual Report of the Forest Department* (1926), p. 10. On free issue to African peasants see Roderick Neumann, 'Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualising State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika', *Environment and History* 3 (1997), pp. 45-68.
- ⁷⁵ Asst. Conservator of Forests to Conservator of Forests, 9 April 1930, TNA 270K/1/D.
- ⁷⁶ In 1926, 1000 square yards were cut from the Mogo forest to make a rifle range for the King's African Rifles, a harbinger of the eventual complete demise of the forest. *Sixth Annual Report of the Forest Department* (1926), p. 2.
- ⁷⁷ *Eighth and Ninth Annual Reports of the Forest Department*, (1928 and 1929).
- ⁷⁸ Connections between Tanganyikan nationalism and forestry have been noted in Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison, 1990); Peter Pels, 'Creolisation in Secret: The Birth of Nationalism in Late Colonial Uluguru, Tanzania', *Africa* 72:1 (2002), pp. 1-28; Roderick Neumann, *Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998).
- ⁷⁹ *Annual Report of the Forest Department* (ARFD) (1950), pp. 5, 10.
- ⁸⁰ ARFD (1956), p. 40 and (1957), p. 40.
- ⁸¹ ARFD (1951), p. 13.
- ⁸² Abrechnungswesen Forstverwaltung Rufiji, 1912, TNA G8/543; Forstliche Jahresberichte, Grass report, 13 April 1900, TNA G8/514; Waldreservate Allgemein, Eckert report, 16 January 1904, TNA G8/609.
- ⁸³ ARFD (1955), p. 12.

Chapter Three

Race, Class and Housing in Dar es Salaam: The colonial impact on land use structure 1891-1961

J.M. Lusugga Kironde

The history of colonial land use in Dar es Salaam offers a clear vista into the city's physical development, racial segregation, and class differentiation. The implementation of German and later British land laws provided the foundation upon which colonial governments, white settlers, Indian and Arab business investors, and African landowners, farmers and workers would struggle to shape the urban economy for their own ends. The shape of Dar es Salaam today is strongly influenced by the outcome of these struggles. The German and later British governments segregated Dar es Salaam by race through building codes and land laws. European and Indian investors seized economic opportunities by purchasing land from Africans for buildings or farms. As Dar es Salaam's population expanded, government had to balance demands of non-African landowners, which they inclined to favour, with the needs of a growing African population seeking an urban home. The resulting compromises, and subsequent interventions by the late colonial government into Dar es Salaam's land and housing markets, formed the basic outlines of Dar es Salaam's major neighbourhoods, and still define much of the city's physical shape today.

The land use structure of any urban area is a result of the interaction of many factors. Governments through their regulatory powers have a major impact on how various uses and categories of users are located in a city. By and large, economists agree that government intervention in land markets to order land use is desirable. This is because the land market is considered to be imperfect and generally unable to live to the ideals of a perfect market. In the case of Africa, evolution of urban land policy can be divided into three phases as proposed by Mabogunje.¹ Here, we are concerned with the first two of these phases. The first runs from the late 19th century to 1945. Urban land policy in the early colonial period was guided by the need to shape Dar es Salaam to serve the twin aims of colonialism, i.e. exploitation and domination. Policy was characterised by racial discrimination, partly justified by the concern

with 'public' (i.e. European) health – 'the sanitation syndrome'² – and partly in order to create a psychological atmosphere of African inferiority, to ease domination, and to privilege European and other non-native populations in land development. Investment in infrastructure and services varied according to the races occupying particular areas, on the pretext that different races had different requirements. Most legislation relating to land tenure and township administration was formulated during this phase, and has had a lasting influence on the character of the colonial (and postcolonial) city. The second phase, running from 1946 to 1961, was characterised by the Government taking greater responsibility for the provision of African housing and services, as well as asserting itself more forcefully into the management of Dar es Salaam's land economy.³ Paradoxically, this post-war commitment to managing urban growth would mark the historic peak of the state's relative investment in Dar es Salaam, just at the time when the late colonial Government was fast losing its legitimacy because of the continued racial inequities in its distribution of urban resources.

Creating a colonial capital in German East Africa

The German territorial government selected Dar es Salaam as the seat of power and as the chief port of the colony in January 1891, although Bagamoyo had been headquarters of the preceding German colonial administration, the *Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft* (DOAG, or 'German East African Company'). The first Governor for German East Africa, Julius von Soden, never stayed in Bagamoyo, moving directly to Dar es Salaam from Zanzibar in April 1891. The town was selected because of its natural sheltered harbour, which presented a cheaper option than that of transforming Bagamoyo into a modern port. Additionally, there were relatively fewer vested interests to stand in the way of government designs (e.g. land appropriation) at Dar es Salaam.

Early German land acquisition reflected the motives of colonial rule. Land was required for government offices, officials' residences, and the military, as well as for trading purposes. All land along the harbour was immediately acquired and soon put to uses such as defence, warehousing, customs, and general administration. Europeans, aware of the moderating influence of a sea breeze on the hot and humid climate, also acquired land along the Ocean Front for residential purposes. Initial policy sought to avoid disturbance of the old Majid town, with its vested Indian and Arab interests. Government used three major ways of obtaining land: acquiring it forcibly from Africans with minimum or no compensation; acquiring land which became vested in the government through the German East Africa Company or through the 1895 Decree (see below); and obtaining land through genuine negotiations, purchase, or exchange with the more prominent Arab and 'non-native' landowners.

The case of local landowner Halid bin Msuo is representative of how Africans were removed from the foreshore.⁴ In 1890, Halid and other 'natives' were ordered to leave their settlements along the harbour front to make way

for European settlement. In compensation, landowners received one rupee for each large palm and 20-30 rupees for a house. Halid was not willing to sell his plot, which contained the grave of his father and a small mosque. He also declared that within the affected plot were two houses worth several hundred rupees and 65 palms. However, Halid, his brother Rasgalla and another person, all owning six and half hectares of land and developments, were paid only 200 rupees. They could not protest as 'all natives abandoned their plots without regard to compensation out of fear of Europeans'. This amounted to forcible eviction with minimal compensation, yet documents detailing the transfer of their land to the German Government were presented as contracts of purchase (*Kaufvertrags*). In this way Germans obtained land in the area between the harbour and the current city centre.

By the time of von Sodden's arrival in April 1891, the process of clearing the Government Quarter of natives was well under way. The DOAG remained an important partner of government. In an agreement between the two, dated 20th November 1890, the DOAG was granted right to seize and occupy all 'un-owned' (*Herrenlos*) land,⁵ with a proviso that the Imperial Government, if so desired, were able to construct public buildings on that land in the interests of good governance and security. In the early colonial period the DOAG was therefore at the forefront of land seizure and acquisition. Though, under a new agreement in November 1902, it was finally forced to give up exclusive occupation authority of 'un-owned' land in favour of government.⁶ The company nevertheless retained extensive land along the harbour and in the government/residential area.

As land values increased, many Africans in and around Dar es Salaam were turned into tenants paying rent to German landowners. In an attempt to reverse the process, a decree issued in 1895 prevented the transfer of land exceeding one hectare in size between natives and non-natives within townships without the Governor's consent. It provided inadequate protection. Many African landholdings were less than one hectare, and in any case, the Governor need not withhold consent. Record books of the central areas of Dar es Salaam and Tanga circa 1900 show no African property ownership therein.⁷ Furthermore, the 1895 Decree had declared as Crown land all land considered owner-less. Prior to that, in 1894, a system of land registration had been introduced.⁸ Thereafter, for a number of years, government called upon those with claims on land to present evidence in support of their claim. Those who failed to report, or who had no evidence (the majority of Africans) or whose evidence could not satisfy officials, had their land confiscated. As a result, most of the foreshore, city centre, parts of Upanga, Kurasini and the Msimbazi Valley passed into government ownership. Government thus became a major, if not the largest, urban landowner. Nevertheless, except in the case of the Government Quarter where natives had to move within six months, occupiers of government land were not required to leave immediately land was acquired. This led to its continued occupation by Africans and Indians in an indefinite system that later came to be known as *Kūwanja* tenure.

In contrast to its dealings with most Africans, in cases where landowners were powerful, the government preferred negotiations, purchase or exchange.

The case of Suleiman bin Nasr el Lemky, a Zanzibari Arab, is illustrative. He owned extensive land, part of which was in what became the Government Quarter. Instead of having it expropriated, Suleiman (who was *Liwali* of Dar es Salaam between 1891 and 1903) exchanged land with the government. In cases such as this, part of government land was later on disposed of to private individuals after it had been subdivided into plots.⁹

Shaping Dar es Salaam's early land use structure

Land use structure was central to implementing colonial goals. It has been argued that, in comparison with towns like Tabora, Arusha, and Iringa, the military aspect was less important in shaping land use in Dar es Salaam. This apparently resulted from the suppression, early in the colonial period, of local uprisings that posed a threat to the regime.¹⁰ However, it should be noted that in Dar es Salaam, the harbour was paramount. Protection could be mustered from the Ocean, since the *Flotilla* (Navy) was stationed at Dar es Salaam. The Governor's *Palast* was strategically placed by the harbour's entrance, and a fort was built at the harbour mouth. Moreover, a *Boma* was constructed midway along the early harbour, and the *Kaserne* (Barracks) were located in the interior harbour. These military institutions, alongside a police barracks beyond the Kurasini Creek, were among Dar es Salaam's earliest government structures.

Dar es Salaam's early development was guided by the town's first *Bauordnung* (building code), introduced on 14th May 1891. It divided the town into zones in which different standards of construction were required. Land use planning was then targeted to street layouts, land subdivisions, and building regulations, mainly for sanitary considerations, but with an ulterior aim of legalising racial segregation. According to the *Bauordnung*, the zone along the harbour front and eastern part of the town was exclusively allocated for 'European type buildings' (as interpreted by Imperial officials); the next zone around India Street had to be built of solid materials and could not fall into the category of 'native huts'; for the rest of Dar es Salaam towards the periphery there was no restriction on building types, allowing the construction of the simplest huts. All construction required a permit. By 1905, Dar es Salaam was essentially developing on racial lines. Segregation was openly invoked throughout German East Africa, and a native zone was in the process of being laid out in the Kariakoo area.¹¹ The Government quarter, consisting of both Government offices and officials' residences, was planned with straight, wide boulevards lined with trees linking it to the old Majid town to the west – a type of planning then fashionable in Europe.¹² Individual plots were quite large, buildings mainly two storied, and a large area was allocated to botanical gardens which were not only of considerable scientific and economic value, but formed a great attraction to residents. The European area was projected to develop northwards and end up at the Golf Course. This was curtailed by the outbreak of World War One, but was completed by the British Administration after 1918. To the west of the Government Quarter, the Indian *bazaar* (part of the former Majid Town) consisted of basic and unhygienic single storied flat-

roofed houses, comprising shop and residence. These existed in contradiction to stipulations of the *Bauordnung* which required stone buildings in the area. A semi-angular street plan was prepared for the *bazaar*, generally simulating the curve of the Harbour. Such 'ring' development was fashionable in European town planning at the time. All streets in this area converged on the harbour, a reflection of its centrality to the town at this stage in its development. Density of population was high in contrast to the Government quarter, and also to the 'native' area to the north and west of the *bazaar*.



Fig. 3.1 *Street in the Native Town of Dar es Salaam (Kariakoo), circa 1905*

Source: *Archives of Dr. D. Schmeiser*

In the African quarter a grid pattern plan was prepared, typical of European 19th century working class quarters. Building in any materials was allowed here, and the type of structures erected ranged from the large thatched Swahili houses to more simple structures (see Fig. 1). Kariakoo, which was to become the principal African settlement, comprised in part the Sultan of Zanzibar's former plantation. These 213 hectares had been purchased by a German planter-cum-land speculator named Schoeller in the 1890s. For this purpose, Schoeller established the Sultan Plantation Company, allowing Africans to settle on this land in exchange for rent. It was also a speculative investment anticipating the land's future value, which in the 1910s had reached 1-2 rupees a square metre. With the commencement of railway construction, many Africans flocked to Dar es Salaam and settled haphazardly, particularly on Schoeller's *shamba*. By 1913, government was under pressure from European

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residents to acquire the *shamba* for the proper settling of 'natives'.¹³ These petitioners noted that the plantation contained 1,600 out of the 2,400 African houses in the township, and 15,000 of the 24,000 urban residents. The development of such a large native settlement could not be left to a private company, profiting from land rent and coco-palms, that stood to lose if the area was re-developed. Furthermore, they held that government purchase of the plantation was essential for sanitary purposes; in particular for effective racial segregation as stipulated in the *Bauordnung*. Schoeller's *shamba* was subsequently bought by government in 1914 for 500,000 rupees.

In the light of such circumstances, alongside the tremendous increase in Dar es Salaam's population (from 9,000 people in 1894 to 24,000 in 1913), a new *Bauordnung* was called for. This appeared on 1st July 1914 (see Fig. 2). Shaped by the 1891 *Bauordnung*, it divided Dar es Salaam along more or less




Fig. 3.2 *The 1914 Bauordnung for Dar es Salaam*

Source: TNA 12589/II, *Dar es Salaam Township Layout*

racial lines into three zones of European (Zone I), Asian (Zone II), and African (Zone III) settlement, including a planned 'neutral zone' separating Zone III from Zones I and II. War broke out a month after the 1914 *Bauordnung* was published, curtailing its implementation. Nevertheless, the new *Bauordnung* laid the basis for Dar es Salaam's inter-war growth; the British implementing it to the letter.

Zoning requirements in the European area, as well as the infrastructure therein were usually implemented through government investment, while the private sector tended to be relied upon in the Indian and African areas. As a result, standards of buildings, infrastructure and the general environment in these areas differed immensely. The infrastructural development of early Dar es Salaam most plainly benefited the town's small European population. Laying roads in the European area was relatively easy, as it had been cleared of occupants. In the *bazaar* area and the African quarter, where existing construction was unplanned, more difficulty was experienced. German officials prepared street layouts for these areas, to which existing and later structures had to conform. It was reported, for example, that Becker Strasse, stretching from the Government Hospital to the city centre, as well as Wissman Strasse and Suleiman bin Nasr Strasse, were laid out in 1907/08, and that native huts in the way were demolished and their owners compensated.¹⁴ Nevertheless, according to Gillman, the bazaar area remained 'a messy, labyrinthine triangle where the Indian dukas and dwellings mingled with Arab and African huts, a veritable slum area defying all effects of proper municipal administration and sanitation'.¹⁵ There was equally limited infrastructure in the form of sewers and drains. An anti-malaria campaign directed the construction of drains in parts of the European area. Otherwise there was no system of drainage. In 1907 horizontal and vertical measurements were taken as a basis for Dar es Salaam's sanitation network, and a general plan was drawn up but not implemented.¹⁶ A sewerage and drainage network for central Dar es Salaam was not constructed until the 1950s. Whatever services there were during the German period were concentrated in the European area. Moreover, services tended to follow development rather than vice versa.

Dar es Salaam under British control: The inter-war period, 1916-1939

On 4th September 1916, the British occupied Dar es Salaam and the German government was forced to Tabora. From this point up till 1919, permits were given to African soldiers and civilians to build houses in Kariakoo in a somewhat haphazard manner.¹⁷ It was only after 1922 that the new Government demonstrated greater interest in town planning. The German administration had, for the most part, already transformed Dar es Salaam into a colonial capital. The British focused on completing the work of their predecessor. The 1914 *Bauordnung* had hardly been promulgated when World War One broke out. The British went ahead to shape Dar es Salaam according to its provisions. Building areas (Zones) modelled on the *Bauordnung* were published under the

Township Rules in 1924. In conjunction with the earlier *Township Ordinance* (passed in 1920), these gave the British Governor powers to prescribe areas (i) in which residential buildings of European type only were to be constructed, (ii) in which residential and trading buildings may be erected; and (iii) for native quarters only. These areas were called Zones I, II and III respectively. The British tried to slot the various races in their proper zones, although over time this proved difficult to sustain. Within the zones, efforts were made to regularise and direct land uses internally. Meanwhile, consideration had to be given to the question of new land to cope with demand for urban plots. In all these processes the issue of public health was usually raised to justify racial segregation.

The first major British undertakings were to regularize and extend the African quarter in Kariakoo and Ilala, and to clear the 'neutral zone', or Open Space (today known as Mnazi Mmoja), of its existing, mostly 'native' buildings. The British imagined that the Germans planned the 'neutral zone' as a lung, to separate those classes who use WCs from those who use more 'primitive' methods of disposing waste matter, or to provide an open space for fire protection.¹⁸ It was originally planned to be 300 yards wide, but was reduced to 150 yards. From 1921, the Administrative Officer for Dar es Salaam took steps to prevent the erection of new buildings in the area.¹⁹ To expedite the removal of people from this area, the Township Authority applied the *Township Rules* of 1923 in a curious manner. The rules required permission to erect a building, and the Township Authority defined 'erection' to include rebuilding walls that had fallen down. Therefore, whenever the wall of a house in the earmarked Open Space fell into severe disrepair, the Township Authority refused to grant permission to repair, and could then move in to demolish the building as being unfit for human habitation. In this way, buildings disappeared from the Open Space, although Africans were in most cases unwilling to move. In July 1927, the remaining 'native' houses were given notice to quit within three years, affecting some 170 buildings. Realising the futility of fighting government, most Africans had moved by mid-January 1930, and by the mid-1930s the Open Space was cleared.

In Zone I British officials simply took over former German residences. However, as these proved insufficient for existing requirements, some ex-German private properties were 'nationalised' after being withdrawn from public auction during the sale of Enemy Property in 1922, and bought at officially determined prices. Oyster Bay was selected as a European settlement, although it was then outside the township boundary. A bridge – named Selander Bridge after Tanganyika's first Director of Public Works – was constructed across the Msimbazi Creek in 1929 to replace an earlier temporary one, thereby facilitating the town's northward extension. The area north of Selander Bridge, including Oyster Bay, was finally annexed to Dar es Salaam in August 1931 through a plan to reclaim mosquito-infested areas as well to prevent squatter building.²⁰ Europeans worked hard to keep Oyster Bay racially exclusive, although no such racial restrictions formally existed in the zoning laws.

In the commercial area, although much land had been acquired by government during the German era, African and Indian inhabitants were left

relatively unmolested.²¹ They continued to construct haphazardly, utilising varied building materials. This rather indefinite occupation on government land, somewhat akin to squatting, was known as *Kiwanja* tenure. It was permissive occupation, whereby tenants paid rent to government, and tenure was terminable at six months notice. After clearing the 'Open Space', the administration turned its attention to the commercial area, in order to remove 'native dwellings' and to force Indians to improve their buildings and the area's general environment. To do this, 'natives' were denied permission to repair their houses, and Indians were forced to take up Rights of Occupancy, which incorporated expensive building and land use covenants. In 1926, the Chief Secretary issued *Circular No. 31* to all Provincial Commissioners requiring that all non-natives who occupied land on *Kiwanja* tenure be given notices to quit their tenancy within six months, i.e. by 31st March 1927, although the deadline was extended to 1932. Many Indians complained they could not afford the higher rents and to abide by the expensive building covenants, and *Kiwanja* tenure persisted well into the 1930s.²² Nevertheless, over time the community by and large complied with the Rights of Occupancy requirements. Gradually the central area was regularised and rebuilt. In 1936, the Land Division pointed out that there were no more plots in Dar es Salaam held on *Kiwanja* tenure.²³ This process had the effect of de-legitimising continued 'native' residence in the commercial area, while enhancing Indian predominance.

In Zone III, where it became increasingly obvious that the number of plots earlier demarcated in Kariakoo was insufficient to cope with demand, the land west of modern-day Msimbazi Street up to the Msimbazi River valley was divided into plots. By August 1923, 600 of these were ready for issue. The market, disused since the war when it served as a Carrier Corps Depot, was formally opened for business by the Governor. The vicinity of the market was designated a 'non-native trading area', where Indian traders could engage in commerce. Meanwhile, over time growing numbers of Indians moved into other parts of Zone III for both residential and commercial purposes.²⁴ Seeing the futility of resisting this process, government decided to amend the *Township Rules* with respect to building areas to legalise the *de facto* construction of non-native houses in the African township. The argument given was that zoning provided minimum, but not maximum standards, and the terminology of the building code for Zone III was changed to read, 'an area into which buildings of any type could be built', provided authority was obtained.²⁵ By 1929, there were so many native applicants for building plots in Zone III that government agreed to demarcate and issue some 600 further plots on Borman's *shamba*, a 500 acre ex-enemy property west of Kariakoo acquired by government at auction for about £4,000 'for public purposes'. The new suburb, seen as the natural extension of the 'native' town, was named Ilala by the Governor, after the district in Northern Rhodesia in which Dr. Livingstone died.²⁶

Both the provincial and township authorities had fairly narrow goals for Dar es Salaam. They saw the town as a European and Indian settlement in which some 'natives' had to be tolerated. The general approach to land use was negative, restricted to defining who should live where and what should or

Race, Class and Housing in Dar es Salaam

should not be constructed where, within a general framework of public health and sanitation considerations. British land policy was mostly reactive, determined by *ad hoc* responses to crisis situations. The general urban economy was seen in fairly narrow terms of employment for Europeans, commerce for Indians and menial and casual jobs for 'natives'. Infrastructural standards in Dar es Salaam were low, and were not equitably distributed among the town's residents. Europeans took the lion's share, while Africans got the least. For example, figures for water supply from the record of the Public Works Department show that between 1933 and 1938, Europeans in Dar es Salaam consumed, per capita, between 31-43 gallons of water per day; Indians consumed between 7.5 and 14.5 gallons; and Africans consumed just 0.68-0.88 gallons.

Dar es Salaam was a phenomenon devoid of central dynamism or of a long-term perspective. It was a town made up of social and geographical entities encased in a kind of parochialism, couched in terms of different needs for different races. The distance that many Africans had to walk to work was not considered – it was sufficient that 'natives' were in their own zone with some minimal land ordering, and away from Europeans. Discriminatory allocation of space led to overcrowding in both the Indian and 'native' areas, as well as to strife between the various races, particularly when Indians 'overflowed' into Zone III. While it was recognised that the city centre was becoming overpopulated, no efforts were made to regulate Upanga, although it was clear that it was the natural overflow area for Indians. Zone III was even more adversely affected. No building plots were provided for Africans outside the areas of Kariakoo and Ilala, both prepared before 1930. Between them, these two areas comprised just over 2,000 plots, which was all that was available for thousands of Africans in Dar es Salaam during the 60 years of German and British colonialism until the late 1940s. These demarcated plots were to cater mainly for those already in the town. For newcomers, the policy kept but a blind eye. This led to overcrowding, and to the haphazard occupation of available land.

Growth and Development, 1946-1961

The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1939 offered funds to British colonial governments for development projects to improve working and living conditions of African subjects. Colonial Governors were encouraged to draw up Ten Year Development Plans for their territories. In Tanganyika, a document known as 'An Outline of Post War Development' was published in 1944, followed in 1946 by the *Ten Year Development Plan for Tanganyika*. This guided Tanganyika's development until superseded by the Vasey Plan in 1961. The Plan had considerable impact on urban development in Tanganyika in general, and on Dar es Salaam in particular. It provided for investment in urban infrastructure – roads, housing, water, electricity, and sewage networks – and social infrastructure including schools and health centres. Investment undertakings of a national character like the construction of trunk roads and

airports, and the expansion of the harbour, also had considerable effects on Dar es Salaam's development.

Although major housing schemes were undertaken, these were once more provided along racial lines. Housing shortages were desperate for all races in the 1940s, and overcrowding was rife in Zones I and II – a situation exacerbated by spiralling urban growth. After the war, a total of £4,000,000 was spent on European staff housing, mainly located in the areas of Oyster Bay and Kurasini. About 350 housing units for Asian Government staff were constructed at this same time, mostly in the Chang'ombe area. The major focus of the post-war housing plans concerned the expansion of African urban housing. Experimental buildings were constructed in order to produce a cheap, economic house in permanent materials. Such 'quarters' as they became known, were built in Ilala, Temeke and Magomeni. Of the territorial total of £2,200,000 for African Urban Housing, up to £1,600,000 was spent in Dar es Salaam, as it had been planned to provide African Housing in a ratio of 5:2 for Dar es Salaam to all other urban areas. African urban houses cost around £216 on average, compared to £1,000 for Asian houses and £1,500-£3,000 for European houses.²⁷ Sites and services plots were provided in Temeke, Magomeni and Kinondoni and across the Harbour at Kigamboni. In these areas, plots were demarcated and issued to Africans on short-term tenure for self-construction. Africans were encouraged to become house-owners by building traditional or modern type houses.

Nearly 8,000 plots were demarcated during the 1950s on both government land and on private land acquired from its owners. Unlike the previous era, better amenities, including roads, water supply, markets, schools, recreational grounds, were stressed.²⁸ It was hoped that land would be fully serviced before allocation. However, in most cases plots were allocated with rudimentary or no services. The African Urban Housing Loan Fund was established in 1953 to offer wealthier Africans in Dar es Salaam access to financial assistance and longer security of tenure. With a deposit of £75, applicants could borrow up to £500, to be repaid over 20 years at a flat rate of Sh.12/50 per £100 per month.²⁹ In 1954 only a few loans had been sanctioned, but by 1960 the demand for loans exceeded available funds. Official development of African housing was an offshoot of the acceptance of African labour as a permanent phenomenon in urban areas as compared to the earlier period when African labour was seen as casual and migratory, and therefore entitled to just temporary shelter. The colonial administration sought to cultivate the goodwill of Africans, particularly after the labour disturbances of the 1940s. A Memorandum on Housing in Dar es Salaam written for the Executive Council in the mid-1940s argued that Government should erect modern houses for Africans in Zone III:

One of the difficulties at present in Zone III is that the African is convinced that the Government is not interested in his housing; this feeling makes for political unrest... If the building of these... houses cost[s] £12,000, it will be a cheap price to pay to preserve peace and good order in the African Community during the next five years.³⁰

It is worth noting that in the *Ten Year Development and Welfare Plan*, African housing was prominently categorised, while European housing was hidden within the Public Works and Buildings heading.

The creation of Ilala, Temeke and Magomeni

Supply of African housing was conceived as having economic, political and public health aspects. It contributed to the urban economy through the provision of planned areas for African housing in relation to urban demand for labour. Africans were conceived to have three areas of employment: the Docks, for which a settlement was planned at Kigamboni; the industrial area along Pugu Road, with a settlement planned at Temeke; and the wealthy suburbs surrounding Oyster Bay, with a settlement planned at Kinondoni. Politically, the new policy aimed at nurturing African goodwill towards the colonial Government. This was centred on the provision of complete houses for Africans - so called 'quarters' - in Ilala, Magomeni and Temeke, and plots in Magomeni, Temeke and Kinondoni for self-construction in traditional materials without financial assistance; or in permanent materials, with the help of the African Urban Housing Loan Fund. Finally, public health concerns were centred upon the drive to reduce overcrowding in Kariakoo and Ilala. The area earmarked to take surplus African population was Magomeni, where over 3,000 plots for self-construction were provided.

Ilala was the first Government sponsored African Housing Scheme in Dar es Salaam. By the early 1940s, Colonial Office pressure was mounting on East African administrations to address the question of African housing; in part, to win the political support of Africans. In April 1942, Whitehall officials drew the attention of East African Governors to the details of recent housing experiments in South African municipalities.³¹ At the same time, African employees were exerting pressure on government. In August 1944, one Jeremiah Mukondya of Morogoro Township wrote to his District Officer, urging government to build or buy houses for its African employees since all good housing was occupied by Indians, and, bad housing 'causes sickness'.³² Commenting on the above, the Dar es Salaam Township Authority agreed, and recommended that the post-war planning committee should initiate government schemes for housing its employees. In 1944 the administration decided to set aside £2,000 from the territorial budget for an experimental housing scheme in Ilala. To prevent overcrowding, it was proposed that lodgers be prohibited, and that adequate light, water, roads, sewerage transport and other public services be considered. Some 261 houses were built at Ilala between 1946 and 1950; the majority two-roomed with an external pit latrine and kitchen.³³ The African housing scheme deliberately highlighted the difference between government housing and dilapidated self-constructed native houses; their initially thatched roofs were later on replaced with clay tiles. On account of its location close to the city centre and low rents, Ilala quarters proved extremely popular. Nevertheless, government soon realised that this 'direct construction' strategy could not solve the housing problem. In later

schemes, it remained only part of a wider strategy including the demarcation of plots for self-construction.

Temeke was considered for African residential settlement in tandem with policies of labour supply to Dar es Salaam's emerging industrial area along Pugu Road. In 1938, an inoffensive factories site was mooted in this vicinity and it was envisaged that '[a] settlement here would form a reservoir of labour for the factories'.³⁴ A tentative layout for 525 houses and a further area where large employers might erect accommodation for their workers was presented; additionally there was another 200 acres of government land available westwards, where 1,000 houses could be accommodated with ease. In the end officials decided to put up a number of 'quarters', and at the same time, make available plentiful land for self-construction. The construction of Temeke quarters began in 1950; by January 1953, some 242 houses had been completed. It was decided that nobody would be allocated quarters in Temeke unless they were wage-earners with a salary of at least 150/- per month.³⁵ Temeke quarters were initially unpopular. The rent was considered extortionate, the area lacked services, it was too far from the city centre, and was yet to be served by public transport. Thus, of the 242 houses allocated by December 1952, half remained unoccupied in 1953, although everyone on the waiting list for urban housing had been offered accommodation.³⁶ Temeke was earmarked to provide labour to the nearby industrial estate, thus its residents were not expected to be frequent visitors to the city centre.³⁷

The selection of Magomeni as an area suitable for an African housing scheme in the late 1940s and early 1950s was forced as much by circumstances as by the area's geographical location. With no bridge over the Msimbazi River at Jangwani, Magomeni had long been considered inaccessible, and was given second priority to the area beyond Ilala. Yet plans to extend African housing in Ilala were thwarted by Indian landowners, who turned down compensation offers. Following this, the administration began to seriously consider a temporary scheme at Magomeni.³⁸ The area contemplated for this purpose was about 130 acres across the Msimbazi Creek, west of Kariakoo. It was elevated 25-30 feet above the creek, and had natural springs of good quality water, sufficient for 800 to 4000 families. Extensive anti-malarial drainage works had been undertaken in adjoining creeks, and the incidence of malaria was not likely to be higher than elsewhere on the outskirts of town.³⁹

Magomeni was not in the end selected for a temporary African housing scheme, but for two major permanent schemes: one involving construction of complete housing units ('quarters'), and another providing demarcated plots on which Africans could build themselves in semi-permanent (as in the earlier cases of Kariakoo, Ilala and Temeke) or permanent materials. The problem of Magomeni's accessibility was solved with the construction of a bridge over the Msimbazi River in 1953 (part of the Tanga-Dar es Salaam Road). Some 740 acres in Magomeni was compulsorily acquired by government in 1951 for African housing.⁴⁰ Experimentation had been going on since the mid-1940s using various building designs and materials, in order to come up with a type of a house which would be 'economic', i.e. whose rent could be paid by Africans without a government subsidy. Temeke quarters had proven

rather costly, so a cheaper type of construction was adopted for Magomeni, with pit latrines and small external kitchens. Water and electricity services were not connected. The economic monthly rents were Shs. 12/-, 20/-, and 29/- for one, two or three room units respectively; a major improvement on Temeke. By December 1953, 1,450 houses had been completed. For the larger part of the Magomeni area, government demarcated several thousand plots throughout the 1950s, allowing construction in any materials. Applicants scored highly if they had large families, a high income, large savings, and if they intended to use cement/concrete for foundations and floors, or *debe* (crushed tins) or iron sheets for roofs. For example, a person who elected to use thatch (presumably the poor) would score no points, while one who elected to use expensive *debe* or iron sheets would score 20 points. By the end of 1958, 3,107 plots had been demarcated, and 1,782 surveyed and allocated by the District Commissioner. The duration of the Rights of Occupancy over most of the allocated land was one year. Plots were to be put to residential uses only. Sub-letting to non-natives was prohibited, and the Right could be revoked if this occurred.⁴¹ Over 100 plots in Block W were reserved for the beneficiaries of the African Urban Housing Loan Fund. These plots were larger, carried long-term Rights of Occupancy, and beneficiaries were expected to construct houses in modern materials. As with Temeke, land servicing remained secondary to land demarcation and allocation, so that by the end of 1958 government contemplated putting a moratorium on the further development of Magomeni until services were provided.⁴²

Developing the leafy suburbs: Upanga and Oyster Bay

Besides the city centre and the trading areas in the African township, government earmarked two major post-war schemes for Asian residential occupation, Upanga and Chang'ombe. Government land at Chang'ombe was demarcated to provide plots for the construction of housing by government itself, as well as by an Ismaili housing organisation. Upanga entailed a much larger land pooling and redistribution scheme for private construction. The success of Upanga's development as an affluent suburb for Indians and some Europeans was the major post-war urban land policy triumph. Prior to its regularisation, Upanga consisted of approximately 100 different holdings, largely irregular in shape, un-surveyed and undeveloped, and with no access roads, electricity, water or other amenities. The land was held by 'natives' and 'non-natives', the latter gradually buying out the former. The area comprised of some 470 acres bounded by the Msimbazi Creek, portions of Bagamoyo Street, Sultan Street, Kisutu Street, Upanga Road and Ocean Road.⁴³ By the early 1940s, government was ready to see Upanga regularised and made ready for development on 'modern' lines; in order to reduce overcrowding in the city centre, as well as to give Asians a planned area in which to invest their considerable resources.⁴⁴ The alternatives were for Indians to expand in large numbers into the native area, or into Oyster Bay, both of which were deprecated by government. A preliminary planning scheme for Upanga was

published in 1946, forming the basis of a more comprehensive scheme two years later. Special legislation was drafted – the Upanga Area (Planning and Development) Ordinance cap 283 of 1949 – which enabled the Governor to appoint a committee to plan Upanga. As this land was freehold in private ownership, the legislation gave powers for the whole land to be pooled, i.e. for each of the owners to lose rights to a particular piece of land and to be reallocated that or another piece 75 percent of the original size. The 25 percent of land contributed by all owners was for the provision of roads, open spaces, and other public purposes. The authorities were given powers to construct roads and other public infrastructure, and charge either the whole or part of the costs against landowners. In July 1949, the Upanga Area (Planning and Development) Committee was appointed. The Upanga Planning Scheme, the aim of which was to convert the 100 or so holdings into between 900-1000 plots, was ready in July 1950 and adopted in 1951.⁴⁵ No major objections were presented by landowners, except that places of worship, burial grounds, and other sacred places should not be tampered with.

Surveying started in 1952, and in that year alone 753 plots were demarcated; another 370 were surveyed over the next decade. In order to ensure some finality in plot ownership, the Land Registry Ordinance was amended. Prior to 1949, land registration was optional, but from 18 March 1949, an amendment allowed the Governor to order compulsory registration in any area he considered it necessary and within a time frame specified. Failure to comply with the order could lead to the forfeiture of all rights in the land in question. Immediately, an order for compulsory registration was made in respect of Dar es Salaam's City Centre and Upanga. The closing date for application for first registration was 31 December 1949. By far the majority of the applicants (77.5 percent) were Indians, who had been acquiring land from 'natives' over the years.

To some extent, this was the result of Government policy, which had since the mid-1930s encouraged market forces to remove Africans from Upanga. Indians had invested their capital into land in Upanga and other peri-urban areas. There was some conflict among colonial administrators whether it was appropriate for Africans to sell their land to 'non-natives'. In mid-1950, the Provincial Commissioner of Eastern Province opposed the idea, arguing that land had been a source of income for Africans for years. In a note to the Member for Local Government in June 1950, he protested that:

The displacement of these Africans for the value of comparatively small sums representing the difference between the price the coconut tree could fetch if sold to other Africans or to non-natives, does not appear to me to be altogether justified or desirable.⁴⁶

This was a turnabout from the stance taken by his predecessor, who had constantly urged central Government to remove 'natives' from Upanga. By mid-1951, Government did not favour the exclusion of non-Africans from African areas, since this would amount to 'racial reserves', contrary to the Trusteeship principles and African wishes. The point should be to ensure that the non-African did not swindle the African.⁴⁷ In order to speed up such

transfers, especially in Upanga, the Governor delegated his powers of consent to the Director for Lands and Mines, and to the Land Officer, provided disposition was recommended by the District Officer.⁴⁸ Using its powers of refusing consent, the Government gave Africans 'offers they could not refuse'. Some signatories of a petition from Upanga residents against their Government-ordered removal in the 1930s were offered between Shs. 30,000/- and 140,000/- for their land.⁴⁹ These were fantastic sums at the time, which forced even those with scruples about family tombs to sell their land. Only a handful of Africans, including Mohamed Tambaza and possibly the family of Mfaume, were still in Upanga by the mid-1950s.⁵⁰ By insisting on a high price for 'native' land bought by non-natives, the Government was applying the hitherto held principle of 'non-proletarianisation' of the African, who, though losing usufructuary rights on his traditional land, should receive payment sufficient to set themselves up elsewhere.⁵¹ Upanga developed as an Asian, and to a lesser extent European, area, and is still regarded so today – although the addition of nearly 400 plots soon after independence in 1962, mainly on areas earlier planned for public uses, allowed the acquisition of land in Upanga by several prominent Africans in Government service and business.

The major scheme earmarked for European residential use was at Oyster Bay. While land policy continued to be conceptualised along racial lines, it proved no longer possible to segregate Europeans from the better off Asians except in government-constructed housing. The Oyster Bay Planning Scheme was conceived around 1945, in anticipation of Colonial Development and Welfare Funds, as an area of extension of the officials' residential area. The Indian President of the Dar es Salaam Township Authority, S. B. Malik, noted in November 1947 that the authority wanted Oyster Bay to be a 'first class residential suburb'.⁵² Construction started in 1947 on a number of houses meant for European officials. Plots were one acre in size, and each contained a huge bungalow, a garage and servants' quarter. As Dar es Salaam was then experiencing a severe shortage of official accommodation, construction of temporary or semi-permanent houses in Oyster Bay was allowed.⁵³ Harry L. Ford, the Town Planning Advisor, planned for 730 plots at Oyster Bay to accommodate 2,695 Europeans, 1,540 Asians and 3,760 Africans. The latter were house servants and the figure was based on the assumption that official quarters would each have a boys' quarter with two rooms, and that in each would be a 'boy' and his wife, or four Africans per plot. He was quick to point out that this high African figure should not be cause for alarm, as the Township Authority would allow only one boys' quarter per plot. That Africans were unwanted in Oyster Bay can be gauged from the colonial officials' attitudes when, in early 1948, it was found necessary to establish a police post in the area. In a note to the Member for Law and Order in May 1948, the Commissioner of Police pointed out that a post had been planned in the Oyster Bay shopping centre, but as this was in the middle of a European residential area it was 'not possible to site the living quarters for African Police in the near vicinity of the Police Station'. He, like Harry Ford, suggested a site in the 'new African area'.⁵⁴

A meeting convened in October 1947 to discuss Ford's layout for Oyster Bay, resolved that the Right of Occupancy over Msasani Peninsula (alienated

for 99 years with effect from 1928 and used as a sisal estate) be revoked with the least possible delay so that sufficient land was available to enable the comprehensive planning of the area. It was further agreed that half the number of plots in Oyster Bay should be allocated administratively rather than through public auction to avoid speculative buying, and that short term rights of occupancy could be given up to five years, during which allottees could put up temporary structures. In November 1947, the Government appointed an Oyster Bay Committee to advise on how to dispose of Oyster Bay plots, two hundred of which were nearly ready; the final total was expected to be in excess of 600. Services were to be provided later.⁵⁵ The Committee likewise suggested that Oyster Bay plots should be allocated administratively, which effectively protected salaried European officers from having to compete against far wealthier Indian bidders.⁵⁶

Land without services: The origins of Dar es Salaam's unregulated development

The policy of allocating land without services prompted complaints from the Medical Officer of Health in 1951. In a note to the Member for Social Services, he pointed out the high-density areas demarcated in the Dar es Salaam's Town Plan were conspicuous for the lack of any controlled development. He cited Kinondoni, an African settlement some 300-400 yards from the low-density (i.e. European) residential zone where housing and amenities had been provided consistent with a satisfactory state of environmental hygiene and sanitation. In Kinondoni, demarcated plots only had what he called 'doubtful earth roads'. Nothing whatsoever was done to drain the area, to provide roadside drainage, control building standards, to prevent overcrowding or to provide an adequate system of sewerage and refuse disposal. He further pointed to the shallow, water-filled pit latrines, and complained of the health dangers they posed.⁵⁷ Commenting on these, the Member for Lands and Mines agreed that the problem of inadequate services in African areas was not new, but no one had worried in the past, owing to the remoteness of such areas from low density housing. The Medical Officer of Health's views were echoed by the Chief Town Planning Officer, L. Sylvester White, who in a Memorandum to the Member for Social Services, produced a hypothesis, which identified Africans as being solely to blame for their poor living conditions.⁵⁸ In his opinion, the African could not afford to build anything more elaborate than an ordinary mud and wattle shack, and could only afford the most elementary means of sanitation. This was a result of his (the problem was viewed in gendered terms) lack of productivity; low earning capacity, which limited his expenditure on housing; low taxation capacity, which made him unable to pay for public services; the unrestricted immigration of – mostly unproductive – Africans to the towns, thus increasing demand for houses; and the apathy of the African too easily satisfied with a low standard of living. Sylvester White failed to mention that most European houses, which beneficiaries enjoyed cost free, were usually constructed and serviced with

public funds.⁵⁹ Moreover, the hostile attitude of colonial officials towards Africans in urban areas; the inferior, badly located, un-serviced land which was usually allocated to Africans; the precarious status of tenure of land allocated to Africans; the lack of any financial provisions to help in housing construction; and the artificially depressed wages, were all alternative causes of minimal African investment in buildings and the environment.

As a result of the Medical Officer of Health's complaints, a meeting of officials took place in January 1952. It was agreed that some minimum services were required in areas zoned for high-density (i.e. African) housing, but it was insisted that the provision of such services should not add to the costs, and therefore the land rent. It was proposed that the following should be provided in any new area before land allocation: standing water drainage, provision of minimum water kiosks and standpipes, and provision of skeletal roads (though not too many, as paths were deemed sufficient). Municipal bylaws could be used to regulate the standard of pit latrines. As will be noted, these suggestions were not radical as far as land servicing for Africans was concerned. All the same, it would appear that little was done. In October 1958 it was found necessary to call another meeting to discuss infrastructure in African areas. This meeting was attended by the Provincial Commissioner, the Town Clerk and the Member for Local Government.⁶⁰ It was noted that both Government and the Municipal Council had been aware for some time of the almost complete lack of such services as roads, drainage and street lighting in the high-density (i.e. African) residential areas of Dar es Salaam, which arose because of the urgent need for additional housing units to accommodate the rapidly increasing population. Some new housing areas, it transpired, were actually inaccessible to Municipal cesspit emptying and garbage vehicles. This caused serious public health concerns. Central government agreed to give £20,000 p.a. for the following three years (1958-61) to be matched by an equal sum from the Municipal Council, but it was realised that the total sum of £120,000 would only 'touch the fringes of the work required'. It was agreed to freeze development in Magomeni until services had been developed there, but to allow development in Kinondoni, Temeke and Kigamboni without services, partly to avoid political complications since land development had proved popular with Africans. The cost of installing services in Magomeni was not considered prohibitive since standards aimed at need not be high; and a premium of Shs. 50/- per plot would be levied to meet these costs, the balance being provided by government and the Municipal Council.

Conclusion

Dar es Salaam's land use structure during the 1940s and 1950s resulted from a government policy influenced by the dictates of an epoch which required the stabilisation of labour and more effective urban management. However, the old order of racial segregation continued to be upheld. On the eve of independence, Dar es Salaam had expanded considerably: an extended European (and Asian) area at Oyster Bay, and to a lesser extent at Kurasini;

planned development in Upanga for Indians; new African residential areas at Ilala, Temeke, Kinondoni, Magomeni and Kurasini; and the Industrial area along Pugu Road. Several unplanned areas developed at Keko, Chang'ombe, Kigogo, Msasani and Buguruni; others were in the making just outside the Municipal boundaries. This land use structure resulted from an official policy whose primary motivation was neither efficiency nor equity. With the coming of Independence, racial segregation had to go, but established land use patterns could not be obliterated. New attempts were made at 'development', but the government's ability to regulate urban land uses was dwarfed by the sheer weight of rapid urban growth, inadequate and inappropriate administrative frameworks, and dwindling resources.

The attainment of Independence in December 1961 brought with it city status to Dar es Salaam, and initiated a new phase of urban development. The inherited structure of racial segregation was retained but modified. African officials made early arrangements to get into former European and Asian areas of Oyster Bay and Upanga. Residential land development continued to be conceived in terms of low, medium and high-density areas. Access to land continued to be skewed in favour of officials, politicians and wealthy residents and/or those of high social status. For the majority, though, access to land could only be realised by settlement in unplanned areas. Despite official planning schemes, the phenomenon of squatting occurred at an alarming rate, and government was powerless, and lacked political will, to control it. By 1979, seventy percent of Dar es Salaam's population lived in unplanned areas; which, at the end of the millennium, continued to provide a home for the vast majority of the urban population. The land use mosaic of Dar es Salaam is characterized by a hotchpotch of planned areas catering for mainly middle to high income households; the rest of the residents, particularly those in low income brackets, being accommodated in unplanned areas: verily, a city of squatters and planning schemes. This phenomenon is likely to persist unless intervention in land markets is conceived in the interests of the poor majority.

Notes

¹ A.L. Mabogunje, 'Urban Planning and the Post Colonial State', *African Studies Review* 33:2 (1990), pp. 121-203

² T.S. Gale, 'Segregation in British West Africa', *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 20 (1983), pp. 495-507; M. Swanson, 'The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900-1909', *Journal of African History*, 18 (1977), pp. 387-410.

³ For a continent-wide periodization of these developments, see Mabogunje, 'Urban Planning'.

⁴ This information is based on a study and translation of German documents made by the Land Officer during the British era, in 1930, in response to petitions made by Msuo bin Majid and Shaha Jagna against unfair compensation paid to their fore-bearers when the Germans expropriated their land in the 1890s. See petition by Msuo bin Majid, Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) 61/81/76. All the information in this paragraph is taken from this source.

⁵ *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, 1890, pp. 301-306.

⁶ German Colonial Government, *Annual Reports*, 1902/03.

⁷ K. Vorlauffer, *Koloniale und nachkoloniale stadtplanung in Dar es Salaam*, Johann Wolfgang

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Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt-am-Main (1970), p. 22.

⁸ *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, 1894, p. 252.

⁹ For a further analysis of this important figure, see Franck Raimbault, 'L'évolution de l'espace péri-urbain à Dar-es-Salaam durant la colonisation allemande (1890-1914)', in Bernard Calas (ed.), *De Dar es Salaam à Bongoland* (Nairobi/Paris, 2006), pp. 35-105.

¹⁰ Vorlauffer, *Koloniale und nachkoloniale stadtplanung*, pp. 14-16.

¹¹ C.C. Gillman, 'Dar es Salaam 1860-1940: A Story of Growth and Change', *Tanganyika Notes & Records* (hereafter *TNR*) 20 (1945), pp. 12-16.

¹² W. de Boer, 'Urban Renewal and Rehabilitation in Kariakoo, Dar Es Salaam. Part one: Pre-studies/Recommendations', (Mimeo), Ardhi Institute, Dar es Salaam (1984).

¹³ Vorlauffer, *Koloniale und nachkoloniale stadtplanung*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁴ German Colonial Government, *Annual Report*, 1907/08.

¹⁵ Gillman, 'Dar es Salaam', p. 15.

¹⁶ German Colonial Government, *Annual Report*, 1907/09.

¹⁷ Improvement of Native Houses, Volume II, TNA 24387.

¹⁸ See TNA 10477, Compensation for Houses removed by Government.

¹⁹ Dar es Salaam Township Layout, TNA 12589.

²⁰ Dar es Salaam Township, inclusion of Oyster Bay, TNA 19825.

²¹ The next two paragraphs are based on TNA 12248 and TNA 61/94/A.

²² For a more detailed discussion, see J. M. L. Kironde, 'The evolution of land use structure of Dar es Salaam 1890-1990: A study in the effects of land policy', Ph.D. thesis, University of Nairobi, Dept. of Land Development (1994), Chapter 4, pp. 173-176; see also the following chapter by Jim Brennan.

²³ Tanganyika Territory, Land Division, *Annual Report for 1936*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1937, p. 9.

²⁴ See the following chapter by Jim Brennan.

²⁵ General Notice 14 of 11/1/1933.

²⁶ General Notice no. 1088 of 4 October 1930.

²⁷ *Revised Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika, 1950-1956* (Dsm, 1951).

²⁸ *Development Plan 1955-60: Capital Works Programme* (Dsm, 1955).

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ 'Memorandum of Housing in Dar es Salaam', in TNA 32982.

³¹ Improvement to Native Houses, Vol. II, TNA 24387.

³² Housing Accommodation, African Government Employees, TNA 61/4/3.

³³ *Tanganyika Report for 1948*.

³⁴ Dar es Salaam Township Layout, TNA 12859.

³⁵ Government Policy on African Housing, TNA 36707/1.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Dar es Salaam Roads, TNA 18835.

³⁸ African Housing Scheme, Dar es Salaam Housing, TNA 36707.

³⁹ These conditions induced the Provincial Commissioner to suggest that, as an alternative to the African housing scheme, the area was also suitable for a non-native (i.e. European) residential area. Note to the Chief Secretary, from the Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province, 23rd March 1948, in *ibid.*

⁴⁰ General Notice 689 of 28 April 1951.

⁴¹ Rights Occupancy to Africans, TNA 540/11/38.

⁴² See note from Deputy Provincial Commissioner to the District Commissioner 18th Oct. 1958, TNA 540/11/38.

⁴³ Government Notice 808, 7th August, 1946.

⁴⁴ In July 1947, Yusuf Jaffer Daya was given permission to erect twenty temporary (i.e. mud and pole), and *makuti* (thatch) houses on his freehold Shamba off Upanga Road to relieve congestion in the Commercial area. The tenants were to be recommended by the Township Authority, who would also determine the rent. See TNA 13483, Town Planning Scheme for Dar es Salaam Volume II.

⁴⁵ General Notice 1119 of 7th July 1950.

⁴⁶ Land, Transfer of property between Natives and non-natives, TNA 61/255.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Section 11 of the Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance, (Cap

114), of 1923, prohibited the transfer of land from native to non-native without the consent of the Governor.

⁴⁸ General notice No. 914, 7th June 1950. Government actually favoured the transfer of Upanga land from 'native' occupants. The reference to avoiding racial stratification mentioned above should be compared to the conditions under which land was being allocated to natives at about the same time, within their 'native' designated areas like Magomeni. Here, occupation of such land by non-natives (e.g., through subletting) was prohibited and was a serious breach of the conditions of the Right of Occupancy, and could lead to its revocation. Recognition of this Trusteeship principle was a matter of convenience.

⁴⁹ See petition of Mwinyi Waziri bin Mwinshehe *et al.*, 16 May 1931, TNA 12589/I/102, and Provincial Commissioner Eastern Province to Chief Secretary, 3 April 1936, TNA 23547/12.

⁵⁰ A secondary school in the Upanga area is named after Tambaza, and there is an 'Mfaume' Road. Tambaza's mosque, though greatly extended and modified still stands on United Nations Road in Upanga.

⁵¹ For an examination of legal actions surrounding these valuable lands in Upanga and elsewhere in Dar es Salaam, see James R. Brennan, 'Nation, Race and Urbanization in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 1916-1976', Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University (2002), chapter 4.

⁵² Town Planning Scheme for Dar es Salaam, TNA 13483.

⁵³ See *Tanganyika Standard*, 27/2/1947.

⁵⁴ Police Post at Oyster Bay, TNA 37124.

⁵⁵ Town Planning Scheme for Dar es Salaam, TNA 13483/II.

⁵⁶ It should be pointed out that in 1947, the *Land Ordinance 1923* had been amended to allow the Governor to allocate a Right of occupancy, otherwise than through public auctions. The amendment had been opposed by Indian, but supported by European and African legislators.

⁵⁷ Health and Sanitary Measures: Dar es Salaam Municipality, TNA 41949. The rest of the information in this paragraph is taken from this file, unless otherwise shown.

⁵⁸ Copy in TNA 225/DC3602.

⁵⁹ In January 1939, one official observed: 'Surely the native town deserves something when officials who pay no rates have their hedges cut and their drives gravelled for nothing'. Minute dated 31st January 1959, TNA 26602.

⁶⁰ Right of Occupancy to Africans, TNA 540/11/38.

Chapter Four

Between Segregation and Gentrification: Africans, Indians, and the struggle for housing in Dar es Salaam, 1920-1950

James R. Brennan

This chapter investigates two interconnected relationships. The first relationship is between two competing principles of colonial urban policy, segregation and gentrification. Keeping with German precedent, the British colonial government segregated Dar es Salaam into three zones, corresponding with neighbourhood economic activity, housing standards and—implicitly but quite plainly—racial groups. At the same time, however, the colonial government also championed urban improvement through securing conditions for greater capital investment, a policy which this chapter terms ‘gentrification’.¹ These two policies came into conflict along the spatial border where Africans and Indians met. Relations between Indians and Africans in Dar es Salaam form the second relationship at the heart of the chapter.² This relationship imbued colonial urban policies with political meaning. A policy of segregation eventually yielded to one of gentrification as Dar es Salaam’s Indian community outgrew its narrow commercial ‘zone’ and expanded into African-designated areas such as Kariakoo. Lacking the financial resources and political will to maintain the ‘racial integrity’ of African neighbourhoods, the British colonial government abandoned spatial controls of racial zoning for economic controls of managing urban living costs. In a most peculiar legacy, the discarded urban policy of segregation provided a language of political empowerment and invective for Africans fearing that Indian-led forces of gentrification would dispossess poorer households in established African neighbourhoods.

Dar es Salaam’s urban policy was grounded on the racial legal codes of the colonial state. From the ashes of German policy, British officials rebuilt a legal structure grounded on distinctions between Europeans, Indians, and Africans in order to restructure spatial and economic interaction among these groups after formally taking control over Tanganyika in 1919. Nominally intended to protect the interest of African ‘natives’, the administration of these laws revealed two competing colonial visions for urban Africa—one that

contemplated state-guided urbanization driven by non-African commerce and capital improvements, and another that contemplated the systematic protection of Africans from non-African market forces. This division manifested itself in the pursuit of competing priorities among British officials, some of whom sought to raise public health standards by encouraging non-African expansion, while others sought to protect African-held urban and peri-urban areas by championing segregationist and protectionist policies. Of at least equal importance, African and South Asian initiatives in many cases ran far ahead of either administrative vision, and there emerged a distinctly reactive and *ad hoc* character to inter-war urban administration.

The British administration's land, credit, and trade policies ideally bifurcated Tanganyika's population between African 'native' producers living largely on communal lands, and European and Asian 'non-natives' confined either to urban areas or estates alienated during German rule. In 1920 the new administration formed a Central Building and Town Planning Committee to oversee Dar es Salaam's reconstruction, and this committee adopted almost all German precedents.³ Seeking to secure a separate European residential area yet finding legal racial segregation 'impracticable' as well as in conflict with the government's trusteeship mandate from the League of Nations, the committee dropped explicitly racial references and retained 'a standard to which all new buildings must conform', which 'will secure the "same advantages"' as *de jure* segregation.⁴ The close proximity of the residential (i.e., European) Zone I and commercial (i.e., Asian) Zone II, however, divided only by a single street along which expensive buildings already stood, imposed formidable costs to executing segregationist public health prerogatives, and obviated plans to create a second 'neutral zone' to complement the first such zone, between Zone II and the 'native' Zone III, created in the late German period. 'Segregation for Europeans and Asiatics in Dar-es-Salaam, and probably also in Tanga, appears to be impracticable', the Land Officer concluded in 1920. 'There does not appear to be anything, however', he continued, 'to prevent segregation of other races from natives'.⁵

Building and sanitation codes provided the first of two major tools officials utilized to segregate Dar es Salaam.⁶ Structural improvements to already-standing 'native' houses in Zones I and II were forbidden in 1920.⁷ Beginning in 1923, the government offered Africans new plots in Zone III (the 'native' zone) in exchange for quitting their plots in the European and Indian quarters. Many accepted but were slow to move, and in 1928 the government ordered them to demolish their old houses within six months.⁸ The cornerstone of the new administration's segregationist urban planning in Dar es Salaam was the renewal and re-clearance of the old German sanitary corridor or neutral zone.⁹ The majority of Africans evicted were relocated to Ilala, a new residential quarter in Zone III laid out in 1930; 'non-native' evictees were left to their own devices.¹⁰ The neutral zone itself (Mnazi Mmoja today) was reserved for non-European sporting purposes. Urban land policy was the second major tool used to restructure and segregate post-war Dar es Salaam. German titles had granted either leasehold tenure or restricted ownership, a tenure similar to freehold.¹¹ Plots with stone buildings were given renewable

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government leases usually lasting thirty years, while plots of *makuti* huts were given annual tenancy renewable year to year.¹² This annual renewable tenancy was known colloquially as *kiwanja* tenure, named after the *kiwanja* (Swahili, 'plot') tax that the German administration had charged urban residents in addition to an annual house or hut tax. During the 1920s, the new British administration lacked sufficient records and deeds, and thus payment of *kiwanja* tax implied recognition of tenancy. In order to raise revenue collections and building standards in 'non-native' areas, however, the new government proposed to replace *kiwanja* tenure with a Rights of Occupancy tenure system.¹³ Rights of Occupancy tenancies required that structures on leased plots conform to the Township Authority's grid layout and be worth an agreed-upon value. In Zone II, these tenancies usually called for two-storied, permanent stone structures with water-borne waste disposal. Colonial officials considered South Asians the worst sanitary offenders in town, and hoped that conversion to a Rights of Occupancy system would raise sanitary conditions.¹⁴ In 1926, the government launched a lengthy and contested battle against 'non-native' tenants, most residing in Zone II, to replace *kiwanja* tenure with Rights of Occupancy for terms of 33, 50, or 99 years, with land rents determined by public auction.

The imposition of a more coercive land tenure system contingent on capital investment resulted in the state-guided gentrification of Dar es Salaam's Indian neighborhood. The Provincial Commissioner reported that the introduction of more secure land tenure in 1927 had given 'a fillip to the building trade in the town'.¹⁵ Indian speculators cheaply acquired several desirable plots with dilapidated buildings in anticipation of their rising value.¹⁶ The most valuable sites were obtained by bidding competitions.¹⁷ In one typical contract, Ghulam Haidar acquired a plot for 33 years at Shs. 200/- annual rent if he constructed a building worth Shs. 4,000/- within two years.¹⁸ Average annual plot rentals increased from Shs. 60/- under the year-to-year *kiwanja* tenure to Shs. 194/- under the long-term Rights of Occupancy tenure.¹⁹ Enforcement of these building covenants eventually produced a neighborhood predominated by expensive stone buildings by the mid-1930s.

The Indian quarter undermined the segregation of the African quarter, popularly known as 'Kariakoo'. Several Indians in Zone II could not afford the substantial improvements brought about by Rights of Occupancy leases, and renters faced impossibly high rents. A District Officer observed in 1929 that, despite the on-going building boom, rents still remained 'at a fictitiously high figure', while housing conditions for most Indians 'can only be classed as scandalous and worse than the slum areas of European cities'.²⁰ South Asians seeking cheaper plots and rents moved to Kariakoo. E. C. Baker noted that Indians could 'obtain greater privacy and more attractive surroundings at a lower debt' in the African quarter than in Zone II.²¹ Between 1931 and 1939, the number of 'native'-owned houses in zone III rented by Indians rose from 32 to between 200 and 300.²² The influx of Indians into the African quarter revealed the limits of segregationist zoning laws, and confronted officials with an enduring contradiction—how to manage interactions between 'native' Africans and 'non-native' South Asians in the theoretically exclusive 'native' zone of Kariakoo.

Kariakoo and competing visions of urban development, 1920-1940

Major segregationist public works such as the clearing of the 'neutral zone' and Kisutu village were exceptional for their unambiguous consequences – Africans were simply removed from non-native or 'neutral' areas. Far more important to the social history of Dar es Salaam, however, were the contradictory results that segregationist laws produced when they intruded upon inevitable interactions between Africans and Indians. These interactions challenged the intent and viability of housing, trade, and land laws. More importantly, the interaction between Indians and Africans, and the enduring African urban presence, forced officials to confront the implications of the colonial vision that inherently communal 'natives' needed protection from the predations of the inherently individualistic 'non-natives'.

The establishment of the central market in Kariakoo in the early 1920s stimulated the development of Dar es Salaam's most vital neighborhood. In stunning contradiction to the logic of racial-cum-occupational zones that guided Dar es Salaam's urban planning, the administration not only relocated the city's central market from the Indian to the African quarter, but also established a 'non-native' trading area surrounding the new market. The old market in the 'Asiatic' quarter was too small and could not meet growing demand for stalls. In the eyes of medical director R. R. Scott, the market premises were 'disgraceful and insanitary blots on our otherwise fairly presentable town' whose congestion drove small traders onto the streets to hawk foodstuffs in unsanitary conditions.²³ The market was moved in August 1923 to the eponymous Carrier Corps building (in Kiswahili, 'Kariakoo'), built originally by the Germans in 1914 as a market to stimulate the area's development, but immediately converted into a depot for German and later British military porters during the war.²⁴ The British resuscitated German plans by surveying over 600 plots in the native zone along a grid plan with the new market as its focal point, dramatically raising property values in its proximity.²⁵ In the wake of the new market's opening, Indians emigrated in large number to Kariakoo to seize trading opportunities. In early 1931, Indians legally owned 142 of the 2,035 houses in Zone III on Rights of Occupancy tenure, most located around the market or along Msimbazi and Kichwele (today Uhuru) Streets; a further thirty-two African-owned houses were rented by 'non-natives', mostly South Asians. As a group, 'non-natives' occupied over 9 percent of the houses in the African quarter.²⁶ E. C. Baker observed at this time that '[i]t is hard to foresee the future of Zone III the population of which is becoming very mixed'.²⁷

Kariakoo grew amidst contradictory expectations between many Indians and Township Authority officials on the one hand who hoped that the neighborhood would become a commercial area with a strong 'non-native' presence, and many Africans and District Office officials on the other hand who hoped that it would be an exclusively African residential neighborhood. The former view was anchored by the swift domination of Indian traders

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over Kariakoo's commercial life during the 1920s. By 1927, 'non-natives', nearly all of whom were Indians, occupied 396 of the 420 trading sites in Zone III.²⁸ The protectionist land tenure system that forbade 'non-natives' from acquiring 'native' property was thus regularly circumvented in Dar es Salaam over the inter-war period by building in the exempted 'non-native' trading zone within Kariakoo. Beyond the central market, Indian acquisition of African-owned housing required the Governor's approval. Over the early and mid-1920s, the protectionist-segregationist view had few effective advocates, as very few Indian requests for the Governor's approval to obtain 'native' property in Kariakoo were denied or even contested. As a result, the major economic development of Kariakoo during the inter-war period was the dramatic increase of property and rental values created largely by the influx of Indians willing and able to pay considerably higher purchase prices and rents from African house-owners.

Opponents of the Indian incursion into Kariakoo discovered that segregationist urban planning laws offered little in the way of positive protection for African interests. One of the administration's chief instruments to effect urban segregation was building codes, which were the legal basis in defining Dar es Salaam's 'non-native' European and Asian zones. The relevant clause in the township rules stated only that the 'native' Zone III should be reserved as 'an area for native quarters only', without specifying zonal building regulations. The Township Authority's planning committee, no longer able to square this ideal with the reality of a multi-racial Kariakoo, moved in 1932 to substitute this clause with 'an area in which buildings of a type to be approved by the competent township authority may be erected', on grounds that '[t]his practice of allowing non-Native businesses to become established in Zone III is one of long standing and, though contrary to law, it has the advantage of providing convenient shopping facilities for the Native residents'.²⁹ A District Office official stated his reservations to the committee's suggestion:

However, as land becomes more valuable that native may get gradually squeezed out of the area which has, for practical purposes, been allocated for his use. It seems to me that in the natives interest we should import the racial question to some extent and say that Zone III is confined to native quarters and such other premises, approved by the Township Authority, as that Authority considers necessary to serve the needs of the residents in the Zone.³⁰

A Township Authority official agreed that rising land values were pushing poorer African inhabitants from Kariakoo, but countered that 'nothing we can do will enable people with Whitechapel incomes to live in Mayfair . . . [i]t may be unfortunate, but it is inevitable'.³¹ Imposing maximum building standards, he warned, would be a mistake of the first order, as better buildings benefit everyone, Africans included. The Chief Secretary agreed with the Township Authority's planning committee that the clause 'an area for native quarters only' should be altered, and added that the new description should be phrased to permit any type of quarters in Zone III. He justified this decision by arguing, rather disingenuously, that 'it has not been the intention of the

government to prevent Natives from building elsewhere than in Zone III, or that persons other than Natives should not build in that zone if they have the land and wish to do so'.³² Government revised the building ordinance for Zone III the following year to allow for the construction of any type of building instead of 'native' types only, retroactively legalizing 'non-native' building types in the area.³³ The administration proved unwilling to sacrifice either the improved building standards or substantial land rents and license fees generated by Indians in Kariakoo.

Township Authority officials – whom the government had allocated the task of general urban improvement – approved of South Asian penetration into the 'native' quarter because their capital investments raised tax revenue and building standards. In response to Indian commercial predominance in Kariakoo, the Township Authority re-zoned Zone III along its main thoroughfare, Msimbazi Street in 1925. It declared the area east of Msimbazi a commercial zone, and the area west of Msimbazi (despite already having several shops) a residential area, effectively shifting the division between the Indian commercial zone and African residential zone from the 'neutral zone' to Msimbazi Street.³⁴ The commercial successes of Dar es Salaam's burgeoning South Asian population made possible this extension of the commercial to residential, east to west, higher-status to lower-status, lighter to darker pattern of zoning that in practice valued the principle of gentrification over segregation. In a half-hearted attempt to reconstruct a protected 'native' zone further west of Kariakoo but still within Zone III, the Township Authority declared plots around the new market in Ilala reserved for 'natives' in 1932, but also agreed that Kariakoo already had too many shops and too few residential plots. Africans were thereafter regularly refused trading permits west of Msimbazi in Kariakoo.³⁵

District Office officials—whom the administration had allocated the task of protecting urban 'native' interests—were unwilling to leave Kariakoo and its largely African population to the whims of Indian-dominated market forces. In 1929, Dar es Salaam's District Officer appealed to the Land Officer that:

You are doubtless perceiving the fact that native owned land in the township of Dar-es-Salaam is rapidly passing into the possession of non-natives who are mostly of Asian nationality. This general process is causing me some uneasiness. The growth of land monopoly of such a character is not good and I submit to you that it is wrong to regard it as a natural course of events.³⁶

Despairing to prevent Indians from further entering Kariakoo, District Office officials retreated their expectations westwards in hopes of maintaining Ilala as an exclusively 'native' area. In 1934, however, this policy was unexpectedly changed after a Land Officer refused an application by an Arab (considered 'non-native') to buy a house from an African in Ilala, on the understanding that everything west of Msimbazi Street was reserved for natives. The Chief Secretary over-ruled him on grounds that it was 'never the intention of the government to establish a racial standard in this or in any similar area, nor to prevent a native from selling his plot to a non-native, when he could

advantageously do so'.³⁷ Upon later discovering through the courts that township notices establishing separate residential and trading areas within Zone III were *ultra vires* (beyond legal authority), the administration in 1937 declared the whole of Zone III a trading area. One effect of these constant policy shifts was, unsurprisingly, administrative confusion. Though now Africans could legally trade in their own houses in Zone III if a proper license was obtained and the buildings met township standards, this information appears to have been either ignored or not effectively communicated, for officials continued to deny Africans permission to trade from their own residences.³⁸ Itinerant commerce, meanwhile, lay mostly in the hands of African traders, many of whom were supplied by Indian shopkeepers taking up buildings in Kariakoo—reflecting the complicated and intertwined nature of relations between Indians and Africans, as well as the futility of regulating economic and residential behaviour through zoning legislation that attempted to segregate the Indian and the commercial on the one hand from the African and the residential on the other.

Sacrificed in the struggle between rival official visions of Kariakoo as a 'native residential' or 'non-native commercial' area were the fortunes of Dar es Salaam's embryonic African commercial class. The re-zoning of Kariakoo into residential and commercial areas had been nominally intended to protect Africans from entering into agreements with non-natives that, many officials believed, ended inevitably in Africans' displacement from their residences. Instead, this re-zoning prevented Africans from establishing shops in the most convenient locations possible—their own premises. In the early 1920s, the government offered plots in a 'native' trading area around an open square in Kariakoo to Africans willing both to erect cement-floored buildings suitable for a foodstuff shop and to pay an economic rent of Shs. 100/- per year, but none were taken up.³⁹ Although a number of Africans opened up small shops in Zone III during the 1923 Indian commercial strike (*hartal*) with the government's encouragement⁴⁰, the number of African shopkeepers (as distinct from market stall-holders and doorstep vendors) in Dar es Salaam had decreased to only two by mid-1931.⁴¹ The town's Executive Officer concluded that Africans from this coastal region 'have not the trading instinct sufficiently developed to run the business of a shop in competition with non-natives already established'.⁴² E. C. Baker explained that African traders did not take up plots in the trading lay-out because of steep 'economic' rents—i.e., land rents set in proportion to the anticipated value of permanent structures to be built on the plots—and the proximity to Indians, 'with whom he feels that he is unable to enter into competition'.⁴³ Government appears to have prohibited native and non-native traders alike from establishing shops on the township's borders to avoid this proximity to fierce competition.⁴⁴ African traders in 1923 had asked for legal concessions in this theoretically 'native' zone from non-native sanitary laws that required produce retailers to have cemented verandahs that discouraged vermin, something generally affordable to Indians alone.⁴⁵ These traders were initially exempted from building codes for trading everything but green food and fish, but by the late 1920s, public health concerns prevailed over what little official prerogative to cultivate an African commercial

class had existed.⁴⁶ Both native and non-native traders were routinely prohibited from trading by medical authorities who found their premises unsatisfactory, even though trading licenses had been taken out.⁴⁷ By 1939 there were only twenty African shops in Zone III, all holding small values of stock, and twelve of which were in the restricted area of Ilala.⁴⁸

African landlords, Indian tenants

Geographic declarations were blunt and ineffective tools in shaping Kariakoo's development. Officials tended to rely more heavily, if no more effectively, on regulating interaction between individual natives and non-natives on a case-by-case basis. Their chief legal mechanism was granting or denying permission for either the transfer or sub-letting of plots in Zone III by 'natives' to 'non-natives'. The influx of Indians willing to pay high purchase prices and rents went largely unchecked during the 1920s, but even Township Authority officials began to reconsider the implications of this during the 1930s. The most important figure was E. H. Helps, a South African who served as Municipal Secretary of Dar es Salaam's Township Authority from 1929 until 1945. Helps supported the general project of Indian-led gentrification, but feared its excesses would leave urban Africans without a stable residential centre. He warned in 1932 that 'the constantly increasing number of traders in the Native Area is depriving Natives of their residential holdings in the Township',⁴⁹ and later noted that:

Properties leased by natives to non-natives are almost invariably purchased by the lessees at a later date. Non-natives are interested in all properties in Zone III which are valuable for trading purposes but no others. I am personally in favor of natives being given every encouragement to trade among themselves in Zone III, possibly to the exclusion of non-natives whose true locale for trading purpose is Zone II. My reason for this is that natives are gradually surrendering all the best plots in Zone III to non-natives. They cannot resist the temptation of a good offer for their premises, but not infrequently the riches thus acquired become dissipated within a short time.⁵⁰

Case by case, District Office officials and Helps attempted to preserve the African position in Zone III by enforcing regulations that increased the cost of doing business with non-natives.⁵¹ Kariakoo housed a large class of African house-owners whose main livelihood was their lodgers' rent; Baker called the house 'the one form of investment of the urban native'.⁵² In 1931, these house-owners could charge 'non-natives'—almost invariably South Asians—as much as Shs. 120/- per month for a whole house, while the average room rent paid by an African was Shs. 5/- per month.⁵³ By the late 1930s, the government required Africans renting to non-natives to take out 'non-native' Rights of Occupancy at economic rents, rather than continuing to profit from paying low annual fees of *kiwanja* tenure while receiving high rents from 'non-native' tenants. Many such lease agreements between African landlords and

Indian tenants, however, were entered into 'without reference to and without knowledge of the government'.⁵⁴

House-owners had profited handsomely during the boom years of 1926 to 1930, but economic depression put the 'floating population' of lodgers on which house-owners depended for their income, as well as many house-owners themselves, out of work—one-third of adult African males in Dar es Salaam were unemployed in 1931.⁵⁵ Mama Nurdini, an African landlady, complained that she did not rent to 'Waswahili' because they cannot pay even half of what Indians could, they did not stay in one place for long, and they were often repatriated from town by the government for not paying their poll taxes.⁵⁶ E. C. Baker similarly noted that 'native rents are often one or two months in arrears and the lodger not infrequently decamps at night in order to avoid paying his debts'.⁵⁷ In 1936, the Director of Medical Services demanded that the government no longer brook Africans' chronic failure to finish their houses, and called for the vigorous enforcement of a long-standing law requiring that all African houses be of 'approved type' and completed within twelve months. 'The time has come', Scott announced, 'when a higher standard of construction can fairly be insisted upon'.⁵⁸ Better-off African landlords could most easily meet these standards through the rents of Indian lodgers. African homeowners positioned to profit from the Indian presence in Zone III seized those opportunities and often circumvented paternalistic policies designed for their protection in the process. Living costs, not landlessness, had long been the principal concern of Africans in Dar es Salaam. By the late 1930s, it had finally become the principal concern of British colonial officials as well.

Crises in food and housing and the origins of popular racial politics, 1940-1950

Dar es Salaam expanded rapidly in the 1940s. Annual population growth rose from roughly two percent to eight percent. Pressured by spiraling urbanization that strained the provision of basic minimum living conditions, and work stoppages that protested the unaffordability of urban life, the colonial government began a thorough-going intervention into the urban economy, abandoning its *ad hoc* system of urban growth management. The regulation of living costs replaced segregationist town planning as the major feature of Tanganyika's urban policy. During the Second World War, food and piece-good imports fell while urban immigration from upcountry increased, intensifying the state's desire to maintain minimum urban living conditions for Africans while minimizing their presence. The result of subsequent state intervention was to further politicize and racialize the distribution mechanisms of Dar es Salaam's economy.⁵⁹

Racial inequities in the supply of urban housing and food formed the foundation of popular racial politics in Dar es Salaam. Food had been rationed throughout the city from 1943 on a racial basis, causing enormous resentment among Africans towards Indians' higher ration standard.⁶⁰ The end of the war did little to alleviate conditions, as the immediate post-war years proved

the most difficult in the town's history for urban consumers – the Provincial Commissioner declared that 1946 would be remembered as 'one of the bleakest in living memory'.⁶¹ Although wheat and butter rations had been discontinued at the end of 1945, drought and locust attacks in 1946 forced the government not only to re-introduce the rationing of these items, but also to reduce existing maize and rice rations.⁶² Tensions between African consumers and Indian merchants escalated, becoming ubiquitous during these crises. Tanganyika's intelligence officer reported that the steady rise in post-war living costs and black marketing stood as 'a definite and continued threat to Indo-African relations' because, while the government was 'not unreasonably blamed for this, the African's primary reaction is anger against the Asians whom he considers, with considerable justification, to be exploiting his essential needs'.⁶³

Nowhere was this simmering racial resentment more clear than in public debate over access to housing. The severe shortages and dramatic gentrification of Dar es Salaam's housing market intensified the racial meaning of urban space while serving to mask class conflict between African landlords and African renters. Home ownership and landlordism presented the most viable business opportunity for the town's African population, and subsequently became site of the sharpest intra-African class differentiation. Yet consciousness of this class differentiation dissipated in the face of racial resentment that emerged from the paradoxical 'failure' of urban segregation. The most important development in Dar es Salaam's housing market during the 1940s was the increased influx of Indians into the theoretically 'native' Zone III area of Kariakoo and Ilala. African landlords often played a cagey game, standing by quietly as African tenants protested this racial 'takeover' by Indians, yet simultaneously exploiting burgeoning demand through raising the rents of both remaining African and newly-arrived Indian tenants. The result was a sharpened sense among Africans that they were entitled to certain urban space by virtue of their shared racial identification.

A major part of the problem was the failure of housing construction to keep pace with population growth. Building practically halted during the 1940s because of a dire shortage of materials. While the number of African houses had at best increased eleven percent, and perhaps even dropped during this period, population grew from 33,000 to 45,000 between 1939 and 1943 – raising the African area's population density from ten to nearly fifteen people per house.⁶⁴ Moreover, Asians grossly overpopulated Zone II, where building new homes and repairs to old ones had ceased since 1939 for want of cement and iron, and many existing houses had been converted for military or commercial purposes.⁶⁵ By March 1945 the urban population had increased to 55,000. The colonial government attempted to ameliorate the housing crisis by erecting a sufficient amount of its own housing, but this came too little and too late.⁶⁶ The years 1946-48 were particularly severe owing to a crisis in land availability and property speculation, which only eased in the early 1950s.⁶⁷ New housing construction was driven by property investors. The well-entrenched class of African landlords – who wielded sufficient capital to purchase 150 of the first 500 plots sold at the new neighborhood of Magomeni, and by 1956 numbered 8,000, forming 19 percent of the town's

African population – were well-positioned to capitalize on opportunities offered by this seller's market.⁶⁸

Indian 'immigration' into Kariakoo became a full-blown political crisis during the 1940s. African residents had already witnessed over twenty years of official racial zoning that on the one hand had resulted in the displacement of Africans from Zones I and II, while on the other hand turned a blind eye to the unauthorized erection of Indian-owned buildings in Zone III.⁶⁹ Indians had also purchased a number of 'native' properties in Zone III in the years preceding the war, numbering 53 houses between 1936 and 1939, bringing the total of Indian-owned properties there to 147.⁷⁰ This rate of influx had increased dramatically during the Second World War. Indian renters, either bachelors or families, turned to African landlords as an affordable solution to the spiraling rents of Zone II.⁷¹ A 1945 survey of 400 buildings in Zone II found that 126 of them had been condemned, yet still housed 2,258 people who were 'crowded into dark, dismal, insanitary buildings'.⁷² By 1947, there were 338 'non-native' households, numbering perhaps over 1,000 people, renting accommodation in Zone III.⁷³ African tenants were turned out of their rooms to make way for wealthier Asian tenants. They moved either to peri-urban settlements or into *vibanda* or huts, numbering over one thousand in 1945, which African landlords had constructed in their backyards.⁷⁴

Lacking the resources to create sufficient housing to meet demand, colonial officials relied instead upon regulatory cost controls to manage Dar es Salaam's housing crisis in the 1940s. The government passed a Rent Restriction Ordinance in 1941 that limited rental increases to ten percent of the rent paid on 3rd September 1939, the date of the war's outbreak. However, enforcement depended on parties bringing disputes to the township rent control board. Officials soon came to consider the rent restriction board ineffective. In the first seven months of 1948, only one case was brought before the board seeking rent reduction – most cases involved either landlords seeking to dispossess tenants, or tenants complaining of illegal acts by landlords to induce them to leave, such as removing part of a room's thatch roofing in order to allow rain to pour in. One African renter complained that African landlords not only charged black-market rents, but threatened to evict anyone who reported the illegal rents to government—in one case, some one hundred lodgers reported illegal rents to the *liwali*, upon which they were evicted by their landlords and 'are now residing at shambas'. In the tribunal following the 1947 general strike, the District Officer reported that owners had threatened tenants with witchcraft if they did not pay higher rents and, through fear, many tenants agreed.⁷⁵

While few Africans took up representations to the government rent board to gain redress, African landlord and tenant together embraced racial politics, offering polemics against the Indian 'invasion' of Kariakoo. The African independent newspaper *Dunia* located the forces of housing exploitation in the transgression of established racial boundaries. The paper's editor, R. M. Plantan, observed that high rents were driving Indians out of Uhindini (literally, 'place of Indians') and into Uswahilini ('place of Swahilis'), depriving Africans of their racial urban home. Pandering to the state's own visions of racial

order, Plantan rhetorically asked if the government would ‘agree to the mixture of your palm leave-roofed houses with those of Indians’, and speculated, ‘[w]ill it not be necessary to embark on a new move to the cracking creeks? Who is to blame? Well, we must not cry against a move—we must only go on until we reach Pugu’.⁷⁶ Plantan did briefly consider African complicity in the housing crisis:

The housing difficulties are caused through the greed of the *wenyeji* (‘natives’). They turn out their fellow natives who pay Shgs 6/- p.m. for a room in order to obtain large rents by leasing the whole house to Indians or whites, and so it continues, until many people are homeless, and the Indians have spread to every quarter of the native area. So let this Government take notice and remove the whites from the houses in the native areas, returning them to the Europeans or Indian quarters, for by living in the native area they avoid payment of high rents and their evasion damages the native.⁷⁷

Elaborating racial invectives, however, proved more attractive to Plantan and most of his readers than investigating the exploitation of African landlords. While a government worker argued that wages should be raised ‘to pay house rents as an Indian can pay in African quarters’, he emphasized that Indians should be removed from Zone III, except those with shops, in order to free up housing for Africans. Plantan’s solution was to re-establish urban racial order—if the government would only remove Indians from Uswahilini, then ‘Africans themselves would be able to live in comfort in their buildings’.⁷⁸ He later declined to publish a letter critical of both African landlords and the ‘agitating African’ who sought to prevent the former from realizing his or her investment by refusing higher rents.⁷⁹ The Tanganyika African Government Servants Association, representing the salaried group most sharply affected by the housing crisis of the 1940s, understood the problem in wholly racial terms. They protested that Indians were ‘overflowing into the African portion of the town’,⁸⁰ and that it ‘should consider some way of reducing and/or expelling the number of Asians now residing and/or occupying houses in African quarters area’.⁸¹ A Kisumu resident wondered when ‘Indians in our town will be given the order to leave our buildings’, to which Plantan responded by imploring his readers to buy a building plot in the area himself to prevent further Indian expansion.⁸² Few residents, landlords, or officials publicly took the cool view of Abdulwahid Sykes, who described rental increases as ‘a boon rather than a menace to house owners irrespective of race’ because it raised needed capital for further housing construction.⁸³ In other words, few could accept arguments in favour of gentrification at face value. For many, reviving racial zoning was a sufficient solution to a difficult economic problem.

Officials were increasingly sympathetic to popular African demands to re-segregate Kariakoo, but remained unclear about the legality of non-native tenancies on African property, as the question was entangled with poorly understood commercial zoning policies. As late as 1944, the highly competent District Commissioner Dick Bone had to ask Municipal Secretary Helps where the ‘so-called “Trading Area”’ in Zone III was located, and what was the

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authority for restricting trade—to which the veteran Helps scribbled ‘not sure!’ and ‘none’, respectively.⁸⁴ The planning sub-committee of Dar es Salaam’s other local governing body, the Township Authority, recommended that trading in Zone III be restricted to Africans only, which S. B. Malik – the board’s president and an imposing business figure in Dar es Salaam – refused on grounds that such segregation opposed the principles of the Mandate. In 1945, the government attempted to effect a compromise of sorts between non-racialism and ‘native’ protection by allowing Africans to gain three-year rights of occupancy over trading plots at a standard rent while ‘non-natives’ had to pay rent determined at auction.⁸⁵

The September 1947 dockworker’s strike – caused in large part by the housing crisis – moved officials to seek a more immediate solution.⁸⁶ The Labour Commissioner recommended mass Asian evictions from Zone III and to appoint an African Rent Restriction *baraza*. In January 1948, the government halted further leasing by natives to non-natives, as well as property sales to non-natives, in the Kariakoo area except on extraordinary grounds.⁸⁷ The District Officer wrote that the African housing problem ‘is in reality not so much the problem of African housing as it is of Asian expansion into African areas’, and, with considerable exaggeration, claimed that ‘[t]he lure of high rentals paid by Asians has virtually meant that 90 percent of Kariakoo, once a purely African area, is now either owned or leased by Asians’ – his successor reduced the figure to 60 percent.⁸⁸ Even officials who viewed the housing crisis in primarily economic terms understood that popular racial understandings made it an immediate question of political stability. The arrival of building materials in the early 1950s finally eased the housing crisis somewhat, and the subsequent increased enforcement of building codes led to the more efficient removal of African squatters. In the words of an anonymous intelligence officer, this ‘combined to create a general impression amongst African residents that there is a drive to oust them from the Municipality in favour of Asians and Europeans . . . [t]his feeling is at the moment widespread, and the cause of considerable discontent’.⁸⁹ The town’s District Officer also noted that rumors were circulating among Africans that the purpose of new town planning proposals was to demolish African houses overnight to give the plots to Indians.⁹⁰ Reflected in both the rumours of the street as well as in the articulated policies of African bureaucrats, reversing this pattern of Indian-led gentrification had become a central goal of incipient African racial populism in Dar es Salaam on the eve of nationalist politics.

Conclusion

The British colonial state devised a rather modest and ineffective tool kit for guiding urban development in Dar es Salaam. Spatial urban policies that sought to segregate Dar es Salaam between ‘native’ Africans and ‘non-native’ immigrants through building codes and land tenure proved sufficient to facilitate the removal of inconveniently-located Africans living in Zones I and II, or what were firmly to become the European and Indian neighbourhoods

of the town during the colonial period. But colonial urban growth also relied heavily upon the investment of private capital, the lion's share of which lay in the hands of Indians living in a small and tightly circumscribed location. The urban policy of gentrification provoked political resistance when it aided and legitimated the expansion of Indian households into majority African neighbourhoods. Although few in government were committed to urban segregation as a policy of positive protection for Africans from being priced out of their 'zone', embittered African tenants embraced this implied promise by demanding that government support the racial integrity of neighbourhoods such as Kariakoo and Ilala. The state's abandonment of spatial segregation in favour of an urban policy centred on managing urban living costs through rationing and rent controls in the 1940s only strengthened the resentment held by emerging African politicians in Dar es Salaam towards Indian interlopers, although many African landlords quietly benefited from these developments. The colonial government had entangled itself by its simultaneous reliance upon Indian commercial wealth and African political consent, and proved increasingly powerless to mediate the growing conflict between the two during the 1940s and 1950s.

Notes

¹ This production-side definition of gentrification focuses on the relationship between urban space and capital flows. For an important theoretical elaboration from this perspective, see Neil Smith, *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City* (London, 1996).

² On this see James R. Brennan, 'Nation, Race and Urbanization in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 1916-1976', Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University (2002), and Ned Bertz's forthcoming dissertation at the University of Iowa.

³ The translation of the German building ordinance was finally carried out in 1921, and was easily available only by 1923. 'Notes on Building Plots in the Native Quarter of Dar es Salaam' by Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority', 18 May 1931, Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) 12589/I/134.

⁴ Minute of Hollis to Byatt, 22 December 1920, TNA 3152.

⁵ Allen to Chief Secretary (hereafter CS), 15 October 1920, TNA 3152/1.

⁶ The main legislation was the 1924 Building Areas for Dar es Salaam, No. 160 of 11 June 1924. J.L.M. Kironde, 'The Evolution of the land use structure of Dar es Salaam 1890-1990: a study in the effects of land policy', Ph.D. thesis, University of Nairobi (1994), p. 161.

⁷ 'Notes on Building Plots in the Native Quarter of Dar es Salaam' by Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority, 18 May 1931, TNA 12589/I/136; E.C. Baker, 'Memorandum on Dar es Salaam (1931)', copy held in SOAS library special collections, p. 10.

⁸ 'Minutes of extraordinary meeting of the Township Authority 18 May 1928', DSM Township Authority minute book (hereafter DSM TA), copy of notes on this book made by Martha Honey and in the author's possession. I am greatly indebted to Martha Honey and Robert Gregory for allowing me to use these notes on the DSM TA, for which I was unable to locate the original minute book in Dar es Salaam.

⁹ See the discussion by Kironde in the preceding chapter.

¹⁰ Ronayne to Provincial Commissioner (hereafter PC) Eastern, 2 April 1929, TNA 61/250/45. Ilala had grown in 1930 from a village of 20-30 people to a suburb of 1,500-2,000 residents. Executive Officer, DSM Township Authority to CS, 19 September 1930, TNA 12227/I/13; Fryer, Dar es Salaam District Annual Report (hereafter DAR) 1930.

¹¹ Gerald F. Sayers, *The Handbook of Tanganyika* (London, 1930), p. 242.

¹² Extract from revised draft circular by Attorney General, n. d., ca. 1923-24, TNA 3125B/3.

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- ¹³ The administration rejected *kiwanja* tenure because it considered the ground rent it generated paltry (2.5 percent of the structure's value), and the utilization of Zone II's limited space by shabby, single-story buildings inadequate. Griffith to CS, 19 October 1930, TNA 61/94/A/93. On *kiwanja* tenure, see Kironde's contribution in this volume.
- ¹⁴ Brett [?], Dar es Salaam DAR 1924, TNA 1733/26; Dawkins, Dar es Salaam DAR 1927, TNA Library.
- ¹⁵ Eastern Provincial Annual Report (hereafter PAR) 1927, TNA 11676/I/5.
- ¹⁶ Owen to CS, 7 December 1927, TNA 7841/187.
- ¹⁷ Acting Land Officer to CS, 12 November 1928, TNA 10063/II/34/1.
- ¹⁸ Land Officer to CS, 18 November 1929, TNA 10063/II/62. Rights of Occupancy in townships were issued for 33 years for buildings worth less than Shs. 10,000; 50 years for buildings worth between Shs. 10,000/- and 20,000/-; and 99 years for buildings worth over Shs. 20,000/-. Sayers, pp. 244-245.
- ¹⁹ 'Conversion of Kiwanja Tenure', *Tanganyika Herald*, 18 August 1934, quoting the 1933 Report of the Land Department.
- ²⁰ Fryer, Dar es Salaam DAR, 1929, TNA Library.
- ²¹ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 15.
- ²² Ibid., pp. 14-17; Baker, Amendments to 'Memorandum', enclosed in Deputy Information Officer to CS, 10 January 1940, TNA 18950/II/1A.
- ²³ Brett, Dar es Salaam DAR 1921, TNA 1733/7; Scott to E. E., 12 April 1920, TNA 2712; Scott to CS, 6 May 1920, TNA 2712/6.
- ²⁴ Adolfo C. Mascarenhas, 'Urban Development in Dar es Salaam' M. A. Thesis, UCLA (1966), p. 97.
- ²⁵ 'Notes on Building Plots in the Native Quarter of Dar es Salaam' by Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority, 18 May 1931, TNA 12589/I/135. Although figures are not available for the increase in property values around the Kariakoo market, around the old market in the Indian quarter, two-roomed shops rented out at Rs. 50/- to Rs. 72/- per month were expected to drop to Rs. 20/- to Rs. 25/-. Skelton to CS, 18 November 1920, TNA 3088.
- ²⁶ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 16; Baker, Amendments to 'Memorandum', enclosed in Deputy Information Officer to CS, 10 January 1940, TNA 18950/II/1a/16. In 1931, Arabs owned 41 houses and 'other non-natives' owned 3, for a total of 186 of the 2,035 houses in Zone III, or 9.1 percent.
- ²⁷ Baker, 'Memorandum', pp. 11-12.
- ²⁸ Eastern PAR, 1927, TNA 11676/I/53.
- ²⁹ Secretary, Central Town Planning and Building Committee to CS, 28 September 1932, TNA 11150/II/285.
- ³⁰ Hartnoll to CS, 6 October 1932, TNA 11150/II/287.
- ³¹ Minute of I. L. L. to CS, 6 October 1932, TNA 11150/II/289.
- ³² CS to Secretary, Central Town Planning and Building Committee, 13 October 1932, TNA 11150/II/290.
- ³³ This was done by a 1933 amendment to Township Rules of 1930 Ordinance. Kironde, 'The Evolution of the land use structure', p. 161.
- ³⁴ 'Notes on Building Plots in the Native Quarter of Dar es Salaam' by Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority, ca. June 1931, TNA 12589/I/140.
- ³⁵ Minutes of special meeting of DSM TA, 8 June 1932, DSM TA minute book; minutes of 487th meeting of DSM TA, 18 July 1934.
- ³⁶ Ronayne to Land Officer, 30 July 1929, TNA 61/324/I/46.
- ³⁷ Land Officer to CS, 3 January 1934, TNA 12589/II/156; CS to Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority, 4 July 1934, TNA 12589/II/148.
- ³⁸ District Officer (hereafter DO) Dar es Salaam to PC Eastern, 28 March 1939, TNA 26862/2A; minutes of 594th meeting of DSM Township Authority, 5 January 1939, DSM TA minute book; Pike to PC Eastern, 2 June 1939, TNA 61/490/363. For an example of co-existing but diametrically opposed understandings of policy towards trade in 'residential areas' of Zone III, compare Pike's position of 2 June 1939 cited above with Marchant's minute to CS, 3 October 1938, TNA 61/490/302, cited below.
- ³⁹ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 30.

⁴⁰ Buckley to CS, 30 August 1923, TNA 2712. For the *hartal* see James R. Brennan, 'South Asian Nationalists in an East African Context: The Case of Tanganyika, 1914-1954', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 19:2 (1999), pp. 26-28.

⁴¹ 'Notes on Building Plots,' ca. June 1931, TNA 12589/I/140. This document states that there are only two (formerly four) African shop keepers in town. Baker, writing in February 1931, states there are four native shops that sell foodstuffs other than fruit, vegetables, firewood, etc., all situated outside the trading layout and admitted by oversight to the residential area. Baker, 'Memorandum,' p. 30

⁴² 'Notes on Building Plots', TNA 12589/I/140.

⁴³ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 30.

⁴⁴ CS to PC Eastern, 21 December 1936, TNA 61/299/1/64.

⁴⁵ See for example the letter from 'Native Observers', ca. August 1923, TNA 2712.

⁴⁶ Buckley to CS, 30 August 1923, TNA 2712.

⁴⁷ Minutes of 282nd meeting of DSM TA, 30 January 1929, DSM TA minute book; minute of Helps to CS, 16 November 1932, TNA 10849/188/4.

⁴⁸ Baker, Amendments to 'Memorandum', enclosed in Deputy Information Officer to CS, 10 January 1940, TNA 18950/II/1A; Helps to PC Eastern, 14 August 1936, TNA 61/18/I/514. Helps wrote that 'not more than twelve dukas run by Asiatics fall within this category [of carrying less than Shs. 600/- stock]. These latter dukas are of a very humble type'. *ibid.*

⁴⁹ Minute of Helps to CS, 16 November 1932, TNA 10849/188/3.

⁵⁰ Helps to PC Eastern, 29 September 1938, TNA 61/490/300.

⁵¹ Property transfers from Africans to non-natives not only required government permission but also cost Shs. 10/- per annum, whereas transfers between natives cost only Shs. 2/- p.a. Foyer to PC Eastern, 18 February 1930, TNA 540/11/A/73/10.

⁵² Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 18.

⁵³ Baker, 'Memorandum', pp. 16-17. The most common type of accommodation, the 'Swahili' house, generally comprised of six rooms.

⁵⁴ Helps to PC Eastern, 29 September 1938, TNA 61/490/300.

⁵⁵ Helps, 'Report on Dar es Salaam Township for the year 1934', TNA 61/625/7; Helps to PC Eastern, 8 July 1935, TNA 61/27A/15; Helps to PC Eastern, 27 August 1936, TNA 61/534/3; Hugh Hamilton McCleery, 'Extent and Conditions under which some natives are occupying land on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam', June 1939, Rhodes House (Oxford University) MSS Afr. s. 870, p. 4.

⁵⁶ Petition of Mama Nurdini to CS, 21 August 1931, TNA 10849/1.

⁵⁷ Baker, 'Memorandum', p. 17.

⁵⁸ Scott to CS, 14 August 1936, TNA 61/534/1. The 'approved type' house required windows, plastering, and lime washing. PC Eastern to CS, 1 September 1936, TNA 24387/I/5.

⁵⁹ This paragraph summarizes the arguments in Brennan, 'Nation', chapter 3.

⁶⁰ Brennan, 'Nation', pp. 173-180.

⁶¹ Eastern PAR, 1946. See also Bone, 1944 Uzaramo DAR, TNA 61/3/A/11; and Eastern PAR, 1945.

⁶² Westcott, p. 227; Bryceson, 'A century of food supply', in Jane Guyer (ed.), *Feeding African Cities* (Manchester, 1987), p. 169; *Economic Control Board Bulletin*, 7 December 1945; minute of Member for Finance, Trade and Economics to CS, 10 May 1949, TNA 34990/I; minute of M. A. N. R. to M. S. S., 9 March 1950, TNA 28584/7; 'Raiya zako Watii wa amri, wote wa Dar es Salaam' to District Commissioner (hereafter DC) Uzaramo, 20 January 1946, TNA 540/27/27/6.

⁶³ Political Intelligence Summary for Tanganyika, April-June 1949, enclosed in letter of CS, 8 August 1949, Colonial Office, Public Records Office (hereafter CO) 537/4717/2.

⁶⁴ Of the 3,123 'native' houses in Dar es Salaam township, 2,084 were in Kariakoo and Ilala, 173 were in Zones I and II (including Kisutu), and another 866 were in Chang'ombe and other outlying areas. 'Memorandum on proposal for extension of Zone III, 22nd July 1943', by Molohan and Pike, TNA 24387/II/10C; Jackson to Stanley, 27 November 1943, TNA 24387/II/10. For figures that show an actual decrease in housing, see Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, Crime & Colonial Order in Dar es Salaam*

Between Segregation and Gentrification

(Oxford, 2005), p. 90.

⁶⁵ Director of Intelligence and Security to PC Eastern, 14 November 1944, TNA 61/4/14/2; minute of Bone to PC Eastern, 14 November 1944, TNA 61/4/14/6, and other correspondence in this file.

⁶⁶ In 1943, the government drafted a plan to demarcate 2,000 residential plots for Africans upon which to construct a pilot housing scheme. Because of astronomical land prices, land was not first acquired until 1947. Shortages in land, building materials and urban planning personnel resulted in the government only erecting 1,762 of approximately 5,000 planned houses in Dar es Salaam between 1946 and 1956. 'Memorandum on proposal for extension of Zone III' by Molohan and Pike, 22 July 1943, TNA 24387/II/10C; 'African Housing, Dar es Salaam', n. a., n. d. (ca. 1948), DSM Extra-Provincial District Book, TNA; Bell to Municipal Secretary, 15 April 1947, TNA 26693/II/45A; 'Rents for Government African Houses in Dar es Salaam' by Whitlamsmith, 4 December 1948, TNA 32575/III/483; Twining to Gorell-Barnes, 7 November 1953, CO 822/589/5; A. J. Dixon, 'The Evolution of Indirect Rule and the Development of Rural and Urban Local Government in Tanganyika During the British Administration, 1940-1961' (B. A. thesis, Oxford University, 1969), pp. 137-138.

⁶⁷ On this see Brennan, 'Nation, Race and Urbanization', chapter 4.

⁶⁸ J. A. K. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam* (London, 1963), p. 155; Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 386; Leslie, *op. cit.*, pp. 153 & 261.

⁶⁹ Minutes of 611th Meeting of DSM TA, 26 January 1940; minutes of 623rd meeting of DSM TA, 15 November 1940; minutes of 640th Meeting of DSM TA, 14 November 1941.

⁷⁰ 'Township Authority's Report on the PC's Proposals for the Reorganisation of the DSM Township and District', 16 September 1940, DSM TA minute book; Baker, Amendments to 'Memorandum', pp. 15-16. African houses in Zone III totaled 2,092.

⁷¹ Director of Intelligence and Security to PC Eastern, 14 November 1944, TNA 61/4/14/2. The Intelligence Director identified 88 male Indians [which he conflates, accurately or not, with 'Asians'] renting from Africans in Kariakoo, and another 23 in Kisutu. These figures excluded duka owners and small traders, and found typical Indian resident to 'occupy one or two rooms each and in some cases the whole house. Most of them are bachelors, but there are also several with families. Africans who own good houses are being approached daily by Indians who are offering them Shs. 100/- and more per month if they will turn out the present native occupants and let them have the entire building on a two or three year agreement with payment of up to one half of the amount in advance'. *Ibid.*

⁷² 'Notes on Housing Conditions in Dar-es-Salaam' by G. A. Wilson, in Wilson to PC Eastern, 12 February 1945, TNA 61/4/15/1.

⁷³ DC Uzaramo to Municipal Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 22 August 1947, TNA 61/255/45.

⁷⁴ 'Causes for disaffection amongst natives in Dar-es-Salaam', n. a., 25 January 1945; enclosed in Director of Intelligence and Security to PC Eastern, 27 January 1945, TNA 61/4/14/8. African-owned housing was most expensive in Kariakoo, where a derelict thatch hut could fetch up to Shs. 3,000/-, and other houses as much as Shs. 15,000/-; Ilala houses cost between Shs. 1,000/- and 3,000/- but up to Shs. 5,000/- along Kichwele street; houses in the Zone II area of Kisutu cost only up to Shs. 3,000/- because plot leases were terminated after the building's (inevitable) collapse. DC Kisarawe to PC Eastern, 3 March 1949, TNA 29538/9B.

⁷⁵ PC Eastern to CS, 18 September 1948, TNA 35905/58; letter of W. A. M., *Tanganyika Standard*, 28 April 1947; 'Tribunal hears evidence on wages and housing costs', *Tanganyika Standard*, 19 September 1947.

⁷⁶ 'Translation of Extract from Tanganyika Opinion "Dunia", dated 25th May 1944', TNA 61/750/2/52. Original text not in file.

⁷⁷ 'Extract from Dunia of 27 October 1944', in Director of Intelligence and Security to PC Eastern, 30 October 1944, TNA 61/4/14/1. Original not in file.

⁷⁸ Letter from 'Savage', *Tanganyika Standard*, 15 February 1945; 'Extract from "Dunia" Friday the 16th February 1945', TNA 61/4/14/18; 'Extract from "Dunia" Tuesday 20th February 1945', TNA 61/4/14/20; 'Extract from "Dunia" Monday 7th July 1945', TNA 61/4/14/26. Original from 16 February 1945 reads: 'Basi tutashukuru sana kama serkali itatutulia msaada wa kaanun wa kuwaondoa Wahindi mitaa ya Uswahilini wa Africans

wenyewe waweze kustarehe katika majumba yao’.

⁷⁹ Minute of Bone [?] to PC Eastern, December 1945, TNA 61/4/14.

⁸⁰ Notes of an interview given by the Chief Secretary to the President and the Secretary of the African Government Servants Association on the 29th March, 1946, TNA 11889/II/75. Indian boarders fueled spiraling rents—‘The Asians occupying African houses have generally to pay fantastic rentals, e.g. a room in an African house for which a reasonable rent in 1939 would have been Shs. 8/- and for which at the moment a rent of Shs. 15/- per month is definitely on the generous side, is being let to Asians at anything between Shs. 40/- and Shs. 100/- per month’. Minute of Nayar to CS, 21 November 1949, TNA 32697/I. Emphasis in original.

⁸¹ Honorary Secretary, Tanganyika African Government Servants Association to CS, 5 February 1945, TNA 61/4/2/II/2.

⁸² Letter of Mohamed Seleman and response of editor, ‘Extract from “Dunia” Saturday 14th April 1945’, TNA 61/4/14/25. Original of Seleman’s letter reads: ‘Nimeona Wahindi wengi wamenunua viwanja Kisutu kwa kujenga majumba ya makuti kwa mjengo wa kizungu na taa za stim na vyoo vya kizungu, jee, majumba hayo tutapewa nafasi wenyi wasaa kuyapanga, au ya Wahindi tu. Kama ya Wahindi tu, jee, wale Wahindi wa mjini mwetu watapewa amri kutuachia majumba yetu, au killa mmoja akae atakapo kwa wasaa wakw?’

⁸³ Letter of A. W. Sykes, *Tanganyika Standard*, 8 May 1947.

⁸⁴ Bone to Helps, 6 October 1944, TNA 540/6/40/1.

⁸⁵ Minutes of 673rd Meeting of the Dar es Salaam Township Authority, 14 December 1944; ‘Notes from Land Officer on memo prepared for Provincial Commissioner’s Conference, 1946, Appendix D’ by P. H. Hutchinson, Land Officer, 3 June 1946, in PC Conference Minutes, UDSM East Africana Collection; Municipal Secretary to Mohe Din Karim Din c/o Baluchi Community, Arab Association, 17 May 1946, TNA 540/11/12/17.

⁸⁶ On the 1947 strike, see John Iliffe, ‘A history of the dockworkers of Dar es Salaam’, *Tanzania Notes and Records* 71 (1970), pp. 119-48.

⁸⁷ PC Eastern to DC Uzaramo, 19 November 1948, TNA 61/255/97; DC Dar es Salaam to Land Officer and PC Eastern, 8 November 1948, TNA 61/255/95.

⁸⁸ Dar es Salaam DAR, 1950, TNA 540/1/4/B/4; Dar es Salaam DAR, 1951, TNA 540/1/4/B/5. In Leslie’s 1956 survey of the African areas, he found that 94 percent of all ‘non-Africans’ surveyed (almost entirely Indian or Arab) lived in Kariakoo, and that only 2 percent of all Indian households in Kariakoo own a house. Leslie, ‘A Survey of Dar es Salaam’ (1957), Appendix B.

⁸⁹ East African Command Fortnightly Intelligence News Letter No. 64, 5 January 1951, CO 537/7218/1.

⁹⁰ Dar es Salaam DAR, 1951, TNA 540/1/4/B/5.

Chapter Five

*'Brothers by Day': Policing the urban public in colonial Dar es Salaam, 1919-61**

Andrew Burton

Along with the administration and judiciary, the Tanganyika police force formed the third branch of the urban state at the heart of the imposition and maintenance of colonial order in Dar es Salaam.¹ Indeed, of all three, it was perhaps the most essential. While the British regime, in its administrative and judicial initiatives in the town, attempted to establish structures of governance that retained the broad acceptance of the African urban population, their legitimacy was always to some degree reliant upon the coercive potential of the colonial state. Police enforcement of laws and by-laws was integral to the implementation of colonial urban policy. Through their presence or absence, actions or inactions, the police exercised an enduring influence on how urban space was conceived and utilised, helping shape a town that reflected prevailing social, economic and political contexts.

The urban order in force was a racially discriminatory one. Not only were substantially more resources devoted to the policing of Dar es Salaam's European community than to its Indian or, especially, African communities, but the town was often policed through the enforcement of legislation that nakedly discriminated against the African majority. Most obviously, the police enforced laws restricting African mobility within the town; moreover, various laws prohibiting social, cultural and/or economic pursuits, such as *ngoma*, the consumption of 'traditional' brews, or informal trade, also led to the arrest and prosecution of countless 'offenders'.² The prejudicial nature of much colonial legislation was transparent to urban Africans, and resulted in great resentment towards the police who acted as the principal agents of enforcement.

Police actions not only reflected racial prejudices inherent in the colonial situation; they also arose from, and reinforced, an evolving urban socio-economic stratification. A growing class of unemployed, under-employed and informally-employed Africans, who were blamed for spiralling crime as the town underwent unprecedented growth from the late-1930s, formed the

principal target of colonial policing. Heightened crime rates can in fact be attributed in part to intensified action against this class, as increasing numbers were apprehended and charged for a diverse array of (often victimless) offences from loitering to street trading. These occupants of the town not only contradicted European and Indian notions of orderly urban space, but also affronted the peace of mind of a respectable urban African elite. Such action against the 'residuum' helped mollify the town's propertied classes. However, in the face of rapid urbanization in the late-colonial period its effect was largely symbolic. Even with the deployment of a police force whose reputation for coercion was high, the degree of influence exercised by the colonial administration over the African population was substantially less than that aspired to by both European officials and police officers, and that desired by European and Indian settlers and an African elite.

The Dar es Salaam police were also situated at the forefront of the most prominent socio-cultural cleavage in the town: that dividing the urban majority of Swahili-influenced Muslims, originating from Dar es Salaam's coastal hinterland, from upcountry, often Christian, Africans whose relative affluence and social success in the colonial town were resented by coastal indigenes who viewed them as interlopers. Thanks in part to an official policy of stationing police officers outside their home districts, the African constabulary in Dar es Salaam was made up overwhelmingly of upcountry recruits. This intensified resentment towards the police among the capital's coastal African majority, who viewed the Dar es Salaam force less as a neutral keeper of the peace than as an occupying force.³

The formation of a colonial constabulary

In 1919, when the British colonial administration formally took over German East Africa, it was faced with a high incidence of urban lawlessness in the territorial capital. This disorder had its roots in the collapse of authority which occurred in Dar es Salaam during the transition from German to British rule in the First World War. After more than two decades of strict German rule elements among the town's inhabitants responded to opportunities arising from a British administration unfamiliar with local conditions.⁴ The military authorities responded by enlisting twenty-eight European officers, non-commissioned officers, and troopers of the South African Mounted Rifles to form the nucleus of a territorial Police Force, who set about recruiting and training an African rank and file.⁵ At the end of the war these men were transferred to the civil administration (although initially not discharged from the army).

With a mini-epidemic of crime sweeping the territory, officials recognised the urgent need to establish a more substantial policing body. The initial intake of African constables largely came from ranks of demobilised soldiers of the King's African Rifles.⁶ Over the years, incentives for joining the force were introduced, including after nine years the exemption for life from tax, which, according to the 1927 police report, was 'a great inducement to police service'.

'Brothers by Day': Policing the urban public in colonial Dar es Salaam

After World War One, rates of pay were improved in order to attract men who could read and write.⁷ By 1949 recruits were supposed to be literate in either Swahili (to standard IV) or English (standard VIII).⁸ Before this they had been predominantly non-literate and the force was built up largely as a military organization, as policemen unable to read or write were ill-placed to adopt conventional policing methods.⁹ By 1923, a territorial force had been established comprising over 1,800 African, European and Asian policemen, of whom the vast majority were African – 1,762, as opposed to 63 Europeans and 17 'Asiatics'. The strength of the force remained around the same level until after World War One. In 1950 it had grown to just under 3,000. In the final decade of colonial rule, as crime rates spiralled, it grew significantly and by 1961 there were 6,143 policemen (and women).¹⁰ Statistics for Dar es Salaam are less comprehensive. Between the wars the number of Africans stationed in the town varied from 159 in 1924 to 247 in 1938, with a slight dip in the early-1930s. The number of Europeans and Asians appears to have remained steady at 10-15.¹¹ By 1950 the total strength of the force (excluding the district CID) had risen to 395. Surprisingly, over the remainder of the decade, a time when crime was on the increase and the territorial force was expanded, the number stationed in Dar es Salaam only grew modestly, reaching 413 by 1959. In the following year, however, the municipal force was expanded by over fifty percent, and by independence there were 633 police stationed there. In the territorial force, senior police ranks were dominated by Europeans.¹² Up to 1955 the highest rank attainable by an African was that of Sub-Inspector. In 1951 100 Africans had attained this position. The other African ranks consisted of Sergeants Major, Sergeants of the first and second grade, corporals, and ordinary constables. The first African Inspector was gazetted in 1955, three more in the following year, and in 1960, in preparation for the transfer of power, a further 21 were appointed.

Throughout the colonial period the capital's major ethnic groups were noticeably under-represented in the police, while large numbers were recruited from neighbouring colonies.¹³ The small number of policemen identifying themselves as Zaramo in 1921 (38) had by 1924 dwindled to none, and the minimal Manyema presence (from 10 to 45 throughout the 1920s and early-1930s) had also disappeared by 1935. On the other hand, 'alien' groups such as the Wemba (from Northern Rhodesia: 68-108) were well represented, as were groups such as the Yao (106-151 in the same period), Nyasa (64-84) and Luo/Kavirondo (79-201) whose populations were primarily to be found in neighbouring Mozambique, Nyasaland and Kenya respectively.¹⁴ The same was true post-1945. By 1960, 451 Luo served in the Tanganyika police, as did 182 Yao. Manyema, meanwhile, numbered just 52, and the total Zaramo, whose numbers had only risen above 25 in 1959 for the first time since the early-1920s, came to just thirty.¹⁵ Of the Tanganyikan peoples it was the Sukuma and Nyamwezi who, in the words of the 1928 report, provided 'the backbone of the African ranks both in physique and intelligence'¹⁶, each having over 150 representatives in the force. In 1960 they remained two of the most important groups, numbering 199 and 482 respectively. By this time, though, it appears an effort was made to recruit more from other Tanganyikan groups.¹⁷

The ethnic composition of the force reflected entrenched ideas among European officers about their suitability to serve as policemen. At various points the Nyamwezi, Sukuma, Ngoni, and Yao were singled out as well-fitted to police work.¹⁸ Meanwhile, after an initial lack of belief in their suitability,¹⁹ the 'Kavirondo' came to form a substantial presence in the Tanganyika police.²⁰ One result of this policy of concentrated recruitment was that Dar es Salaam was policed by officers whom the majority of the town's African population regarded as outsiders, a factor which had significant consequences for police-public relations.²¹ Although in 1956 the five main ethnic groups—Zaramo, Rufiji, Luguru, Ndengereko and Ngindo—constituted approximately 62 percent of the total population, they constituted just 5 percent of the urban constabulary.²² By contrast, Luo and Kuria, from Kenya and northern Tanganyika, whose civilian presence in Dar es Salaam was negligible at best, comprised around 17 percent. According to Mohamed Said, during the colonial period the police actually came to be known as 'Kavirondo' by 'coastal people'.²³ In being policed predominantly by representatives of non-local groups, however, the Tanganyikan capital was not unique. The contrast was—thanks to its size and the relative dearth of police recruits from Eastern Province—simply more apparent in Dar es Salaam than other areas. From early on throughout the territory it was a stated aim of the force to 'reduce local men serving in a police unit to the smallest number possible'.²⁴ By this means, according to the 1921 police report, it was

possible to break down the fatal policy which had perforce to be created in the early days of inauguration of having districts almost entirely policed by natives of the district in close touch with the families and relations, a system which is admitted on all sides to be absolutely opposed to proper police administration and courts disaster in case of local trouble.

Similar calculations, along with the perceived superiority of recruits from neighbouring territories, accounted for the substantial presence of non-Tanganyikans. It was, as Governor Twining pointed out in a letter to his Nyasaland counterpart requesting permission for the Tanganyika police to enlist more Nyasa officers, judged to be 'desirous to have a proportion of men recruited from outside the Territory, as it is considered that they would be more reliable in times of internal trouble'.²⁵ The utility of such recruits in circumstances of increasing nationalist agitation, such as occurred in Dar es Salaam in the 1950s, would have been particularly appreciated by colonial officials.

Policing the town, 1919-45

Soon after the imposition of British rule a network of fixed beats was established throughout Dar es Salaam. These helped to stem the high incidence of housebreaking and theft following World War One.²⁶ '[T]he mere presence of uniformed police in the streets', observed the Police Commissioner in the 1924 report, 'deters the timid criminal'. By 1926, though, the effectiveness of

these beats was significantly diminished and a system of random night patrols was introduced. '[T]he movement of police in pairs by night at unexpected intervals and directions and with delays between the patrols',²⁷ was reported to have had 'an undoubted influence on the movements of the thieving fraternity and restricts their activities by night'.²⁸ Over the next few years patrols were further developed with, according to the 1928 report, 'the most beneficial results to the protection of property and the confusion of night prowlers'. By 1930, police officers were operating in pairs on constantly changing routes, which had a system of patrol boxes that ensured 'a regular check throughout the night on the movements of the patrol'.²⁹

A number of other measures were taken in the fight against crime, including a system of rewards for civilian assistance. Rewards were paid to members of the public from 1920, if not earlier. The first Commissioner 'constantly impress[ed] upon both Political and Police Officers the desirability of gaining the confidence of the natives by the liberal distribution of rewards for services rendered to the police'.³⁰ He was in no doubt that rewards formed a 'great inducement to the native Chief and Headman to assist the police'. '[E]xcellent co-operation' with the 'tribal authorities', who assisted in the rounding up of wanted persons, was singled out in 1926, 'as an important factor in the improvement of crime throughout the year'.³¹ A network of police informers was also established, who were paid 'according to the value of their information'. These informers consisted of 'mostly ex-criminals or other natives well acquainted with the haunts of criminals'.³² Other innovations in policing had an impact. The establishment of a Fingerprints Bureau in the early 1920s facilitated the capture (and conviction) of re-offenders. Similarly, the creation of a Criminal Investigation Department in 1932 improved detection rates for more serious crimes committed in the township. In 1934, the fifteen detectives working in the department handled 137 cases, the bulk of which originated in the capital. Their workload was dominated by crimes against property, though CID officers were also involved in action against urban 'undesirables' and infractions against the liquor laws.³³

Between the wars there was a high degree of complacency prevalent amongst senior officers, whose faith in the efficacy of policing could only be sustained thanks to their ignorance of conditions in Uhindini and Kariakoo. At one stage or another, representatives of each of Dar es Salaam's racial communities felt compelled to voice their dissatisfaction with the level of protection. After European homes fell victim to the rash of crimes that occurred in the wake of World War One, editorials in the settler newspaper, the *Dar es Salaam Times*, berated the inadequate response, with particular ire directed at the supposedly gentle treatment of the native offender.³⁴ One correspondent to the paper, S.V. Montgomery, complained that the European was 'daily flouted by the native' reaching the striking conclusion that 'controllers of our native system would be wise to remember some of the ugly incidents that have marred the social history of South Africa as a result of over-indulgence on the part of the European'.³⁵ By 1921, though, this initial outburst of criminality had been countered by the organization of police patrols in European residential areas. While this did not stem criticism of official negligence,³⁶ it

did have the effect of making Zone I a safer place than either Zones II or III.

Resources devoted towards the policing of the town heavily favoured its European population; especially between the wars. In 1935, when the predominantly European residential zone had 34 policemen patrolling it at night, Uhindini had just 28 patrolmen and the African areas a mere seventeen.³⁷ These are telling figures when the size of Dar es Salaam's Indian and African communities at this time were in excess of 9,000 and 20,000, respectively, while European inhabitants numbered under 1,400.³⁸ Judging by contemporary accounts, the streets of Uhindini were abounding in that class of African deemed by officials to represent a threat to the colonial order. However, diverse legislation against the 'detribalised native' appeared to be only applied there with great irregularity. '[T]he government is clearing vast areas of the territory of Tsetse,' complained a 1932 *Tanganyika Herald* editorial on the prevalence of crime against Indians and the lack of police protection, 'why can't it clear an area of one square mile of criminals?'³⁹ There was a dearth of stations and of patrols in Uhindini. In 1931, the editor of the *Tanganyika Opinion* complained that police patrols were 'so ingeniously regulated that only the [European] shore area may enjoy the fullest security... The stretches of town which are inhabited by the less fortunate community, the Indians, may search in vain for an *askari* at night'.⁴⁰ Shortly after this a much needed post, manned by an Indian officer and two African constables, was established in the New Market area; however, the situation in Uhindini remained substantially unchanged throughout the decade. Even around New Market, after the post was established, residents complained that 'their area has been allowed to remain unpoliced and that native hooligans have again begun to harass traders'.⁴¹ In 1935 things degenerated to such a point that the *Herald* could refer to what it called a 'Native Raj' operating in the bazaar.⁴² 'The inaction and inability of the Police', the editor observed, only appeared 'to embolden the native loafer and scoundrels'.⁴³

If Uhindini was inadequately policed, the police presence in Zone III was so thin as to be almost non-existent. According to the 1924 report, beats were restricted to the European and commercial areas, although it is likely that patrols would have been introduced to the main African centre of Kariakoo before the end of the decade. Nevertheless, in 1930 the growth of the Ilala suburb, already occupied by 1,600 Africans, had not been accompanied by the extension of policing there. Dar es Salaam's District Commissioner stressed the urgent need for a police post.⁴⁴ Three years later, when patrols were finally extended to Ilala, the *Herald* reported that up to then: 'In consequence of the lack of public lighting at this native location, and the absence of police supervision, native residents of the town were being seriously molested'.⁴⁵ Even with a night-time police presence from 1933, Ilala purportedly continued to be used as a daytime retreat by 'undesirables'.⁴⁶

That non-European areas were so thinly policed represented not just a failure to enforce colonial order, but also the recognition by the administration that this order was unattainable with the resources at its disposal. The Dar es Salaam force was understaffed, and hence incapable of providing either the protection against crime demanded by its inhabitants, or the systematic

enforcement of legislation aimed at asserting comprehensive colonial control of the town and its diverse communities. Indeed, on at least one occasion—for a few months in 1931—the police were 'so severely taxed' they needed assistance from units of the King's African Rifles.⁴⁷ Under such conditions, choices had to be made regarding the neighbourhoods to be policed and over which legislation was to be enforced.

Policing the town, 1945 – 61

The years after 1945 saw the true emergence of a modern police force: one better equipped and organised, and numerically stronger. In part this resulted from the successful drive to attract educated recruits. With a growing proportion of literate officers it was possible to adopt more widely the use of certain basic techniques – such as the keeping of police notebooks and routine collection of statements – which hitherto had been neglected.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the dramatic increase in recorded crime after the war – partly down to improved detection rates – had a significant impact on central government. Increasing resources were made available to the police in an attempt to combat this trend.⁴⁹ While these may not have matched the amounts that senior officers felt were necessary, the injection of funds resulted in an unprecedented expansion in the scale and sophistication of policing.⁵⁰

Urban police stations proliferated in the final years of colonial rule. In August 1952 the Commissioner of Police complained to the Chief Secretary that there was in the town 'only one Police Station which has any claim to such a title'—the Central police station.⁵¹ By the end of the following year it had been augmented by new stations at Chang'ombe, Kilwa Road, Oyster Bay, a somewhat decrepit one at Msimbazi, and one opened late that year in 'a fine new building' at Temeke which, according to the 1953 district report (written in early 1954), was 'already proving its worth'.⁵² There were also police posts at Ilala and Kawe.⁵³ A police post at Magomeni was established in the mid-1950s (upgraded to a full station in 1961), and new buildings were built to house the Msimbazi station in 1958.⁵⁴

Complementing this proliferation of stations, a number of important innovations in policing techniques were adopted. Motorised patrols were introduced in 1952, alongside a wireless communications system that connected the patrols to each other and to the various stations. According to a 1953 report these 'van patrols... proved most useful in filling in the necessarily big gaps in foot patrols' as '[t]he sprawling development of th[e] town' produced 'large areas of varying densities of population which could not be covered by foot or bicycle'.⁵⁵ By 1955 most areas were patrolled in rotation⁵⁶ by officers in Bedford vans, Landrovers, on motorcycles and bicycles, and on foot. Apprehension of criminals was facilitated from April 1957 by the introduction of dog patrols. By 1958 all four urban police divisions were subject to dog patrols during the day and more especially at night. They had an immediate impact. '[T]hroughout the district', the town's CID chief noted with satisfaction, 'where dogs have patrolled no offences have been reported'.⁵⁷

Burglaries and break-ins in Oyster Bay were found to rise on the dogs' days off.⁵⁸ Such an effect was understandable. On their introduction in 1957 the Commissioner of Police had 'reassured' the public that police dogs would 'only attack human beings when commanded to do so... and only savage a person if he struggles'.⁵⁹

In addition to such preventive measures, more pro-active methods also came to be favoured. Undercover operations were organised, aimed at the apprehension of Dar es Salaam's petty criminals. One European officer described how he celebrated the *Ramadhan* festival in 1953 by 'getting into my oldest clothes, stopping shaving to look as scruffy as possible and mingling with the crowds to knobble pick-pockets, cycle thieves and people stealing from vehicles'.⁶⁰ He was assisted by an inspector and six other men 'working the same racket'. Five bicycle thieves were arrested, and two men stealing from cars. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of policing in the 1950s, though, was the escalation in campaigns against urban 'undesirables', aimed at removing jobless individuals who were considered to be at risk of joining the capital's criminal classes.⁶¹ By the late-1950s police raids were responsible for the forced removal of up to 290 Africans per month from the town.⁶² In addition a special *wahuni* (hooligans/loafers) section, consisting of 'a squad of the more energetic constables', 'was given the task of apprehending loiterers, unlicensed hawkers and the "crafty" type of "spiv", who is generally too cunning to be caught in a normal raid'.⁶³

Dar es Salaam's district administration was increasingly called upon to play a supportive role. From at least 1954 town headmen and elders were incorporated into 'check teams' for the regular campaigns against undesirables.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, close cooperation between the police and European district officials was central to the success of the campaigns against *wahuni*, and more generally in maintaining urban order.⁶⁵ C.C. Harris, District Commissioner in the mid-1950s, found himself 'needing to pay ever more frequent visits to the office of the Police Special Branch, the officers of which were invaluable in helping me to assess and evaluate, as well as acquire... vital information about matters of possible political discontent'.⁶⁶ Greater civilian co-operation was also encouraged. The principal form this took was in the promotion of a system of 'special constables'. Special constables had been used in an auxiliary policing role from the 1930s, however, their contribution was negligible.⁶⁷ In 1951, the decision was taken to re-establish 'the presence of a trained body of voluntary police... a permanent reserve of strength'.⁶⁸ By June 1952, after Dar es Salaam was organised into four constabulary ward divisions (two European wards [Kurasini and Oyster Bay] and two Indian [Uhindini and Upanga/Kisutu]), the special force numbered 263 European and Indian volunteers.⁶⁹ The following year, police officers stressed the need for 'many more "specials"'.⁷⁰ Such was this need that by early 1955, in 'another effort to resuscitate the Special Constable organization', Africans were encouraged to volunteer.⁷¹ Three years later they formed the backbone of the organization, providing 145 out of a total of 228 specials.⁷²

Crime prevention and the maintenance of order, 1945-61

The foregoing description of the expansion and elaboration of policing in Dar es Salaam gives a somewhat deceptive impression of the Tanganyikan capital as a place where the police played a more decisive role in the prevention of crime and in upholding colonial authority than was actually the case. In fact, Dar es Salaam remained a minimally policed town, in which an imposed colonial order was never as pervasive or robust as police and administrative officers, or for that matter European and, to a lesser degree, Indian residents and an African elite, hoped it would be.⁷³

One major problem was the need to operate over an ever-increasing area. Substantial new residential communities emerged in the late-1940s and 1950s stretching from Temeke in the south to Oyster Bay in the north and Magomeni in the west. The growth of the capital prevented the police from providing adequate protection or control over its expanding population, itself a further complicating factor. In 1952, the Commissioner of Police complained that at night less than one policeman per square mile was available to patrol the 32 square miles covered by the town.⁷⁴ ‘The establishment of personnel in respect of Dar es Salaam is totally inadequate’, echoed the Assistant Commissioner two years later, ‘[b]eats are far too large and until such time as more personnel become available they cannot be shortened’.⁷⁵ The effectiveness of such overstretched patrols was severely curtailed: ‘the would-be thief has ample opportunity to fulfil his mission, whilst the disinterested constable is aided in evading periodical inspection’.⁷⁶

This was the position in the areas lucky enough to receive regular police patrols. It was often some time before patrols were extended to new residential areas. For example, in December 1952, when almost 5,000 people were living in the area, Temeke Ward Council complained of a lack of patrols.⁷⁷ It was the African areas in particular that suffered. According to a 1952 article in the *Standard*, the police admitted that ‘[f]ull patrols are sent out regularly only in the commercial area and Oyster Bay [a predominantly European suburb]—where live the more vocal sections of the population’. As a consequence, the paper noted, ‘[t]here are few Africans who, if they have not themselves had a burglary, do not know of friends or relatives who have lost their property’.⁷⁸ ‘Instead of drastic measures for the safety of the public’, wrote one correspondent in 1950, ‘all we get... is the advice to ‘keep to the roads’ and “walk in pairs”’:

[R]esidents of major streets like the New and Livingstone Streets and the minor ones like Udohe, Pemba, Narungone and Mchikichi, will assure that these are certainly not the streets favoured by the Police, though it would appear from daily occurrences of robbery etc. that these streets deserve at least as much attention as Main and Acacia Avenues [the principal European shopping area], if not more. Majority [sic] of the people living in or around these forsaken streets still have to teach children what a policeman looks like.⁷⁹

Certain parts of town were considered off limits by patrolling policemen.

Minutes from a 1948 meeting of the Ilala Ward Council record the complaint that 'all one side of Ilala is so dark that even the Police won't walk there at night'.⁸⁰ Similarly, in a secretariat minute from 1950 it is noted that 'even the police themselves dislike having to patrol' Magomeni, Keko and Makaburi.⁸¹

Despite being allocated substantially more resources in the last fifteen years of colonial rule, after 1945 senior officers began to voice serious anxieties about their ability to satisfactorily tackle crime.⁸² Post-war expansion of the police and the growing sophistication of policing techniques led to a dramatic increase in the extent of crime recorded in official statistics, and to a heightened awareness of criminal activity. As a result, after 1945 public concerns about crime and the inability of the police to deal with it satisfactorily were matched by those of senior officers. In 1952, when submitting a five year plan, the Commissioner of Police invoked a 1949 report from neighbouring Uganda:

Expansion of the Police, both in equipment and personnel has not kept pace with the development 'drive' and the political consciousness which it engenders, and has not been adequate in the view of the growth of the population due to social service and the inevitable increase in crime following the scramble for wealth.⁸³

Two years earlier three officers and nineteen constables were wounded in a serious outbreak of disorder that accompanied a dockers' strike in Dar es Salaam. This was only suppressed with the assistance of a detachment of King's African Rifles and a platoon from a navy frigate in port at the time.⁸⁴ Admittedly, rioting such as this was extraordinary. However, senior policemen were equally concerned by their inability to combat everyday crime. 'Police in Dar es Salaam', the Commissioner warned the Chief Secretary, 'are inadequate in numbers, insufficiently equipped and badly accommodated for the task before them... It is difficult to believe that a large capital town, such as Dar es Salaam, has to be policed in the year 1952, under such drawbacks'.⁸⁵

Communities tended to suffer several years of high crime rates before a police post or station was finally established in their vicinity. As late as 1950 Kariakoo still lacked such a facility. In February that year the editor of the *Tanganyika Opinion* stressed the urgent 'need for a permanent Police *chowki* [station] in this area and vigilant police patrols' in order 'to stem [a] rising tide of loot and thuggery'.⁸⁶ Three years later, the police failed to prevent an outbreak of burglaries and assaults in the growing African location of Magomeni. Despite the area containing 5-10,000 inhabitants, and being singled out for 'urgent consideration' by the Assistant Commissioner, a police post had yet to be built there.⁸⁷ Msimbazi police division in the mid-1950s operated from 'an apology of a building', severely undermining its effectiveness. According to a 1954 report 'the existing hovels at Msimbazi and Ilala almost preclude any efficient action being taken'. 'These two hovels received 1,770 reports (Penal Code and Local Laws) during the first nine months of the year', yet were not 'equipped to deal with a quarter of this number'. Six months later the Assistant Commissioner voiced his dissatisfaction at the negligence of central government in connection with Msimbazi:

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any further delay in the erection of a police station in this densely populated Native Quarter... can and might well have serious consequences... the day to day crime cannot be effectively handled with the means at my disposal. The public is not getting the service to which it is entitled and I... have not got the proper facilities to combat crime in the Native Quarter... or to ensure the proper administration of Msimbazi Division.⁸⁸

The police were allocated greater resources in the final years of colonial rule than at any time previously. However, it was never enough. In 1958, the Commissioner observed '[t]he greatest difficulty faced was that of finance'.⁸⁹ With growing demands placed upon them arising from the unique demands of the urban environment, rapidly escalating crime rates, and African nationalist agitation, senior officers became increasingly frustrated by the inadequate resources at their disposal. In 1953 it was calculated that the ratio of Tanganyikan police to population worked out at just one per 2,216 people (and per 81 square miles).⁹⁰ By 1960 this was only slightly reduced to 1:1,800.⁹¹ In Dar es Salaam itself, the ratio at the start of the 1950s was a more respectable 1:202, but declined to around 1:250 in 1960. On the verge of independence, in 1961, it was an African politician, the Minister for Home Affairs in the 'responsible' government, G.C. Kahama, who complained that Tanganyika was 'the lowest policed country in the world'.⁹²

Police behaviour and public relations

The Tanganyikan force was neither the most disciplined nor the best behaved of policing bodies. European officers repeatedly bemoaned the necessity for frequent checks on their subordinates.⁹³ Even after the adoption of a new recruitment policy in the late-1940s, which resulted in the induction of better-educated African recruits, the position appears to have been substantially unchanged. The Assistant Commissioner in 1953 wrote that '[a] constant battle is... being waged by Officers and Senior Inspectors in checking men on their duties and trying to instil in them a far greater sense of duty'.⁹⁴ The Police Note Book of Assistant Superintendent Young for 1952/3 records his frequent discovery – in the course of checking on night patrols – of constables asleep on duty or absent altogether. At a kit inspection parade on 21st January 1953, only three out of sixteen constables turned up on time and six failed to turn up at all.⁹⁵ Such ill-discipline must have had serious repercussions for the effectiveness of policing in Dar es Salaam.

Of greater consequence than ill-discipline, however, was abuse of position. In the early years of British rule it was not uncommon for policemen to take advantage of their standing as colonial agents. In 1921—when the Commissioner observed that 'acts of oppression at the hands of native policemen are becoming distinctly less frequent'—124 officers were dismissed for 'repeated breach of the Regulations'.⁹⁶ Over the next four years 425 officers were awarded corporal punishment for misconduct. When the Colonial Office suggested abolishing corporal punishment to discipline policemen, Acting Governor Jardine pointed out the 'immediate fruits' of such a move

'would be a recrudescence of those serious offences against the rights of the civil population to which the African of Tanganyika, when clothed with a little authority and away from immediate supervision, is peculiarly liable'.⁹⁷ From surviving evidence in other parts of Tanganyika, police corruption appears to have been common.⁹⁸ Among Dar es Salaam's African community such conduct may have met with broad acceptance, or just mild disapproval. Bribery could, after all, offer the opportunity of circumventing inconvenient colonial laws and bureaucratic procedure.⁹⁹

Of greater concern to the African public than police corruption was their tendency towards strong-arm tactics. An article by Methusela Majanja, a constable based in Mbeya, written—to the consternation of his superiors—for the White Fathers' newsletter *Lumuli*, indicates police attitudes towards the use of force. According to Majanja:

a criminal may be beaten for the following reasons:- The first is that when a criminal runs away after being caught, a policeman is allowed to beat such a person when he is caught the second time. Secondly, if a thief is arrested and gives back a few of the goods he has stolen and hides the rest, or refuses to mention his fellow thieves, a policeman is allowed to use any means by which the thief may be forced to give back the rest of the goods or mention his fellow thieves.¹⁰⁰

Among the lower ranks at least, force seems to have been an accepted police tactic. Long time resident of Dar es Salaam, Hamisi Akida, recollected the colonial police as 'rather physical-minded'. 'The people', he said 'were very much trying to be away from the police. The reason is, you can talk or you can do something and then police may take it seriously and take you away... The police in the colonial period were frightful'.¹⁰¹ Indeed, the Dar es Salaam constabulary appear to have been perceived of as something of an occupying force. To J.A.K. Leslie, who conducted a social survey of the town in the late-1950s, 'they were the antithesis of the 'bobby on the beat' ...definitely *persona non grata*'.¹⁰² Randal Sadleir, government Public Relations Officer in Dar es Salaam in the late-1950s, recalled: 'At that time, the police were nicknamed *ndugu mchana* (brothers by day) because they were believed to be enemies at night, when it was thought they went around arresting people anonymously'.¹⁰³

Living apart from the African community, in the Police Lines, policemen had precious little contact with the public outside their professional duties. Oral informants recalled:

The police were people who demanded respect. They didn't mix much with the people, remaining in their quarters. You only saw them in uniform, on patrol, there was no interaction with locals—they never rented houses with locals—and it could be difficult for them to get information. An incident might occur somewhere but it could take time for the police to realise. They were too distant from the people.¹⁰⁴

The situation was exacerbated by the fact that so many came from ethnic groups distant from the majority urban population who in turn seemed more likely to obstruct than assist them in their duties. The District Commissioner

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in 1946 noted 'a disturbing tendency for the African public to come to the aid of persons arrested by the police rather than to help in the preservation of law and order'.¹⁰⁵ In the 1950s, police-public relations deteriorated significantly. This was no doubt connected with their role in upholding colonial authority at a time of rising nationalist feeling. It may just as plausibly be explained, though, by the fact that with the extension of patrols, and the growing frequency of *wahuni* raids, public contact with the police increased and their ability to intervene in the affairs of the African community was enhanced.

Examples of this growing lack of cooperation are manifold. In May 1952 the *Standard* reported that '[a]ccording to the police a crowd of at least 200 onlookers made no effort to intervene' when an *askari* struggled to apprehend a gang of six who had stolen property from a house on Sikukuu Street. '[W]hile the crowd remained inactive the six Africans broke loose from the fight and ran off, leaving the *askari* lying in a pool of his own blood'.¹⁰⁶ Five years later the same paper recorded:

a disturbing incident... which necessitated drastic action... against a crowd estimated at close on five hundred who, it is alleged, went wild, defied the Police when they attempted to arrest one or more individuals involved in a disturbance near an Indian *duka*, and in their defiance threw stones at the Police who were eventually compelled to disperse the crowd with a baton charge and the use of smoke grenades.¹⁰⁷

The following year it was pointed out the police 'found increasing difficulty in obtaining assistance from the public to maintain law and order'.¹⁰⁸ It was in 1959, however, when—in the words of the Provincial Commissioner—'[t]he increasing disrespect for the Police Force... reached a climax'.¹⁰⁹ On 16th February a major riot occurred in the large African suburb of Buguruni as a result of which a constable was killed and a patrol car destroyed. While the immediate cause of the incident stemmed from local superstitions about individuals being abducted and having their blood extracted—*mumiani*—it reflected the level of tension between the police and the general public in the late-colonial period. Although a crowd of about 200 participated in the disorder, the police could only obtain enough evidence to charge four suspects of rioting (Jim Brennan talks of '[t]he complete lack of assistance offered by those in Buguruni to the police'¹¹⁰), and in its frustration Government resorted to imposing a £3,000 communal fine on Buguruni residents. These events appear indicative of a town-wide trend. The public temper had deteriorated to such an extent that a Magistrate complained 'that almost every day people appeared before the court charged with assaults on the police'.¹¹¹ One such incident in March 1959 was captured by the *Standard*:

Saidi Salum of Magomeni was stated to have attacked a police constable after trying to steal a roll of cloth from a shop. He seized the constable by the throat and threw him to the ground, while a crowd of about one hundred told him to find a knife and cut the constable's throat.¹¹²

'Africans in general', noted a correspondent to the *Standard*, 'for reasons best



Fig. 5.1 African policemen in Dar es Salaam in 1958 overlooking a crowd that had gathered outside the Dar es Salaam courthouse where TANU leader, Julius Nyerere, was being prosecuted for libel.

Source: Drum (reproduced in Tanzania: The story of Julius Nyerere, *Mkuki na Nyota, Dar es Salaam*, & Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1998).

I am grateful to Bailey's African History Archives for granting me permission to reproduce this photograph.

known to themselves have indicated feelings amounting almost to contempt for the police'.¹¹³

Senior police officers were dismayed by such hostility. Attempts were made both to improve relations with the African public and to enlist their support in the fight against crime, with little apparent success. From the early-1950s the police gave broadcasts over government radio several times a month, and articles on combating crime were published in the government (Swahili) press.¹¹⁴ By 1953 the 'broadcast talks' were organised by an African Inspector. These were reported 'as being very popular' and it was hoped 'the sought after cooperation of the public will soon start to show itself'.¹¹⁵ The alleged popularity of such broadcasts aside, however, hopes of increased cooperation remained frustrated. Indeed, far from experiencing an improvement in their public relations, the position of the police, as we have seen, actually deteriorated as the decade progressed. Three years later the Provincial Commissioner noted that whilst outside of Dar es Salaam 'co-operation of the public at large with the police is improving', in the capital itself it was 'unfortunately otherwise'. He ascribed this failure to cooperate to a 'lack of sufficiently close

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administration'.¹¹⁶ More plausible causes, though, would have to include rising nationalist agitation and the social and residential separation of the constabulary from the larger community.¹¹⁷

Although there was little the colonial rulers could do about the former (beyond ceding power), the unrepresentative nature of the local constabulary could have been addressed. It was some time, however, before the issue was raised. The reluctance of senior officials to consider the reorganization of the force may be explained by their conclusion that at a time of growing nationalist sentiment—particularly in Dar es Salaam—the need for a 'detached' constabulary was more necessary than ever. By the end of the decade, though, the idea that the difficult relationship between the police and the public may have had something to do with the constabulary's lack of social integration had at last begun to suggest itself to officials. In an interview with the *Standard* in 1959, the Commissioner of Police acknowledged that policemen in Dar es Salaam 'tended to be strangers and could not hope to know people on their beats in the way they should'.¹¹⁸ C.C. Harris, District Commissioner in the mid-1950s, took such ideas to their logical conclusion:

I believe that two revolutionary changes of policy are necessary: they must accept the principle of using as many police as possible in their home areas and, wherever possible, at least a proportion... must live and lead normal lives amongst the public, not in Police Lines. ... [This] is my considered opinion after a number of years in Dar es Salaam witnessing the annoyance of the population at being policed by Jaluo [plural of Luo] (who in language and acceptability to the public rank below expatriate officers) and the remarkable results achieved in the early days of Magomeni by the posting there of one elderly local sergeant who actually lived amongst the people.¹¹⁹

The large intake of recruits from previously under-represented ethnic groups which took place from 1959 onwards is perhaps a sign that this issue was finally addressed (see above). Even so, in 1961 the lack of police drawn from those groups who predominated in Dar es Salaam remained striking, with only Zaramo (30 out of a total force strength of 6,143) and Manyema (49) having more than twenty five representatives.¹²⁰

Nevertheless, a concerted effort was made to improve the force's public relations. In April 1959 a 'new look' police was announced by Commissioner Wilson 'in which the constable on the beat in towns will be regarded as a friend by all those who live in the neighbourhood'.¹²¹ Alongside increased cooperation, Wilson pleaded for greater understanding of the police role:

We want the public to realise that the policeman does not become their enemy because he puts on a uniform. The man-in-the-street ought to know that *practically all* the members of the Force are as much Tanganyikans as he himself is. [Emphasis added]...What people tend to forget is that the police are appointed to enforce the law of the country and every police officer is therefore a servant of the law. The police do not make these laws – they only enforce them.

As part of an attempt 'at bringing the police nearer the people' a Police

Information Centre was opened on Msimbazi Street, Kariakoo, in July 1959.¹²² Its role was 'to provide as much information as possible about the work of the police, and in turn enable the police to gain a closer understanding of the problems facing the public'.¹²³ In his annual report, the Provincial Commissioner noted what he called the Police Public Relations Office had 'proved popular', but substantially more was required than such cosmetic initiatives if the soured relations were to be significantly improved.

The relationship between the constabulary and the African community in the 1950s was seriously undermined by their position as the guardians of colonial authority. At the many rallies organised in the capital by TANU, police and the public met each other in a context of confrontation. African policemen, armed with batons and unaccustomed to such large and apparently hostile gatherings, may not have handled the situation with the greatest sensitivity, although by mid-1958 Harris noticed 'a quite remarkable improvement by the individual policemen in the handling of crowds over the last few months'.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the police and their tactics became the focus of criticism by TANU politicians.¹²⁵ When the announcement that the police vote was to be increased in 1959 – in order that Commissioner Wilson's 'new look' police could be created – the TANU publicity secretary rubbished the move:

to spend £1,708,700 of our meagre financial resources on pistols, batons, etc., in a country of mud houses where a dynamic economic programme is badly needed is to invite criticism from investors both here and abroad.

However, faced with a loss of authority as a result of the nationalist challenge, ever escalating crime rates which had seen property offences increase by almost fifty percent in the previous three years, alongside non-African pressure for 'an efficient police force... to protect their life, honour and property against the forces of lawlessness' (in the words of one correspondent to the *Standard*¹²⁶), central government felt compelled to devote more resources to policing.¹²⁷

In the event, after the adoption of responsible government, the views of TANU politicians were moderated by their own anxieties about potential disorder. The party line became much more supportive, as articulated by the Minister for Home Affairs at the senior Police Officers' Conference in January 1961:

I have stressed from time to time the necessity for the Police to be the friends of the people.... I realise that there is another side to this question and that the Police have frequently been assaulted in the execution of their duties ... [W]hen I am speaking to the TANU Seminar later on this morning I will ask for their help and co-operation in persuading the people that such incidents are most undesirable and should be avoided. I consider that the change in uniform which is due to take place in the middle of this year will have a beneficial effect as the people will come to realise that the Police are the Police of a people's government and that they exist for their protection and not as their enemies.¹²⁸

Later the same year, after Nyerere opened the first East African Police Staff College, he deemed the event 'a landmark'. 'The foundation of good

government rests on the maintenance of law and order', the future premier remarked, 'which can only be achieved by an efficient and contented police force'.¹²⁹ Like their colonial predecessors, once in power Tanganyika's new African rulers quickly recognised the need for a coercive force to exert some control over what officials all too often perceived as an unruly urban populace.

Conclusion

The Dar es Salaam police provide useful insights into the paradoxical nature of the colonial state; its coercive might and yet, in the end, its relative impotence. In the maintenance of order, force was all too often employed by the police, as is evident from their unsavoury reputation among urban residents. This reached its peak in their prominent role in the round-ups and repatriations of *wahumi* in the 1950s. However, the degree of force required to exert colonial control escalated as the town grew. *Wahumi* raids represented a forlorn attempt to address the administration's inability to cope with the consequences of rapid urban growth. Unlicensed hawkers, illegal brewers, petty criminals and jobless Africans picked up in the course of the raids formed just a small proportion of their kind present in the town in contravention of diverse legislation. Their presence testified to the failure of both the urban administration *and* the police to assert colonial order in the Tanganyikan capital. British officials, through allocating increased resources to urban policing after World War Two, attempted to subject the urban population to closer control. However, perhaps the most significant impact of the greater police presence in the closing years of colonial rule was the alienation of Dar es Salaam's African community, which contributed to a decline in the legitimacy of both the British administration and its police force. A great irony of the so-called 'second colonial occupation'¹³⁰ was that rather than acting as a re-assertion of the colonial state, it actually served to hasten colonialism's demise.

Nevertheless, the colonial organization of a modern police force and its role in the enforcement of urban order was to have a significant post-colonial legacy. Maintaining a colonial policy which envisaged urban citizenship extending only to those who fulfilled certain criteria, notably formal employment, the TANU administration deployed the police as their principal enforcers. Although it is of course not unusual in this regard, the role of the police in post-colonial Dar es Salaam continued to reflect the interests of the urban administration and the more affluent members of what remained a socio-economically stratified town. The wealthy northern suburbs, known both before and after independence as Uzunguni, in spite of an influx of more affluent African and Indian residents, continued to receive a disproportionate amount of police resources. Meanwhile, the urban poor were targeted in a post-colonial variant of the *wahumi* raids.¹³¹ Writing on East Africa as a whole, but with application to Dar es Salaam, R.E.S. Tanner observed in 1970 that 'in disregard of any possible effects on their public relations, the police often carry out drives in pursuit of the minor petty criminals

connected with licenses, tax, transport permits and immigration'. 'Police forces in America and Europe', he observed, 'would hesitate to antagonise the public to this extent except under the gravest circumstances related to murder or serious theft'.¹³² Thirty years on the position was largely unchanged, the police acting as the main agents in enforcing an urban order which marginalises and antagonises large sections of the city's population.¹³³ For many residents of the contemporary city, subject to police harassment, violence or corruption, the Dar es Salaam force remains an institution more feared than respected.

Notes

* This chapter is a slightly amended version of the following article: Andrew Burton, "'Brothers by day': colonial policing in Dar es Salaam under British rule, 1919-1961", *Urban History* 30:1 (2003), pp. 63-91. I am grateful to Cambridge University Press for permission to reproduce it; and to David Anderson, David Killingray and Andrew Roberts for their comments on earlier versions.

¹ See Andrew Burton, 'Adjutants, agents, intermediaries: the Native Administration in Dar es Salaam township, 1919-1961' in *idem.*, *The Urban Experience in Eastern Africa, c.1850-2000* (Nairobi, 2002), pp. 98-118.

² See *idem.*, *African Underclass: Urbanization, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam* (Oxford, 2005).

³ This is not to say that urban Africans were antipathetic to crime control measures. In precolonial Tanzanian societies deterrents against property crime were often strikingly harsh, including enslavement, amputation and beheading. See, e.g., T.O. Beidelman, *The Matrilineal Peoples of Eastern Tanzania* (London, 1967), pp. 22, 32, 62. For the ambivalence of African attitudes towards property crime in a town characterised by fundamental colonial inequalities, see Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 117-23.

⁴ For the wider territory, see 1921 Police Annual Report; and for Dar es Salaam, 1919-20 District Annual Report (hereafter DAR), Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) 1733/1. In the Uhindi bazaar (the Indian commercial area), in 1918, the situation had degenerated to such an extent that at one point a serious outbreak of looting had taken place, the only surviving reference to which is in a *Tanganyika Herald* editorial dated 4th June 1932.

⁵ J.F.R. Hill, and J.P. Moffett, *Tanganyika: a review of its resources and their development*, (Dsm, 1955), p. 108.

⁶ 1921 Annual Report of the Police Department (hereafter PAR). The 1921 annual report can be found The U. K. National Archive (Public Records Office), Kew, Colonial Office (hereafter CO) 691/56; annual reports for 1922-61 are located in CO 736.

⁷ In 1948 there were just 55 men in the force drawing an allowance for knowledge of English; two years later there were 300. *Tanganyika Standard* (hereafter TS), 15th April 1950.

⁸ Tanganyika Police Terms of Service, 1949, TNA 31481.

⁹ TS, 15th April 1950.

¹⁰ By this time the statistics were not broken down by race (although, interestingly, the tribal breakdown remained). In 1957, the last year in which there was a separate entry for non-Africans, there were 531 European and Asian policemen out of a total force strength of 4,828.

¹¹ PARs 1924-38; and TNA 61/24.

¹² For example, as late as 1954 there were 126 European, 8 Asian, and no African gazetted officers.

¹³ The following discussion utilises information from police reports which reflected European confidence in ascribing Africans discrete tribal identities. In fact African ethnicity – especially in Dar es Salaam – was probably relatively permeable. Here, tribal categorizations are employed for the insights offered on the geographical origins of policemen, which are significant in the context of growing tension between local citizenry and police 'outsiders' in Dar es Salaam.

¹⁴ Throughout the British Empire it was apparently common for peripheral groups to provide a large proportion of police recruits. Killingray, 'Maintenance' p. 425.

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¹⁵ PARs 1921-1960.

¹⁶ 1928 PAR.

¹⁷ Between 1953-1960 Nyakyusa and Ngoni numbers jumped from 144-478 and 96-302 (though the latter were also recruited from Nyasaland). In addition, seven more groups joined those mentioned in having more than 100 representatives: Haya, Fipa, Makua, Chagga, Digo, Zigua, and Hehe. By contrast, between 1959 and 1960, Kuria (from western Kenya and northern Tanganyika) declined from 487 to 88.

¹⁸ See, e.g., 1921 and 1924 PARs.

¹⁹ Anticipating the complaints of Dar es Salaam residents, the 1924 police report observed that '[b]eing Pagans, they have little influence with the Mahomedan element in the larger towns'.

²⁰ 'Kavirondo' was a blanket term frequently used in colonial East Africa to refer to Africans originating from Nyanza Province in Kenya.

²¹ Similar policies elsewhere in Africa had the same results. See Killingray, 'Maintenance', pp. 423-4.

²² The Zaramo, who comprised almost 40 percent of the population, had just four representatives out of a total of 478 African policemen in the Coastal division. Figures derived from Leslie's 1956 survey appendices (SOAS archive) and Quarterly Police Report (hereafter QPR), 1st Oct.-31st Dec. 1955. QPRs from 1953-8 can be found in TNA 90/1011/5.

²³ Mohamed Said, *The Life and Times of Abdulkahid Sykes (1924-1968): The untold story of the Muslim struggle against British colonialism* (London, 1998), p. 76.

²⁴ 1924 PAR.

²⁵ Twining to Sir Geoffrey Colby, Zomba, Nov.(?) 1949, TNA 31481.

²⁶ See *Dar es Salaam Times* (hereafter *DT*), 9th June 1920, for early police successes.

²⁷ 1926 PAR.

²⁸ 1927 PAR.

²⁹ 1930 PAR.

³⁰ 1921 PAR.

³¹ 1926 PAR.

³² 1921 PAR.

³³ 1934 PAR.

³⁴ *DT*, 30th Nov. 1920.

³⁵ *DT*, 14th Jan. 1920.

³⁶ E.g., the eccentric pamphlet published by 'Vigilantes' in 1930, Rhodes House, Oxford University (hereafter RH) Mss.af.s.1072.

³⁷ *Tanganyika Herald* (hereafter *TH*), 30th Nov. 1935.

³⁸ The 1931 census put the figures at: African, 23,000; Indian, 9,000; European, 1330. See Burton, *African Underclass*, App. 1.

³⁹ *TH*, 21st May 1932.

⁴⁰ *Tanganyika Opinion* (hereafter *TO*), 7th Aug. 1931.

⁴¹ *TH*, 9th Sept. 1939.

⁴² *TH*, 6th April 1935.

⁴³ *TH*, 23rd March 1935.

⁴⁴ 1930 DAR, p. 9.

⁴⁵ *TH*, 30th Sept. 1933.

⁴⁶ 1934 Report on Township affairs, TNA 61/625.

⁴⁷ Commissioner of Police (hereafter CP) to Chief Secretary (hereafter CS), 17th August 1931, TNA 20219.

⁴⁸ *TS*, 15th April 1950.

⁴⁹ See Figure 1 in Burton, 'Brothers'.

⁵⁰ With rapid post-war urbanization, the ratio of police to town dwellers actually diminished in the 1950s, until the urban force was expanded substantially towards the end of the decade. However, the force's efficiency was significantly increased after 1945 thanks to improvements in equipment and organization.

⁵¹ CP to CS, 14th August 1952, TNA 21963/Vol.II.

⁵² 1953 DAR, p. 4.

⁵³ QPR 1st Oct.-31st Dec. 1953; *TS*, 20th Sept. 1952; 1953 DAR, p.4.

⁵⁴ PARs.

⁵⁵ QPR, 1st July-30th Sept. 1953.

⁵⁶ According to the QPR, 1st Oct.-31st Dec. 1955, there were 'insufficient men to cover each beat nightly.'

⁵⁷ QPR, 1st Jan.-31st March 1958.

⁵⁸ QPR, 1st July-30th Sept. 1958.

⁵⁹ TS, 8th April 1957.

⁶⁰ R.W. Young, personal correspondence, 12th Oct. 1953, RH Mss.Afr.s.2293.

⁶¹ See Burton, *African Underclass*, chapter 12.

⁶² In the first quarter of 1958, 842 people were repatriated. QPR, 1st Jan.-31st March 1958.

⁶³ ASP Cairns' Desk diary, RH Mss.Afr.s.554 (at 15th June 1955); QPR, 1st Jan.-31st March 1955.

⁶⁴ QPR, 1st July-30th Sept. 1954.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., 1960 DAR, p. 7.

⁶⁶ Tim Harris, *Donkey's Gratitude* (Edinburgh, 1992), p. 342. The Special Branch in Dar es Salaam no doubt played an important role in the surveillance of African political activism as did corresponding departments in other British colonies. Unfortunately negligible data on its activities has survived. For evidence of their political surveillance see the reports on TANU leaders' speeches in PRO CO/822/1325.

⁶⁷ See *Kivetu*, 8th Sept. 1939; and TS, 2nd Oct. 1948.

⁶⁸ TS, 3rd March 1951.

⁶⁹ TS, 14th June 1952.

⁷⁰ TS, 4th July 1953.

⁷¹ QPR, 1st Jan.-31st March 1955.

⁷² QPR, 1st April-30th June 1958.

⁷³ For an African advocate of the police role in 'the maintenance of the Queen's peace', see Jacob Wangatha to TS 25th Feb. 1959. For elite African attitudes towards crime and policing, bemoaning increasing lawlessness and an inadequate governmental response, see M. Mkonimwe to CS, undated (1944/5?), TNA 10849; and letters from Erica Fiah and Lawi Kardi to the *Standard*, 28th June 1952, 18th June 1957.

⁷⁴ CP to CS, 14th Aug. 1952, TNA 21963/Vol.II.

⁷⁵ QPR, 1st April-30th June 1954.

⁷⁶ QPR, 1st Jan.-31st March 1954.

⁷⁷ General meeting, Temeke Ward Council, 14th Dec. 1952, TNA 540/3/75A.

⁷⁸ TS, 1st March 1952.

⁷⁹ Letter from 'Unprotected', 4th Feb. 1950, TNA 20219/Vol.II.

⁸⁰ Ilala Ward Council minutes, 7th October 1948, TNA 540/3/76.

⁸¹ Min., 15th March 1950, TNA 20219/Vol.II.

⁸² In marked contrast to the inter-war period, when senior officers displayed complacency towards public complaints about urban crime and the poor police response. See correspondence in TNA 21963.

⁸³ CP to CS, 12th June 1952, TNA 42360. The quote is from the 'Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Disturbances in Uganda during April, 1949'.

⁸⁴ For a detailed account of the riot, see Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 185-8.

⁸⁵ CP to CS, 14th Aug. 1952, TNA 21963/Vol.II.

⁸⁶ TO, 17th Feb. 1950 (extracted TNA 20219/Vol.II).

⁸⁷ MAAO to Town Clerk, 8th Sept. 1953; Aliosemwa Baraza la Watu 40, 13th Aug. 1953, TNA/540/3/75A; QPR, 1st July-30th Sept. 1953.

⁸⁸ QPRs, 1st Jan.-31st March 1954; 1st July-30th Sept. 1954; 1st Jan.-31st March 1955. 1958 PAR.

⁹⁰ 1953 figures for Uganda and Northern Rhodesia were 1:1,941 and 1:755 respectively. In 1952, Kenya's was 1:760. *Sunday News*, 8th Feb. 1955.

⁹¹ 1960 PAR.

⁹² TS, 8th Feb. 1961.

⁹³ For egs., Burton, 'Brothers', p. 83.

⁹⁴ QPR, 1st Oct.-31st Dec. 1953.

⁹⁵ ASP Young, Police Note Book, RH Mss.Afr.s.2293.

⁹⁶ 1921 PAR.

⁹⁷ Jardine to Passfield, 15th May 1931, TNA 10422.

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⁹⁸ See CP to Superintendent of Police, Northern Province, 23rd Sept. 1954, TNA 90/2009/Vol.1.

⁹⁹ In a case of misconduct in Northern Province, the Magistrate observed that 'people living around Moshi are very fond of offering bribes and if they had not taught the Police Constables to accept bribes, the temptation would not have been there.' *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Translated article and police response in TNA 90/2009/Vol.1.

¹⁰¹ Hamisi Akida interview, 28th May 1997.

¹⁰² J.A.K. Leslie interview, 7th August 1998.

¹⁰³ Randal Sadleir, *Tanzania: Journey to the Republic* (London, 1999), p. 218. According to the author Roald Dahl, who worked in Dar es Salaam for a few years from the late-1930s: 'If there was one thing in Dar es Salaam that every local was terrified of, it was the police....' Roald Dahl, *Going Solo* (Harmondsworth, 1986), p. 74.

¹⁰⁴ Interview, Mwinyimvua Sultan, Amiri Mngamili and Hassan Mbwana, Buguruni kwa Malapa, 9th July 1997. Residential separation of the police had similar consequences in other colonies; see Killingray, 'Maintenance', p. 424.

¹⁰⁵ 1947 DAR, p. 16.

¹⁰⁶ TS, 31st May 1952.

¹⁰⁷ A similar incident was also reported in Tanga. TS, 26th Sept. 1957.

¹⁰⁸ 1958 Provincial AR.

¹⁰⁹ 1959 Provincial AR.

¹¹⁰ James R. Brennan, 'Mumiani and Uhuru: Buguruni on the eve of Tanganyika's independence', ASA Conference paper, 1998, p. 12.

¹¹¹ TS, 6th March 1959.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ TS, 26th June 1959.

¹¹⁴ CS to Town Clerk, 2nd Sept. 1952, TNA 21963.

¹¹⁵ QPR, 1st July-30th Sept. 1953.

¹¹⁶ 1956 Provincial AR.

¹¹⁷ By the end of the decade the TANU Youth League was itself performing a policing role, much to the consternation of the colonial government. See James R. Brennan, 'Youth, the TANU Youth League, and managed vigilantism in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 1925-1973', *Africa* 76:2 (2006), pp. 221-46.

¹¹⁸ TS, 10th April 1959.

¹¹⁹ Miscellaneous reflections, C.C. Harris, undated (1958/1959), RH Mss.Afr.s.1157.

¹²⁰ 1961 PAR.

¹²¹ TS, 10th April 1959.

¹²² TS, 29th May 1959.

¹²³ TS, 17th July 1959, in TNA 90/2009/Vol.1.

¹²⁴ DC Harris to W.G. Popple, Central Police Station, 22th May 1958, TNA 540/27/11/A.

¹²⁵ TS, 11th Nov. 1959.

¹²⁶ TS, 26th June 1959.

¹²⁷ John Iliffe stresses political motives for the expansion in the police force: a much-needed bolstering of state capacity for an administration losing control as a result of the nationalist challenge. See his chapter 'Breaking the Chain at its Weakest Link: TANU and the Colonial Office', in Gregory Maddox and James Giblin, *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 168-97.

¹²⁸ Speech by Mr. Kahama at Senior Police Officer's Conference, 23rd Jan. 1961, RH Mss.Afr.s.937.

¹²⁹ TS, 2nd Aug. 1961.

¹³⁰ As the proliferation of colonial officials and initiatives after the Second World War was termed by David A. Low and John Lonsdale, 'Introduction: Towards the New Order, 1945-63', in D.A. Low & Alison Smith, *Oxford History of East Africa Vol. III* (London, 1976), pp. 1-63.

¹³¹ See Burton, 'Haven'.

¹³² R.E.S. Tanner, *Three Studies in East African Criminology* (Uppsala, 1970), p. 22.

¹³³ For examples of police harassment of urban youth and petty traders in contemporary Dar es Salaam, see Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 279-80.

Chapter Six

*Unpretentious Bars: Municipal monopoly and independent drinking in colonial Dar es Salaam**

Justin Willis

In 1935, the *Tanganyika Standard* ran an article which celebrated the opening of a new drinking establishment in Dar es Salaam - though the almost exclusively European readership of that newspaper would most certainly not have considered themselves potential customers:

A visit there discovers a large square, some 30 yards by 50 yards, around each side of which are erected seven or eight huts of rural style, unpretentious kiosks, and it is there that natives can take their ease while *pombe* is supplied to them from six unpretentious bars.

Each bar is presided over by a 'bar-maid' and there are customers who prefer to sip their drinks while leaning at the bar... For others who will take their ease in the kiosks there are African hebes¹ up-to-date who act as cup-bearers.....

Between serving customers the bar-maids may recline luxuriously in deck-chairs, but with the appearance of a new client they are not long in drawing off a 'glass' of foaming native ale. The 'glass' is of aluminium and runs 14 to the gallon, a little over half-a-pint. Ten cents procures this boon to the visitor.²

Fulsome as it was, the article did not explain the background to the opening of this new 'native beer market'. Assiduous readers of the *Standard* would have learned from earlier issues that after some debate, and not a little protest from Africans, the Township Authority had turned the previous beer market into a monopoly establishment. This was the only place in Dar es Salaam township where intoxicating beverages might legally be sold to Africans; all the *pombe*, or 'native liquor', sold there was now produced by Tanganyika Breweries Limited, who had the sole legal right to make such liquor in the township; and the women who worked there were all employees of the Township.

The enthusiasm of the *Standard's* reporter was not shared by the African

drinking public. Within a few months, it was apparent that drinkers were shunning the beer market, and when the contract to supply beer to the market came up for renewal, after a year, Tanganyika Breweries declined to bid for it again, as the venture had proved unprofitable. They preferred to concentrate on their core business, which was producing bottled beer - a beverage forbidden to Africans - for European and Asian customers. With the withdrawal of the Breweries, the monopoly beer market became unsustainable, as the Township had no drink to sell, and the sale of liquor to Africans in Dar es Salaam reverted to the system which had prevailed in the years before 1934, with a number of independent African women brewers making and selling their own *pombe* in the market, and paying a licence fee to the government for the right to do so.

There is something irresistible about this story of a colonial scheme going awry, and it has already attracted academic attention. Marjorie Mbilinyi has argued that the failure of the monopoly scheme was the result of a politically-inspired boycott, with African drinkers rallying to the support of the women brewers who had been displaced by Tanganyika Breweries.³ She has also located the whole monopoly scheme in the context of a consistent colonial policy to ensure a cheap and circulating supply of male migrant labour by keeping women out of towns; the very existence of the women brewers threatened this, and so the colonial state sought to deprive them of their income. Her analysis of the policy, and of its failure, fits squarely into what Mager has called the 'control-resistance' model of academic work on drink in colonial Africa, which focuses on state attempts to control drink and the way that these provided a focus for a popular consciousness of resistance which coincidentally defended both the economic autonomy of women and the drinking culture of men.⁴ The policies of the South African state, and resistance to these, have figured largely in this literature, and the municipal monopoly beerhall has served as symbolic centrepiece of the controlling ambitions of the state.⁵ First created in Durban, where they funded 'a singularly repressive system of urban control', including the physical institutions of a developing migrant-labour system, South Africa's beerhalls were very visible structures of control.⁶ They consistently provided a target for popular action intended to challenge not only the control of drinking but the policies of the state more generally.⁷

The temptation to analyse events in Dar es Salaam in terms of the same 'control-resistance' model is a strong one; and it is increased by the way that, as this paper will show, some actors in Tanganyika at the time drew explicit inspiration from the South African example. But this article will question both the implication of a clear colonial agenda and the analysis of a solidary response and an economic victory for women brewers. It will suggest that there was no clear commitment to drive women out of Dar es Salaam's economy; that there is no evidence of a politically-inspired boycott; and that, far from being part of a coherent strategy, British policies towards African drinking in Dar es Salaam in the inter-war years revealed the characteristically uncertain course of a colonial state which was swayed by multiple, and often contrary, winds of opinion and anxiety, blowing from many different quarters.

Drinking in Tanganyika

British policy on liquor in Tanganyika was quite distinct from policy in South Africa, and different even to that in neighbouring Kenya. In South Africa, the control and supply of labour was central to the making of policy, and African drinking of any kind was seen as a potential threat to the labour supply: 'the question of African alcohol production and consumption was inextricably linked to the difficulty in securing an adequate supply of African labor'.⁸ It might be noted, incidentally, that municipal monopoly was not the only policy for addressing this perceived problem in South Africa: in much of the Union, complete prohibition for Africans was tried first, and the spread of municipal monopolies beyond Durban was a consequence of the failure of these attempts at total prohibition, and was not always successful.⁹

In Tanganyika, by contrast, the question of labour did not dominate liquor policy. Officials were willing to concede that there was some link between the control of labour and the control of drink, and there were those – notably European settlers and miners – who consistently argued that African drinking threatened the labour supply, and needed to be tightly controlled, or even prohibited, for that reason.¹⁰ But officials were generally politely resistant to these demands. Revealing correspondence followed a question from an Unofficial European member of Legislative Council in 1929, which alleged excessive drinking by Africans: provincial commissioners and Secretariat officials were united in the opinion that this was a 'silly question' and that there was no serious problem.¹¹ While African drinking did concern administrators, they saw it primarily as a question of order and disorder: mocking settler allegations about the idleness of drunken Africans yet at the same time expressing profound concern over the 'disorderly scenes' and 'vice and crime' which could result from drinking when it was not properly regulated.¹²

This concern with order had two aspects. Drinking had the potential to create violent crime and disorder; and at the same time the control of drinking manifested a categorical world of different kinds of order, for its proper regulation took different forms in different places. Drinking in rural areas was part of a traditional moral order of authority, and was properly regulated by chiefs or headmen (using their general powers under the Native Authority Ordinance); and it stood in mutually-defining contrast with drinking in urban areas, or areas where there was a substantial mining or settler presence. In the mid-1920s the policy was established – partly owing to the influence of Charles Dundas – that so far as possible there should be no sale of drink in rural areas.¹³ The principle was reinforced, with a slight modification, by a circular in 1932 which stated that rural drinking should largely be a matter for Native Authorities to regulate, but that the development of a commerce in liquor was inevitable where there were plantations, and this required more formal regulation.¹⁴ In towns or settled areas, by contrast, drinking was a commercial affair, and must be regulated by a system of licences or permits, according to specific legislation enforced by police and magistrates. Most of the debates on the detail of policy in Tanganyika related to the management, and constant redrawing, of this boundary between the drinking order upheld by the headman

and that upheld by the police.¹⁵

The law relating to commercial drinking in Tanganyika was the Native Liquor Ordinance of 1923 (in the first years following the British occupation, officials had made selective use of the existing German legislation to order urban drinking). The 1923 Ordinance remained substantially unaltered for decades thereafter; a striking contrast with the situation in neighbouring Kenya, where there were repeated amendments to the legislation relating to African liquor. Despite the fact that the Tanganyika government actually sought the advice of Kenyan authorities in framing the 1923 Ordinance, there were other notable differences in the legislation.¹⁶ The landmark Kenya legislation of 1921 had created the possibility of municipal monopoly, and an amendment in 1928 and new consolidating legislation in 1930 barred women from either selling or consuming liquor in towns; the 1930 law also made it illegal for men to possess any liquor off licensed premises in any town in Kenya. These restrictions, aimed to exclude women from the urban economy of drink and to signal that African women in particular simply did not belong in towns, were not imitated in Tanganyika. This was unsurprising, as there was never in Tanganyika the sort of clear intention to impose a migrant labour system, and therefore to prevent African women from residing in towns, which can be identified in Kenya and – even more clearly – in South Africa. In contrast to towns in Kenya and South Africa, Dar es Salaam was a town in which African women as well as men could legally drink; though they were expected to do so in ways which displayed the distinctive order of an urban space.

There was one locally-produced alcoholic beverage which they could not drink, however. *Tembo*, or palm wine – tapped principally from the coconut palm, but also obtainable from doum and other palms – was particularly problematic. The production and sale of this had been permitted under German rule; under the 1923 Ordinance palm wine was a ‘native liquor’; and might therefore be sold, by licence. However, British officials were convinced that palm wine was uniquely strong, and that its consumption would threaten public order. They were particularly concerned about its effects upon ‘up-country’ workers, used only to grain beer:

This liquor is popular because the consumer is able to get drunk on it at less cost than on *pombe* which is less intoxicating. I am of the opinion that the native population, of which a large proportion are members of tribes upcountry where the coconut and therefore “tembo kali” is unknown, should not be encouraged to drink this beverage but to remain content with *pombe* to which they are accustomed.¹⁷

The British had forbidden tapping for palm wine since the occupation, and the 1923 ordinance was swiftly followed by a Circular from the Governor, which warned officials that ‘His Excellency the Governor desires that Tembo drinking should be discouraged as much as possible’.¹⁸ The sense that tapping was a wasteful use of coconut palms which might otherwise produce copra compounded this disapproval: it was banned ‘from the points of view of the health of the people, of the Coconut industry, and of control of the liquor traffic’.¹⁹ Here, too, it is possible to detect a wider concern about morality - in

this case, the possible effects of coastal life on naive migrants - finding expression in discourse over beverage alcohol. So *tembo* too was banned - not by law, but by the simple refusal to issue permission to anyone who wished to sell it, or even (in most cases) to tap for personal consumption.²⁰ In areas where the Native Liquor Ordinance did not apply – that is, in most of rural Tanganyika – there was no actual legal restriction on tapping, but administrators succeeded, presumably by dint of extra-legal bullying, in creating the impression that it was illegal.²¹ The prohibition was an unpopular one, and provoked occasional expostulations from Tanganyika's little band of letter-writers: in 1931 Cecil Matola wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs on behalf of the African Association, asking that *tembo* be legalised as it was 'a kind of native intoxicant of a better type than *pombe*'; and in 1934 an unnamed correspondent (probably Erica Fiah, on whom more below) writing on behalf of the African Commercial Association made a similar, unsuccessful, appeal

the educated Africans of modern civilisation are now humbly insisting upon the repeal of the prohibition of toddy, knowing that it is in all its forms the natural gift.²²

In economic terms, it should be noted, this prohibition was one which affected men, rather than women; while *pombe* was women's work, the ownership of palm trees and the work of tapping were male preserves.

African drinkers in Tanganyika were subject to one more prohibition, and in this the law was very similar to those in Kenya and South Africa. Africans were forbidden to consume 'European' liquors: not only spirits, but wines and beers too. The ban had its origins in the nineteenth century debate over the dangers of 'demoralization' which had inspired what Ambler and Crush have called a 'broad imperial assault on the consumption of spirits by Africans'.²³ This too reflected ideas about order – in this case, racial order. The ban served as an implicit assertion of the dangers which modernity posed to Africans, and expressed a European claim to responsible trusteeship over vulnerable Africans.²⁴ And while the international agreements which emerged from the European debate actually related only to spirits, British practice in eastern and southern Africa was consistently to deny to Africans any intoxicating liquor which Europeans consumed: a policy which emphasized the unsuitability of modern drinks for Africans and – incidentally – helped to maintain social distance. By the same principle, Africans were forbidden to make distilled spirits.

Drinking in Dar

The Tanganyika government's general policy on African drinking up to the mid 1930s was not, then, simply moulded by an overriding concern with the labour supply, but rather with the definition and maintenance of order, and of spaces governed by different forms of order. In Dar es Salaam, however, particular local concerns of officials also fed into policy on African drinking; and the chronic impecuniousness of the town's authorities was to play a major

role in shaping its ambitions, and in setting limits on the realisation of these.

The German legislation on African-brewed liquor, which in theory applied to the whole territory, made it illegal to sell such liquor without a licence.²⁵ While licences under this law were issued in some parts of Tanganyika, there were no licensees in Dar es Salaam from the beginning of the British occupation until late in 1921; though, whether this meant that no liquor was sold is very much open to doubt.²⁶ The 1923 legislation established the principle that the Native Liquor Ordinance only applied to specified areas, and it provided for the creation of beer markets; and there was an explicit expectation that one of these would be created in the capital. Beer markets were not the same as municipal monopolies; they were a modification of the licensing system, intended to change the way that *pombe* was sold.

Native liquor in the Territory is usually brewed and sold by women. A licensee collects a number of women on his premises, each of whom brews a pot of beer on the premises and then sells it. Thus in one hut for which a licence has been granted it is by no means uncommon to find half a dozen women each selling drinks from her own pot of beer. The law is nominally observed by the pretence that the women sell as servants of the licensee. Under the market system the fees now paid by the women to the licensee will, it is anticipated, be received by the Government.²⁷

The market system, then, was conceived as an attempt to derive revenue for government, by capturing the income which male licensees were extracting as 'rent' from women brewers.

However, although the 1923 Ordinance was applied to Dar es Salaam from 1st April 1924, the beer market system was not introduced at once, since there were no funds available for the construction of the market. By the time the building was finally opened, in May 1926, it appears that the intention of eliminating the licensees had been forgotten – a lapse of memory which suggests this was not a pressing issue.²⁸ Instead, the market simply served as a place in which to concentrate the licensees, who continued to play a role as rentiers, charging women brewers who came and sold beer under their patronage. There had been ten licensees operating from licensed premises in 1922; by 1927 there were twelve licensees – ten of them women – in the market. Until the beginning of 1927 these licensees extracted a rent from the brewers who actually made and sold the beer. In early 1927 the system was changed, so that the licensees employed the brewers on a monthly wage.²⁹

It was at this point that the Durban example was raised; as a result of a combination of circumstances. F.W. Brett – who had been involved in the discussions over the creation of the beer market in the early 1920s – became Provincial Commissioner of Eastern Province. At more or less the same time, the Acting Deputy Director of Medical Services produced an enthusiastic report on the Durban system, observing that it yielded a profit of £49,258 in 1924-1925. This represented a stupendous amount to the perpetually cash-strapped authorities in Dar es Salaam. Moreover, it had contributed to the construction costs of African 'locations' of a standard which deserved 'the warmest commendation'.³⁰ Thus encouraged, Brett brought to the attention

of the Chief Secretary a letter and report from the Labour Officer urging the creation of a 'location' for the 'masses of strangers working at the port' and for workers travelling through the town on their way to Zanzibar.³¹ A further report was then obtained on Nairobi's rather more modest experiment with a municipal monopoly. Brett made much of the profits which the licensees in Dar es Salaam's beer market were allegedly making; he estimated these at more than £7,300 each year, and contrasted this with the bare £720 each year the government received from licence fees. He suggested that the government should take over the market entirely and directly employ the women brewers on a monthly wage (as was the practice in Nairobi).³²

In consequence of this little storm of letters and minutes, the Governor agreed in principle to the suggestion that the government should pursue the original plan for the beer market, take over the brewers and dispense with the licensees.³³ But the plan stalled again. When, in 1928, a question was asked in Legislative Council about the beer market, Brett rather defensively admitted that he had not been able to implement the takeover of the market, as better buildings were needed before this would be possible. His suggested reply to the question acknowledged that the market had not realised the intention of providing 'a social benefit to the Natives and an economic benefit to the Government', as no funds had been available to provide the necessary improvements to the buildings and for 'supervisory staff'.³⁴

The funds were still not forthcoming and in 1929 it was noted that – once the cost of upkeep had been deducted – the beer market would produce a net return of only £276.³⁵ In 1930 the market attracted a rather different sort of interest. Following reports of 'much drunkenness and disorder in the town', the Governor demanded a report on the beer market, and commented that 'we should not make the business of obtaining *pombe* too cheap, or too easy'.³⁶ When the PC delayed in replying, he received irritable reminders of the need for an early response; when the reply finally came, it argued the market was not a problem, and that disorderly drinking came from illicit sale and drinking elsewhere in the town; the Governor was apparently satisfied by this response.³⁷

The beer market remained in the hands of the licensees, of whom there were then twelve – all women. In 1931 Baker (then District Officer) made some estimates of their profits as part of his study of social conditions in Dar es Salaam. Like other colonial observers, he believed that this was a very lucrative activity; and reached this conclusion largely because he was unaware of the brewers' two chronic problems: bad brews and bad debts.³⁸ For a variety of reasons, the brewing of grain beer can go wrong. It is difficult to quantify this risk, but it was far from negligible. And bad debts were a very common concern. Drinking was often done on credit – and calling in such debts was by no means always easy, since the sellers had no effective legal recourse and could rely only on social pressure and the threat of refusing to supply more drink. The effectiveness of the latter threat would, of course, be in inverse proportion to the number of other sellers – if a drinker refused further credit could easily turn elsewhere, he would be unlikely to pay his debts.

Baker's interest in the profitability of 'native liquor' was, however,

symptomatic of a colonial suspicion that the sale of drink was a way for Africans to accumulate largely undeserved wealth – like renting out urban property, it seems to have been viewed as disreputable at least partly *because* it was believed to be profitable (symptomatically, some of the women brewers were accused of being property owners, as well as drink profiteers).³⁹ But there was also a more immediate motive for Baker's interest. His 'Memorandum' as a whole did not suggest the sort of commitment to a policy of cheap, casual, male migrant labour which Mbilinyi has argued – if anything, it suggested that Dar es Salaam had too large a 'casual' population, and that the burden of supporting a retinue of occasionally-employed male relatives was impoverishing urban workers and undermining the stability of urban society. Baker did note that the presence of women might exacerbate this problem, but he made no argument for the expulsion of women from urban areas. His concern was not with any plan to build migrant hostels, on the South African model, but rather with improving the urban environment through education, and through urban planning.⁴⁰

Properly conducted breweries

It was an interest shared, at least to some degree, by the members of the Township Authority, the government-appointed and European-dominated body responsible for the town. Since the late 1920s, the leaders of the Authority had held ambitions for an elevation of their status – to that of a Municipality, a legal category which existed but had not yet been used – and in pursuit of that aim had recruited E. H. Helps, a local government bureaucrat with South African experience.⁴¹ But in the early 1930s, the acute lack of funds which affected the whole of Tanganyika was a serious obstacle: could the Township Authority really assume the financial responsibilities inherent in Municipal status – particularly given the need for spending on facilities and services for the African population which Baker's 'Memorandum' had suggested? As Helps himself observed '[t]he actual and potential revenue producing sources open to a Municipality at Dar es Salaam would appear to be somewhat circumscribed'. The Governor agreed, and directed that the ambition for a Municipality be abandoned, but neither Helps nor the Unofficial members of the Township Authority fully accepted this.⁴² It was the need for a new source of municipal revenue which had encouraged the abortive discussions on a liquor monopoly in 1927, and there was now an analogy nearer at hand than Durban, or Nairobi, as plans were being laid for a monopoly in Mombasa.⁴³ Surely the Dar es Salaam beer hall could generate earnings which would fund municipal improvement?⁴⁴ From the point of view of the Township Authority, it was not simply a matter of increasing total revenue. Under the Native Liquor Ordinance, income from licences went to central government funds; under municipal monopoly schemes like those of Durban and Nairobi, it went straight to the municipal authority. The amending legislation of 1934 which created the legal framework for monopolies in Tanganyika made the same provision.

There were, however, some difficulties. The very success of these schemes,

financially, had raised objections from some quarters – was it proper for the state to profit from selling liquor to Africans, and ‘encouraging Africans to drinks’ when the very reason for its existence was supposedly the task of trusteeship, which included moral guardianship?⁴⁵ There were periodic fits of anxiety among Europeans in East Africa over the dangers posed by African consumption of any kind of alcohol – one of which prompted an article in the *Standard* in 1935 referring to ‘the depravity which is inevitably the result of continuous drunkenness’.⁴⁶ In the mid-1920s one senior administrator had made clear his opposition to any profiteering from ‘beer shops’; the lingering suspicion that *pombe* was anyway a public health risk increased the disinclination of some officials to deal in ‘native liquor’.⁴⁷ Any scheme solely and explicitly intended to raise municipal funds from drink would be unlikely to prove acceptable in Dar es Salaam, let alone the Colonial Office. And the atmosphere and ambience of the beer market had also attracted both European and African criticism; officials regarded it as ‘a blot on our model native town’, and some Africans hesitated to drink in this public and occasionally rowdy environment: ‘an exceedingly unpleasant place, in which beer is consumed in the most degrading conditions’.⁴⁸ It may well have been this perceived problem with conditions in the beer market that lay behind appeals from Matola and others for the legalization of *tembo*.

There was also a metropolitan, rather than a colonial, analogy to consider. During the First World War a small number of localized state monopolies on the sale of liquor had been created in the United Kingdom; but with the intention of reducing consumption, rather than raising revenue. All but one of these had been abandoned at the end of the war; only Carlisle maintained the state monopoly – which was in the hands of central, rather than local government. This sole example remained a beacon of hope to a small but committed band of temperance lobbyists who believed state control would create a ‘disinterested’ trade, with no motive to increase sales.⁴⁹ In the United Kingdom, the Royal Commission of 1931 recommended the possibility of further experimentation with this form of state control – whose aims were very different to those of the Durban scheme.

Each of these considerations – reducing the excessive profits made by African drink-sellers, raising local revenue, the control of public drunkenness, the provision of a respectable drinking venue and a hygienic beverage, and the overall desirability of discouraging alcohol consumption – arose in the debate on the establishment of a municipal monopoly that took place in 1934. Additional legislation was required to allow the township to obtain ‘native beer manufactured in properly conducted breweries’. The *Standard* noted the arguments advanced in support of the bill: ‘One of the benefits which is expected to result from this measure is that beer will be brewed under more hygienic conditions... the sale of the beer will take place under conditions which will admit of more effective supervision in the interests of orderliness and sobriety’ and profits would be used ‘for public purposes beneficial to the natives of the township’.⁵⁰ A *Standard* leader on the issue described the monopoly as the application of the Carlisle system to Dar es Salaam, and stressed that – while there was no need for concern over the ‘bigger people

behind the scenes' who had profited from the old system – it was essential that the new scheme should offer employment to 'those who are now employed in the local native beer trade, whether as stall holders or assistants'.⁵¹ There can be little doubt that the principal concern of the Township Authority, which initiated the process, was revenue. Clearly, others had very different ideas about what the monopoly was for.

Uncertainty over the real aims of the scheme undermined it from the start. The obvious approach for a revenue-raising beer hall would have been that adopted in Mombasa at precisely the same time (which was tried out later in Tanga): a monopoly 'beer hall' that actually sold palm wine.⁵² *Tembo* was much in demand, commanded a good price, and required no complicated arrangements for brewing. However, presumably because of the persistent fear that it was 'highly potent' and would be a danger to consumers, this option seems not to have been seriously considered in Dar es Salaam; even though the district authorities in Tanga were, at the same time, coming to the decision that the ban on tapping was unenforceable and counter-productive. 'It is better to face the realities of a problem on orderly lines rather than to drive it underground, to the detriment of the general welfare and the bringing of the law into disrepute', Tanga's Provincial Commissioner observed in 1935.⁵³

The Dar es Salaam Township Authority also made a curious decision about the type of *pombe* they would sell. Nairobi's beer hall had run very successfully for years by employing women brewers, but the concern to have a standardised brew free from the 'impurities' of the existing product led the Township Authority to give the contract for beer supply to Tanganyika Breweries – whose marketing of bottled beer made much of their 'up to date' methods and 'hygienic' brews.⁵⁴ The contract stated, rather elliptically, that Tanganyika Breweries were to supply 'a liquor similar to those used by native brewers in the manufacture of the native liquor known as *pombe*'. They seem to have attempted a sort of semi-industrial production; with disastrous results, for drinkers consistently expressed their dislike for the resulting beverage. The distinctly low alcoholic potency of the drink – presumably a further gesture towards the aim of reducing drunkenness – was a further cause for consumer dissatisfaction: 'It was elicited that the natives do not like the beer brewed by the brewery as it is regarded as too weak'.⁵⁵ And perhaps equally significant in deterring customers from visiting the 'unpretentious bars' at the beer market was the absence of credit. *Mambo Leo*, the official Swahili newspaper, had noted that this was a problem as soon as the new market started operations; and even the *Standard's* gushing report had to acknowledge the degree of discontent on this issue.⁵⁶ Credit, of course, would have been difficult to manage; it would also have been illegal, since a strong principle of British legislation on liquor, which had been carried over into the law in Tanganyika, was that allowing drinking on credit would encourage irresponsible selling and drunkenness.⁵⁷

It would seem to have been this combination of factors which drove consumers away, rather than any politically-inspired 'boycott'. Mbilinyi argues for the existence of such a boycott on the basis of evidence of African

opposition to the monopoly – the most vocal expression of which came from Erica Fiah, through the medium of the African Commercial Association.⁵⁸ Fiah did criticise the proposal to exclude women from brewing; but he did so in terms suggesting his own possible commercial interest: ‘No Native will singly be in a position to satisfy the provisions of the bill for the manufacture of the Native liquor and the result will be that the whole business will pass into non-Native hands...’.⁵⁹ When the Township Authority did put the first tender out for *pombe* supply, Fiah bid for it – unsuccessfully.⁶⁰ There is no evidence that he organized a successful boycott on political grounds, nor that any observer at the time believed that he had done so. Official opinion was that the beer market lost customers because its beer was bad.⁶¹ This was not a problem unique to Dar es Salaam. The beerhalls of Durban were boycotted in 1915 because of the quality of their beer (interestingly, not long after a new industrial-scale brewery had been opened to supply them); and in Northern Rhodesia beerhall product was unpopular because it was weak and poor in flavour.⁶² When the Tanga municipal monopoly was established, ten years later, officials explained that it would be restricted to *tembo* precisely because *pombe* was so much more complicated to produce: ‘expert brewing is required if the article is to made palatable to consumers’.⁶³

The independents

Dar es Salaam’s drinkers abandoned the beer market, but they did not become teetotal. It is presumably the case that there had already been a good deal of drinking outside the beer market; it is instructive to note that while Durban’s monopoly sold 0.6 pints of beer per head of the African population each day, the beer market in Dar had sold only around 0.1 pints per head of the estimated 20,000 population in the early 1930s.⁶⁴ Even allowing for the existence of a substantial non-drinking Muslim population, the disparity is striking, and may be a sign of the extent of the trade in illicitly-brewed *pombe*, stolen European liquor, and methylated spirits which officials noted but never sought to quantify.⁶⁵ Presumably, the decline in trade at the beer market would have seen a corresponding growth in these alternative trades. Although in the months after the monopoly began, the pages of the *Tanganyika Standard* reported only one prosecution for illicit *pombe* selling the story was given a good deal of space, and clearly identified the motive for illicit production and sale:

enquiries made among natives go to shew that Dar es Salaam’s adventure in state control of liquor – Dar es Salaam’s Carlisle experiment – does not appeal to a number of independent spirits.

The independents would not perhaps question the wholesome quality of the controlled beer that is now supplied, under restrictions, but they think wistfully of the fulness of flavour of Binti Fulani’s beer in the olden time, of the fine head that another product had, and they seek to tread the paths of old.

As the reporter dryly noted, when sentence was passed on the woman and man found guilty in the case, 'no occasion arose to check any applause in the court'.⁶⁶ Presumably, the custom lost to the beer market had gone to illicit liquor.⁶⁷ The control of such illicit drinking had always been problematic; the task had been made significantly greater by the monopoly, since it had been decided that the scheme could only work profitably if competition were suppressed by the creation of a three-mile strip beyond the Township boundaries – in an area where there had previously been no such control – in which the sale of liquor was prohibited.⁶⁸ At the same time, the police were increasingly worried about other kinds of drinking – particularly, African consumption of illicit spirits: a 'vicious habit'.⁶⁹ Not only was the monopoly system not making money, it was in effect encouraging the spread of illicit drinking in uncontrolled circumstances which the police had always disliked.

The decision to abandon the monopoly certainly represented a defeat for the Township Authority. The licensing system was re-established, with women licensees paying fees which went direct to general revenue.⁷⁰ However, it may have been less than a complete victory for the women who had held licences in the beer market for it accelerated the emergence of a much more complex pattern of African drinking in Dar es Salaam, by encouraging the emergence of alternative drinks and drinking places.

The beer market was re-established – not in its old buildings (which became first a cinema, then – as the Alexandra Hall – a meeting room and latterly a Social Welfare Centre) but apparently in the 'unpretentious bars' created for the monopoly. In 1939, electric light was installed to allow these to stay open into the evening, in the hope of encouraging more trade, though more ambitious and costly plans for new buildings were postponed.⁷¹ These attempts at physical improvement were a response to continued complaints about the conditions in the beer market, the flavour of which was nicely captured in Margery Perham's nose-wrinkling reaction when she visited the market with Martin Kayamba: 'a dirty, crowded place with half-drunken women pushing among the men'.⁷² Not all drinkers, or brewers, were willing to accept these conditions.⁷³ It was reported in 1938 that the number of licences at the beer market had dropped; only ten had taken up licences again in the main beer market in 1936, and this had then gone down to eight. A subsidiary beer market at Ilala had closed entirely for several months in 1937, as there was simply no custom. While the Municipal Secretary planned for electric lights, administrators began to consider more radical steps, and tentatively, the Acting Provincial Commissioner suggested a course of action that would previously have been unthinkable: could Dar es Salaam follow the example already set in Tanga, and legalise the sale of *tembo*, so that licences could be issued for the sale of *tembo* in the market, to bring drinkers back?⁷⁴

The proposal was not immediately approved, but in 1940 the issue was raised again, partly in the context of the sudden influx of soldiers, whose illicit consumption of *tembo* was a serious concern. In these new circumstances it was generally agreed that the *tembo* prohibition in Dar es Salaam had failed, and that its lifting would 'improve existing relations between the Government and the African population'.⁷⁵ A proposal made in 1938 that tapping should

be permitted in Temeke, and that licensees should be allowed to bring *tembo* from there to sell in the central beer market, and the subsidiary market at Ilala, was approved.⁷⁶ At this point the linkage between liquor control and the financing of urban schemes of improvement was very largely lost: the tapping fees (of 1/- per tree per month) were to go the Native Authorities in Temeke, and the licence and market fees (100/- at Ilala, 125/- in the central market) to the general revenue of the government. By July 1941 there were fourteen licensed *tembo* sellers operating in Dar, and 1,599 registered tappers, paying fees to tap 4,156 trees. A substantial part of the revenue from the legal selling of 'native liquor' and from the system of control of sale, was now going to African men – tappers, sellers and the Native Authorities.⁷⁷

The *tembo* trade would seem to have been a lucrative one. It is striking that while it is not possible to identify the degree of continuity and business success among the women licensees at the *pombe* market – to see, for example, whether the licensees of 1926 were the same as those of 1938 – there are snippets of information which suggest the successful entrepreneurship of some of the men who acquired *tembo* licences. In April 1947, John Rupia obtained a licence to sell *tembo* in the town; very soon, he and another licensee, Ubwa Salim, were the subject of complaints. Both were taking advantage of the fact that they were allowed to sell at a slightly higher price (25 cents a measure) than were the licensees who sold in the beer market. They paid 20 cents a measure to tappers who brought them palm wine; since the other licensees had to sell at 20 cents a measure, they could not offer tappers so much.⁷⁸ Rupia was earning enough from the *tembo* trade to try some ground-breaking diversification. In May 1947 he was the first African to apply for a licence to sell European beer, in the wake of the change in the law which allowed Africans to drink beer and wine; and was given the licence in 1948. When, a year later, the second such licence was issued, it went to Ubwa Salim. Until September 1950, these two were the only Africans in Dar es Salaam to hold such licences.⁷⁹ Their bars were particularly attractive since they offered not only the novelty of bottled beer, but the chance to drink legally in much more salubrious conditions than those of the beer market: they must have been particularly welcome to people like Shaaban Mtengeti, an African clerk, who in 1946 had asked that the authorities in Dar should follow the example set by those in Tanga, who allowed 'reputable Africans' to drink *pombe* off licensed premises, as 'I always find it somewhat unsound to drink in a bar where loafers and ruffians are dominant'.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, the licensed *pombe* sellers of the beer market were an increasingly marginal part of Dar es Salaam's drinking culture. Legally, *pombe* could only be sold in the beer market, which gave the licensees there a certain advantage. Pauline d/o Magagulo, who had a licence to sell in the market in 1947 and 1948, and then lost it, complained in 1953 that she and others were being shut out of the market by the favoured few licencees (of whom there were still twelve). However, Leslie's survey suggests that by the mid-1950s the legal consumption of palm wine, beer and bottled spirits had taken much of the potential market – alongside illicit brewing and selling (mostly on the edges of the town), illicit distillation, and the illicit selling of bottled beer and spirits

Unpretentious Bars

from unlicensed premises.⁸¹ It is presumably significant that there were still only twelve licensees at the main beer market – the same number as in 1926, though the urban population was by this time very much greater. At the same time, the demand for *tembo* had grown substantially; by the end of the 1940s consumers beyond the town had complained that their palm wine was being diverted to urban drinkers:

Tax-paying subjects should get liquor just like town people get it, at any time; they should get enough tembo because everybody's well-being depends on some kind of drink like this.⁸²

The dream of controlling and containing African drinking and turning it into a significant revenue stream had never quite been forgotten, and was to reemerge after independence with the Chibuku experiment; but Dar es Salaam's drinking cultures were now dominated by the 'independents' – both legal and illegal.

Conclusion

Even in South Africa, where labour was of such importance in determining colonial policy on drink, Ambler and Crush have noted the ambivalence of the colonial state towards African drinking: this was a potential source of revenue, but also a focus for multiple anxieties about disorder and disease.⁸³ The failure of the beer hall monopoly in Dar es Salaam may be attributed directly to a similar – and perhaps even stronger – ambivalence in Tanganyika, which inspired an under-resourced state to pursue a scheme of monopoly control whose multiple aims – making a profit, selling a less 'impure' brew, and controlling consumption – resulted in a product and a drinking atmosphere which African consumers rejected. Here, as elsewhere in East Africa, officials' wild imaginings of the profits made by women brewers, and their concerns over disorder, encouraged unsustainable experiments in the regulation and control of drinking which ultimately served only to encourage the emergence of new forms of drinking – and to enrich those entrepreneurs who were able to take advantage of the uncertain, shifting, schemes of colonial control.

Notes

* The research for this piece was largely conducted in the course of the author's work on the history of alcohol in East Africa, which was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council from 1997-2000 (project R 000 23 7019); the author is also indebted to Andrew Burton and James Brennan for generously sharing notes on files in the Tanzania National Archives (SMP 18893 vol I and II; SMP 13723; 61/76; and 540/6/3/259) which it was not possible for him to consult.

¹ A waitress: from the Greek goddess of youth.

² 'Where beer costs 10 cts a glass', *Tanganyika Standard*, 16 Feb. 1935

³ M. Mbilinyi, "'This is an unforgettable business': colonial state intervention in urban Tanzania", in J. Parpart and K. Staudt (eds.), *Women and the state in Africa* (London and

Boulder, Co., 1982), pp. 111-29.

⁴ A. Mager, 'The first decade of European beer in South Africa: the state, the brewers and the drinking public', *Journal of African History*, 40 (1999), pp. 367-88.

⁵ C. Ambler and J. Crush, 'Alcohol in southern African labor history', pp. 1-11, in J. Crush and C. Ambler (eds.), *Liquor and Labor in Southern Africa* (Pietermaritzburg/Athens, Ohio, 1992), pp. 1-55. See also H. Bradford, 'We women will show them: beer protests in the Natal countryside, 1929', in Crush and Ambler, *Liquor and Labor*, pp. 208-34.

⁶ P. la Hausse, *Brewers, Beerhalls and Boycotts. A History of Liquor in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1988), pp. 22-28; P. la Hausse, 'Drink and cultural innovation in Durban: the origins of the beerhall in South Africa, 1902-1916', in Crush and Ambler, *Liquor and Labor*, pp. 78-105.

⁷ Ambler and Crush, 'Alcohol in southern African labor history', p. 1.

⁸ La Hausse, 'Drink and cultural innovation', p. 86.

⁹ P. Bonner, 'Backs to the fence: law, liquor and the search for social control in an East Rand town, 1929-1942', in Crush and Ambler, *Liquor and Labor*, pp. 269-305. In 1937, in effective acknowledgment of the failure of prohibition, the Union government had passed a law which required municipal authorities either to accept 'household' brewing by Africans, or create liquor monopolies.

¹⁰ Officials repeatedly reported such complaints from Europeans: see for example Acting Provincial Commissioner (hereafter Ag PC) Northern Province to Chief Secretary (hereafter CS), 28 Feb. 1929, Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) Secretariat Minute Papers (hereafter SMP) 12694 Vol I.

¹¹ The correspondence is contained in TNA SMP 13427.

¹² Iringa Province Annual Report, 1927, p. 8, TNA SMP 11677; District Officer (hereafter DO) Iringa to PC Iringa, 11 May 1928 TNA SMP 12275; Ag PC Iringa to CS, 24 Sept. 1928, TNA SMP 12694 Vol I.

¹³ Minute, Dundas to CS, 6 Jan. 1925; Minute by CS for Governor, 8 Jan. 1925; minutes by Governor, 20 and 21 Oct 1925, all in TNA SMP 3214 Vol I.

¹⁴ CS to all PCs, 28 Jan. 1932, TNA 157/A2/8.

¹⁵ See for example the succession of minutes to the CS and Governor on 19 and 20 Apr. 1926, in TNA SMP 3214 Vol I; the contents of SMP 12694 are largely concerned with the boundary between government and Native Authority control.

¹⁶ Hollis (CS) to CS Kenya, 22 Apr. 1921; Ag. CS Kenya to CS Tanganyika, 14 May 1921, TNA SMP 3214 Vol I. In Kenya too there was a focus on order and the distinction between urban and rural drinking.

¹⁷ Brett, Senior Commissioner (hereafter SC) to CS, 17 Oct. 1922, TNA SMP 3214 Vol I.

¹⁸ Mzee bin Juma, 'on behalf of all Wadigo' to CS, 13 Sep. 1922, TNA SMP 3214 Vol I; Circular No 5 of 1924, 13 Feb. 1924; see also the Minute of Executive Council meeting, 4 Feb. 1924, TNA SMP 3214 Vol I.

¹⁹ Director of Agriculture to CS, 14 Aug. 1928; PC Eastern to CS, 29 June 1931, TNA SMP 12356 Vol I.

²⁰ The Ordinance allowed tapping for personal consumption, but only if a special permit were issued (there was a similar provision for grain-beer brewing, but permits for personal consumption of this were actually issued): Native Liquor Ordinance, Tanganyika Gazette, 27 July 1923.

²¹ PC Eastern to CS, 19 May 1936, TNA SMP 12356 Vol I; PC Lindi to CS, 31 May 1940, TNA SMP 12356 Vol II.

²² Matola, African Association to Secretary for Native Affairs, 30 Apr. 1931; African Commercial Association to DO Dar es Salaam, 13 Dec. 1934, TNA SMP 12356 Vol I.

²³ Ambler and Crush, 'Alcohol in southern African labor history', p. 9.

²⁴ J. Willis, 'Demoralised natives, black-coated consumers and clean spirit: European liquor in East Africa, 1890-1955', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 29 (2001), pp. 55-74.

²⁵ Ag. Inspector, Tabora to SC Tabora, 27 July 1922; Minute by Treasurer, 15 Nov. 1923, TNA SMP 3214, Vol. I.

²⁶ Brett, SC to CS, 17 Oct. 1922, TNA SMP 3214, Vol. I.

²⁷ Note by Elphinstone, Attorney General, 2 Aug. 1923, TNA SMP 3214 Vol I.

²⁸ Brett, PC Eastern to CS, 21 June 1927, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.

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- ²⁹ Brett, PC Eastern to CS, 21 June 1927, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.
- ³⁰ Scott, Ag. Deputy Director Medical Services to CS, 18 May 1927, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.
- ³¹ Labour Officer, Eastern Province to PC, 27 Apr. 1927, and undated report, both with PC Eastern to CS, 21 June 1927, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.
- ³² Brett, PC Eastern to CS, 21 June 1927; Minute to CS, 24 June 1927; Brett, PC Eastern to CS, 18 July 1927, and attached 'Memorandum on beer shop, Pumwani', all in TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.
- ³³ Governor's minute, 12 July 1927, and Ag. CS to PC Eastern, 20 July 1927, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.
- ³⁴ Question from Abdalla Kimji, and draft reply from Brett, attached to PC Eastern to CS, 6 June 1928, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.
- ³⁵ Treasurer to CS, 8 Oct. 1929, TNA SMP 13834, Vol I.
- ³⁶ Governor's Minute, 22 July 1930; Ag CS to PC Eastern, 26 July 1930, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.
- ³⁷ CS to PC Eastern, 7 and 13 Aug. 1930; Ag PC Eastern to CS, 12 Aug. 1930, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.
- ³⁸ E.C. Baker, 'Memorandum on the social conditions of Dar es Salaam', 1931, p. 34 (copy in SOAS archive); for other assertions of 'large profits' made by Africans in the liquor trade, see for example PC Eastern to CS, 21 June 1927, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I; Ag. Senior Commissioner Nairobi to Colonial Secretary, 11 Jan. 1927, Kenya National Archives (hereafter KNA) AG 1/388; PC Nzoia to Colonial Secretary, 2 June 1931, KNA AG 1/402; Willis, *Potent Brews*, pp. 99-101.
- ³⁹ See the comments of the PC Eastern in the Legislative Council debate on the second reading of the 1934 NLO Amendment Bill, in TNA SMP 18893 Vol. I.
- ⁴⁰ Baker, 'Memorandum', pp. 82, 104-5.
- ⁴¹ Dep Governor to Secretary of State, 26 Apr. 1930, TNA SMP 13834 Vol I.
- ⁴² Helps, Municipal Sec. to CS, 3 Feb. 1931; Governor's Minute, 10 Feb. 1931; for continuation of the debate see for example Ag. Treasurer to CS, 4 Mar. 1936 and the comments in PC Eastern to CS, 16 Oct. 1936; all in TNA SMP 13834 Vol I.
- ⁴³ Mombasa District Annual Report, 1934, KNA DC MSA 1/4.
- ⁴⁴ The sales figures are at f. 116 of TNA 61/71.
- ⁴⁵ 'African beer shops', *Tanganyika Standard*, 9 Mar. 1935.
- ⁴⁶ 'Natives and drink - growing evil in Uganda', *Tanganyika Standard*, 17 Aug. 1935.
- ⁴⁷ Minute, 6 Jan. 1925, TNA SMP 3214, vol. I; Governor's minute, 22 July 1930, TNA SMP 10491 vol. I.
- ⁴⁸ Dep. Director Sanitation Service to Senior Health Officer, 29 March 1932, TNA SMP 18950 Vol I; Memorandum on Native Administration, 16 July 1929, TNA SMP 13723; Mbilinyi, "'This is an unforgettable business'", p. 118.
- ⁴⁹ A. Sherwell, *Carlisle and Its Critics* (London: Temperance Legislation League, 1923); J. Turner, 'State Purchase of the Liquor Trade in the First World War', *Historical Journal*, 23 (1980), pp. 589-615.
- ⁵⁰ 'Control of native beer trade', *Tanganyika Standard*, 8 Sep. 1934; this precisely reprises the 'Objects and reasons' stated for the Bill, given in TNA SMP 18893 Vol I.
- ⁵¹ 'Beer trade control', *Tanganyika Standard*, 8 Sep. 1934.
- ⁵² Municipal Sec. Tanga to CS, 30 June 1945, TNA SMP 33144 Vol I; Willis, *Potent Brews*, p. 136.
- ⁵³ PC Tanga to CS, 28 Sep. 1935, TNA SMP 12356 Vol I; 'Tembo kali', *Tanganyika Standard*, 20 Oct 1934.
- ⁵⁴ The feeling that the women's *pombe* was impure was expressed in, for example, the Minute dated 28 Feb. 1933 in TNA SMP 18893 Vol I; for the rhetoric of hygiene, see "'In cellar cool" up to date', *Tanganyika Standard*, 16 Sep. 1933; see also for example the advertisement in *Tanganyika Standard*, 29 Dec. 1934.
- ⁵⁵ Contract, 25 Feb. 1935, TNA SMP 21891; Mbilinyi, 'This is an unforgettable business"', pp. 121-22; Executive Officer, Township to CS, 26 Nov. 1935, TNA SMP 18893, Vol. II. The municipal beer hall in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, suffered from exactly the same problem – consumer rejection of industrially-produced beer: R. Parry, 'The Durban system and the limits of colonial power in Salisbury', in Crush and Ambler, *Liquor and*

labor in southern Africa, pp. 115-38.

⁵⁶ 'Kazi ya pombe', *Mambo Leo*, Jan. 1935; 'Where beer costs 10 cts a glass', *Tanganyika Standard*, 16 Feb. 1935

⁵⁷ This is the principle of the 'Tippling' legislation in the UK; it appeared as section 27 (1) of the 1923 Native Liquor Ordinance.

⁵⁸ For a general account of Fiah, see N. Westcott, 'An East African radical: the life of Erica Fiah', *Journal of African History*, 22, 1981, pp. 85-101.

⁵⁹ African Commercial Association Memorandum, *Tanganyika Standard*, 3 Nov. 1934.

⁶⁰ Mbilinyi, "'This is an unforgettable business'", p. 121.

⁶¹ Minute, 31 Jan. 1939 and Baker, Social Welfare Officer to CS, n. d., 1945, TNA SMP 33144, vol. I.

⁶² la Hausse, 'Drink and cultural innovation', p. 104; R.T Chicken, *A Report on an Inquiry into the Prevalence of Illegal Brewing and its Causes and Effects in the Urban Areas near the Railway Line in Northern Rhodesia* (Lusaka, 1948), p. 6.

⁶³ Municipal Sec. Tanga to CS, 30 June 1945, TNA SMP 33144 Vol I.

⁶⁴ Figures on per capita consumption and production variously from Ag. Deputy Director Medical Services to CS, 18 May 1927; Ag PC Eastern to CS, 12 Aug. 1930 TNA SMP 10491 Vol I; and on f. 116 of TNA 61/71.

⁶⁵ Ag. PC Eastern to CS, 12 Aug. 1930, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I. For 'informal sector' alcohol in colonial Dar es Salaam, see Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam*, Oxford (2005), pp. 154-8.

⁶⁶ 'A Saturday Night Beer Brew', *Tanganyika Standard*, 24 Aug. 1935.

⁶⁷ See Burton, *African Underclass*, p. 155.

⁶⁸ PC Eastern to CS, 27 Dec. 1934, TNA SMP 12694 Vol. III.

⁶⁹ Note by Nicholls, Commissioner of Police, 4 Sep. 1935, TNA SMP 12275.

⁷⁰ Minute, 21 Jan. 1939, TNA SMP 33144 Vol I.

⁷¹ Municipal Secretary to CS, 26 Feb. 1941; Mar. 1 and 29 Nov. 1948; Lands Officer to Social Welfare Officer, 26 Jan. 1949, TNA SMP 10491 Vol II; the installation of electric light and wider plan for improvement were discussed in Governor's Minute, 25 July 1938; PC Eastern to CS, 21 Sep. 1938; Ag CS to Municipal Secretary, 2 May 1939, TNA SMP 10491 Vol I.

⁷² Diary from Tanganyika, 1937, p. 28; Rhodes House Oxford, Mss Perham 49(2).

⁷³ See Baker's Amendments to his 1931 Memorandum, 10 Jan. 1940, in TNA SMP 18950 Vol II.

⁷⁴ Ag. PC Eastern to CS, 24 June 1938, TNA SMP 12356 Vol II.

⁷⁵ Minute, Asst CS, 27 May 1940, TNA SMP 12356 Vol II.

⁷⁶ Governor's Minute, 30 May 1940, TNA SMP 12356 Vol II.

⁷⁷ PC Eastern to CS, 16 July 1941, TNA SMP 12356 Vol II.

⁷⁸ DC Dar es Salaam to Municipal Secretary, 21 June 1947, TNA 540/6/3/259.

⁷⁹ John Rupia to PC, 9 May 1947; CS to PC Eastern 3 Sep. 1947; CS to PC Eastern 10 Dec. 1948; Telegram CS to Provicer, 8 June 1949; Town Clerk to CS, 14 Sep. 1950, all in TNA SMP 38758.

⁸⁰ S. Mtengeti, African Clerk to CS, 11 Feb. 1946, TNA SMP 20646 Vol II. The hygiene and the quality company in municipal beer markets continued to attract adverse comment into the 1950s: see Tanganyika Government, *Intoxicating Liquor Report* (Dar es Salaam, 1954), pp. 2-3.

⁸¹ J. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam* (London/New York/Nairobi, 1963), pp. 250-1; Burton, *African Underclass*, pp. 157-8.

⁸² Petition sent to DC Uzaramo, 10 May 1949, TNA SMP 12356 Vol II.

⁸³ C. Ambler and J. Crush, 'Alcohol in southern African labor history', p. 2, in Crush and Ambler (ed.), *Liquor and labor in southern Africa*, pp. 1-55.

Chapter Seven

The Ngoma Impulse: From club to nightclub in Dar es Salaam

Werner Graebner

When I first stayed in Dar es Salaam in the late 1970s and early 1980s the city's musical soundscape was dominated by *muziki wa dansi*, accompanying the day from sunrise to midnight and beyond. Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD), the one and only radio station, broadcast Swahili language music, and hence *muziki wa dansi* almost exclusively. The nation was thus in tune, since in most households the radio was on from 6am until the station closed down at 11pm on weekdays or midnight on weekends. Walking in any neighborhood one could follow the programmes, the sound of radio shifting from one building to the next, only occasionally broken by a cassette recording.

I lived in a Swahili-type housing area in Kinondoni. At night, music would spill over from various bars and social halls. Depending on the direction of the wind one might make out Marijani Rajab's Dar International playing at Kwetu Bar, slightly further away Orchestre Maquis might perform at Lang'ata Social Hall, Vijana Jazz or Juwata could be audible from Vijana Social Hall, across Morocco Road. Walking across Bagamoyo Road, into the almost village-like surroundings of Mikoroshoni, Remmy Ongala and Super Matimila played the Mkirikiti Bar. On the way back one might catch Issa Matona performing *taarab* at a private wedding celebration turned public, as performance usually took place in the streets.

At the time Dar es Salaam must have had one of the most vibrant music scenes in Africa, with 25 to 30 professional bands performing at the city's nightclubs. While the bands played their homebase on Saturday night, they otherwise rotated to reach the widest possible audience. Bands performed six nights a week, usually taking Monday off. Advertisements for performances appeared in *Uhuru*; one page on weekdays, two to three pages for weekend gigs. Most patrons would come to trust their ears, however, and follow the sound once a band had started its routine after about 10 pm. They feared a band might not arrive because of transport problems, or that electricity might fail. Public transport was scarce, particularly at night, and as a result people

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preferred to just walk round the corner to enjoy an evening out. The halls were usually empty until everything was moving well. A few well-to-do might have entered earlier, making sure that enough beer was available and ordering one or more crates to guarantee they would have a successful night out. If there was a shortage of beer (that also happened), well, then no audience for the band.

The *muziki wa dansi* performance usually began with instrumental versions of perennial favorites like ‘Guantanamera’. They would then move into older Swahili repertoire, either their own hits, or hits of famous 1950s and 1960s bands like Cuban Marimba, or the Morogoro, Dar es Salaam, and Kilwa Jazz Bands as the place slowly filled. Spare musicians circulated around the hall greeting friends or organizing drinks for the hours to come. Only once the full band was on stage to perform more recent songs did the floor fill with dancers. Songs then segued into each other almost without interruption, as musicians who had paused mid-song smoothly took over instruments from their colleagues. And as the night heated up, the songs got longer while the *chemko* – the fast second part of each song, featuring the tight interplay of three or four guitars plus occasional riffs (and question and answer games) by the horn section – came to a boil. By midnight the band was in full swing, revving in top gear to deliver their best for a good three hours more. Many bands had a team of between twenty and thirty musicians, with maybe fifteen on stage at any one time. Extra members allowed bands to play at least five days a week for up to six hours – an energetic schedule by any standards.

Muziki wa dansi’s popularity has been sustained from its emergence in the 1940s up to the present. However, it forms just one of several musical genres that attained popularity in Dar es Salaam in the course of the twentieth century. This chapter provides an account of the most prominent genres up to the 1990s, when economic liberalization and especially the de-regulation of the media had profound effects on the local music scene.¹ It does not attempt a comprehensive account of popular music in Dar es Salaam over the past hundred years. Instead, I will present a short series of snapshots of musical life in the city, wherever possible grounded in the biographies of social types who have been the main movers at different points in the history of the musical styles discussed.

The early 1900s: *Ngoma* Fairs

Ngoma was Dar es Salaam’s dominant musical entertainment up to the 1930s. The German ethnographer Karl Weule, who passed through town in 1906, took photographs of an *ngoma* that were published in his 1909 book. They portray a basically rural environment: male and female *ngoma* dances, against a backdrop of *makuti*-thatched houses, mango trees or coconut palms. However, little supplementary information is provided by Weule on the event, which was organised by the German colonial authorities for him to film and make audio recordings.² A more vivid account is given by Carl Hossfeld, who in a 1908 article in the *Usambara Post* observed that the colonial administration had restricted the staging of *ngoma* to one or two days a week, from which can

be inferred that *ngoma* may have been performed with greater frequency prior to this. According to Hossfeld, a special place existed for the performance of *ngoma*, where on the preceding day heavily decorated tents or roofing was constructed. On the night itself he made out about 20 circles where different *ngoma* were performed. One of which was:

the so-called 'ngoma of Dar es Salaam', where about thirty or more women, wearing colorful cloth and a red headscarf called *mharuma*, dance close together in a semi-circle, slowly moving their hips, and advancing almost imperceptibly with small steps of their feet.

Male *ngoma* performed included a Sukuma war dance and the coastal *goma*. Women also danced the Manyema girls' *ngoma ya mboga*, and the *Bagamoyo ngoma*, which attracted Hossfeld's particular attention:

Women, whose naked torso and face are powdered with flour, dance it. Fantastically colored strips of cloth and an assortment of animal skins cover the rest of the body, while on the head they wear high garland of feathers. To the beats of the drums they dance first in circle, accompanying with a monotonous singing, carrying an axe in their hand and moving their behinds in a kind of grinding motion.

Hossfeld gives a detailed account of the different drums and their tuning through heating, alongside other percussion instruments made of metal barrels, wooden clappers, rattles filled with stones, and most importantly the *nzumari*, the lead instrument in most *ngoma*. People dressed in the latest fashions for the occasion, and all Africans participated in the revelry:

On such *ngoma* nights the whole 'negro-village' seems to be on the move. The streets reverberate with the almost unbearable noise of the drums, flutes and other instruments, mixed with the strange rhythms of the wildly sentimental chants, and [women's] high trills. Everybody seems to be on his or her feet, either to dance or to watch. On these nights the 'negro' is not to be had for anything else, living only for his amusement. Everybody humming or singing, moving in time to the music. The streets otherwise lonesome and quiet are flooded by white *kanzu* and colorful *kanga*.³

Towards the end of his article Hossfeld describes different kinds of *ngoma* practiced in rural areas: urban *ngoma* were clearly distinctive entertainments, put on for the amusement of onlookers and with limited public participation. He also describes what supposedly is a reference to competitive *beni* societies, however, here he refers to happenings in Pangani and not to Dar es Salaam, where *beni* had yet to reach. This bears out the characterization of Dar es Salaam as a new town, not one of the more established Swahili coastal settlements. At this time, according to Ranger, the Sudanese and Ngoni retired *askari* community, and Manyema former-slaves, were regarded as the oldest permanent African communities in the town. Moreover, 'the Swahili-speaking population of Dar es Salaam... was not a wealthy one, nor accustomed to elaborate and expensive festivals. Nor was there any literary tradition to match that of Lamu or Mombasa'.⁴

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The *beni* ngoma arose in the 1890s in Lamu, and spread southwards to Mombasa and Tanga, eventually reaching Dar es Salaam during the First World War.⁵ Partly through its adoption of the style of European brass bands and military drill, *beni* represented both adaptation and resistance to colonial domination. Its heyday in Dar es Salaam was in the 1920s, by which time competing *Marini* and *Arinoti* groups had formed, which according to Iliffe 'followed the pattern of earlier dances on the coast by dividing into high status [*Marini*] and low status [*Arinoti*] societies'.⁶ Alongside songs (in Swahili) and dances mocking rival groups and extolling one's own, performances included, in the words of a contemporary European observer, 'parodies of incidents in, or phases of, European life in its contact with the native... in the form of light comedy, with the laugh against the ignorant or inexperienced blackman'.⁷ *Beni* groups were self-consciously modern. In the urban setting they were adaptive institutions 'concerned with the survival, success, and reputation of their members, acting as welfare societies, as sources of prestige, as suppliers of skills'.⁸ Prominent African townsmen played a leading role, though by the early 1930s 'the modernising functions of *beni* in Dar es Salaam were assumed by the African Association',⁹ which former *beni*-members such as Zibe Kidasi, Kleist Sykes and Ramadhani Ali went on to found. In a 1934 report on Tanga, E.C. Baker noted that *beni ngoma* were now restricted to the urban 'riff-raff'.¹⁰ By this time, the same was true of Dar es Salaam, though oral informants cited by Tadasu Tsuruta recall *beni* surviving in Kariakoo into the 1940s.¹¹ As an urban entertainment, from the 1930s it was displaced by other musical forms, notably *taarab* and *dansi*.

Sons of the city – Taarab: 1920s to early 1960s¹²

Taarab had its origins in the courtly music of Sultan Seyyid Barghash of Zanzibar (1870-88), sung in Arabic to the accompaniment of Middle Eastern instruments; and more broadly in cultural interactions accompanying historical trading activity between Arabia, India and the East African coast.¹³ In Zanzibar, it was transformed from a courtly to a more popular cultural form by the performances of Siti bint Saad and her band from the early-1920s. Performing songs in Swahili she took *taarab* 'out of the palaces and into the hearts of ordinary... Zanzibaris',¹⁴ and subsequently to the *Mrima* (the mainland coast adjacent to Zanzibar), where by the 1930s she was extremely popular. Around the same time a mainland version of *taarab* began to emerge in coastal towns such as Mombasa, Tanga and Dar es Salaam. In each urban centre a distinctive regional style of *taarab* evolved. The style of Dar es Salaam reflected the strongest Zanzibari influence.

Abdulbar Diwani was one of the Dar es Salaam's *taraab* pioneers. He was born in Dar es Salaam in 1912, growing up in Kisutu and Kariakoo.¹⁵ During his childhood, *ngoma* remained the town's principal form of musical entertainment. However, alongside other budding musicians, Abduldar was responsible for *taraab*'s emergence in the 1920s. 'I picked up the violin when I was about ten or eleven', Abduldar recalls: 'I learned on my own, and the

music that I liked was *taarab*. I played with some of my peers, just violin and small drums, or an *'ud* [Arabic lute] as a second instrument'. This new musical entertainment of the 1920s developed a substantial following, especially among the core Islamic urban population in Kisutu and Kariakoo. Gramophone records of Egyptian or other Arabic music were consumed and played at this time. According to Abdulbar and other oral sources, there was also a group of older musicians playing Egyptian style music: a private men's club playing for their own enjoyment rather than staging performances. The names Nadi Salaam, Citizens' Club and Shuban li-Arab are mentioned by older musicians, but none is clear about the chronology or the relationship of these groups. Both Abdulbar and Hamisi Akida¹⁶ remembered Swahili (*taarab*) records in the northern dialects becoming available by the mid-1920s, and both agree on hearing them before the Zanzibari recordings of Siti bint Saad.¹⁷ Accompanied by her group, Siti bint Saad performed concerts in Dar es Salaam and other mainland coastal towns.¹⁸ Abdulbar himself recorded a number of shellacs in the short period between 1928 and 1930 when international record companies came to record in East Africa.¹⁹ Significantly, when *Columbia* set up studio in a hotel room in Dar es Salaam in the spring of 1930 only *ngoma* and *King's African Rifles* songs were recorded.²⁰ Yet by the following decade both *taarab* and *dansi* clubs were being founded en masse and these new forms came to dominate fashionable entertainment around town.

Elders of both the Egyptian and Al-Watan Music Clubs, important ensembles founded in the 1930s and still active today, unanimously hail Abdulbar as the outstanding *taarab* performer of his time, and also as the teacher of many up-and-coming musicians in Egyptian and Al-Watan. Among his pupils was Bom Amberon, prodigy on both violin and *'ud*, and with Abdulbar a founder of the Egyptian Music Club in 1931. Other founding members included the brothers Subeit Salum and Said Salum Nana, Mshindo Pazi, and Naaman Simon, the latter a Greek shoemaker, who had lived in Cairo for some time, and who according to Abdallah Awadh made the suggestion for the name 'Egyptian'.²¹ The designation reflected the local popularity of Egyptian gramophone recordings and films, which had spread throughout the Islamic world, including the East African coast, by this time. Up to the early 1930s the instruments of Swahili *taarab* were the violin, *'ud*, *dumbak* and *rika*. Subsequently, groups would include *nai* (flute) and one or two more violins, following the fashion of the Egyptian *takht*, gradually expanding to the *firqah*-style orchestras made popular by Egyptian movies.²² A rift developed between members of Egyptian in 1933, leading to the formation of the Al-Watan Musical Club. Founder members were the Nana brothers, Mshindo Pazi, Bakar Salum, Ali Salum and Rajab Madua; early female singers included Leluu and Maryam Panya. Said Salum now played the mandolin, and both groups over time would acquire more instruments like cello and double-bass. No recordings document the intermediary 1930s and 1940s style of *taarab*. According to memories, the groups would feature only about six or seven instrumentalists. Occasions for playing included weddings and other family festivities, such as coming of age ceremonies, alongside Islamic holidays such as *Idd-el-Fitr*. Both men and women attended the concerts, though seating arrangements were

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segregated. Female singers sang veiled and there was no dancing.

Egyptian and Al-Watan made a number of recordings for the South African Gallo label starting in 1950. Al-Watan featured the following musicians: Mshindo Pazi and Maalim Subeiti (*'ud*); Bakari Salim 'Fly' and Ali Salum (violin); Said Salum Nana (mandolin); Abdallah Awadh (*nai*); Abdallah Mkwanda (cello); Ali Salim (double bass); Said Omar (*dumbak*); Athman Abbas (*daff*). In Egyptian, Shehe Salim Boga played the *taishokoto*, a kind of type-writer banjo, popular with many *taarab* groups along the coast. The group also soon added a clarinet player and all groups would add accordions in the second half of the 1950s. Surviving recordings feature copies of compositions by Mohamed Abdelwahhab or Indian film songs, sung in both Arabic and Hindi; other songs combined Egyptian and Indian compositions with Swahili lyrics, whilst compositions from within the club were also performed. Rhythms were varied, including tributes to the rumba craze, as well as Arabic, Indian and Swahili rhythms. Leading instrumentalist Bom Amberon also recorded a number of unaccompanied instrumental solos (*taqasim*) on violin and *'ud*.

Family festivities remained important occasions for performance, although by the 1950s groups also often played weekend concerts in places like the Arnautoglu Hall on Mnazi Mmoja. An entrance fee was charged to pay rent and maintain the music club and to buy new instruments. *Taarab* groups also occasionally played in some of the better bars in Kariakoo or Ilala. The colonial official, and student of the town, J.A.K. Leslie provides an evocative portrait of one Al-Watan performance in 1956:

At a quarter past [nine] a few rows are full and the Alwatn [sic] Egyptian-type band starts up, its choir of female voices, heavily swathed in black *buibuis*... The band has a nucleus of Arab fiddlers and a row of very respectable old gentlemen in a variety of clothing, sitting in the front row and playing guitars, banjos, drums, castanets and... other instruments.... The leader... and a few others, wear European suits, in the long-coated Egyptian style, loose-fitting; the front row vary, according to age, from long trousers covered by a *kanzu* and surmounted by a coat, topped with *tarbush*, to long white trousers and a deep red shirt. The main singer for tonight, a young man of rich parentage, who has been unable to settle down in other walks of life, has the confident and slightly fruity air of dance-band singers throughout the world.²³

Leslie describes a cosmopolitan audience that has come for the performance: from a Seychellois mechanic, an Indian family and Arabs dressed in 'European' fashion in the expensive front-row seats, to a mixture of Indians, Arabs and Africans in the cheaper seats, and the 'normally' attired in the main body of the hall, where *buibuis* are the 'invariable rule' amongst women and 'there is more evidence of having come on from the bar'. At the door a crowd of 'young men' (*wahuni*?) are hanging around in the hope of getting in free. The show included a conjurer and three transvestite '*nachi*' dancers, and, after a slow start, 'from half past ten onwards was a success':

the noise increased; the outer windows banged as those [young men] outside fought for a better view through the chinks. Drinks were brought in, cokes

for the Indians, and some beer at the back.... The interval came, at eleven o'clock, in a welter of excited talk reminiscent of the break-up of a close cup final crowd, with a rush for the bar.

Political songs supporting *Uhuru* entered the repertoire of *taarab* groups at this time, the so-called *wakati wa siasa* (the time of politics). Politicians often came to speak at *taarab* concerts. However, with the advent of *Uhuru*, although *taarab* remained popular with the urban audience, according to Askew *taraab's* Arabic and Indian influences 'struck a sharp dissonance with the Afrocentrism of post-independence nationalism'.²⁴ Puritanical TANU ideologists had no time for the cosmopolitan ambience described by Leslie. A similar fate – from being an expression of anticolonial sentiment to a cultural form tainted by non-African influences in postcolonial Tanzania – was in store for *dansi*, the other popular musical genre that emerged in late-colonial Dar es Salaam.

Siwezi kuliacha rumba – the rise of *dansi* (1930s-1960s)²⁵

The other way in which we released our energy was by organising impromptu dances in a room behind the dormitories. One of us would play a guitar made by a carpentry student, another a flute, while another would beat the table as though it were a drum. The rest of us would shout at the top of our voices '*Siwezi kuliacha rumba*.' I learnt to play the guitar then and during the holidays at Kilosa (my uncle moved from Kiberege to Kilosa in 1942), I played in a band there.²⁶

M.W. Kanyama Chiume, *Kivacha: An autobiography*, (Nairobi, 1975), p. 17.

The worldwide popularity of the Cuban dance music, rumba, took Africa by storm in the 1930s and 1940s. Until today many older musicians rave about the music then issued in Africa under the *HMV* *GV* series imprint. Although firmly rooted in coastal culture and *taarab*, even Abdulbar Diwani's imagination was caught by the rumba craze, expressing as he did his one-time desire to learn the saxophone and play in a *dansi* orchestra. However, *dansi* was especially associated with migrants to Dar es Salaam. This is well exemplified by the background of some early bands and musicians.

The Kipande brothers, Hassani and Ahmed, came to Dar es Salaam from Kilwa in the 1940s. Hassani Kipande was born in Kilwa Kivinje in 1924. After finishing school he went to live with an aunt in Kariakoo, working for the customs and excise department for three years, and then for an Indian accountant. His brother, Ahmed Kipande, born in Kilwa in 1937, joined him in Dar es Salaam in the late 1940s. Both were interested in music; they played flute (*filimbi*) and guitar. In 1946/7 Hassani first heard records by the *Sexteto Habanero* (on 'GV'). These inspired him to construct his own guitar, using strings twisted from car tyres and a coconut shell. A relative, Michael Saidi, had a guitar and Hassani learned from watching him play. His brother, Ahmed, bought a used saxophone from an employee of Barclays Bank and mastered the instrument all by himself. In 1952 they joined the Tanganyika Jazz Band,

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based on New Street (Mtaa wa Lumumba today), with whom they played up to 1953, when they formed their own band. Hassani and Ahmed sought assistance from fellow Kilwans working in government offices. Benefactors, such as Boy Abdalla in the Police Department, and Saidi Shomari who worked at Muhimbili Hospital, enabled them to acquire the necessary instruments to start the band. The Kilwa Jazz Band was founded on July 15 1953, with Ahmed playing saxophone and Hassani on guitar. Ahmed Kipande's songs and saxophone playing with Kilwa Jazz would become one of the mainstays of the Dar es Salaam scene until the band's demise in 1967.

The development and organization of Kilwa Jazz Band was symptomatic of other *dansi* bands at this time. Under the British, regional organisations had been permitted, even encouraged, and had come to dominate among *ngoma* and self-help societies registered since the 1920s.²⁷ *Dansi* bands followed along the same lines, mustering regional loyalty in raising funds to establish and maintain a group, or in recruiting musicians. As with *taarab*, the club structure was their model of choice. A number of well-known Dar es Salaam acts—including Western Jazz Band, Nyamwezi Jazz Band, Ulanga Jazz Band—founded in the 1950s were based on this regional paradigm.²⁸

Acts playing earlier forms of dance music had been around from the 1930s. Dar es Salaam Jazz Band, founded in 1932, was commonly recalled as the first. Oral informants describe the slow transition from *ngoma* and *beni* via the instruments and music of colonial brass bands into *dansi* proper:

There was the 'Waikiki Jazz Band' and people like Mathew Mhohuto and Hamisi Halfani also called 'Machapati'. These were kazoo and guitar bands. Also there were brass bands. There was one guy in Tanga, Zibe Kidasi who had played in a German Military Band. The instruments later were sold to the band and they played modified German brass band music for dances and also traditional music arranged for brass band. (Ally Sykes, 6th May 1987).

There where bands like Dar es Salaam Jazz Band, the Home Boys, Bahari Jazz Band. The first two were formed in the thirties. Music in the thirties used acoustic guitars, ukelele, *nzumari* and drums (*ngoma kubwa*). Early music was not developed. The instruments were new and people tried to figure out what to do with them. (Hassani Kipande 11th May 1987).

The earliest bands in the 1930s had one banjo, violin, one *ngoma* and maybe *filimbi* (flute), also everybody sang. Then later on came the records, the GV's, and they started to imitate. Latin American or English. There were up to three banjos, or two guitars, the bass drum, and singers. Dar es Salaam Jazz first had trumpet and violin. Later came two guitars . . . In 1958 they still had violins. Also there was a banjo, trumpet, saxophone, no drum set, only a bass drum, tumba and maracas. The Dar es Salaam Jazz Band was formed in 1932. I joined in 1960. (Michael Enoch, Mwenge 17th July 1987).

Individuals played selfmade or so-called 'Gallotone' acoustic guitars. The classic instrumental line-up of jazz bands was reached by the mid-1940s.

Salum Abdallah, who was to become one of Tanganyika's most famous singers and composers, describes how around this time he was sent on business trips by his father to Dar es Salaam, where he took the opportunity to watch Dar es Salaam Jazz perform. He would also steal away from home on nights the band played in Morogoro. The attraction of Dar es Salaam Jazz was the full set of instruments compared to Morogoro groups still using just acoustic guitars and drums. In 1948 Salum finally managed to get the same instruments after he secretly sold a house owned by his father.²⁹

New bands were also set up by returnees from Word War II, such as Ally Sykes. Sykes played guitar in a British army entertainment corps in Burma. After the war he lived in Nairobi, where he played in the band of his former army boss, Peter Colmore. On his return to Dar es Salaam in 1948 he founded the Merry Blackbirds. Sykes then bought a saxophone and was trained by a former bandmaster in the Police Band. Alongside Sykes on sax, the Merry Blackbirds instrumental line-up consisted of trumpet, trombone, clarinets, guitar, piano, drums and bass (played by Saidi Kastiko). They performed for a more upmarket audience in clubs and hotels meant for whites, or at expatriate weddings, as well as for an up-and-coming African upper class out for fashionable entertainment. In 1951 the Merry Blackbirds were the first to record for Sauti ya Dar es Salaam, the newly opened radio station, broadcasting in the Dar es Salaam area only at this time. Sykes also worked part-time for the station as an announcer, and his band provided some of the accompanying music.

Surviving recordings of the Merry Blackbirds are mainly instrumental and are stylistically in the swing jazz mode. A more down home sound is exemplified by the Dar es Salaam Jazz Band's recordings made from 1950 onwards by South Africa's Gallotone label. The earliest recordings feature a mix of string instruments (violins, acoustic guitars, mandolins, banjo, possibly ukulele) with woodwinds (clarinets) and brass (trumpets). Over time *dansi* came to be dominated by woodwinds and brass, as saxophones and more trumpets were added (and the violins and other acoustic stringed instruments removed). By the late 1950s, the electric guitar had become the major instrument, with the horn section losing importance except for some coloration in juxtaposition to the vocals. Rhythms played on the recordings are mainly Latin, with occasional foxtrots or waltzes. Lyrics are invariably in Swahili, with commentary on, for example, the problems of male-female relationships or the dangers of city life.

Lyrics from these early recordings often topicalize life in Dar es Salaam, giving us a glimpse of how the city was conceived. Mohamed Bwagajuga belongs to the older generation of itinerant solo singers accompanying themselves with a stringed instrument (either local or acoustic guitar). His song 'Dar es Salaam usiende' was recorded *circa* 1950:

Dar Es Salaam nanena wako watu wabaya
Wenye visa vingi sana ewe mami nakwambia
Dar Es Salaam usiende wenzio wakuvizia kwa vishoka na vijembe
Oo mami, oo mami, oo mama
Ninasikitika sana Dar Es Salaam mbaya sana

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I am talking about Dar es Salaam, there are really bad people.
They are giving you endless difficulties, oh mama.
Don't go to Dar es Salaam where your fellow citizens ambush you with axes and knives.
Oh mami, oh mami, oh mama.
It is really making me sad, Dar es Salaam is really bad.³⁰

'Dar es Salaam' by the Rhythm Makers is a similarly cautionary ode to city life (also recorded *circa* 1950):

Dar Es Salaam ni mji mkubwa we
Una furaha na vitisho vingi we
Ukifika huko mtoto wangu we
Angalia maneno haya yangu we
Ukivuka barabara angalia pande zote
Usipojiangalia utakufa kaburini
Kwa sababu ya magari, basikeli hata miziki-kinya bus
Zinakimbia mbio sana huko Dar Es Salaam
Sijamaliza kusema mtoto we
Kwani kuna mambo mengine mengi we
Tega sikio lako mwana wangu we
Ukitaka kuwa na raha nyingi we
Uendako kwenye dansi, mpirani au sokoni
Wanawake huko moto hata na wahuni moto
Kwa kuwa haja yao wote ni moja ni mapesa yako yote
Ujihidhari mwana wangu huko Dar Es Salaam
Ukifika huko mtoto wangu we
Uwe mpole na mwangalifu we
Yaani kwa njia hiyo utapona we
Ukifika huko Dar Es Salama we
Fanya kazi zako zote usipokuwa na kazi
Usijaribu kamari kwa kuwa hiyo hatari
Yaani kamari itakufundisha vitendo vingine vya wizi
Na mwisho wa wizi ni jela huko Dar Es Salama

Dar es Salaam is really a big place.
There are many joys and threats to be encountered side by side.
When you arrive there my child,
Remember my words:
When you cross the streets, first look on all sides.
If you don't watch out you will die,
Because the cars, bicycles and even the city buses.
All drive with speed in Dar es Salaam.
I have not finished yet my child.
There are many other matters to consider.
Listen carefully:
If you want to enjoy yourself,
When you go out to a dance, a football match, or to the market:
The women are really hot, and the bandits are really hot!
All they want is one thing, that is your money!
Be careful my child, there in Dar es Salaam!
When you arrive there, my child
Beware and watch out
It is the only way to survive intact
When you arrive there in Dar es Salaam
Do your work, if you don't have work
Don't try gambling, this is dangerous.

Because gambling will teach you how to steal
And the outcome of stealing in Dar es Salaam is going to jail.³¹

Both songs clearly portray a certain uneasiness about the city. Associational life, notably urban-based regional organisations, seem to have been an antidote to estrangement and the breakdown of social norms in the urban arena. One respondent in Leslie's social survey, for example, stated his preference for regional, customary *ngoma* to ballroom dancing, because:

they are traditional and are dances by people of the same tribe, not just anyone. And as they are traditional anybody who is an outsider will be unable to create a disturbance; the elders are there too, to see that everything is done properly. I prefer this because people then dance in an orderly and organized manner.³²

A similar impulse might have been at the root of the formation of dance bands based on regional affiliation. Friendly relationships or institutionalized rivalries (*utani*) also existed between different clubs. So, early on Dar es Salaam Jazz and Cuban Marimba from Morogoro were affiliated, as were Morogoro Jazz and Kilwa Jazz rather later.³³ Connected groups would invite each other to give joint performances. However, there were also prominent rivalries between bands, as they tried to outdo each other at specially arranged competitive dances. These were attended by the two contestants' fans, who would follow their favourite band to a bar or dance hall across town. In this respect, *dansi* resembled the earlier *beni* genre, with the spiderweb of association of competing societies in different towns and regions. With competition between clubs increasing over time, they tried to attract major musicians, singers or composers by paying outstanding individuals a monthly fee, and sometimes, if they were recruited from further away, allowing them to live in the club premises. When he joined them in 1960, for example, Michael Enoch was the only paid member of the Dar es Salaam Jazz Band.

Dansi clubs were organised along similar lines to their *taarab* counterparts. All members, including the musicians, paid a nominal membership fee. Income from playing in bars or concerts went to the club which covered the rent, general upkeep of the club, renewal of instruments, etc. In times of personal or familial difficulties money was lent or given to club members. Attracted by the music and club life, young boys used to hang around the clubs. Some picked up an instrument to become musicians, like Juma Hassan Town (saxophone player with Dar es Salaam Jazz and later on Mlimani Park Orchestra):

I was born in Kisiju, Kisarawe district in 1941. When my father died in 1949 I came to live with some of his relatives on Mtaa wa Congo in Kariakoo. But my father's relatives did not really care for me, I did not get proper food or clothing, nor did they send me to school. The clubhouse of the Dar es Salaam Jazz Band was very close to where I lived, on Mtaa wa Mchikichi No. 8. Also there was the Sunderland Football club... on Congo [Street]. I really liked to hang around the club of Dar es Salaam Jazz. The musicians sent me out to get cigarettes or later when I was bigger I helped to carry the instruments to the gig. For example there was Tanganyika

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Legion, or the KCC in Ilala. I stayed to listen to the music and I really got a liking for it and decided to become a musician. Before I only made errands for the club elders: Mzee Muba, the late Hamisi Machapati ... But I could enter the club as I liked and fooled around on the instruments; guitar, drums. They could not refuse me. They did not teach me, I only tried on my own. It was Michael [Enoch] who taught me bass, and drum, then rhythm, and saxophone. Even today if I have a problem or a question I ask him. So at the time when the instruments were back from a gig I used to sleep there on the benches. My relatives did not care; they did not even ask where I was. (Juma Hassan 'Town', Kariakoo, 29th March 1989).

1960 to 1980s: *ushirika* into deep Zaramo

Music clubs, both *dansi* and *taarab*, dominated the scene well into the 1960s, yet after independence a new model emerged, arising from a post-independence political dispensation that saw TANU, the ruling party, exercise growing control over all aspects of Tanzanian society.

Muhiddin Maalim Gurumo was born in Masaki village close to Dar es Salaam in 1938. Spending his childhood in the village he grew up with Zaramo culture. He also attended government school there for a couple of years, but after his father's death in the early 1950s, he went to Dar es Salaam to stay with a maternal uncle. The uncle sent him to Quranic school, however, he soon got involved in a street band:

I liked to listen to the songs of Salum Abdallah on the radio. When I came to Dar es Salaam I joined a children's band, a small group, which played the streets in the evenings. The others liked me because I had a good voice, and I was usually the lead singer. The music we played was just this street-type of music, just to please people. When there was a celebration somewhere, an *ngoma* for example, we also went there. We joined whatever was going on, we just played, there was no money involved. We sang other people's songs. Like those of Salum Abdallah, we liked them very much. We heard them on the radio, or on the gramophones. And we listened hard, put it all down in our heads and then we taught the others in our group. Then in 1958 I joined another group, we had an acoustic guitar at the time and I sang first voice. In the same year, Salum Monde, who was the guitar player and I were invited to join Kilimanjaro Cha Cha, a band which played at the Amana Club in Ilala. (Muhiddin Maalim Gurumo, Ubungo, 14th March 1989).

Muhiddin stayed with Kilimanjaro Cha Cha until 1962, when he joined the Rufiji Jazz Band, and then Kilwa B Jazz Band. In late 1964, soon after its foundation, Muhiddin moved to the NUTA Jazz Band, set up as an entertainment group by the national body of trade unions (hence the acronym NUTA – National Union of Tanzanian Workers). NUTA Jazz was to become the model for many groups set up in post-independence Tanzania, a time of increasing state control over cultural production. The importation of all items

not deemed necessary for subsistence was restricted—luxury items such as musical instruments and amplification among them—and all private musical ventures were soon in severe difficulties. Among the big name groups, Kilwa Jazz faltered in 1967; others survived into the 1970s, like the Dar es Salaam and Western Jazz Bands. State and parastatal bodies were not as hard hit by austerity politics, however, and soon there was a plethora of so-called *ushirika* ('collective') bands. The party youth organization set up Vijana Jazz, Urafiki Textile Mills had their Urafiki Jazz; others were to follow: UDA Jazz (city bus company), Bima Lee (National Insurance), Magereza (Prisons), Mwenge Jazz Band (Army), JKT (National Service). Some of these organizations also had *ngoma*, *taarab*, acrobatics, theatre mixed entertainment groups, and also managed dance or social halls. The Dar es Salaam Development Corporation (DDC), for example, which not only ran the Kariakoo, Magomeni and Kibisa Social Halls, but later acquired the Mlimani Park Orchestra from the TTTS (Tanzania Transport and Taxi Services), which had set up the band for their Mlimani Park Bar in Mwenge.³⁴

With NUTA Jazz (later Juwata Jazz) Muhiddin Maalim grew into one of Dar es Salaam's (and Tanzania's) major composers and singers, his voice and tongue-in-cheek topical lyrics an easily recognizable trademark. He left the group in 1978, when TTTS lured a number of Dar es Salaam's musical stars to set up a resident band for the Mlimani Park Bar. Together with his former partner of NUTA days, solo guitarist Abel Balthazar, and Dar es Salaam Jazz Band veteran Michael Enoch, Muhiddin helped to fashion possibly the strongest new voice on the Tanzanian scene for the decade to come, with a sound that was purely Tanzanian and with strong links to Zaramo culture, the city's major repository of entertainment forms.³⁵

The 1960s jazz band fashion had betrayed strong Congolese influences, sometimes copying the whole instrumental arrangement of songs by Congolese bands such as African Jazz or OK Jazz and putting Swahili lyrics to them. Core members of NUTA Jazz had been Congolese, and Dar es Salaam continued to attract visiting bands and musicians from the eastern Congo throughout the 1970s, many opting to stay on in peaceful Tanzania, rather than face civil unrest at home. However, while Congolese rumba formed an important influence, some local musicians sought to root their compositions more firmly in the city's musical culture; not least Muhiddin Maalim, who may rightly be termed the grand master of *mitindo* (sing. *mtindo*). The *mtindo* – which translates as 'style' or 'dance style' – is a kind of musical trademark which distinguishes a particular band, as well as a dance which is closely associated with it. The *mtindo* is used like a second band name and for fans it expresses the affection for their music. In everyday language, *mitindo* names are often used as synonyms for dancing *per se*. Many *mitindo* refer to musical traditions of Tanzania: thus Muhiddin introduced NUTA's *msondo ngoma*, named after a particular (though widespread) type of drum, and of a dance common among ethnic groups of eastern Tanzania. He also introduced Mlimani Park's *Sikinde* and later on, in the 1980s, International Safari Sound's *Ndekule*, both names of Zaramo *ngoma*.

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Sikinde ngoma ya ukae means ‘*Sikinde*, the *ngoma* from home’. At my home in Uzaramo we used to have an *ngoma* by the name of *sikinde*. There were many: *sikinde*, *ndekule*, *mtondoo*, *kabele*, *dekesa*. Our elders danced many *ngoma*. My mother was a famous singer in *sikinde*; therefore you can say that I somehow inherited this work of being a singer. These were *ngoma*, which were danced earlier, they no longer exist. Both women and men danced *Sikinde*. It was played for initiation or wedding festivities, the whole night. The men play drums, the women sing. ... Some elements of the *Sikinde* style play a part in the dancing, however it is not identical to the *sikinde ngoma*. We play our regular music; we use *Sikinde* or *Ndekule* only as a kind of emblem. (Muhiddin Maalim Gurumo, Ubungo 14th March 1989).

The *mitindo* terminology evokes the practice of regional or ethnic *ngoma*, however we should not expect carbon copies of these customary entertainments. *Muziki wa dansi* is an independent contemporary practice which evolved over decades. Still, in the social organization of dance bands—which, as we have seen, developed out of dance and social clubs similar to preceding urban organizations such as *beni*; and in the practices of *malumbano* (‘verbal jousting’) and *utani* (‘teasing’), competitive song exchanges between bands—we find ample evidence for principles which may be linked to the organizational principles of earlier musical forms such as *ngoma* societies.³⁶ The *mitindo* may act as a form of cover for these tendencies, engendering a kind of *communitas* among the followers of a dance band, and rooting this contemporary entertainment in established social structures inherited from earlier forms of city entertainment. Performances by Mlimani Park, and some of the other local bands would often turn into almost pure *ngoma* events, with extended *mdundiko* (a Zaramo dance) style line dances around the venue.

By the late 1970s the instrumentation of dance bands had become standardized with a basic sound of three guitars (solo, 2nd solo and rhythm guitar), bass guitar, drum set and congas, plus a line-up of 2-3 trumpets and 2-3 saxophones sharing the frontline with 3-6 singers. Mlimani Park’s was the most intricate and powerful realization. Under the guidance of Michael Enoch the group further developed the characteristic three-guitar interplay with the 2nd solo guitar filling out empty spaces between rhythm and solo guitar, with Enoch himself taking part in the bands’s inimitable 3-trumpet, 3-saxophone horn arrangements. The lead singers, among them Muhiddin Maalim, Cosmas Tobias Chidumule, and Hassani Bitchuka, composed a string of memorable hits, among them Muhiddin Maalim’s ‘Kassim’, and a follow up ‘Kassim amefilisika’ about a social type common in Dar es Salaam’s dance halls at the time:

**ulipokuwa huna kazi Kassimu we
ulikuwa hutoki nyumbani
sasa umepata kazi ndugu yangu we
nyumbani huonekani**

unapotoka kazini: unapitia kwenye baa
unapokuta marafiki: unaagiza: lete kama tulivyo
unaporudi nyumbani: umelewa kibao
unamwambia mama watoto: pesa zote zimeibiwa

unapotoka kazini: unapitia kwenye baa
unapokaribishwa kiti: unaagiza: lete sanduku moja
**unapokuwa huna pesa nyumbani hutoki
mwisho wa mwezi unapofika Kassimu huonekani**

**When you had no work, Kassimu, you did not leave your home.
Now, that you have got work, you are never seen at home.**

After work, you pass the bars, when meeting friends you order: 'Give us as usual.'
When returning home, you are dead drunk,
telling the mother of your children that all the money has been stolen.
After work, you pass the bars, when you are welcomed to sit, you order: 'Give us a whole crate!'

**When you have no money, you never leave your home.
When the end of the month comes, Kassimu, you are never seen [at home].³⁷**

**ndugu zangu mwenzenu: ninajiuliza aa;
kwa mambo niliyofanya: wakati ule ni mabaya sana
nilikuwa napata pesa nyingi
lakini matumizi yangu ya hali ya juu
ninapokuwa na pesa mfukoni
nawatafuta marafiki tukatumie**

**SASA PESA ZIMEMUISHIA KASSIMU
HANA LA KUFANYA EE**

nikiingia kwenye baa ninaagiza chupa moja
rudishe change haraka - *na mie moja Kassim*
sina habari

**SASA PESA ZIMEMUISHIA KASSIMU
HANA LA KUFANYA EE**

nikiingia kwenye baa ninaagiza chupa moja
lete change yangu haraka - *eh ndiyo maana umefilisika siku hizi Kassim*
sina pesa ya mchezo

**SASA PESA ZIMEMUISHIA KASSIMU EE
HANA LA KUFANYA EE - nimefilisika ile ngumu**

hapo zamani nilikuwa naitwa Kassimu
wa kustarehe na wa kutumia sana
sasa pesa sina
na marafiki zangu sijaona hata mmoja nyumbani kwangu alikuja kutembelea
sijui nitafanyaje

**My brothers: I am asking myself about the things I did in the past. I
behaved badly!
I earned a lot of money, but I also spent lavishly
When I had money in my pocket, I looked out for some friends to spend
with.**

NOW KASSIMU IS WITHOUT ANYTHING, HE CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT
When I enter a bar now, I order one bottle of beer:
'Give me back my change, fast!' *'What about one for me?'* 'I don't care.'

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NOW KASSIMU IS WITHOUT ANYTHING, HE CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT

When I enter a bar now, I order one bottle of beer:

‘Give me back my change, I want to leave.’ ‘Does that mean you are broke these days, Kassimu?’

‘I have got no money to play around with.’

NOW KASSIMU IS WITHOUT ANYTHING, HE CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT – ‘I am really broke!’

In the past I was called Kassimu, the goodtime guy and spender.

Now I have got no money,

and of all my friends I haven’t even seen one who has come to my place to visit me.

I don’t know what to do.³⁸

Despite the difficulties in maintaining a band in those days, alongside the *ushirika* units a number of private individuals or companies also managed bands and places of entertainment. Most prominent in relation to *muziki wa dansi* were Hugo Kisima of Safari Investments and OMACO. Kisima owned a transport and building contractor’s business and a bar, the Safari Resort in Kimara, with its own resident band, Orchestre Safari Sound (OSS). Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, the band was generally led by musicians from the eastern parts of the Congo (then Zaire). Best remembered as band leaders are the singer King Kiki and guitarist Ndala Kasheba, who made OSS into one of Dar es Salaam’s hottest bands. Their biggest rival for the more upper-crust dance audience that OSS attracted was Orchestre Maquis du Zaire (in the 1980s rebaptized Orchestre Maquis Original). Members of Maquis, originally from Lubumbashi, had come to Dar es Salaam in the 1970s for a tour, but decided to stay on. They were one of the big success stories of Dar es Salaam’s music scene, maintaining their popularity well into the 1990s. Following local trends in business organization, the band became a cooperative (OMACO), and even bought a farm just outside Dar es Salaam, marketing its produce in the Kariakoo vegetable market. It also owned the White House Club in Ubungu, and built housing for band members in the Sinza area of town. Interestingly, Remmy Ongala, another Congolese import, and Tanzania’s best known musician internationally, attracted a very different grass roots audience. Through his socially conscious music and lyrics in the 1980s and 1990s, Ongala developed a substantial following amongst the city’s poorer residents in particular.³⁹

In terms of music and general performance style both Maquis and OSS were taken to offer a more high-class and fashionable type of entertainment; as compared to Ongala and especially to local bands with stronger roots in the city’s culture and their link to government and party via *ushirika*. Tellingly, for example, Maquis’ *mtindo* of the late 1970s and early 1980s, *Kamanyola bila jasho*, ‘dance Kamanyola without sweating’, indicated their laid-back and easy going style. Moreover, they tended to play the more fashionable and expensive clubs of the times, such as the White House, and later Mwenge’s Silent Inn and Kinondoni’s Lang’ata Social Hall.

The 1990s and into the new millenium

Comparison of NUTA/Mlimani and Maquis/OSS reflects emerging class

distinctions in Dar es Salaam's entertainment world. Such socio-economic differentiation would become more pronounced in the 1990s. Economical and political liberalization, especially that of the media-landscape by mid-decade, resulted in the transformation of the music scene.

Dansi's popularity declined in the 1990s, though it remains popular live and, amongst others, OTTU (formerly NUTA), again headed by Muhiddin Maalim, and their main rivals Mlimani Park, are still performing. On the other hand a substantial revival of *taarab* has occurred in the form of so-called *modern taarab* or *mipasho*, which has attracted a large following among the city's female population beyond the boundaries of coastal society.⁴⁰ More generally, the younger generation has become dominant in local music production and consumption. However, this is hardly unidirectional as apologetics about the demise of African performing traditions and the globalizing thrust of international media usually hold, but still reflects a strong rootedness in the city's performing traditions. Thus while one section of Tanzanian youth goes international—following the latest global trends in rap and hip-hop, though in a vibrant local form with trenchant Swahili lyrics⁴¹—another section goes local in embracing an *mchiriku* form that reflects the ongoing vitality of the *ngoma* impulse.

Walking any of Dar es Salaam's poorer suburbs on a weekend night one is bound to run into an *mchiriku*. From afar it is usually the high din of the Casio (keyboard) that cuts through the night. Drawing closer one can make out the deep throb of drums and the amplified solo voice. Amplification is somehow the distinguishing feature—setting *mchiriku* apart from other urban *ngoma* forms popular in Dar es Salaam, like *mdundiko* or *chakacha* (a Swahili wedding *ngoma* popular all along the coast). Electricity can hardly be depended on here, or is not found at all, and performers work with battery powered systems seemingly used decades back to make public announcements: a tiny microphone linked to the amplified megaphone. Some provision is usually made to link more than one megaphone, and to hook a contact mike or pickup to the diminutive speaker of the handheld Casio. Feedback and distortion are part of the desired effect, as the lead vocalist(s) bellows out strings of songs for hours on end, to be joined by a chorus of fellow club members and the audience, the intermittent keyboard melodies offering respite for the singer(s) to catch breath. Four differently tuned drums are part of the proceedings, the lowest being placed over a hole dug into the ground to give a booming sound. Originally *mchiriku* derives from a Zaramo wedding *ngoma*. The city version has taken on elements of *mganda* (a coastal dance popular until the early seventies, when it was banned), *mdundiko* and *chakacha*. Occasions for the city-type *mchiriku* include wedding celebrations, naming or circumcision ceremonies. The whole neighborhood gets involved. Later at night, *mchiriku* takes in the city's low-life; illegally brewed liquor, drugs, unruly lyrics and licentious dancing abound at such events. Because of these latter associations, the public performance of *mchiriku* was officially banned in some districts of Dar es Salaam in the mid-1990s.

Mchiriku groups are among the most prolific musicians on the Dar es Salaam scene these days, with dozens of professional groups both performing live, and recording and releasing cassettes; let alone the the amateurs operating on

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a more local basis. Their lyrical subject matter, not unlike Remmy Ongala's or those of young rappers', addresses the plight of youth struggling to make a living, or provides commentary on larger political or social issues. Lately there has been some experimentation with new sounds, including bass guitar or guitars, expanding the traditional line-up and aiming for a cross between *dansi* and *ngoma*. Similar experiments have also started to root the latest trends in *modern taarab* by marrying its instruments (synthesizer and drum machine) and its incisive verbal poetry, with Zaramo *ngoma* melodies and rhythms, creating a mix that oscillates between *taarab*'s sweeter melodic development, the bass guitar echoing the *sanduku* (tea-chest bass) prominent in Zanzibar's *kidumbak*, the long drawn out *mchiriku* jams, or the bite of *unyago* initiation song lyrics.⁴²

Conclusion

I want to know where I will go?
I know where I come from,
where I'll go, I don't know ...

As I ponder: we've come from afar!
Since independence, here in this city-of-use-your-brain.
The call still is: survive working under the scorching sun.
I don't care, I know there will be a day...⁴³

At the beginning of the 20th century, while it retained a rural feel, Dar es Salaam was a fast growing town. Already there was a vibrant scene of urban *ngoma*. However, it could not yet compare to established Swahili centres such as Mombasa, Lamu, or even Tanga. *Beni* societies flourished in these latter towns rather earlier than in Dar es Salaam, which lacked a well-established Swahili core population. By the inter-war years, though, as *taarab* emerged here at the same time as other coastal towns, it had caught up. A recording session in Dar es Salaam in 1930 only yielded recordings by *ngoma* ensembles, yet barely two years later the city featured the most fashionable entertainments in *taarab* clubs and the up-and-coming craze of rumba. *Taarab* and *muziki wa dansi* became mainstays of city entertainment for decades to come, with the latter coming to dominate the media landscape as well as the city's nightlife circuit in the post-independence period and well into the 1990s. A strong *ngoma* undercurrent, especially Zaramo *ngoma*, remained alive, as is borne out by the introduction of the *mdundiko* in 1980s *dansi*, or the popularity of *mchiriku* in the 1990s. *Modern taarab*, the most immediate post-media liberalization success of the 1990s, has also of late come under the Zaramo spell. After decades of cultural austerity, there is now a plethora of musical styles following global media models, most visibly a vibrant Swahili rap culture. We may take 2-Proud's mid-1990s rap 'Ni Wapi Tunakwenda?' ('Where are we heading to?') as a starting point to ask where music entertainment in the city will move: in much that is produced with the newly available resources of sequencers and drum machines might sound like *jua kali* bricolage, the right questions continue to be posed in the lyrics. The stories that *muziki wa dansi* and *taarab* used to tell

have now become part of a larger musical universe, including rap and reggae, *mchiriku*, musical currents from other African countries, MTV sounds, all leading to a new kind of *bongo flava* firmly rooted in the city's and East Africa's musical culture.

Notes

¹ See Alex Perullo, 'The life that I live: popular music, agency and urban society in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', Indiana University Ph.D. thesis (2003); and chapter 11 herein.

² Karl Weule, *Negerleben in Ost-Afrika. Ergebnisse einer ethnologischen Forschungsreise* (Leipzig, 1909). The photographs appear on pages 6 and 53. The paragraph describing the recording appears on page 43. According to Weule's description his cinematographic endeavor failed, the cylinder recordings, however, might have survived at the Museum für Völkerkunde in Leipzig.

³ *Usambara-Post*, 31st December 1908, pp. 1-3.

⁴ Terence O. Ranger, *Dance and society in East Africa 1890-1970: The beni ngoma* (London/Nairobi, 1975), p. 38.

⁵ Except where otherwise indicated, this paragraph is based on *ibid.*, which gives an excellent account of the origin and spread of *beni* through Eastern Africa.

⁶ John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 248.

⁷ Assistant Political Officer, Dar es Salaam, 8th October 1919, quoted in Ranger, *Dance*, p. 75.

⁸ Ranger, *Dance*, p. 75.

⁹ Quote from Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam* (Oxford, 2005), p. 58 (fn. 57), summarising Ranger, *ibid.*, pp. 94-6.

¹⁰ Quoted in Ranger, *ibid.*, pp. 93-4.

¹¹ Tadasu Tsuruta, 'Popular music, sports, and politics: a development of urban cultural movements in Dar es Salaam, 1930s-1960s', *African Study Monographs*, 24:3 (2003), p. 200.

¹² This section is mainly based on conversations with Abdulbar Diwani, Kijitonyama 22nd July, 1987; Hamisi Akida, Mnazi Mmoja 17th July 1987; members of Al-Watan Musical Club, Kariakoo, 4th August 1987; Shehe Salim Boga, Abasi Mzee & other members of Egyptian Music Club, Kariakoo, 2nd August 2001, Abdallah Awadh, Kariakoo, 03rd August 2001.

¹³ This paragraph draws on the following sources: David Henry Anthony, 'Culture and society in a town in transition: a people's history of Dar es Salaam, 1865-1939', Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin (1983); Werner Graebner, 'Tarabu – Populäre musik am Indischen Ozean', in V. Erlmann (ed.), *Populäre Musik in Afrika* (Berlin, 1988), pp. 181-200; Laura Fair, *Pastimes and Politics: Culture, community and identity in post-abolition urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945* (Athens OH, 2001); Kelly M. Askew, *Performing the Nation: Swahili music and cultural politics in Tanzania* (Chicago, 2002); Tsuruta, 'Popular music'.

¹⁴ Janet Topp Fargion, 'The role of women in *taraab* in Zanzibar: an historical examination of the process of "Africanisation"', *The World of Music*, 35:2 (1993), p. 116.

¹⁵ Abduldar also spent some of his childhood years in Unguja (Zanzibar island), where his father went to work.

¹⁶ Hamisi Akida came to live in Dar es Salaam from Tanga in 1938, and the town remained his principal base for the remainder of the twentieth century.

¹⁷ The earliest recording activity in East Africa is usually dated to the period from 1928 to 1930, when a number of major companies of the time made recordings either on-site in East Africa (Columbia, Odeon), or sent artists to Bombay (HMV) or Marseilles (Pathé) respectively for recording (cf. Graebner 1989a, 2004b). Even though none of those earlier recording has surfaced so far, there is some credibility to Abdulbar's memory, since he was among the artists recorded by Odeon in 1930. Siti binti Saad's recordings appeared from 1928. See also Laura Fair, *Pastimes and Politics*, chapter four.

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¹⁸ Katrin Bromber, personal communication, January 2002.

¹⁹ He recorded in Mombasa for the German company *Odeon*.

²⁰ Werner Graebner, 'The first 35 years of commercial recording in East Africa 1928-1963: Processes of institutionalization', Seminar paper, Institute of African Studies, University of Nairobi (1989).

²¹ By 1937 the line-up included Abdulbar, Bom Amberon, Salim Mboga, Mussa Mwaikombo, Abdallah Moh'd Majahanun, Said Moh'd Bajanun, Mngazija Shioni, Hamisi Akida, Moh'd Fadhil and female singer Mwanaisha Mkongwe.

²² A *takht* ensemble consists of some of the basic instruments of Arabic music, qanun (78-string plucked zither), 'ud (lute), nai (bamboo flute), rabab or violin, dumbak (small drum), and riq (tambourine). The expanding firqa orchestras, doubled some of the voices adding complete string sections of violins, cellos, accordion, later electric guitar and organ. The first Egyptian sound films premiered in 1932, and soon famous musicians like Mohamed Abdelwahhab and Um Kulthum were starring in these feature films. Elsewhere in the Swahili world, in Mombasa the Jauhar Musical Club and Morning Star were formed, in Zanzibar the Ikhwani Safaa Musical Club was revived. Dar es Salaam's first cinema, the Empire, opened in 1929. Sound film was introduced in 1932, and a second cinema opened in 1934. For a history of cinema in Dar es Salaam, see James R. Brennan, 'Democratizing Cinema and Censorship in Tanzania, 1920-1980', *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 38:3 (2005), pp. 481-511; for Zanzibar, see Brigette Reinwald, 'Tonight at the Empire: cinéma et urbanite à Zanzibar, 1920-1970', *Afrique & histoire* 5 (2006), pp. 81-110, and Laura Fair, 'Hollywood Hegemony? Hardly: Audience Preferences in Zanzibar, 1950s-1970s', *ζIFF Journal* 1:1 (2004), pp. 52-58.

²³ J.A.K. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 201-3.

²⁴ Askew, *Performing the Nation*, pp. 275-7.

²⁵ Information in this section mainly derives from conversations with Hassani Kipande, Magogoni 11 May 1987, Ally Sykes, Dar es Salaam, 6th May 1987; Michael Enoch, Mwenge 17th July 1987; Juma Hassan 'Town', Kariakoo 29th March 1989.

²⁶ 'Siwezi kuliacha rumba' is a quote from one of the most popular songs of the 1940s, 'Chaupele Mpenzi'. The song spread all over East Africa at the time, and a number of recordings exist from various regions of Tanzania (all made in 1950 during a recording expedition organized by Hugh Tracy of the International Library of African Music); cf. Hugh Tracy, 'Recording tour, May to November 1950 East Africa' *African Music Society Newsletter* 1:4, pp. 38-51. The quote is from an autobiography of Kanyama Chiume, a Malawian politician who attended school in Dar es Salaam in the 1940s. M.M. Hartnoll, in a short account on African pastimes reports about the demise of *ngoma* in Dar es Salaam and the rise of *dansi*: 'Already in Dar es Salaam most *ngomas* are nothing but sideshows taking their place, on high-days and holidays, among the merry-go-rounds and shooting galleries provided by an enterprising foreigner. This kind of *ngoma*, and the "Europeani danci clubu" which exists in most towns, are the only dances which are purely pastimes, and have no tribal significance'. 'Some African pastimes', *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 5 (1938), p. 31.

²⁷ See Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp. 333-334.

²⁸ For the *Ulanga*, *Rufiji*, and *Western Jazz Bands*, see Tadasu Tsuruta, 'Popular music, sports, and politics: A development of urban cultural movements in Dar es Salaam', *African Study Monographs*, 24:3 (2003), pp. 195-222.

²⁹ Jumaa R.R. Mkabarah, *Salum Abdallah: Mwanamuziki wa Tanzania*, (Dar es Salaam, 1972), pp. 11ff.

³⁰ Mohamed Bwagajuga 'Dar es Salaam Usiende'. One 78 rpm record. Gallotone GB 1262, Side B.

³¹ Rhythm Makers 'Dar es Salama'. One 78 rpm record. Gallotone TA 61, Side B.

³² Leslie, *Survey*, p. 92.

³³ See also Tsuruta, 'Popular music, sports, and politics', *op. cit.*, pp. 203-206.

³⁴ The new structures took over the model of the club, i.e. hiring of musicians against a salary, instruments owned by the organization. In addition to wages they often also provided housing, transport and medical care.

³⁵ For further analysis of such links, see Tadasu Tsuruta, 'Urban-Rural Relationships in

Colonial Dar es Salaam: Some Notes on Ethnic Associations and Recreations, 1930s-1950s', *Memoirs of the Faculty of Agriculture of Kinki University*, Volume 36 (2003), pp. 67-68.

³⁶ Werner Graebner, 'Ngoma ya ukae: Competitive social structure in Tanzanian dance music songs', in Frank Gunderson and Gregory Bartz (eds.), *Mashindano! Competitive music performance in East Africa* (Dar es Salaam, 2003), pp. 295-318.

³⁷ Muhiddin Maalim Gurumo & Mlimani Park Orchestra. 'Kassim', Recording: Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, 7th November 1978. Bold print denotes chorus vocals.

³⁸ Muhiddin Maalim Gurumo & Mlimani Park Orchestra, 'Kassim Amefilisika', Recording: Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, 18th December 1979. Bold print, caps and italics denote different voices and voices qualities (solo, chorus) in the text.

³⁹ See Werner Graebner, 'Whose music? The Songs of Remmy Ongala and Orchestra Super Matimila', *Popular Music* 8:3 (1989), pp. 243-258 [reprinted in Karin Barber (ed.), *Readings in African Popular Culture* (London/Indiana, 1997), pp. 110-117].

⁴⁰ This has hardly had an effect, however, on the clubs or ensembles previously existing in the city. On the rise of *modern taarab/mipasho* in Dar es Salaam, see Werner Graebner, 'Wape vidonge vyao: Taarab as a vital language in East Africa', in Peter Probst & Gerd Spittler (eds.), *Between Resistance and Expansion: Approaching Local Vitality in Africa* (Münster, 2004); and Siri Lange, 'Muungano and TOT: Rivals on the urban cultural scene', in Gunderson Bartz (eds.), *Mashindano*, pp. 67-85. On the general changes in the 1990s Tanzanian cultural scene, see Askew, *Performing the nation*.

⁴¹ See Perullo's chapter herein.

⁴² For examples of this *taarab-Zaramo ngoma* crossover cf. the recent hit recordings: Young Stars Musical Club. *Segere*. One audio cassette. Dar es Salaam: FKW, 2001; and Tandale Modern Theatre. *Mbereko*. One audio cassette. Dar es Salaam: GMC, 2002.

⁴³ 2-Proud, 'Ni Wapi Tunakwenda' from *Niite Mr. II*. One audio cassette. Dar es Salaam: FM Music Bank.

Chapter Eight

Simba or Yanga? Football and urbanization in Dar es Salaam

Tadasu Tsuruta

Football has been by far the most popular sport throughout Africa from the colonial period up to the present. Tanzania is no exception, but its football scene has a rather distinctive aspect as compared to the other countries. What makes Tanzanian football unique is the existence of two longtime rivals, the most prominent clubs in the country: namely Simba and Yanga. Their popularity has spread nationwide over more than half a century, dividing millions of Tanzanian football enthusiasts into two groups. A journalist noted in the mid-1970s that the duopoly reached such a position of dominance that Tanzanians often identified themselves by team allegiance, asking one another, 'Are you Simba or Yanga?'¹

For many men in urban Tanzania over the past sixty years, football has been an integral part of their everyday life. It is not merely a spectator sport, but also an important social activity. Street football teams in Tanzania emerged as community-based social clubs, fostering rival relations within each urban centre and forming networks among other clubs in different towns. This phenomenon is best represented in the development of Simba and Yanga, which grew from small street teams in 1940s Dar es Salaam into teams with enthusiastic nationwide support by the 1970s.

The purpose of this article is to trace a historical outline of the development of these two teams, with special reference to their relationship to processes of urbanization and social change. The discussion is divided into two parts. The first describes their emergence in the colonial era, when they established themselves as communal associations in what was then a significantly smaller town. The second analyses how these clubs were destabilized amid mass rural-urban immigration that occurred after independence. Existing studies of African football in the field of social history have focused mainly on its role in colonial settings, in which the colonizers and the colonized vied in trying to appropriate this popular cultural domain for their respective social and political purposes.² By contrast, this study seeks to describe the development of these

popular clubs as basically a spontaneous African grass roots movement, which spanned different social environments both before and after colonialism.³

Football in Dar es Salaam: the early years

Over the past half century or more Dar es Salaam's heterogeneous ethnic and racial communities have shared one important pastime: football. The game was first introduced to Tanganyika by English UMCA (Universities' Mission to Central Africa) missionaries, and popularized in the 1920s by *alumni* of the UMCA school at Kiungani, Zanzibar.⁴ The first organised league in Dar es Salaam, the Dar es Salaam Association Football League, was established at this time.⁵ It managed regular games and other local tournaments.⁶ Alongside the racially exclusive European sports club, Gymkhana, teams from various governmental institutions, including the police and army, dominated the league in its early years. These workplace teams were established by British officials, though the majority of the players were African.⁷ The sport's popularity was also entrenched through its adoption as an extra-curricular activity at local schools; played at intermissions, after school, at festivities, and at inter-school games from the 1920s. Dar es Salaam's Government School, where the students were divided into several competing teams, was a noted source of local footballing talent.⁸ Alongside Gymkhana, the Government School's ground was the principal venue for major competitions until the Ilala Stadium (now Karume Memorial Stadium) was built by the Tanganyika Football Association with government funds in 1946 or 1947.⁹

Alongside the first and second divisions of the league, the mid-1930s to early 1940s saw the appearance of annual tournament matches such as the Higginson, Pall Mall, Sunlight and Jan Mohammed Cups. The Pall Mall and Sunlight Cups were sponsored by tobacco and soap companies, while the Higginson and Jan Mohammed Cups were donated by an individual European and Indian, respectively. By the mid-1940s, the Sunlight Cup had developed into a nationwide tournament of teams from eight provinces.¹⁰ From 1945, Tanganyika also joined the annual inter-territorial Gossage Cup, in which representative teams from four British colonies (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar) competed. The Sunlight and Gossage Cups captured nationwide attention and by then football's status as the most popular sport in Tanganyika was well established.¹¹

While official institutions certainly played their part in the development of the game, football in Dar es Salaam should also be considered as a spontaneous movement from below. The town's Muslim majority, largely uneducated, was quick to establish their own street teams in neighborhoods such as Kariakoo, Kisutu, Gerezani, and Ilala from the 1920s and 1930s. The Arab Sports (Kariakoo) and Sudanese Team (Gerezani) were remembered as strong teams in the 1930s.¹² In spite of their ethnic titles, they included players from other groups.¹³ Another leading team in the 1930s, the New Strong Team (Kisutu), included Zaramo players and at least one Manyema.¹⁴ Kisutu also had the Caddie Golf Boys, a small team formed by the youth working at Gymkhana's

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golf course. It comprised a heterogeneous squad composed of Yao, Manyema, Ngindo, Luguru, and also included a mixed race Indian-African.¹⁵ By the 1940s, Indian communities had founded their own teams, such as the Goans and Aga Khan (Ismaili Khoja). Meanwhile, African teams based on neighborhood communities, such as Gereza United and Ilala Staff, had also emerged, the latter dominated by Zaramo and Ndengereko members.¹⁶

Football became a hugely popular sport among all the town's diverse communities, many of whom shared a common coastal Swahili culture and were often closely related. Anthony describes major games as spectacular and memorable events, accompanied by the feasting and dancing that characterized coastal culture. The festive nature of sporting events culminated in an annual competition, taking place alternately in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar from the mid-1920s.¹⁷ The atmosphere is nicely evoked in an article from the African newspaper *Kiwetu* reporting the 1939 event, held in Dar es Salaam with 700 guests from Zanzibar.¹⁸ *Ngoma* (song-and-dance performance) festivities went on for three days and nights, involving even Indians and Europeans. Social clubs such as the Jamil El Manzil Club and the Japan Club enthusiastically supported the event, staging *masegese* and *lelemama* dances to entertain their guests. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Sports club arranged *dansi* (Western style dancing) events over two days.¹⁹

Though numerous African street teams sprang up in Dar es Salaam, the first division of the league in 1942 was dominated by teams from public institutions such as the Government School, Post Office, Railways, King's African Rifles, Police and Medical Department.²⁰ The exceptions were the Goans and two African teams: Young Africans (Yanga) and the Old Boys, an immediate forerunner of Sunderland and later Simba. From the mid-1940s, among many existing street teams, Yanga and then Sunderland established themselves as Dar es Salaam's principal African clubs, developing at the same time an intense rivalry.

The development of Yanga and Simba, 1930s-1960s

Yanga dates back to the mid-1920s, when a small ragtag team was formed by several African youths in the Jangwani area of Kariakoo. In the mid-1930s, the team 'New Youngs', as they were called, joined the second division of the Dar es Salaam league, and were subsequently promoted to the first. After suffering several crushing defeats shortly thereafter, Mangara Tabu Mangara, one of the founders, alongside fellow Zaramo members, united with several other street teams to form the Young Africans Football Club (Yanga) in 1938.²¹ Yanga swiftly emerged as a strong team, usually winning at least one tournament a year from 1938, and in 1942 capturing four major cups.²² The club was initially founded and dominated by local Zaramo, mostly from underprivileged backgrounds (petty traders or fish vendors), along with other Africans of coastal origin.²³ Well heeled Zaramo patrons and occasionally Indian traders gave the club financial support.²⁴

Sunderland originated from the aforementioned Old Boys, a sports club

organised by graduates of government schools. In the early 1940s the Nyagatwa brothers and other fellow Old Boys united with another street team to form what would become Sunderland.²⁵ The new team soon came to the fore, winning the first division in 1944 and 1946.²⁶ Sunderland in its early days was associated with educated Africans and with urban residents of 'Arab' descent,²⁷ in contrast to the social makeup of Yanga's support base. Early players and members included clerks from the Government Press, Secretariat, Railways, and Department of Education. The team also contained Indian (Goan and Ismaili Khoja) players. It obtained financial support from a number of wealthy 'Arab' patrons.²⁸

Like other football clubs in the town, Yanga and the Sunderland developed as *chama*, or social clubs, in which the majority of members were non-players whose contributions were used to run the club. Each club had a formal structure, in that a managing committee was formed, headed by a president (later chairman), with a vice-president, secretary, and treasurer; and, by the 1960s (if not earlier), with a manager and coaching staff.²⁹ Far more important, however, was its informal social framework. Aside from the football itself, the club was primarily a gathering place for friends. They spent evenings at the clubhouse talking over coffee or playing table games, irrespective of their ethnicity and class. At one time in Yanga, alongside paying their membership fees, would-be members were each required to bring a chair to sit on.³⁰

The clubs also had mutual aid functions among members. It was particularly conspicuous in relation to *kuzikana* (to bury each other), in which mutual support for funerals was offered. If a Sunderland member or one his family died, incense money would be contributed under the name of the club.³¹ Members and players also assisted each other in finding jobs and housing. In the case of one renowned Yanga elder, Kondo Kipwata, a palm-wine trader of Zaramo origin, he provided the players with one of his houses to live in, free of rent.³² Football became one of the crucial aspects of the communal social fabric in Dar es Salaam.³³ For some youngsters, the club was central to their lives, as a former Yanga member put it:

Yanga members in those days respected each other so that they helped each other out in times of trouble, and assisted fellow members in finding marriage partners, accommodation, and jobs, irrespective of their ethnicity. I would say that three-fourths of my life revolved around Yanga. The older members gave me jobs, and they presided over my marriage.³⁴

Not all the members displayed such a deep commitment to the clubs, however. Nor were the clubs necessarily welcoming or inclusive: a stranger was not accepted as a full member until he was recognized as an agreeable person by the other members.³⁵

As Yanga and Sunderland developed into the capital's leading teams their sporting rivalry intensified. At the same time, their membership and support also reflected social cleavages in the town. Sunderland fans derided Yanga's supporters as uneducated fishmongers, a profession dominated by local ethnic groups such as the Zaramo, Shomvi and Ndengereko. On the other hand, Yanga fans, who regarded themselves as *wenyeji* (the owners of the town),

denigrated Sunderland supporters, who included a number of 'Arabs' (and Indians), as *wageni* (strangers).³⁶ This was, to an extent, an accurate reflection of the two teams' fan base, although Yanga did have some educated, Indian and Arab supporters, while Sunderland attracted its share of uneducated local followers.³⁷

Nevertheless, such distinctions appear to have diminished by the 1950s, when both teams attracted the bulk of their members and supporters from 'coastal peoples' such as the Zaramo and Ndengereko, a majority of whom were uneducated Muslims. Ethnic and hierarchical idioms gradually faded through the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, more formal issues such as team colors³⁸ and place of residence became the justification for *ushabiki* (devotion) to either team. Locational rivalries, in particular, emerged. Broadly speaking, the northern half of Kariakoo, together with neighboring Jangwani and Kisutu, was the Yanga stronghold, while the southern half was largely a Sunderland area.³⁹ Family allegiance was another important factor determining one's favoured club.

The atmosphere of Yanga-Simba rivalry is well expressed in the term *utani* (joking relationship).⁴⁰ Both on and off the pitch, fans of Yanga and Sunderland enjoyed ribbing one another: sometimes about the performances of players at a particular match; at other times about team colors. Though the earlier social distinction between the two clubs had become blurred, they still playfully jibed with each other. Sunderland fans calling Yanga supporters *wachuuji wa samaki* (fishmongers), *wawuni* (fishermen), or *wapanda minazi* (coconut tree climbers), and Yanga fans reciprocated by dismissing their rivals as *watumwa wa waaarabu* (slaves of Arabs), *wazungu* (Europeans), *wasomi* (highbrows), and so on.⁴¹ It is also noteworthy that, like the *utani* customs between different ethnic groups, the custom of *kuzikana* formed common ground between the two rivals, in which the *sanda* (the payment of a mourning gift) under club names could be offered.⁴² Though this kind of relationship between teams is common in Tanzania, the most remarkable is that between the great rivals Yanga and Sunderland (Simba), who are often referred to as *watani wa jadi* or longtime joking partners.

Yanga-Simba antagonism could also have negative repercussions. Intense team rivalry was apt to escalate into violence among die-hard fans both on the fields and in the streets.⁴³ Meanwhile, as club allegiance often stemmed from family associations, 'intermarriages' between Yanga and Sunderland families could be fraught with difficulty.⁴⁴ Enthusiastic fans forced their children to play on their favourite teams, disallowing them from joining their rivals. The transfer of players from Yanga to Sunderland, or vice versa, was rare. An ardent supporter of Yanga displayed the team colors (yellow and green) in his house, eschewing red, the color of the rival team, and anyone with a red shirt was not allowed to enter.⁴⁵ The intensity of team allegiance could provoke various forms of disharmony.

The spread of inter-club networks

Utani rivalry between Yanga and Sunderland spread beyond the teams, creating

numerous branches and affiliates both within Dar es Salaam and further afield. From early on, the two teams developed strong links to football clubs in Zanzibar. Yanga allied with the African Sports Club, and Sunderland with Kikwajuni Sports Club, their affiliations dating back to 1939 and 1944 respectively.⁴⁶ These associations were at their peak during the aforementioned annual Dar es Salaam-Zanzibar games. A notable example of local connections in Dar es Salaam itself is the emergence of rival teams in Temeke, a southern suburb of the city. In 1952, Good Hope, a small street team founded by Sudanese, Zaramo and Ndengereko residents, suffered a secession of members who favoured Yanga. They established a new team, African Temeke, dominated by Zaramo and Ndengereko. African Temeke affiliated with Yanga, against Good Hope, which associated with Sunderland. They reproduced Yanga-Sunderland rivalry in suburban Dar es Salaam, maintaining close links to their respective 'headquarters'.⁴⁷ Mwembe Yanga, a well known group of Temeke based non-players who sponsored African Temeke, and allegedly the first formally admitted branch of Yanga, was also established in Temeke in the mid-1950s.⁴⁸ Other small-time teams in Dar es Salaam associated with Yanga or Sunderland. The Kahe Sports Club, located beside the Sunderland clubhouse in Kariakoo, was a steadfast ally of their neighbours. Western Star (Buguruni), Liverpool (Ilala), and Ivory Coast (Manzese) are also said to have generally inclined towards Sunderland. Meanwhile, members of Young Kenya (Jangwani), Young Kingstone (Kariakoo), and Young Bombay (Kisutu) on the whole supported Yanga.⁴⁹ Supporters in the various clubs scattered throughout the town helped the 'parent team' by scouting out talented players.

The networks also expanded beyond the capital, first to coastal areas and then into the interior. By the 1960s coastal towns such as Lindi, Kilwa, Bagamoyo, Mikindani and Tanga had two rival teams each affiliating with Yanga and Sunderland.⁵⁰ Inland, at Morogoro, affiliates of each club had also developed a local rivalry by the 1960s. The Wanderers (so named probably because of the presence in the team of educated immigrants to the town) affiliated with Sunderland, while the Home Boys (renamed 'Nyota Africa' in the 1970s) were dominated by locals and associated with Yanga.⁵¹ Partnerships between Yanga or Sunderland and their affiliated teams in the provinces included exchanges of visits and recruitment of players.

The two clubs not only formed networks among football teams, but also entered into alliance with local musical groups. Notably, Yanga and Sunderland established formal relations with two major *taarab* groups in Dar es Salaam; the Egyptian Musical Club and the Alwatan Musical Club, respectively.⁵² The football clubs and *taarab* groups had overlapping memberships.⁵³ The affiliated *taarab* group was often invited to play music at parties celebrating team victories, as well as in private ceremonial occasions for team members.⁵⁴

The clubs were also involved in politics, especially from the period of anti-colonial struggle in the 1950s. In particular, Yanga had close relationships with TANU, headed by future president Julius Nyerere, and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), an African political body in Zanzibar established by Abeid Amani Karume, later president of Zanzibar. Yanga's clubhouse was allegedly used for clandestine TANU meetings. Friendly matches between Yanga and its ally

African Sports Club, of which Karume himself was a member, were used for ASP fundraising.⁵⁵ These ties between football and politics continued after independence, with both Yanga and Sunderland, as the most prominent teams in the country, benefiting from personal connections with influential politicians.

Simba and Yanga in the late 1960s and 1970s

As we have seen, in colonial times, Yanga and Sunderland developed simultaneously as both football and communal social clubs made up mainly of coastal ethnic groups, the largest segment of Dar es Salaam's population. Post-independence socioeconomic change, however, had a considerable impact upon the character of the two clubs. From the late 1960s, rapid urbanization in Dar es Salaam resulted in a substantial influx of migrants from all over the country. As a result, Yanga and Sunderland (renamed Simba in 1971) came to embrace new elements among their memberships and support. Some of these new-comers were upcountry migrants, including a number of educated Christians employed by public institutions and corporations.

Accelerating integration of political, economic and communications systems contributed to the enhanced national profile of the capital's two most prominent teams. Matches between these two archrivals, held only once or twice a year, attracted huge attention countrywide, especially games in the National League that was established in 1965.⁵⁶ The lively atmosphere in Dar es Salaam arising from Simba-Yanga clashes is captured by a *Sunday News* report, describing events on the day of the deciding match of the 1974 National League contested by the two teams:

Since morning the green and yellow flag of Yanga, and the red and white flag of Simba were all over the city. On top of cars, trucks, motor cycles, houses, coconut trees, everywhere. In offices, hotels and buses the talk was about the big match.....At Ilala market, one fruit seller, a Yanga fan, offered half price to customers producing a Yanga membership card. While another vendor sitting opposite him, a Simba fan, out-bid him and offered free fruits to customers who could produce Simba membership card[s].⁵⁷

The late 1960s to early 1970s also saw a significant expansion in the scale and nature of both clubs' activities. As their popularity and rivalry grew throughout Tanzania, they intensified efforts to gain both national and international success by employing foreign coaches and training abroad. From the 1960s both teams contested matches, home and away, against foreign teams in the African Cup of Championship Clubs tournament. In preparation for matches against an Ethiopian club in 1969, Yanga embarked on a training tour to Romania. Before the national club championship tournament in 1974, Yanga and Simba went to Brazil and Poland, respectively, for training. Between 1971 and 1974 Yanga employed a professional coach from Romania. His successor was the Zairean coach Tambwe Leya, who served the team from 1974-76. Simba employed a Guinean coach in 1975.⁵⁸

In the early 1970s, both teams erected modern headquarters, marking a

striking shift away from their former shabby rented clubhouses. The four-story headquarters of Simba was built on Msimbazi Street in Kariakoo, with funds primarily raised by the club itself through contributions from ordinary members and fans.⁵⁹ President Karume of Zanzibar (also Vice-President of Tanzania), who himself donated some money for the construction, was invited to the building's inauguration ceremony. The construction of Yanga's three-story headquarters in Jangwani, the cradle of the club, was totally financed by Karume, who laid the foundation stone in April 1971. A practice ground was also constructed by the side of the clubhouse.⁶⁰

As their activities expanded, expenses mounted. Since the collection of club dues from rank-and-file members could not cover expenditure they increasingly came to depend on the gate collection and contributions from wealthy members and supporters. However, increased costs arising from local and overseas training expenses, the employment of foreign coaches, allowances for players in games and daily practices,⁶¹ and money offered to lure good players to join the team, resulted in growing financial difficulties which in turn led to the rise of money-related disputes and scandals.⁶²



Fig. 8.1 *Members of Sunderland Sports Club (Simba) clearing the site for their new premises at Msimbazi Street*

Source: *The Standard*, 9th September 1969

Secession at Simba and Yanga

At the height of Yanga and Simba's popularity, serious internal strife arose within the headquarters of each team almost simultaneously, leading to the eventual breakaway of a significant number of leading members. Both teams had been hitherto headed by a narrow circle of longtime members and elders. The shifting demographic characteristics of the urban population, however, led to the established leadership being overwhelmed.

The breakup of Simba slightly preceded that of Yanga.⁶³ In early 1975, some members started campaigning against the incumbent leaders, accusing them of misusing club funds. Joachim Kimwaga, a former prison officer of Tabora origin, and Jimmy D. Ngonya, a Nyakyusa clerk at the national insurance company, were among the key figures in this anti-executive campaign. Their activism provoked a split within the club, leading to elections, as a result of which Kimwaga and Ngonya won chairmanship and secretaryship, respectively. Former leaders were unseated and this led to the secession of some 70 members from the club. Those who left, including a number of team elders and longtime supporters, immediately formed a new team, Red Star (*Nyota Nyekundu*). The founders of Red Star limited the number of members, concerned that unrestricted membership might lead to similar circumstances to those from which they had just escaped.

Internal conflict and the final breakup of Simba were immediately followed by that of Yanga.⁶⁴ The club was then led by chairman Mangara Tabu Mangara, with his allies, including Shiraz Shariff, the team manager of Indian (Ismaili Khoja) descent. Mangara was one of the founders of the team, serving as president several times and organizing the construction of the new clubhouse in the early 1970s. Shiraz was a major financial supporter of the club and was popular among the players. The roots of the breakup lay in a disagreement between Tambwe Leya, the Zairean coach, and some players. After returning from an international match with the Nigerian champions in Lagos in May 1975, the players railed against Leya's authoritarian approach. As discord emerged within the squad, internal strife in the administration also came to the surface. In an election held the following month, David Mwambungu, a Nyakyusa trader, was appointed general secretary. Mwambungu and his followers began campaigning against the former leadership, including incumbent chairman Mangara and his right-hand man Shiraz, who they accused of embezzling money from the club. Tambwe Leya, who had previously collided with the former administration, supported these allegations. The club was divided between those who supported Mangara, Shiraz and the players, and those who backed Mwambungu and the coach.

A series of revelations over alleged financial scandals fueled a growing rift between the two factions. The tension reached a peak in late September after Mwambungu and his aides appointed a new chairman, declaring the suspension of 22 prominent members including Mangara and Shiraz, leading to violent clashes between the rival factions. As the pro-Mangara faction gathered around the former headquarters on Mafia Street, Kariakoo,

Mwambungu and the anti-Mangara camp congregated at Yanga's new stadium. They marched to the old headquarters, where they clashed with supporters of Mangara, throwing stones and exchanging harsh words, until the unrest was quelled by police armed with tear-gas.

After the disturbance, the government and the ruling TANU party promptly intervened, trying to patch up this bitter division in the most popular team in the country. Failing to soothe both sides, the Regional Commissioner of Dar es Salaam ordered Yanga to hold a general election by the end of the year. In the election, Mangara failed to stand and his supporters were badly defeated. Immediately afterwards, a conflict between players and the coach recurred. Most of the players, who refused to play under Leya, were finally driven out. The pro-Mangara group eventually broke from Yanga and went on to form a new team with the expelled players. Barred from registering as a new team, they initially joined Nyota Africa in Morogoro, an old ally of the Yanga, before returning to Dar es Salaam in August 1976, where they established the Pan African Sports Club.

The intra-club disputes outlined above stemmed from a number of money-related scandals, combined with the struggle for power over these nationally popular clubs. However, similar problems have arisen in the affairs of Simba and Yanga with frequency both before and since, though none have escalated to the point of a major split. The question therefore arises: Why did the infightings in the mid-1970s result in massive defections? It is important to note that those who seceded from Simba and Yanga were mainly old-timers, including a number of founding members, made up chiefly of people with coastal origins. Among the seventy two founders of Red Star, 65 percent were coastal people *par excellence*, including Zaramo (26.4 percent), 'Arab' (15.3 percent), Ndengereko (15.3 percent) and Nyagatwa (8.3 percent). Similarly, nearly seventy percent of Pan African's 174 founding members were either Zaramo (55.2 percent) or Ndengereko (13.8 percent).⁶⁵ Thus, one of the outstanding features characterizing the breakups was that those who were expelled were old members, mostly of coastal origin, who had resided in Dar es Salaam from colonial times. On the other hand, those figures who played a pivotal role in driving them out were on the whole relatively new members, including those who had come from upcountry to the city after independence, who tended to remain aloof from existing communities dominated by coast-dwellers. Significantly, the Egyptian Musical Club, a longtime ally of Yanga, took sides with Pan African. Though it is not clear whether the Alwatan Musical Club overtly supported Red Star, at least Alwatan's counterpart in Zanzibar, the Akhwan Safaa Musical Club, still retains its friendly relations with Red Star.⁶⁶ Members of Egyptian and Akhwan Safaa supported those who seceded from Simba and Yanga, who viewed the clubs as having been infiltrated by *wageni* (strangers). The position of the defectors is well expressed by one of Red Star's founding members:

Sunderland (Simba) in the early days was made up of town kids (*watoto wa mjiini*) who grew up, played, and studied together. The coastal people tend to seek a gathering place where they can have a chat with companions,

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drink coffee, and play dominoes. We knew each other, assisted each other, and worried about friends if they did not appear. We visited them at home and helped them if they had problems.....When animosity occurred in the club, it was no longer the safe place where we felt at home. So we had to establish a new club as a new meeting place.⁶⁷

Over time in Dar es Salaam's football scene, earlier divisions between *wenyeji* (indigenes) and *wageni* (strangers) – Zaramo against 'Arab', for example – appear to have been diluted and/or superseded by distinctions separating older and more recent residents, or those with coastal and those with upcountry origins. Such a shift directly mirrored processes of social and demographic change in Dar es Salaam. This was a time when the longstanding predominance of residents originating from the city's coastal hinterland began to be undermined by mass migration into the capital from all parts of Tanzania. Incidents in the mid-1970s thus marked a critical turning point for not only these nationally popular clubs, but also for African society in Dar es Salaam as a whole.⁶⁸

Both Red Star and Pan African gained leading standings in the league in the 1980s, backed by the 'old guards' of Simba and Yanga, respectively. Pan African, made up mostly of ex-Yanga stars, even won the national club championship in 1982. Meanwhile, the hastily assembled Yanga team suffered several humiliating defeats, though it soon regained its position as a top team by recruiting a number of new players nationwide. Indeed, over the long term, while Simba and Yanga retained their national prominence thanks to their long-established nationwide networks, the splinter teams' fortunes gradually declined. Red Star and Pan African still exist today mainly as tiny social clubs for older residents in Dar es Salaam; in contrast to their former clubs Yanga and Simba, which as the leading teams in Tanzania, continued to reflect the shifting social composition of its principal urban centre.

Conclusion

Yanga and Simba originated in 1930s Kariakoo, one of the oldest African settlements in Dar es Salaam. Both clubs were primarily based within the same close-knit community made up mainly of coastal people (Zaramo, Ndengereko, 'Arab' etc.), who had long been influenced by Swahili culture. They emerged as the most popular teams in the town and were intense rivals from the outset. Each club also had intertwining relations and overlapping memberships with other recreational clubs in the city. In addition, links were established with 'branches' or affiliated teams in the capital and provincial towns, especially along the coast. From the 1960s, their fan base expanded enormously, attracting supporters not only from coastal areas but also from the more remote interior. As a result of the pressures arising from both their preeminent position nationally and in a rapidly changing Dar es Salaam, in 1975 both Simba and Yanga divided into two factions, finally producing the splinter teams Red Star and Pan African. Misuse of club funds, leadership squabbles,

and personal enmity were among the causes of the eventual breakups. However, deeper underlying factors were also present, related to antagonism between more established coastal peoples and new arrivals displaying less affinity with coastal Swahili culture. Gradually, the teams' leadership and support overwhelmed their original core coastal base, alongside the social and cultural functions they performed in the more intimate setting of the smaller colonial town. Their fate formed a reflection of broader social phenomena: how a relatively narrow-based urban community dissolved in the rapid post-colonial expansion of Dar es Salaam. The histories of Simba and Yanga represent a good example of the process of formation and dissolution of a Swahili-oriented community in this East African coastal metropolis.

Notes

¹ Hadji Konde, *Utani wa Simba na Yanga* (Dar es Salaam, 1975), p. 1.

² See, for example, W. Baker and J. A. Mangan (eds.), *Sport in Africa: Essays in Social History* (New York, 1987); Phyllis M. Martin, *Leisure and Society in Colonial Brazzaville* (Cambridge, 1995); Laura Fair, *Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945* (Athens, 2001). Although Fair's work focuses on colonial Zanzibar, it is packed with suggestive details for the analysis of football in colonial Tanganyika. There has been no full-length study of football in mainland Tanzania, though Iliffe and Anthony provide brief accounts of football in colonial Dar es Salaam. John Iliffe, *Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979); D. H. Anthony, 'Culture and Society in a Town in Transition: A People's History of Dar es Salaam, 1865-1939', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1983).

³ This paper is based mainly on data collected by the author during the course of field research, conducted (on and off) between December 1995 and September 2003. The main sources of information are interviews with those who were themselves active on the local football scene, along with a number of newspaper articles. Part of the research results have been published in another article: Tadasu Tsuruta, 'Popular Music, Sports, and Politics: A Development of Urban Cultural Movements in Dar es Salaam, 1930s-1960s', *African Study Monographs* 24:3 (2003), pp. 195-222.

⁴ Iliffe, *Modern History*, p. 393. How football was popularized in and around Dar es Salaam through missions remains unclear, yet there are records of matches in the UMCA Minaki mission, located slightly west of the capital, in *Kiwetu*, No.12, August 1939 and No.14, September 1939, and *Mambo Leo*, July 1942.

⁵ A. Keto, *Yanga Ilikotokea*, unpublished manuscript, (Dar es Salaam, 1973), p. 1; Anthony, 'Culture', p. 125; interviews with Haroub Hassan (one of the founders of the Yanga), Magomeni, 19 March 1997 and Hamisi Akida (a longtime resident of Dar es Salaam), Mnazi Mmoja, 21 August 1999. Estimates of the year when the league was established vary from 1921 (Keto) to 1928 or 1929 (Anthony).

⁶ Hadji Konde, *Kutafuta Klabu Bingwa Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 1983), p. 10. The Dar es Salaam Football Association was dominated by the British, but also included a few Indians and 'Arabs'. Shebe Omar Gesan, an 'Arab' clerk (probably part Shomvi) of the Department of Education, served as the (assistant?) secretary of the Association at some point between the 1930s and 1950s. He was also a member of Sunderland. Salehe Ghullum (one of the founders of the Sunderland), Magomeni, 10 November and 15 December 1996; Salehe Lumelezi (one of the earliest members of the Sunderland), 27 October 1996; Selemani Selemani (a.k.a. Nanga, one of the earliest members of the Sunderland), Mbagala, 31 August 2003. See also Anthony, *Culture*, p. 125; *Kiwetu*, no. 7, 1 May 1942.

⁷ Anthony, *Culture*, p. 126; Haroub Hassani, 16 and 19 March 1997; Hamisi Akida, 21 August 1999. See also Tsuruta, 'Popular Music', p. 206.

⁸ Hamisi Akida, 21 August 1999; Salehe Ghullum, Magomeni, 10 August 2000; Mashaka Lumelezi (a former player of the Sunderland), Magomeni, 8 February 1997; Hamisi

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Kilomoni (a former player of the Sunderland), Kinondoni, 13 August 2003; Konde, *Kutafuta Klabu*, p. 1; Kanyama Chiume, *Kivacha: An Autobiography* (Nairobi, 1975), pp. 17-8.

⁹ Chiume, *Kivacha*, pp. 17-8; Salehe Ghullum, Magomeni, 23 March 1997; Masoud Ali (a former member of the Yanga), Kariakoo, 30 June 2002. The Tanganyika Football Association was set up in 1945, when Tanganyika joined the inter-territorial Gossage Cup. This enclosed stadium was built to generate funds through gate money to cover the expenses for the Sunlight and Gossage Cups. *Mambo Leo*, September 1950, p. 108.

¹⁰ Tsuruta, 'Popular Music', p. 216; Haroub Hassani, 19 March 1997; Anthony, 'Culture', p. 125; Mtaruke Mangara (one of the earliest members of the Yanga), Ilala, 21 November 1996; Masoud Ali, 4 July 2002; Kwetu, no. 7, 1 May 1942; Mambo Leo, December 1949. At least for a certain period, the first division of the league (aka the Percy Brown Cup) was sponsored by Mr. Brown, then Commissioner of Police, while the Kassum Cup was contributed for the second division competition by Kassum Sunderji Sanji, an Indian who was also a committee member of the Dar es Salaam Football Association.

¹¹ Keto, *Yanga*, p. 13 and Konde, *Kutafuta*, p. 9. The government Swahili monthly *Mambo Leo* in the 1940s and 1950s often featured special reports on the Sunlight and Gossage Cups, reflecting African enthusiasm for these competitions.

¹² Important ethnic groups in early Dar es Salaam included the aboriginal Zaramo (with its close neighbor Shomvi), who together composed roughly half of the town's African population in the 1940s, and its southern neighbor Ndengereko (with Rufiji), the second largest group, along with other more distant migrants such as the Manyema, Sudanese, Nyamwezi, Ngindo, and the 'Arabs'.

¹³ Anthony, *Culture*, pp. 123, 126; Masoudi Ali, 30 June 2002. According to Anthony, the Arab Sports comprised of 'Arabs' and persons of mixed ancestry, along with a few Africans, and was associated with clerks and traders.

¹⁴ Haroub Hassan, 19 March 1997; Abeid Maulid (a former player of the Yanga), Ilala, 27 July 1999; Anthony, *ibid.*, p. 124.

¹⁵ Haroub Hassani, 16 March 1997; Anthony, *Culture*, p. 124. A similar team was also set up by caddies in Zanzibar in the 1920s. Fair, *Pastimes and Politics*, pp. 235-8.

¹⁶ Anthony, *loc. cit.*; Haroub Hassani, 16 March 1997; Salehe Ghullum, 23 March 1997; Omari Ali Kuwi (one of the earliest members of the Ilala Staff), Ilala, 30 July 1999.

¹⁷ Anthony, 'Culture', pp. 124-5; Fair, *Pastimes*, pp. 238-9.

¹⁸ Saidi Hirizi, 'Habari za Sports', *Kiwetu*, no. 13, August 1939.

¹⁹ The Jamil El Manzil Club was a Swahili elders' society, and the Japan Club was probably a dance society of the Nyamwezi. Hamisi Akida, 21 August 1999; Fundi Saidi (Kipara, a former member of a Nyamwezi dance society, Hiari ya Moyo), Magomeni, 11 August 2003. *Masegesi* was a dance (or an instrument used in it) of the Nyamwezi people, while *lelemama* was a performance danced by Muslim townswomen.

²⁰ *Kiwetu*, no. 7, 1 May 1942. The Aga Khan and Sudanese Teams, both of which participated in the previous year, were suspended because of a breach of the rules of the association.

²¹ Keto, *Yanga*, pp. 2-8; Haroub Hassani, 16 March 1997; Chonjo Mwinchande Digendo (a former secretary of the Yanga), Tandika, 15 September 1998.

²² Keto, *Yanga*, pp. 8, 17.

²³ Haroub Hassani, 19 and 22 March 1997. Salehe Lumelezi, 3 October 1998; Keto, *Yanga*, p. 6.

²⁴ Keto, *Yanga*, pp. 5, 12; Chonjo Mwinchande Digendo, 15 September 1998; Haroub Hassani, Magomeni, 22 March 1997; Ramadhani Mloka (a former Yanga member), Kigamboni, 24 August 2003.

²⁵ Hamisi Akida, 21 August 1999; Salehe Ghullum, 15 December 1996 and 10 August 2000; Masoud Ali, 30 June 2002. Nyagatwa is an ethnic category closely related to Ndengereko. Probably descending from mixed Arab-African, they have been living along the coast in Rufiji District.

²⁶ Konde, *Utani*, p. 15; Salehe Ghullum, 15 December 1996.

²⁷ So far as I can determine, the 'Arabs' in Sunderland embraced all the major groups who might identify themselves as Arab, including recent immigrants from Oman and the Hadhraumat and those with mixed Arab-African ancestry. Most of them were thought to be of Hadhrami extraction, mixing with coastal ethnic groups. Abdallah Awadhi (a former member of the Alwatan Musical Club and the Young Arab Sports Club), Kariakoo, 3 July 2002. It is worth noting that Sunderland (together with its close ally, the Alwatan Musical Club) seems to have

had overlapping membership with the Young Arab Sports Club, set up in Kariakoo, probably in the mid-1940s, after Arab Sports, which represented an older generation, had disbanded in the late 1930s. The club was made up of all sorts of 'Arabs', including both Hadhrami and Omani, and later transformed into the Arab Social Club where members played table tennis and other indoor games. The club also included at least one Comorian member in the 1950s. Salehe Ghullum, Magomeni, 15 December 1996 and 10 August 2000; Abdallah Awadhi, Kariakoo, 23 February 1997 and 3 July 2002; Mohammed Bajabil (a former member of the Alwatan Musical Club and the Young Arab Sports Club), Chang'ombe, 9 March 1997; Salehe Hujjat (a former member of the Arab Social Club), Ilala, 20 October 1996.

²⁸ Salehe Ghullum, 15 December 1996. For instance, there were renowned Arab patrons such as Thabit Ali 'Mmanga' and Salum Bamura, of Omani and Hadhrami stocks, respectively.

²⁹ Various interviews; Keto, *Yanga*, p. 19.

³⁰ Masoud Ali, 4 July 2002; Yusuf Abdoulrahman aka Ugundo (a former member of the Yanga), Kariakoo, 7 September 2003.

³¹ Salehe Ghullum, Dar es Salaam, 10 August 2000. A *Mambo Leo* column written by a Sunderland member, from April 1946, announcing the death of one of the team's best known players, observes that 'members of all the football clubs in Dar es Salaam, along with people of every ethnic group, attended the funeral. Members of the Sunderland Football Club organized a *hitima* ceremony (memorial service for the deceased)'.

³² Masoud Ali, 30 June 2002. Though illiterate, Kondo Salum Kipwata, a.k.a. 'Kamanda' ('commander'), was the longest serving head of Yanga, serving as president (chairman) from 1946 to 1958, and 1966 to 1970. Keto, *Yanga*, p. 27.

³³ This was also the case in colonial Zanzibar. Fair, *Pastimes*, pp. 227-8.

³⁴ Ramadhani Mloka, 24 August 2003. He joined Yanga from the late 1960s until 1975.

³⁵ Hassim Muhika, Kariakoo, 23 August 1999; Ali Pazi (a former player of the Young Kingstone and Young Bombay) 8 September 2003; Omari Halfani Kiruke (a longtime member of the Simba), Mtoni, 31 August 2003.

³⁶ Tsuruta, 'Popular Music', p. 207. Many scholars have argued that a dichotomy and rivalry between *wenyeji* and *wageni* was characteristic of urban coastal society. See, for example, Peter Lienhardt, ed. and tr., *The Medicine Man: Swifa ya Ngwumali* (Oxford, 1968), p. 13; Terence Ranger, *Dance and Society in Eastern Africa* (London, 1975); John Middleton, *The World of the Swahili* (New Haven, 1992), pp. 1, 26, 83 *et passim*; James Brennan, 'Nation, race, and urbanization in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1916-1976', Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University (2002), chapter 2.

³⁷ Iliffe suggests that until the mid-1940s Yanga was a club for educated men. *Modern History*, p. 393. Indeed, Yanga did have some educated members including Chonjo Mwinchande Digendo (a former secretary), a Zaramo who got a clerical job in the railways after finishing at Tabora Secondary School in 1941 (interview, 15 September 1998). Judging from evidence collected in the course of my research, however, Yanga seems to have attracted strong support from illiterate townspeople from the outset: Haroub Hassani, 19 March 1997; Keto, *Yanga*, pp. 2-6.

³⁸ The team colors of Sunderland are red and white; those of Yanga yellow and green. These have been used in banners and team uniforms.

³⁹ Ali Keto (a former secretary of the Yanga), Ilala, 13 August 1999; Burahani Mlanzi (a former member of the Sunderland), Kariakoo, 17 August 1999; Ali Pazi, Kariakoo, 2 July 2002. This seems to have derived from the location of the clubhouses.

⁴⁰ *Utani* is a reciprocal relationship existing between particular ethnic groups in Tanzania. For this somewhat ritualized exchange of abuse, pleasantry and mutual assistance, and its relation to funeral ceremonies, see R.E. Moreau, 'Joking Relationships in Tanganyika', *Africa* 14 (1944), pp. 386-400; and J.A.K. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam*, (London, 1963), pp. 35-7.

⁴¹ Hamisi Kilomoni (a former player of the Sunderland), 13 August 2003.

⁴² Issa Ausi (a former member of the Sunderland), 1 September 2003; Mussa Libabu (a former player of the Sunderland), Kinondoni, 21 August 2003; Hamisi Suleiman (a longtime member of the Yanga), 27 July 1999.

⁴³ Hooliganism was not a phenomenon limited to Yanga and Sunderland, and, as McHenry points out, the government in the 1960s-70s frequently expressed their concern about indiscipline of football players and fans. D. E. McHenry, 'The Use of Sports in Policy Implementation: the Case of Tanzania', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 18:2 (1980), p. 242. Burton refers to incidents of football hooliganism in 1950s Dar es Salaam. Andrew Burton, 'Urchins, loafers, and the cult of the cowboy: urbanization and delinquency in

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Dar es Salaam, 1919-61', *Journal of African History* 42:2 (2001), p. 206.

⁴⁴ Sunday Manara (a former star player of the Yanga), Temeke, 20 August 1999; Mohamed Ali (a former Yanga member), Temeke, 18 September 1998.

⁴⁵ Sunday Manara, 20 August 1999 and 21 August 2000.

⁴⁶ Keto, *Yanga*, p. 37; Konde, *Utani*, p. 26. For the African Sports Club and Kikwajuni Sports Club, see Fair, *Pastimes*, pp. 249-55.

⁴⁷ Ali Hassan (Kocha, one of the early members of the Good Hope), Temeke, 5 August 1999; Omari Omari (a former member of the African Temeke), Temeke, 5 August 1999; Keto, *Yanga*, p. 38. According to *Uhuru* (4 November 1970), a leadership election of African Temeke was held under the supervision of several Yanga leaders.

⁴⁸ Interview with the members of the Mwembe Yanga, 2 September 1998. The place where members gathered under a big mango tree (*mwembe*) and its vicinity came to be called 'Mwembe Yanga' after the club. Members of the group later founded a number of other Yanga branches, mainly in Temeke's southern neighborhoods such as Tandika, Mtoni, Yombo, and Mbagala.

⁴⁹ Ali Pazi, 7 September 1999 and 5 July 2002; Zuberi Ali (a former player of the Young Kenya), 4 September 2003; Omari Kiruke, 31 August 2003.

⁵⁰ Various oral sources. See also Lienhardt, *Medicine Man*, pp. 16-7.

⁵¹ Juma Kilaza (a former member of the Wanderers), Morogoro, 8 December 1996. The Wanderers was renamed Shujaa in the 1970s.

⁵² *Taarab* is an Arab-derived musical style, which has been popular among Swahili people on the East African coast. For the development of *taarab* musical clubs in Dar es Salaam, see Tsuruta, 'Popular Music', pp. 203-4, and Graebner's chapter in this volume. According to Keto, the friendship between the Yanga and the Egyptian Musical Club dates back to 1942. Keto, *Yanga*, p. 37.

⁵³ Those who were remembered as leading figures in both the Sunderland and the Alwatan include Subeti Salum and Salum Bamura, both of Hadhrami extraction. Ali Pazi, 5 July 2002. Two earlier Zaramo members of Yanga, Mangara Tabu and Mohamed Sultan (Mabosti), were also recognized as elders of Egyptian. Abasi Mzee (a former musician of the Egyptian), Kariakoo, 26 December 1996. Mwalimu Tumu (a former player of Bagamoyo origin), who voluntarily coached Yanga in the 1950s, was also an accordion player in Egyptian Musical Club. Hamisi Suleiman, Kariakoo, 31 August 1999.

⁵⁴ Chonjo Mwinchande Digendo, 15 September and 20 October 1998; Ali Pazi, 2 July 2002; Selemani Selemani, 31 August 2003. The friendship between *taarab* and football clubs culminated at the annual Dar es Salaam-Zanzibar games. Yanga and Sunderland also allied with popular dance bands in the city, the Western Jazz Band and the Dar es Salaam Jazz Band respectively, which also joined forces in the annual sporting event in the 1960s.

⁵⁵ Tsuruta, 'Popular Music', pp. 213-4. In 1959, Yanga participated in and won the Afro-Shirazi Cup held in Zanzibar. Keto, *Yanga*, p. 17.

⁵⁶ The league was set up at the advice of a Yugoslavian footballer, who was invited to act as coach of the national team. Konde, *Kitafuta Klabu*, p. 10.

⁵⁷ Subira Kumbuka, 'Soccer Fever Grips Dar', *Sunday News*, 11 August 1974. The venue of the match was actually in Mwanza.

⁵⁸ Konde, *Utani*, pp. 21-7; Keto, *Yanga*, pp. 36-40; *Uhuru*, 15 January 1974.

⁵⁹ Salehe Ghullum, 10 November 1996.

⁶⁰ Keto, *Yanga*, p. 24; Konde, *Utani*, pp. 21, 68; *Uhuru*, 10 April 1972, p. 8; McHenry, 'The Use of Sports', p. 252; *Daily News*, 1 July 1974.

⁶¹ Though there were no fully professional footballers at this time.

⁶² Various interviews. See also McHenry, 'Use of Sports', p. 254.

⁶³ The following description on the Simba crisis draws upon interviews with a number of former Simba members including Salehe Lumelezi (one of the founders of Red Star), Dar es Salaam, 3 October 1998, together with newspaper articles from the *Daily News*, 20-21 April and 17 August 1975.

⁶⁴ The following account on the Yanga crisis is based on interviews with former Yanga members and numerous newspaper articles which appeared in *Uhuru* and the *Daily News* between May 1975 and February 1976.

⁶⁵ The figures are based on interviews with members of Red Star and Pan African.

⁶⁶ For the Akhwan Safaa Musical Club (or Nadi Ikhwan Safaa), see Fair, *Pastimes*, pp. 172-3.

⁶⁷ Interview with Burahai Mlanzi, Kariakoo, 4 July 2002.

⁶⁸ I explore these in a separate article currently under preparation.

Chapter Nine

In the 'Age of Minis': Women, work and masculinity downtown

Andrew M. Ivaska

In the modern world ... men and women are in a crucial tug-of-war in which each side is claiming for superiority.

– Peter Claver F. Temba, letter to *Tanzania Standard*, Oct. 16th, 1970.

Tanzania's first postcolonial decade has recently come into its own as an object of study in historians' work on the country. Urban history – and particularly the history of Dar es Salaam – has been a key part of the move toward exploring this period.¹ This article seeks to contribute to this growing literature by examining gendered tensions and struggles over women's work and movement in downtown Dar es Salaam in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Long an issue in Dar es Salaam, women's dress and comportment grew to become a matter of unprecedented political charge in the 1960s. This was in large part due to the confluence of a number of different phenomena, initiatives and crises during that decade: a highly-touted state project of 'national culture', rising unemployment amidst booming migration to the capital, a steady and significant increase in the number and proportion of new migrants who were women, and new opportunities for women in particular kinds of urban formal sector work in Dar es Salaam.

The charged nature of women's dress as the focus for increasingly intense public debate and struggle was showcased by 'Operation Vijana', the first of what would become a series of official bans in Dar es Salaam on 'indecent' fashion, and more specifically, mini-skirts. The campaign generated extraordinary debate after its launch by the TANU Youth League (TYL) in late 1968 – debate that spilled out far beyond the ostensible justification for the ban in terms of 'national culture'.² It was also accompanied – indeed enforced – by a series of often violent attacks on, and harassment of, women wearing mini-skirts by crowds of young men including both TYL members

and others. These physical attacks were concentrated at particular sites associated by anxious young men with female accumulation, mobility and autonomy – bus stations, commuter routes, downtown streets and offices – and the debate over the ban featured the powerful association of ‘indecent’ dress not only with prostitution, but just as closely with female office-workers, who were becoming much-discussed figures on the city’s cultural landscape. Indeed, in the public discourse around Operation Vijana the oft-professed link between the mini-skirt, working women downtown, and prostitution was nearly unassailable.

Although Operation Vijana failed to eradicate the mini-skirt, it by no means marked the last of the campaigns, which continued to be launched periodically. But the mini-skirt was a contested sign, and by the early 1970s the ideological field had shifted somewhat, facilitating the emergence of some successful challenges by women seeking to disentangle the mini-skirt, work and movement downtown, from the suspicion of illegitimate gain through sex. After briefly considering the history of women and work in postwar Dar es Salaam, this chapter explores these shifts by focusing on a 1970-71 dress campaign – one that sought to broaden and further institutionalize the battle against ‘indecency’ – and on the trial of one woman who successfully challenged her arrest for indecency in court. I argue that the movement of campaigns against particular items of clothing from vigilante³ to more institutionalized forms opened the door for more robust challenges to both the dress codes and the ideological underpinning of the campaigns.

Gender, migration and work in post-war Dar es Salaam

Beginning shortly after WWII and continuing for decades, Tanzania saw an upsurge in rural-urban migration. With Dar es Salaam receiving a disproportionate number of those heading for town, its population nearly quadrupled in less than twenty years, from 69,200 in 1948 to 272,821 in 1967.⁴ The gender dynamics of this influx are important. In the colonial period, those migrating to town in Tanzania, as across colonial Africa, were predominantly male (approximately two thirds of migrants in the 1950s). Compared with many other African cities of the time, however, the number of women in colonial Dar es Salaam was by most accounts relatively high. Rising and falling through the colonial period, the male:female ratio in the capital ranged from 140:100 in 1928 and 206:100 in 1931, to an apparent low of 110:100 in 1940, and back up to 141:100 by 1948.⁵ Despite being effectively barred from most formal wage-earning jobs, many women were able to carve out income-earning niches. Women could own property in Dar es Salaam and earn money as renters, and seemingly a striking number did so.⁶ Several kinds of informal work were dominated by women, including selling food to male labourers, street hawking, beer-brewing, domestic employment and sex work.⁷ The city also presented opportunities for a range of relationships with men – from sex work to the provision of the ‘comforts of home’ to regular clients, non-marital cohabitation, and cultivating lovers who helped pay the rent – all

of which offered young women a greater degree of social and economic autonomy than could be gained through formal marriage. Such non-marital relationships, categories of which were often blurred, were predominant in Dar es Salaam, a fact that was thought as early as the late 1950s to have 'raised the bargaining position of women in the town'.⁸

Despite the already significant female presence in colonial Dar es Salaam, the decade following independence saw a substantial rise in the proportion of women among migrants, a trend that changed the demographic character of urban areas. By 1971, women constituted a majority (54 percent) of new arrivals in Dar es Salaam, contributing to what John Campbell called the capital's 'radically changing urban sex ratio'.⁹ Between 1948 and 1967, Dar es Salaam's male-to-female ratio declined from 141:100 to 123:100, with the ratio for 15-24 year-olds reaching near-parity at 103:100.¹⁰ The demographic profile of female migrants was also changing. Regardless of gender, migrants to the capital were overwhelmingly young, continuing the pattern of the late colonial period, but the proportion of female migrants who were unmarried upon arrival grew steadily, from 13 percent in 1952 to 33 percent in 1970. Though still a minority, many of these women had taken advantage of the growth in educational opportunities for women, which had expanded faster than those for men.¹¹

Despite high unemployment in Dar es Salaam in the 1960s, the postcolonial capital did present young women migrants with growing opportunities for increased economic autonomy. Some of these built on and extended the informal income-earning niches of the colonial period.¹² Other opportunities, however, were new. While the overall percentage of town-dwelling women in formal wage employment remained very small through the decade (reaching 13 percent in 1970),¹³ particular kinds of formal sector work were opening up to women in ways that were non-existent during the colonial period. A male preserve prior to independence, secretarial work was one domain in which by 1970 female employees were common (by some reports, even sought after), and it was not alone. According to a 1970 survey, the percentage of employees who were female in four categories of wage employment – clerical, professional/managerial/technical, public service/nursing/social work, and hotel/restaurant/bar – ranged from 24 percent to 38 percent.¹⁴ Some of Dar es Salaam's factories, too, were hiring large numbers of women in the 1960s, with Urafiki Textile Mill and the Tanita cashew-nut processing plant (where nearly three-quarters of employees were female) being notable examples.¹⁵ Large majorities of women in such jobs were under the age of thirty, single or divorced, and (with the possible exclusion of 'barmaids') possessed some formal education.¹⁶

This is by no means to suggest that most women in Dar es Salaam were well off, earning a wage, or building futures free from social controls. On the contrary, not only did the informal economy remain the dominant sphere of women's work throughout the early independence period, but men retained a privileged position in the social and economic life of Tanzania's capital, and the city's chronic shortages of jobs, housing and social services affected women at least as severely as men, if not more so. In 1970 male migrants in Dar es

Salaam were over five times more likely than their female counterparts to find wage employment.¹⁷ Indeed, one of the results of the marked increase in female job-seekers migrating to Dar es Salaam in the late 1960s was a sharp rise in the female unemployment rate, which hit 20 percent in 1970.¹⁸

Nevertheless, in relation to their aims and expectations of the move to town, urban life may have afforded *relative* gains for young women that did not accrue to their male counterparts. There is growing historical evidence, both from Tanzania and from research on other African contexts, to suggest that motives, expectations and outcomes of rural-urban migration differed considerably for women and men. Scholars have long suggested that a primary motivation for migrating involved circumventing the control that elders in rural areas held over marriage options. But if for young, migrant men the dream was to quickly earn a cash dowry and return, respected and admired, to the village to marry on one's own terms, for many young women 'migration [was] seen as an end in itself': an attempt to take more permanent advantage of the opportunities for autonomous accumulation that the city seemed to offer.¹⁹

The above suggestion remains a tentative one. What is more certain is the presence of a widespread *perception* among young men struggling to get by in Dar es Salaam that the city was full of young women getting ahead, finding work, gaining spending money of their own, and all at young men's expense. As J.A.K. Leslie observed in the mid-1950s, the gap between male migrants' expectations of urban life and its reality were considerable, and made harder to bear by the ready appearance of wealth and success on the city's landscape:

His aim in coming to town has been to get cash; yet he finds that he is poor (whereas in the country, with far less money, he was not): yet being poor he is surrounded by tempting things which can be had only for money; all the glamour which helped draw him to town – dances, women, drink, clothes, cinemas, taxis, require money before he can enjoy them; they are so near yet out of his reach.... there is always somebody to be seen enjoying the things he cannot get.... To get cash he needs work, yet the Government, whose duty he believes it is to provide work for all, does not give him work....²⁰

Moreover, many young men appear to have viewed their female counterparts not simply as disconnected others who happened to be doing well, but rather as engaging in social climbing through relationships with older, wealthier 'sugar daddies', and shunning relationships with young men who were unable to compete in material terms.²¹

The gendered gaps in motives, expectations and outcomes of migration to town, and the potential for gender tension arising from them, were likely emerging features in late-colonial Dar es Salaam. They would, however, be exacerbated considerably by the various shifts of the 1960s – particularly the movement of women into new areas of formal sector work and public space, an increasing rhetorical promotion by the state of this kind of work for women, and the appearance of new avenues like the TYL's indecency campaigns through which male frustration could be channeled against women. Such

frustration had indeed erupted in the Operation Vijana campaign, as the mini-skirt came to be seen by young, male supporters of the ban not only as a *sign* of female accumulation, consumption, mobility and autonomy, but as a *catalyst* for socio-economic 'exploitation' of men by women. As one supporter of Operation Vijana put it, in a charge that was frequently leveled angrily in the debate over the campaign: 'I must condemn the minis from start to end. Ladies have to be guided as these young girls surely love the minis for gaining market; one dressing thus will win everybody.'²² For many of Dar es Salaam's young men, failing to gain the access to resources (and women) that fantasies of city life promised, Operation Vijana promised to eliminate what was seen as a central tool of women who placed themselves out of their material reach. For those participating in attacks on women and even in the TYL-led enforcement of the ban, the campaign provided an opportunity to enact sexualized performances of power over those women in the very spaces that were deemed to provide the conditions of possibility for female accumulation, mobility, and autonomy. As the phrase 'gaining market' suggests, those who were associated with banned fashion, prominently including secretaries and schoolgirls, were widely represented as being in positions ripe with possibilities for gaining access to men and their money through sex. Quite unlike the TYL's argument that the mini-skirt was antithetical to 'national culture', which was rather effectively challenged, this conflation with prostitution was nearly unassailable in the debate around Operation Vijana.²³ By the turn of the 1970s, however, this had changed, as we shall see as we turn to examine debate around, and challenges to, a 1970-71 attempt to resurrect the issue with a campaign against 'indecenty' in downtown Dar es Salaam.

Experiments in institutionalization: downtown 'swoops' and the Pauline Joseph case

As a formal campaign, Operation Vijana did not last long. Indeed, debate over the measure lasted considerably longer than the campaign itself, and its impact on memory and public discourse in Dar es Salaam appears to have greatly exceeded its impact on dress in the city. With enforcement of the ban tapering off three weeks after its launch in January 1969, residents of Dar es Salaam were commenting within months on the return of banned dress to the streets.²⁴ Some observers later commented that young women simply took their skirts and dresses to tailors for lengthening during the campaign, returning to have them shortened as soon as TYL patrols slackened.²⁵ No campaigns or measures against 'indecent' dress were undertaken for almost two years. Then in July 1970, letters began to appear in the press sharply criticizing the government for inaction in the face of a 'frightening'²⁶ proliferation of minis in the city's streets, offices, schools, buses and bars. Referencing each other, and escalating to such a point that *Uhuru* dubbed the correspondence the 'war over short dresses', many of the early calls were notable for laying a large portion of blame at the feet of the state for 'closing its eyes' to the issue. Indeed, some openly expressed the common suspicion that political 'big men' were

encouraging the wearing of mini-skirts by their potential 'prey'.²⁷

On 28th September 1970, two months after these calls began, and after more than eighty letters on the issue, the government launched a new initiative to combat, as one TANU spokesperson put it, 'the tendency of some of our girls to go about half-naked'.²⁸ Sharing with Operation Vijana a primary target of young women dressed 'indecently', the new campaign differed from its predecessor in key ways. If Operation Vijana had at least nominally included men's styles among its targets, the new campaign focused exclusively on women and paid considerably less attention to framing the issue in broad national cultural terms. Even more importantly, enforcement of the new initiative fell not to the TYL and its vigilante allies, but rather was placed in the hands of the police. Throughout late 1970 and into 1971 Dar es Salaam's police launched surprise evening 'swoops' on the city's downtown area, arresting women deemed to be guilty of 'indecent dressing in a public place'. Towards the beginning of the campaign, typical evening raids – often carried out twice a week – would result in the arrest of anywhere from twenty-five to one hundred women. Pressure was also placed on public and private institutions – bars, clubs, restaurants, schools and offices – to bar women dressed 'indecently' from their premises.²⁹ Much of this pressure seems to have gone at least partially unheeded, but at least one secondary school instituted a policy of sending girls with 'very short' school uniforms home to change. The policy, which the school took seriously enough to produce mimeographed form letters to accompany offending students home, was widely publicized when a parent wrote a letter to *Uhuru's* Editor praising the administration of Zanaki Secondary School for their policy and thanking them for punishing his daughter. The parent included the mimeographed form, completed with his daughter's name, which *Uhuru* published prominently on its letters-to-the-editor page.³⁰

As the campaign progressed on the ground, and was engaged in public debate, some noteworthy challenges emerged to the dress measures and the arguments made to support them. These challenges, representing a gendered struggle over work, autonomy and urban space, were more extensive and somewhat different in kind than those articulated during Operation Vijana. The conditions of their emergence were complex, arising as they did from both the framing of the campaign itself and, perhaps more significantly, a number of associated debates, trends and initiatives occurring simultaneously. I now turn to explore the relationship between the new dress campaign and these surrounding dynamics in an effort to understand both the kinds of challenges that emerged to the targeting of mini-skirted women downtown and the limits of these challenges.

On the evening of Saturday, 3rd October 1970, Dar es Salaam police arrested thirteen women in a handful of city centre bars and nightclubs on charges of 'indecent dressing in a public place'.³¹ The police raid was the second in what, over the following few months, would be a series of evening 'swoops' on the capital's downtown in an effort to rid certain city centre spaces of women either dressed 'indecently' or seen to be behaving like 'rogues and vagabonds'.³² Among the women taken into police custody, was 25 year-old Pauline Joseph, an employee of a Dar es Salaam travel agency who was arrested along with

several female friends as they approached the New Palace Hotel around 11pm.³³ While each of her friends – and indeed all of the other women caught up in the swoops – pled guilty to the charges, Joseph chose to contest them. Denying the charges against her – charges which carried penalties of substantial fines or months of imprisonment³⁴ – after four nights in jail, Pauline Joseph was released on 500/- bail.³⁵ After three postponements her trial finally began on January 27th, 1971, and continued for twenty four days.

The timing of the trial accentuated the public attention it received. There were several reasons why such a trial, situated as it was at the intersection of concerns over respectability, gender and urban public space, would garner attention in late 1970 and early 1971. The case coincided with a charged public discussion about women and work in the city, a debate that unfolded over multiple rounds and in the context of increasingly visible promotions of women's formal sector work by the state. Further thickening the charged context in which the Pauline Joseph story unfolded was its overlapping, temporally and otherwise, with another campaign playing out on Dar es Salaam's downtown streets: the latest effort to 'round-up' the capital's unemployed in order to 'repatriate' them to the countryside.³⁶ Finally, of course, the Joseph case played out in the midst of the continuation of the 'swoops' in which Ms. Joseph had been caught up. Like Operation Vijana, these new raids generated intense debate and a resurgence of public discourse focused on the familiar figures of prostitute, secretary and schoolgirl that were emblematic of the shifting and contested boundary between indecency and respectability. And yet, unlike the discourse surrounding Operation Vijana two years earlier, debate over these figures in 1970-71 saw the emergence of new challenges to the ideological nexus of respectability, gender and urban space underwriting the indecency campaigns.

It is particularly important to examine the *grounds* upon which the wearing of a mini-skirt – its legality or illegality, decency or indecency – were contested in the Pauline Joseph case. The target of the police raids in which Joseph and well over a hundred other women were arrested was not 'indecent' dress in isolation, but rather its display by certain people (Tanzanian women) in particular *public* spaces (downtown streets, bars, restaurants and nightclubs³⁷) often at specific times (evening). While remaining unstated in official declarations on the raids, the code here was clear. The target was framed as prostitution, and indeed a majority of public interventions by Dar es Salaam residents on the issue debated the swoops in these terms. It is difficult to assert to what degree the police were *actually* targeting prostitutes, as some maintained,³⁸ for there is much to suggest (as several letter-writers did) that the broad and elastic category of prostitute provided cover for more general attacks on women in the city centre after-hours.³⁹ In this context, the Pauline Joseph case opened the door for challenges to the policing of dress codes on the grounds that no firm conclusions about a woman's respectability could be read off of her evening appearance in a downtown street or nightclub wearing a mini-skirt, trouser suit or wig. For Ms. Joseph, her friends, and their testimony regarding the night of October 3rd all lent themselves to a narrative with a defensible claim to respectability, insofar as it fit into certain popular ideals of

'modern development' [*maendeleo ya kisasa*] – a story of 'modern', working women, of a 'type' sanctioned by the state, participating in the life of a 'developing' capital city alongside their male, office-working colleagues.

This narrative was built up during the trial and the publicity surrounding it. References to Pauline Joseph were almost always made alongside a notation of her status as a travel consultant. At 25, Joseph remained unmarried. What emerged strikingly in trial testimony by Joseph as well as by a friend present the night of her arrest, a Mrs. Mwinyipembe, were images of female autonomy in accumulation, consumption, and enjoyment. In describing the events preceding the women's arrest, Mrs. Mwinyipembe, who identified herself as a registered nurse, described how Joseph and a number of other female friends had attended a party hosted by Mrs. Mwinyipembe on that Saturday evening. After the party, the group 'decided to go for a dance at the New Palace Hotel' where they witnessed Joseph and another of their friends – one who was wearing a 'trouser suit' – being 'shoved into a vehicle by a policeman'. Deflecting aggressive prosecutorial questions about the length of Joseph's dress, Mwinyipembe provoked laughter in the court with her assertion that when Joseph arrived at her house for the party 'she did not measure the length of her dress'.⁴⁰ The picture painted here was one of 'modern' women moving easily between formal sector jobs, female-hosted parties, and downtown dance clubs, all apparently without significant male supervision (that is, aside from the policemen whose actions – including allegedly demanding at the police station that Joseph remove her underwear 'for checking' – appeared to implicate them in the 'indecenty' they were charged to curtail and may only have accentuated the appearance of Joseph and her friends as comparably respectable). A telling moment in the emergence at trial of associations of Pauline Joseph with desirable emblems of a cosmopolitan 'modern' came as defense and prosecution each marshaled authorizations for competing positions on the decency or indecency of the dress Pauline Joseph wore the night of her arrest (which was presented as an exhibit by the prosecutor). Attempting to answer testimony by the TANU Women's League Chair Mrs. John Mwalimu that Joseph's dress 'was not Tanzanian and was a shame to the culture of the country', defense counsel Mr. R.W. Moisey argued that 'wearing a dress whose length conformed with international standards such as that worn by air hostesses could not be regarded as indecent'.⁴¹

Isolated attempts to appropriate banned dress for respectable, 'modern' life and work in the city had been made before, though perhaps not with the power and visibility occasioned by the Joseph trial.⁴² And yet, the grounds on which the charges against Joseph were fought out in and around the trial were not exclusively – or even primarily – focused on the question of whether or not the mini-skirt was a respectable or appropriate outfit. Rather, much of the trial centred on the question of whether or not women had a legal *right* to wear what they wanted. With the exception of his brief attempt to defend the length of the Ms. Joseph's dress as lying within the bounds of international standards of decency, Joseph's lawyer attempted to sidestep the respectability issue by underlining the absence of a Tanzanian *law* regulating the length of dresses and arguing that it would be the duty of the national legislature, not of

the court or the police, to enact such regulations.⁴³ And in the end, it was a criterion of legality, and not decency, on which the decision in the trial hinged. In his final judgment the presiding magistrate acquitted Pauline Joseph of all charges – including that of ‘indecentcy’ – even as he lamented that she was, in fact, ‘indecent’. Saying that the dress Joseph wore the night of her arrest was found to rest six inches above her knee, Resident Magistrate C.U. Osakwe judged that ‘any...decent girl will think twice before putting it on’. He then went on in his official judgment to wonder why Joseph, ‘obviously not endowed with good looks and shapely legs, and whose thighs are more of an eyesore than a pleasant sight...should be desirous to engage in the latest craze of mini-dresses’. Nonetheless, ruled Osakwe, her ‘indecentcy’ aside, Joseph’s arrest constituted a ‘flagrant encroachment on the powers of the legislature and no doubt interference with individual liberty and freedom’.⁴⁴

In a lengthy post-trial interview with the *Sunday News* (published along with a photo of her posing in a mini-dress as a full-page feature on the paper’s ‘Women’s Page’), Pauline Joseph stressed both strands of challenge present during the trial: that the mini-skirt was not indecent, *and* that women in Tanzania had a legal right to dress as they chose. The queries of the unnamed interviewer focused repeatedly on questions of respectability and decency. In response to this line of questioning Joseph on the one hand insisted that ‘this dress [the mini] is like any other’. Asserting that she was a working woman who had ‘been putting on minis for years’, but was now the centre of public attention in a manner that was ‘embarrassing’ not only for her, but for her parents upcountry and her employers in town, Joseph attempted at length to disentangle the mini-skirt from prostitution.

Q [Interviewer]: But have you considered the charge that minis and such dresses are at the root of immorality and decadence in society?

A [Joseph]: What do you mean? Do you mean prostitution? You should not forget that prostitution started from time immemorial when minis were unknown. The cause of prostitution in our countries is the suppression of women and their lack of material wealth. That is partly why Parliament has passed the marriage Bill recently stressing equality of husband and wife. One has to remember that the traditional dress of the Wamasai does not by any means suggest that these people are prostitutes. In Uganda, the West Nile women go about naked but there are less prostitutes there than in the nightclubs of Kampala. The half-dressed Giriama women of Kenya are surely less prostitute than the ‘sophisticated’ Kikuyu women of Nairobi.⁴⁵

Furthermore, Joseph pointed out, images of the mini-skirt in Dar es Salaam’s media landscape were far from universally disapproving. ‘The dress is even advertised in newspapers and in cinemas. They said, “This is what a modern girl should look like”’.

At several points in the interview, however, Joseph countered the reporter’s attempts at getting her to comment on the decency or indecency of the mini-skirt by turning the discussion to the legality of policing dress. Answering a question as to whether she thought ‘decency’ was ‘part and parcel of a good and disciplined socialist society Tanzania is aiming at’, Joseph said: ‘This must

depend strictly on the law of the country'. Her victory in court was a 'victory for justice', she asserted, one which had 'helped prove the worth of the Tanzanian law'. Asked at the end of the interview for a 'general word of comment on the whole episode', Joseph chose to reiterate the focus on the law and a discourse of 'women's rights': '...At this juncture in the country's development, women should stand firm in defense of their rights. They should not allow their rights to be swept away by the political current'.⁴⁶

As a moment in an ongoing gendered struggle over downtown space, the Pauline Joseph episode showcases particularly well the charged and contested character of the female office-worker as a border figure between a respectable downtown presence for women on the one hand, and prostitution on the other. The case was not alone in this regard in 1970-71, for it unfolded alongside other debates about working women in town and their relationships with men – debates that echoed some of the themes being played out in the street, police station and court in the Pauline Joseph saga. Taking account this larger discursive context allows us to begin to track some of the shifts emerging in the time between Operation Vijana and the Pauline Joseph case in the contest over the meaning of the female office-worker.

Representations of 'the secretary' appeared in many different ways in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but the competing ways of valuing or devaluing this figure throughout this period gathered under two kinds of signification that were profoundly at odds, yet almost always appeared in close proximity to one another. On the one hand, the secretary operated as a sign of a 'modernizing' Tanzania, confirming (or, perhaps more accurately, standing in for) the nation's progress in 'developing' toward international standards of urban business and life. Particularly in the mid-1960s, secretaries often appeared in advertisements as fetish 'equipment' of the 'modern' Tanzanian office, often represented as more machine than human. Despite (or perhaps in an effort to counteract) the deep suspicion with which secretaries were regarded in some quarters (notably by young men with few career prospects and businessmen's wives anxious about their husbands' potential for office affairs), the Tanzanian state took an approving line for women in office work throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Women working in office jobs in Dar es Salaam were favorite subjects for relatively frequent features in the state-run press in which they were depicted in glowing terms as the progressive face of a nation with a bright future.

However, such approving depictions of the secretary were far from stable, for they were frequently confronted by a discourse that represented female office workers downtown not primarily as signs of desirable 'modern development', but rather as linchpins of an illicit system bordering on prostitution in which secretaries sought material rewards in exchange for sex with their male superiors.⁴⁷ The debates surrounding Operation Vijana saw relatively delicate and rare attempts to re-claim secretarial work as respectable overwhelmed by the much more prevalent and insistent conflation of the secretary with the prostitute out to 'gain market'. Yet the relative power of the two competing views of the secretary was not static but shifting. By the time of the Pauline Joseph case – with enforcement of dress codes having moved

out of the hands of a vigilante Youth League and into those of the police and reluctant magistrates, the number of women (an unprecedented number of them unmarried) migrating to the capital having surpassed the number of men, and the steady increase of state promotion of women's formal sector work – the material and ideological fields had shifted somewhat.

As Pauline Joseph stood trial for public indecency, heated discussions about women and work were taking place. Concerns over increasing employment of women in wage-labour jobs in Dar es Salaam had been present throughout the sixties, but were particularly charged in late 1970 and early 1971 due to a confluence of forces: on one hand, the launch of a massive effort to round-up the capital's armies of unemployed young for 'repatriation' upcountry; on the other, an energetic and visible campaign by governmental and party institutions to legitimize and promote women's entry into blue- and white-collar jobs. This latter campaign included pitches by TANU's Women's League (UWT) at well-publicized speeches, but extended far beyond UWT efforts to regular, full-page features in the Party Kiswahili press. Among such features were reports on women's 'progress' that explicitly and repeatedly highlighted women's 'emancipation' and 'equality' with men as urgent and necessary parts of the building of a modern, socialist Tanzania. Some of these reports exemplified an older, essentially conservative line (prevalent particularly in UWT statements through the 1960s),⁴⁸ but a majority of features took more radical positions decrying the existence of gendered occupational norms and urging women's entrance into male-dominated spheres of employment 'if [the] nation wants to be capable in any way of developing'.⁴⁹ For instance, a full-page layout in *Uhuru* on 'Education and Women's Progress', criticized the overwhelming prevalence of schoolgirls pursuing home economics and declared:

These subjects [like home economics] are certainly important for all, boys and girls, but usually these courses that are known as girls' subjects don't lead them [girls] to wage employment. If education for women can be thought of as one way to develop the country's economy, then it is necessary for more education in technical subjects to be made available for women so they have greater choice of work after their education.... The time for saying that a certain job is for men only has passed.⁵⁰

The photo chosen to accompany this feature, complete with approving caption, was of a young woman working as a downtown petrol station attendant, pictured filling the tank of a car, and it joined numerous other visual and narrative portraits in the press of women in a range of urban formal sector jobs. These portraits included detailed profiles of women in professions out of reach for all but the tiniest minority of Dar es Salaam's women (like Julie Manning, Tanzania's first female lawyer, her younger colleague Augusta Madere, and Member of Parliament Bernadette N. Kunambi, all profiled in *Uhuru* as 'women of today's Tanzania'⁵¹), but they also included features of women in less elite careers: electricians, nurses and secretaries were all glowingly profiled in the state-run press around this time, and even 'barmaids' were stridently defended by *Uhuru*'s T.N. Mshuza, one of working women's most vigorous activists in the press.⁵²

Of course, the proliferation of official representations of women in the formal sector did not necessarily signal a commitment on the part of the government to provide the structural conditions necessary for a large increase in opportunities for women to gain waged employment. Some degree of such commitment did exist and was steadily increasing after the Arusha Declaration. For instance, efforts were undertaken to increase rates of female enrolment in school – both in the primary-secondary-college track and importantly in the massive and significantly successful adult education campaign launched in the late 1960s – and encouraging government offices and parastatals to hire women. But such efforts relied heavily on repeated exhortations, and proportions of women in the formal workforce remained low. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, particular kinds of formal sector work – secretarial work, for instance – were opening up to women. These positions tended to be highly visible ones and emerged, in conjunction with the mini-skirt, as convenient targets for the articulation of the anxieties of young men in Dar es Salaam regarding their own prospects for achieving goals of work and family that the city held out so tantalizingly.

Appearing in tandem with the launch of the most recent wave of round-ups of unemployed men (the largest to date), this profusion of officially-sanctioned, positive images of women workers – combined with the sight of young women spending their days downtown searching for office jobs (all too successfully, and with preferential treatment, some men believed)⁵³ – provides an important context for men's anxieties. One area of concern was with the supposed negative effects of women's wage labour on the relationship of the working couple. In August 1970, amidst the widespread calls for government action on 'indecent dress' that spawned the raids in which Pauline Joseph was arrested, *Uhuru* published the results of a study of workers at two Dar es Salaam factories, Tanganyika Textiles and Tanganyika Tegry Plastics. Featuring interviews with male and female workers at the plant (as well as with a local Catholic priest), the study sought 'to investigate why so many of those [couples] that split up in town are working couples'.⁵⁴ In answering this question, workers of both genders painted a picture of relationships beset by male 'jealousy', a mutual lack of trust, and a fragility attributed to the 'self-reliance' women gained through wage labour. As Alli Abdallah, one of the textile factory workers, put it, 'There are men who have intense jealousy, and this is one of the problems in married life. Since the wife is earning her own money she's free to not be cautious in life, because whatever happens she'll be able to be self-reliant [*kujitegemea*] even if she is left [by her husband]'. He continued, 'Some working women have the bad habit of coming home late, and they're always using work as an excuse, which many times isn't true'.⁵⁵ Female workers agreed that 'working gives women more freedom [*uhuru*]' and added that this freedom included a reluctance to tolerate an abusive husband: 'Girls these days are progressing in a major way [*wako kwenye maendeleo makubwa*], and that condition of being beaten by their husbands...it makes a girl feel ashamed and she can decide to leave him'.⁵⁶

Some female workers seemed to confirm men's fears, asserting that the flexibility afforded women by work applied not only to money, but to sexual

liaisons as well. Mariamu Omari described how 'if a woman finds someone to please her outside [her marriage], she loses desire for her husband and disagreements erupt', and opined, 'Sometimes women become scornful because they have work'.⁵⁷ For their part, some of the men interviewed complained of the material difficulties of getting married and keeping a wife satisfied. With one worker noting the burden of accumulating enough to pay bridewealth, another asserted, 'Sometimes a woman gets so accustomed to entertainment, but when the husband changes this situation suddenly, perhaps because of his means, the woman...becomes dissatisfied with these changes and disagreements result'.⁵⁸

These expressions of a crisis of masculinity arising out of a nexus of women's work and mobility in the city, high rates of urban unemployment (for both genders), and perceptions of these phenomena, were not new, although the contours of the crisis were growing clearer. What was more unprecedented was the vocabulary used to describe the consequences of women's autonomous accumulation and increased mobility. 'Freedom' (*uhuru*, the term for Tanzania's independence from colonial rule), 'development' or 'progress' (*maendeleo*, the single-most important goal – indeed the expressed *raison d'être* – of the state), and 'self-reliance' (*ujitegemeo*, a central keyword of the post-Arusha Declaration, socialist project) – these words were endowed with a nearly unassailable value difficult to match in Tanzania in 1970.⁵⁹ Conveying not only official approval, but also popular desirability, the use of these words to describe the effects of increasing female autonomy (even by those disapproving of these effects) is remarkable and is evidence of a significant shift in the terms of the debate about women, work and respectability. If a close association between women's formal sector work and 'gaining market' through sex was still eminently present, it existed alongside the emergence of assumptions that women's formal sector work was a politically positive goal, part of the progress, development, and self-reliance of an independent Tanzania.

This is not, of course, to suggest that men in Dar es Salaam were growing more comfortable and secure with the idea of women earning their own wages in town. Indeed, as another round of debate developed in the press in early 1971 over the perceived high numbers of women being hired in offices and factories, interventions by men on the issue strongly indicate the contrary.⁶⁰ One young man, a student at the Modern Commercial College in Dar es Salaam, wrote a letter enumerating the pressures on even relatively educated, unmarried men in town. Pleading with the government to instate a policy of hiring men first and paying them more than women, Thade S. Pella cited the difficulties of marrying as constituting a unique burden on the unemployed young man – a burden, he argued, that current practices of hiring young women in large numbers was exacerbating:

When a man wants to marry he has to furnish a house and pay a bridewealth to the woman's parents, and women don't have these kinds of problems.

Now, if a woman has a job and the man doesn't, what will that be like? I think it will be a problem. As if it's not enough that the woman has a job, she

In the "Age of Minis": Women, work and masculinity downtown

takes on a swagger and scorn for men. You'll find many women, those with work, without husbands; but you'll find some of them with children, maybe two or three. If you ask her who fathered these children she has nothing to say. How will these children who have no father live?

If you ask that same woman why she doesn't want to marry she answers because husbands are scarce. This is not true. It's because of the haughty and scornful attitude that they [get from] hav[ing] work.... So many problems result from men not being able to find work.⁶¹

Others, like J.T. Mnali, extended complaints about the burdens shouldered by men in town to the case of married men. Adding his support to those calling for a state and private-sector policy to hire men first, Mnali argued that 'a husband is someone with many more problems than women, for he has to first provide for his family'. He intimated that jobs were wasted on women who, 'once they are educated...don't concentrate on their jobs but are always thinking of men, and many of them end up...pregnant'.⁶² This last complaint was part of a chorus of accusations about the behavior of young women hired to work in offices downtown – accusations that accompanied most calls for a reduction in hiring women in such jobs. Such accusations deployed the familiar trope of the secretary out to advance herself materially through sex. Suggesting that offices were being used as 'brothels', one civil servant wrote,

Go into some of the various Government offices and factories that hire girls. The girl knows she's at work, but you'll see her taking her mirror out of her little handbag. Here you see her looking at her lips, there you see her putting powder on her face; here you see her combing her hair, there she is doing this and that all in order to attract the young men she works with. Can work really be respected like this?⁶³

Another man likened the hiring of women to 'sex work', claimed that eight out of ten 'girls' in every office or factory were pregnant, and lamented the 'big heads' that he suggested secretaries' liaisons with higher-ups gave these 'office girls'.⁶⁴

And yet, even the expressions of frustration and victimhood on the part of men contained repeated nods to the 'equality' of women and men, women's 'right' and 'freedom' to work. 'All people are equal, I agree', wrote one man, issuing a disclaimer that appeared in many of the letters critical of the practice of hiring 'so many' female office workers. 'Men and women are equal, even in the right to be hired'.⁶⁵ Even the attempts by some to question the kind of 'freedom' that would result in the presence of large numbers of women in formal sector jobs are indicative of the degree to which concepts like 'freedom', 'equality' and 'rights' had gained a foothold as terms (alongside others) with which women's formal sector work, urban mobility and accumulation were debated. Many acknowledged that state policy (correctly in their view) insisted on 'equality' and 'non-discrimination'⁶⁶; even Mr. Pella, near the end of his letter, evidently felt the need to preempt expected criticism of his call for advantages for men in hiring and pay, dismissing those who would call this 'discrimination'.⁶⁷ And indeed, many women *were* charging just that, answering

men's letters by suggesting that calls for restricting the hiring of women were 'pushing our development as women backwards', that harassment of women on city streets was indicative of men's, not women's, 'indecent' and lack of 'respect', and even that 'what Europeans thought of Africans is what you African men are thinking of women'.⁶⁸ 'I urge our Government,' one young woman wrote, 'to consider women as human beings, as capable and free people – to give them the rights they deserve and the freedom and the equality they hunger for'.⁶⁹

If defenses of appearing and moving about downtown in a mini-skirt were most often made by attempting to ascribe to such women the respectability of the well-behaved (by either appropriating discourses of 'modern development' and 'equality', or deploying a standard of legality), late 1970 also saw signs of rebellious interventions that eschewed such gestures and point to the limits of the gestures toward respectability. Among these was an outpouring of vitriol sparked by a young woman who publicly defended the mini-skirt not with reference to decency, modernity, or equality, but rather with an explicit celebration of an urban, 'city girl' identity, open defiance of generational norms of deference, and a denigration of the rural ideal upon which assaults on urban youth culture so often rested.⁷⁰ The public outcry around these statements was accompanied by a flurry of concern about schoolgirls, portrayed as an unapologetically pleasure-seeking group that refused to observe public decorum and gendered or generational hierarchies of authority. Such perceived challenges by young women and girls that went beyond trying to claim the mini-skirt for respectability tended to be met with ferocious volleys of verbal assault and dismissal and were unable to gain the kind of foothold (significant even when marginal) achieved by the assertions of 'decency' and legality.

By contrast, Pauline Joseph won her case, and those arguing in favor of women in offices and factories achieved significant success in re-framing these positions in the eminently respectable terms of 'equality', 'freedom', 'modern development' and 'self-reliance', even as such work remained closely associated in many quarters with the mini-skirt and 'gaining market'. Success in this struggle owed much to protagonists' ability to take advantage of both the form of the new dress campaign and available discourses surrounding it to exploit the ambivalence that lay at the heart of the figure of the working woman in banned fashion. Energetic official promotions of women in formal sector work provided a vocabulary and set of associations that were seized upon to strengthen claims for normalizing new patterns of women's mobility and 'freedom of dress' in the city. Likewise, while the move to enforce the new dress campaign through the institutions of the police, schools, public and private sector business represented an expansion of the scope of the policing of dress codes, this very institutionalization lent itself to Pauline Joseph combating the measures on legal grounds in court. Successful re-framing, of course, was by no means equally accessible to women in Dar es Salaam regardless of levels of material and social capital. Indeed, for women working as 'bargirls', for instance, who were generally less educated and less well-off than those in other formal sector positions, both the nature of their labour and the way it was perceived tied them much more

stubbornly to the bundle of deep-rooted associations between men, urban women and accumulation through varying shades of sex work that were a feature of colonial and post-colonial urban landscapes.

By the early 1970s, then, the female office worker had emerged as a 'border figure' that could be struggled over with considerable success, in a way that figures of rebellious 'city girls', eschewing claims to respectability, had not. Rooted in a history stretching back to the late colonial period of migration, work, accumulation and sex in Dar es Salaam in which many young men often perceived women to be pitted against them, this struggle over women's work and movement intensified and assumed new forms as a result of socio-economic and ideological/discursive shifts of the 1960s. Many of these shifts were contested: if the opening up to women of particular areas of formal sector work exacerbated perceptions among some young men of women's advancement at their expense (through exploiting sexual liaisons, many suggested), it also allowed women to contest certain stigmatizations of their presence, dress, and comportment in downtown public space. Likewise, if the emergence in the 1960s of campaigns for 'national culture' (those of the TYL as well as the broader campaigns discussed here) provided young men with new avenues for acting out grievances against certain kinds of women, an increasing promotion by the state of women's participation in the public sphere provided a new discursive weapon to contest these attacks. As such, this struggle over the boundaries and signs of respectability was one in which the material and the discursive were inextricably connected.

Conclusions

This struggle over women's work, movement, dress, and comportment is one that has continued in various forms since the 1970s. The male to female ratio in Tanzania's urban areas, including Dar es Salaam, has continued to decline steadily. More marked has been the increase in women's formal sector employment, which in Tanzanian urban areas as a whole shot up in the 1970s from 15 percent of the total formal sector labour force in 1967, to 37 percent in 1978 (it then grew more slowly, reaching 42 percent in 1988).⁷² A detailed look at the developments of the last two decades lie beyond the scope of this chapter and will require sustained research, but anecdotal evidence would suggest that with these continued moves into the public sphere has come a certain measure of success in expanding the boundaries of respectability. Nonetheless, debates around connections between women and work, dress and comportment, sex and accumulation, have continued into the new century, and the shape of these debates suggests that neither 'side' in the struggles surrounding the Pauline Joseph case can claim victory. Attacks on women perceived to be dressed too fashionably or provocatively continue to occur on occasion, and the line between working women (and schoolgirls) and accumulation through sex remains a blurred one in much public talk and networks of rumor. Indeed, the contested nature of this line remains a prominent feature of the capital's landscape.

Notes

¹ See e.g., James R. Brennan, 'Blood enemies: exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958-75', *JAH* 47:3 (2006), pp. 389-413; and Andrew Burton, 'The Haven of Peace purged: tackling the undesirable and unproductive poor in Dar es Salaam, ca. 1950s-1980s', *IJAH*, 40:1, pp. 119-51.

² See Andrew M. Ivaska, ' "Anti-mini militants meet modern misses": urban style, gender, and the politics of "national culture" in 1960s Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', *Gender and History* 14.3 (2002), pp. 584-607.

³ On the vigilante ethos of the TANU Youth League in Dar es Salaam, see James R. Brennan, 'Youth, the TANU Youth League, and managed vigilantism in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1925-73', *Africa* 76:2 (2006), pp. 221-46.

⁴ R.H. Sabot, *Economic Development and Urban Migration: Tanzania, 1900-1971* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 43-50.

⁵ The statistics for 1928, 1931 and 1940 are drawn from district census data quoted in Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam* (Oxford, 2005), p. 56; the 1948 figure, also from national census data, is quoted in *ibid.*, p. 90.

⁶ J.A.K. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam* (London, 1963), pp. 168-69; Burton, *African Underclass*, p. 56; James R. Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1916-1976' (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 2002), p. 56; for a comparable phenomenon in Mwanza, see John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 531.

⁷ Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1997), pp. 31-38; Burton, *African Underclass*, p. 56.

⁸ The quote is from Leslie, *Survey*, p. 4; see also, p. 14; Burton, *African Underclass*, p. 56; Swantz and Bryceson (1976), p. 29; Kenneth Little, *African Women in Town: An Aspect of Africa's Social Revolution* (London, 1973), pp. 24, 90-91, 96; Luise White, *The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi* (Chicago, 1990).

⁹ Sabot, *Economic Development*, p. 90; John Campbell, 'Conceptualizing gender relations and the household in urban Tanzania', in Colin Creighton and C.K. Omari (eds.), *Gender, Family and Household in Tanzania* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), p. 183.

¹⁰ Sabot, *Economic Development*, p. 90; Israel Sembajwe, 'Secondary statistics on overall demography and demographic trends (Especially migration) in urban areas with special reference to Dar es Salaam', in Olivia Mgaza and Han Bantje, *Tanzania Country Report for the IUNS Study 'Rethinking Infant Nutrition Policies Under Changing Socio-Economic Conditions'*, Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre and Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning (BRALUP), November 1980, p. 144.

¹¹ Sabot, *Economic Development*, pp. 94-95; Deborah Fahy Bryceson, 'Social, political and economic factors affecting women's material conditions in Tanzania', in Mgaza and Bantje, *Country Report*, p. 157.

¹² By 1971, for example, some 38% of those renting houses in Dar es Salaam were reportedly female. Deborah Fahy Bryceson, 'A review of statistical information on women in the work force seeking employment in Dar es Salaam and their families' economic welfare', in Mgaza and Bantje, *Country Report*, p. 188.

¹³ Sabot, *Economic Development*, p. 92.

¹⁴ Bryceson, 'A review of statistical information', p. 188. For similar trends in Zambia, see Little, *African Women*, p. 17.

¹⁵ Marje-Liisa Swantz and Deborah Fahy Bryceson, 'Women workers in Dar es Salaam: 1973/74 survey of female minimum wage earners and self-employed', BRALUP Research Paper no. 43, 1976; Deborah Fahy Bryceson, 'A review of maternity protection legislation in Tanzania', in Mgaza and Bantje, *Country Report*, pp. 175-78.

¹⁶ Bryceson, 'A review of statistical information' (1980). Factory jobs, like Urafiki, would often require Std. 4 education, while secretarial jobs would often ask for Std. 7 completion or a certificate from a secretarial college.

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¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-87.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹⁹ The quote is from Little, *African Women*, p. 28. See also Leslie, *Survey*; Geiger, *TANU Women*, pp. 37-38; Swantz and Bryceson, 'Women workers', p. 25; Emmanuel Akyeampong, "'Wo pe tam won pe ba'" ('You like cloth but you don't want children'): urbanization, individualism and gender relations in colonial Ghana, c. 1900-39', in David M. Anderson and Richard Rathbone (eds.), *Africa's Urban Past* (Oxford, 2000); Christine Obbo, *African Women: Their Struggle for Economic Independence* (London, 1980).

²⁰ Leslie, *Survey*, p. 4.

²¹ Ivaska, 'Anti-mini militants', pp. 599-600. For hints of gender tension arising out of the political economy of sex in late-colonial Dar es Salaam, see Leslie, *Survey*, p. 229; and in a broader, comparative context of East and Central Africa, see Little, *African Women*, chapter 7.

²² 'Supporter', letter to *Standard*, 25 October, 1968.

²³ Ivaska, 'Anti-mini militants'.

²⁴ *Uhuru*, Aug 2nd, 1969; *Standard*, Sep. 11th, 1969; *Ngurumo*, Nov. 22nd, 1969.

²⁵ 'Aibu mpaka lini?', editorial, *Uhuru*, Oct. 7th, 1970.

²⁶ Anselmi Nere, letter to *Uhuru*, July 23rd, 1970.

²⁷ *Ibid.* Also see letters in *Uhuru* from Pembe A. Ng'amba, July 30th, 1970; J.M. Makuyu, Aug. 19th, 1970; Fausta A. Matemba, Aug. 21st, 1970.

²⁸ 'Girls in court after swoop', *Standard*, Sep. 29th, 1970.

²⁹ 'Onyo kwa wenye mabaa', *Uhuru*, Mar. 18th, 1971; 'Aibu mpaka lini?', editorial, *Uhuru*, Oct. 7th, 1970.

³⁰ Hatibu H. Kimbwera, letter to *Uhuru*, Aug. 31st, 1970.

³¹ '13 women held in second police swoop', *Standard*, Oct. 5th, 1970.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ For details of the events of Oct. 3rd, as they were told to the court in testimony, see 'Girl denies indecency charges', *Standard*, Jan. 28th, 1971; 'Witness sends Dar court into laughter', Feb. 8th, 1971.

³⁴ Of the women arrested on the same night as Ms. Joseph, most were given sentences of a 100/- fine or two months in prison.

³⁵ 'Warning to married women', *Standard*, Oct. 7th, 1970.

³⁶ On the colonial and postcolonial history of these round-ups, see Burton, *African Underclass*, and *idem.*, 'Haven'.

³⁷ Among the venues repeatedly targeted were the New Palace Hotel, the Airlines Hotel, and Margot's Night Club. See 'Police swoops draw a blank', *Standard*, Nov. 1st, 1970.

³⁸ See e.g., Felician S. Makwaya's letter, *Standard*, Oct. 24th, 1970.

³⁹ 'Warning', *Standard*, Oct. 7th, 1970; 'Police swoop', *Standard*, Nov. 1st, 1970. Entangled in the elasticity of the category of prostitute were two intersecting phenomena: the fluid parameters of the material practice of 'prostitution' in Dar es Salaam historically (see p. 3 above); and the considerable rhetorical latitude exhibited by the stigmatization of particular women as prostitutes. While the degree to which the police were simply targeting prostitution remains an open question, what interests me here is the way in which initiatives against indecency, such as the one in which Pauline Joseph was arrested, became terrains of struggle over broader issues of women's work and movement downtown.

⁴⁰ Testimony by defense witness, Mrs. Mwinyipembe, as described in 'Witness', *Standard*, Feb. 6th, 1971.

⁴¹ See 'Girl denies indecency charges', *Standard*, Jan. 28th, 1971 for a description of the UWT Chair's testimony, and 'No law on length of dress, court told', Feb. 13th, 1971 for that of the defense counsel's statements.

⁴² Ivaska, 'Anti-mini militants', pp. 600-3.

⁴³ 'No law', *Standard*, Feb. 13th, 1971.

⁴⁴ 'Mini girl cleared in test case', *Standard*, Feb. 18th, 1971; 'Court frees mini-skirt girl', *Nationalist*, Feb. 18th, 1971.

⁴⁵ Interview with Pauline Joseph, *Sunday News*, Mar. 7th, 1971.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ For instance, see Dixon Mubeya's letter, *Standard*, Mar. 3rd, 1971.

⁴⁸ This position charged those with more advanced formal education with the duty of instructing their 'less fortunate' sisters in the arts of 'modern' life – even as it went little beyond highlighting the realm of home economics. See, for instance, UWT officer Anna Mgaya's contribution to *Uhuru's* 'Women's Page': 'Jinsi wanawake wanavyoweza kuhudumia Taifa', *Uhuru*, Mar. 20th, 1971.

⁴⁹ T.M. Mshuza, 'Elimu na Maendeleo ya Wanawake', *Uhuru*, Nov. 7th, 1970.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ T.N. Mshuza, 'Wanawake wa Tanzania ya leo', *Uhuru*, Nov. 14th, 1970; See also T.N. Mshuza's report on Esther Mwaikambo, Tanzania's first female medical doctor, in *Uhuru*, Feb. 13th, 1971.

⁵² See e.g., 'Fundu wa kwanza mwanamke', *Uhuru*, Mar. 13th, 1971; T.N. Mshuza, 'Tusidharauliwe katika kazi', *Uhuru*, Jan. 16th, 1971; 'Chakubanga' cartoon of *Uhuru*, Mar. 16th, 1971 (artist: C. Gregory).

⁵³ See, for instance, a letter to the *Standard* from 'Akili-Kuambiana', July 13th, 1970. Giving voice to perceptions of preferential treatment for 'girls' in hiring for office jobs, while 'many experienced boys are visiting every office seeking for employment', this young man lamented: '...many girl[s] do not want to get married simply because they are employed.... Girls will get married by boy[s] who will support them. What about boys?'

⁵⁴ T. M. Mshuza, 'Kwa nini ndoa nyingi kati ya wafanya kazi katika miji huvunjika?', *Uhuru*, Aug. 15th, 1970.

⁵⁵ Ali Abdallah, quoted in Mshuza, 'Kwa nini?' *Uhuru*, Aug. 15th, 1970.

⁵⁶ Emiliana Chaulaya, quoted in Mshuza, 'Kwa nini?' *Uhuru*, Aug. 15th, 1970.

⁵⁷ Mariamu Omari, quoted in Mshuza, 'Kwa nini?' *Uhuru*, Aug. 15th, 1970.

⁵⁸ Casian John Hale, quoted in Mshuza, 'Kwa nini?' *Uhuru*, Aug. 15th, 1970. The comments on dowries were made by Frank Mkwemba, quoted in the same article.

⁵⁹ For instance, see *Nchi Yetu*, April and September, 1970, and February 1971; *Uhuru*, April 26th, 1970; *Nationalist*, May 1st, 1971.

⁶⁰ T.M. Mshuza, 'Tatizo la ukosefu wa kazi mijini', *Uhuru*, Oct. 17th, 1970; exchange on 'Women at Work' between Kessi Hassan Dibwa and a spokesperson for the Urafiki Textile Mill, *Standard*, Jun. 29th, 1970.

⁶¹ Thade S. Pella, letter, *Uhuru*, Mar. 3rd, 1971.

⁶² J.T. Mnali, letter, *Uhuru*, Feb. 24th, 1971.

⁶³ 'Mtumishi wa Serikali', letter, *Uhuru*, Feb. 5th, 1971.

⁶⁴ Buchuchu B. Kwazaho, letter, *Uhuru*, Feb. 15th, 1971.

⁶⁵ Buchuchu B. Kwazaho, letter, *Uhuru*, Feb. 15th, 1971.

⁶⁶ See, for instance, 'Mtumishi wa Serikali', letter, *Uhuru*, Feb. 5th, 1971; Buchuchu B. Kwazaho, letter, *Uhuru*, Feb. 15th, 1971; 'Tarishi wa Zamani', letter, *Uhuru*, Feb. 15th, 1971.

⁶⁷ Thade S. Pella, letter, *Uhuru*, Mar. 3rd, 1971.

⁶⁸ Bi. M. Mwaka, letter, *Uhuru*, Mar. 19th, 1971; Sarah Towela, letter, *Standard*, Oct. 4th, 1970; 'Miss E. Maria', letter, *Standard*, Oct. 25th, 1970.

⁶⁹ 'Miss E. Maria', letter, *Standard*, Oct. 25, 1970.

⁷⁰ See Andrew M. Ivaska, 'Negotiating "culture" in a cosmopolitan capital: Urban style and the state in colonial and postcolonial Dar es Salaam' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 2003), pp. 248-52.

⁷¹ John Campbell put the male:female ratio in Dar es Salaam at 111:100 in 1988. See Campbell, 'Race, class and community', p. 26. Data from the 1988 census suggests an average of parity across Tanzanian towns in 1988. See United Republic of Tanzania, *Women and Men in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Statistics, 1997), p. 1.

⁷² Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), *Gender Profile of Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: TGNP, 1993), p. 37.

Chapter Ten

'I am a Partial Person' *The urban experience of rural music*

Stephen Hill

In July 1997, Rosy Margaret Ndunguru celebrated her confirmation into the Roman Catholic Church in Mwananyamala, Dar es Salaam. Her parents, well educated, middle-class urban migrants from Mbinga District, rented a hall and invited about 150 family and friends for this important event. Music featured prominently at the reception and came from two sources, a hired commercial band that performed Tanzanian, Congolese, and international hits interspersed with moderately successful covers of regional *ngoma* drumming styles. The other source of music was a *lindeko* drumming group, playing an episodic, commemorative, celebratory music from the Matengo¹ ethnic group, to which Rosy Margaret's parents and many guests belonged. The pop band was non-Matengo and entertained the guests; however, the reaction generated by the *lindeko* drummers was of a different order. Apart from the celebrant, who must remain aloof and look a little dour, *lindeko* dancing sparked passionate participation from the Matengo community and great interest and vicarious excitement from the non-Matengo guests. Although a small group of blue-collar musicians brought and played the instruments, the most energetic participants were the men and women with the highest education and social rank; the urban Matengo elite.

'We in Dar es Salaam we are a group, almost a unique group. Almost (completely) white-collar and if you want to have your celebration, you need to organize some dance from home they (invited urban guests) can see as unique, you know? (Also) towards you yourselves.'

Simon Mahai (12 July 2003)²

Spending all or part of one's life in an urban setting is a reality for increasing numbers of Africans. The statistics on African urbanization are staggering. By 2030, total population in the 'less developed regions' should reach four times the population in the 'more developed regions'.³ Urbanization rates in 'less

developed regions' outstrip those in 'more developed regions' by a factor of four.⁴ They are highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, hovering around 4-5 percent *per annum* due largely to post-colonial migrations.⁵ Between 1995 and 2005, Tanzania's urban population rose from 8.3 million to 14.4 million.⁶ It is in this urban world, and not in rural villages, that the history of Tanzania is now being written.

In this chapter, I will chart the history of one urban community, the Matengo of Dar es Salaam, from the pioneers from Mbinga District in the 1940s to the mature but fractured community of the early 21st century. In particular, I will identify the unifying role the rural music/dance *lindeko* plays as an emotional centre for ethnic identity construction and conduit for negotiating space on Dar es Salaam's public stage. *Lindeko* is a participatory, processional dance accompanied by one or more drums and a kind of bell. The texts are either commentaries on social actions relevant to the community or formulaic greetings and praises. The musical meter is duple and song forms are episodic/strophic with a strong call and response. Men and women dance together; both sexes act as song leader; however, men drum exclusively while women shake rattles. As Simon Mahai, former head of the secondary education sector in the Ministry of Education, points out in the second epigraph, through *lindeko* performance the Matengo tell themselves and the broader urban community where they came from, who they are, and what their aspirations are. A key question I will address is why Tanzanian urban society — relentlessly cosmopolitan, connected, forward-looking — values a resolutely rural identity as a portion of a person/community's urban profile.

Scholars have long charted the effects of urban migration on African society. Early work rested on the assumption that Africans were ill-suited for urban life; that an urban African was somehow anomalous.⁷ These studies and colonial policy assumed that African residence in urban settings was inherently problematic because Africans 'naturally' belonged in rural villages.⁸ Such work rested on the assumption that the urban landscape determines African response and opportunity through economic, housing, political and social limitations, not that Africans contribute, albeit without full command of resources, to modifying the urban environment for their benefit. I propose that Dar es Salaam residents with rural backgrounds use both rural and urban performative resources to negotiate a new identity and create new lives in cities and that in the Matengo case the *lindeko* dance is critical to this community's urban history. That is, I view the urban context as a stage on which African actors plan, negotiate, and enact a role based on personal and group history, available resources, and the constraints of the urban society.

The current size of the Dar es Salaam Matengo community is unknown — the 2002 national census did not record ethnicity or place of origin for the urban population, nor has ethnicity been recorded in the national census since 1967. Population estimates by my Matengo research partners during the summer of 2003 range from 3,000-4,000 to 500,000 individuals; the latter figure is impossibly high, indicating that the urban Matengo community is itself unaware of its own size.⁹ To further complicate matters, no long-term, stable, community-wide voluntary organization that might keep membership

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rolls has ever arisen. Instead, Matengo voluntary associations in Dar es Salaam form around either rural valley of origin and are largely social and mutually supportive, or around emergent economic issues in homeland communities and are transient and likewise centred on particular villages or valleys. Dr. Daniel Mbunda notes: 'They [the urban Matengo community] are very much united when something happens, when there is a wedding or a funeral, but it is very spontaneous.'¹⁰ Matengo ethnomusicologist Sabinus Komba suggested that the lack of permanent, community-wide organizations might be because of state suspicion of this group due to the Oscar Kambona affair.¹¹ Whatever the case, reliable numbers of Matengo living in Dar es Salaam are not available. I estimate the population during the summer of 2003 as between 8,000 and 10,000.

Establishment: the early years, 1940s – 1950s

Neither local histories nor census records accurately pinpoint the beginnings of the Matengo community in Dar es Salaam. Abel Hyera, a respected elder in this community and famous *lindeko* drummer, related that the first Matengo migrants to Dar es Salaam arrived as labourers in the 1940s.¹² Mr. Hyera's statement does not preclude earlier individuals making personal trips, or even living in the city, but his memory points to the first incarnation of a recognizable, coherent, continuously present Matengo community in this decade, a dynamic applicable to other ethnic groups.¹³ This relatively late date for community formation in the city is likely the intersection of three features. First, the remoteness of Umatengo: the Matengo homeland, in the far south of the country meant these men were largely not conscripted into service during the First World War, and thus were not part of the influx to the city after the war. Second, Umatengo is sparsely populated and agriculturally bountiful; hence there was scant environmental pressure for out-migration. Finally, it was only in the inter-war period that Tanganyikans first entered government service and the private sector (sources of white-collar employment favoured by Matengo) in significant numbers.¹⁴

A typical dynamic of African urban migration is one of rural poor flocking to the city to escape endemic poverty or poor crops. The Matengo case is nearly the opposite. Good soils, adequate rain, and coffee production (primarily after 1950) generated scant economic pressure to migrate. The main reason Matengo men left the rural homeland was to pursue opportunities provided by education. Ruvuma region houses several excellent schools run mostly by south German Benedictines (Peramiho, Kigonsera, and later Likonde), and these played a central role in the Matengo story. A high level of education and relatively small number of blue-collar workers and unskilled labourers characterizes the urban male Matengo community. Although Matengo women followed men to the city primarily through marriage, they frequently attain high education as well.

Several Dar es Salaam residents (Bertram Mahai, Simon Mahai [no relation], Philip Komba, Dr. Gabriel Ndunguru, Dr. Daniel Mbunda), all from the Hagati

valley of Mbinga District, describe their early lives in similar terms. Around the age of 12, after excelling in the first three or four years of primary education, mission teachers sent them to a residential secondary school for gifted students in Litembo, a neighbouring valley. From this point, these young men never returned to live full-time in their home villages. They were cut off from the kinds of experiences and the diversity of interactions and exchanges typical for other Matengo youth living in their homeland. Philip Komba, professor at the Open University of Tanzania, indicated that he felt like a 'guest' at his family home after a few years away at school.¹⁵ The cost of education and later a career entailed exclusion from their families, neighbourhoods, local stories, beliefs, dances, and musics, that ultimately led to a feeling of partial disconnect from their heritage. The payoff was excellent life opportunities far outside Umatengo. Bertram Mahai, who worked for the United Nations Development Programme for 18 years, summed it up best when his knowledge failed during a conversation about rural music and dance styles. 'I am a partial person', he observed, pointing to his sense of detachment from both rural experience as well as the urban landscape.¹⁶ A recurring theme in my conversations with members of the Dar es Salaam Matengo community was the double bind of nostalgia for a rural life they had not lived and discomfort in the urban life they had.

Dar es Salaam's Matengo community did not settle in proximity to one another.¹⁷ From Kawe to Mbagala to Kimara, members of the Matengo community are spread throughout the city. There is no 'Matengo quarter'. The only small concentration of homes is in the Kigogo/Ilala area, but they number less than a dozen and it is not seen as a geographical or emotional centre for the community. My informants told me the reason for such dispersed residence is that the members came to the city at different times. The staggered arrival of Matengo families certainly played a role in the distribution, but so too did two other factors. First, the kinds of employment that Matengo men (and some women) gained in the city made them economically independent. They typically did not need the support of an existing community to cushion their first weeks or months, nor the economic safety net that such communities often provide members during lean times. Second, members of this community have significant education and experience with non-traditional ways of life obviating a strong emotional need for community solidarity. In many ways, these men were the 'new men' that liberal colonial theorists saw as the promise of colonization. This chapter will show that many older members of this community regret the minimal connection they have in the city and their distance from rural roots. Simon Mahai put it this way: 'They [rural Matengo] seem to stick to their land. They're not like other tribes (his term) who tend to migrate to different areas. They have to have a cause to move from home. Like us [refers to educated Dar es Salaam residents], we had the opportunity to go to school and now we get employment here and there'.¹⁸ In this way, they started on the path to becoming cosmopolitans; an identity group that has 'deeply internalized foreign ideas and made them their own'.¹⁹ Through education and employment in cosmopolitan fields—government, education, international NGOs—members of this community developed new cultural

positions without completely abandoning older identity formations and belief patterns. In the Matengo case, and in similar cases throughout Africa, this means internalizing a broadly western generated and disseminated ethos that includes, among other attributes, the belief in capitalism, personal accumulation, a materialist worldview, individuality, and a more limited vision of the family. In musical terms, journalist Idan Hyera, who professed love of all manner of musics including 'Beethoven and Bach', typified this group's cosmopolitan tastes.²⁰ Consciously or not, Matengo urban migrants built 'elbow room' into their urban community because not to do so would have invited replication of the pushes toward redistribution and cultural leveling so necessary in the rural homeland, but seen as inimical to 'progress' in the city.

Thanks to their advanced education and employment, relative wealth, and their adoption of a new ethos, this community is more individualistic, spread out, and economically conservative than the homeland community. Dr. Daniel Mbunda, former head of the adult education section in the Ministry of Education, characterized the community in these terms: 'Perhaps you could say a characteristic of Matengo, they are very self independent. Normally they don't like to be interfered with what they do unless it is really necessary'.²¹ These factors, together with the community's relatively small size, nudged musical performance toward a utilitarian profile, that is, performance primarily fitting urban realities and secondarily rural cultural and performative imperatives. Cast differently, performance of Matengo music in the city applied a veneer of rural practice to a core cosmopolitan ethos. *Lindeko* fits this necessity perfectly. Performance requires no specialists, is open and participatory, is very portable, requires only two instruments (the *lindeko* drum, a military bass drum, and a *jembe*, a struck idiophone made from a worn grubbing hoe), is relatively easy to learn and perform, invites both individual and group participation and investment, and is strongly 'Matengo'. It was an ideal music/dance for the 'partial people' of Dar es Salaam because it was a potent expression of Matengo identity, yet did not require large amounts of time for rehearsal or performance.²²

From the earliest period, the Matengo community performed *lindeko* at large public celebrations mostly associated with the Catholic Church: weddings, first communions, confirmations, and baptisms. As in the rural homeland, *lindeko* might also be performed to honor an ardent dancer or musician at their funeral; here coupled with other rural dances, *mganda*, *chioda* or *muhambo*.²³ My informants indicated that the community rarely met or organized themselves for any reason outside these contexts, except in the event of an emergency, such as death with the expensive necessity to send the body back home for burial.²⁴ None mentioned the Ngonyama Union, a colonial-era organization noted by Leslie in his survey of Dar es Salaam as promoting unity among rural southerners, which appears to have had little or no impact on the Matengo community.²⁵ Thus, individuals might seek association with other non-Matengo with similar education, class aspirations, or employment, for social or personal advancement, but the Matengo community as a whole focused their energy only on situations where *lindeko* dancing was prominent. Events for large-scale

community performance in the 1940s and 1950s partially reflected a rural ethos of ethnic unity, communal participation, and community support, suggesting that this community was in the nascent stages of developing an urban identity. In this way, this pioneer community fostered linkages to rural practice, but within the constraints of new lifeways. The early Matengo community did not transplant wholesale the 20-plus genres of music and dance found in rural areas, rather they carried out a process of 'consolidation' through which they focused their energy and action on only one dance/music.²⁶

Replication and imitation: Dancing at the beach hotels (1960–1985)

If one defines urban dancing closely reflecting rural practice as a highpoint, then the period between 1960 and 1985 was a 'golden age' of Matengo music in the city. The 1960s saw a significant increase in Matengo families moving to Dar es Salaam, reflecting greater opportunities for the educated after Independence. The majority of the men and women with whom I spoke recall first coming to Dar es Salaam in the 1960s and, although their careers might have taken them far afield for long periods, their social orientation has clearly centred on the city ever since.

During the 1960s a small but steady trickle of Matengo families made Dar es Salaam their home. Settlement patterns described in the last section did not change dramatically, nor did the use of music. Slowly, however, the community matured in its urban home and developed new practices that simultaneously reflect an awakening nostalgia for the rural homeland and new accommodations to the city. They accomplished this first through replication of rural musical and social practices, and second through performing rural music in contexts intimately linked to the urban landscape. Reflected in musical practice, the community began to transform from a transplanted rural population into a fully urban community.

By the early 1970s a sufficient number of Matengo, and closely related peoples from the Lake Nyasa littoral, resided in Dar es Salaam for the community to attempt to reproduce rural musical practice in the city. Two issues bear explanation at this point: a short description of rural musical practice in Umatengo, and the relationship between Matengo and related groups. Regarding the first, the most important, popular, and characteristic dances performed in Umatengo are the group dances *muhambo* (largely defunct by the early 1960s), *mganda* (a men's dance), and *chioda* (a woman's dance). Overwhelming majorities of Matengo in Umatengo participate in these dances, and the dance season for group dances lasts for four months every year. Dance groups typically include 30-40 members, another 4-7 drummers, have hierarchical governing and directorial structures, and attract broad community support including 10-20 'hangers on' who have no formal relation with the group yet regularly attend performances. Groups practice several times a week in the season, specialist composers write new songs each season,

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choreographers from the group's membership develop new dances, and new costumes are either bought or made. In terms of time, money and energy, group dancing requires an intensive commitment.

As to the second issue, due to a long history of migration from adjacent areas (present day Malawi, Mozambique and Upangwa) and a recent history of close economic and social ties to nearby lakeshore peoples commonly (but erroneously) included under the umbrella term 'Nyasa'²⁷, the Matengo share many cultural traits with neighbouring groups, especially the Mpoto. Despite its problematic nature, I will use 'Nyasa' here because the urban community of lakeshore origin itself uses this term. Although I seek to differentiate more broadly between the Matengo and the Nyasa, during this period the two communities worked together to realize shared performance goals. Voluntary ethnic 'lumping' points to an important fact of urban life; an immigrant group must assemble a minimum number of members or else risk marginality. The tension between ethnic specificity and larger aggregations exists into the present. Many in the city erroneously lump Matengo and Nyasa with the Ngoni, making the latter term a catchall for anyone from Ruvuma region. This causes frustration, though Matengo enjoy some benefit from association with the Ngoni and are powerless to change public perception. In Dar es Salaam, Matengo and Nyasa communities performed with one another and supported each other's groups in a way that geographical remoteness would have made impossible in the rural homeland.²⁸

By the mid 1970s a sufficient number of Matengo and Nyasa families lived in Dar es Salaam to attempt to replicate rural musical practices.²⁹ Communities from several neighbourhoods, notably Keko, Ilala, Kigogo, and Ubungo established *maboma* (sing. *boma* – location-based music/dance groups).³⁰ As in the rural homeland, *maboma* developed around population concentrations or, diverging from rural practice, around strong individuals. In Dar es Salaam *maboma* were smaller than in Mbinga district, frequently numbering 20 or fewer active members including 2-3 drummers, and a few more occasional members. The low number of Matengo and Nyasa families in the city, together with the difficulties of transportation, were the main reasons for the small *boma* size.³¹ Another cause, discussed much later but which likely played a role in this period, was the necessity of tending other business.

'Mama Raia' (Rosemunda Mapunda, wife of Abel Hyera) was the *kingi* (titular figurehead, but here also the driving force and organizer) of the *chioda boma* in Ilala from 1982–1991.³² The nine years it performed is the longest of any Dar es Salaam *boma* with which I am acquainted. Membership included local women, primarily Matengo but including a few Nyasa, interested in dancing and comradeship.³³ The *boma* performed in four main contexts, most of which reflected rural practice, but with important accommodations to urban life. These included weddings and other community celebrations; at weekend dance competitions; for State or Party sponsored events; and as a professional culture troupe. Performance at weddings and other community celebrations was the most common type, in contrast to rural practice that favored competitions. Dancing at a wedding was a rather casual affair that happened spontaneously or with minimal planning and was an expression of communal pride. It also

accomplished the performance and negotiation of what Jane Sugarman calls the appropriate 'social and moral order' for this community.³⁴ It was at these events that the older generation and those recently arrived from Umatengo made explicit important Matengo values: cooperation, hard work, individuality. *Chioda* at weddings was usually stripped of its formal attire, administrative hierarchies, uniforms, assigned roles, and time constraints to become a joyful expression of 'Matengo-ness'. *Chioda* at community celebrations is a logical, social, and performative extension of *lindeko*.

The critical change in this period was the formation of *maboma* organized along the same lines as rural *maboma* and the development of weekend dance competitions. Because of the relatively high number of participants necessary to form a *boma*, the necessity for several other such organizations close by, and the complexity of this entire system, the formation of *maboma* in the 1970s signaled a new maturity for the urban Matengo community. Urban *maboma* were smaller than rural *maboma*, yet the presence of between 6 and 10 *maboma* points to as many as 200 people engaged in this practice.³⁵ Informants indicated that participation was far lower than in rural areas, where well over 80 percent of all women in a particular location may participate. I know of eight active *maboma* in this era with approximately 35 percent of the broader community participating. Taking into account sisters and mothers and daughters dancing in the same *boma*, the community consisted of approximately 400 families. If families had on average five members, including extended family, then the Matengo population in the mid 1970s probably numbered around 2,000. I consider this number as the minimum population necessary for an attempt at replicating rural socio-musical practices in the city.

What was new in this period, and ultimately unsustainable, was the institution of a series of weekend competitions that paralleled competitions in Umatengo. Mama Raia indicated that women attempted to replicate rural practice as accurately as possible. In particular, they organized *maboma*, held practice sessions, communicated with other *maboma* through letters, met on weekends during the dry season (June to August), hosted guest *maboma* as lavishly as possible, and danced competitively with as many *maboma* as possible.³⁶ Significant differences from rural practice include fewer *maboma* and practice sessions, dancing only on Sunday afternoon rather than on Saturday and Sunday, and the exclusion of the trappings of competition—judges and the declaration of winners and losers.³⁷ While the exclusion of competitive features from musical events called 'competitions' (*mashindano*) may seem strange, it accurately reflects rural practice where the presence and role of competition has ebbed with changing social and economic realities.³⁸ Informants attributed the changes in urban *maboma* to differences between town and country life. This was ascribed to a number of factors: the smaller size of the urban community and reduced participation by urban women; difficulties of transportation and communication; the attractiveness of other urban music and pastimes; and the faster pace of urban life.³⁹

The attempts of women to replicate rural practice in the city contradict theories of African urban elites and their wholesale adoption of a cosmopolitan ethos. According to this view, in the process of internalizing a new view of

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social reality, they abandon as old-fashioned, un-Christian, or simply ineffective, the cultural practices from their homelands.⁴⁰ The Matengo community did not go this far, nor did most other ethnic communities in Dar es Salaam. During my conversations in 2003 I was surprised by the vigour with which most Matengo supported as appropriate and necessary the public performance of rural dances, and castigated as unworthy those ethnic groups who abandoned rural musical performance at celebrations. Chagga were those most frequently named as making the social *faux pas* of not dancing *ngoma* at their weddings. So what is it about Dar es Salaam, or about Tanzania, that makes rural music performance on the urban stage not only possible, but also a necessity for the full articulation of community identity?

My informants point to nostalgia and community solidarity as the primary reasons.⁴¹ For them, Dar es Salaam does not facilitate rural musical performance; rather it serves as a neutral or minimally welcoming stage on which to perform self and group through music and dance. Leaders in the urban community such as Dr. Gabriel Ndunguru, a food security expert, and Simon Mahai see musical performance as a way to remember the past and to form and reform a bond to a homeland with which they have, ironically, had little experience. More actively, they see music and dance as a key way to promote group unity. In Tanzania, survival depends on effectively managing a large number of contacts, patrons and clients; thus one must dedicate time to building and maintaining these relationships. Dance events in the city function on one level as huge networking parties where a community tests out interpersonal connections while seeking personal and group benefit. Although no one mentioned it specifically, pure enjoyment and entertainment is another important reason for these events. The salutary effects of music and dance on this community are clear when they dance their Matengo-ness for themselves and the broader Dar es Salaam community. Scholars regrettably miss this feature of music and dance in a rush to justify the arts as politically, economically, spiritually, and in other ways significant.

These explanations illuminate how these dancers understand their actions, but do not clarify why and how the broader Dar es Salaam population supports, even demands, rural music and dance. A preliminary explanation must include the powerful role Julius Nyerere played in establishing a sense of national unity through cultural means. The use of 'cultural reformism' to establish a sense of 'national sentiment' is, of course, not unique to either Nyerere or Africa.⁴² What separates Nyerere's impact is how strongly Tanzanians embraced his calls to build the nation using local expressive traditions.⁴³ Informants consistently pointed to Nyerere and his policies as key for both the relative peaceful relations between Tanzania's various ethnic groups and for keeping local music and dance on the national radar.⁴⁴

Paradoxically, Nyerere's nation building simultaneously contributed to feelings of disconnect from homeland communities. Bertram Mahai's self-characterization as a 'partial person' and Philip Komba's assessment of urban Matengo as 'half and half people' (both stated in English) clearly articulate this position. For most, however, the benefits of a life and a country detached from rural life-ways are worth the price paid in personal discomfort.⁴⁵ They

see the benefits primarily in two areas: a lack of interethnic conflict, and a sense of national unity. When discussing the effects of Nyerere's policies with this population, expressions of sadness at a lack of connection with homeland communities were immediately balanced by comments lauding Tanzania's internal peace.⁴⁶ Many favorably compared Tanzania's post-Independence history with Kenya's, marking, at the same time, dissatisfaction with Nyerere's economic policies. Such conversations typically led to comments about the sense of national belonging that they felt and acceptance of its costs. A nationalist ethos of unity for the good of the nation had been internalized; informants considered this a proper way to conduct identity politics.

Matengo groups danced during this period in two final contexts: for the State and at a tourist beach hotel. State patronage of local dance groups is not unique to the urban setting. In Mbinga district, local party branches (in the person of the district or regional cultural officer) and other local power brokers such as the Catholic Church routinely arrange for dancing groups to enliven performances of state or Church power. Common contexts for such performances were at *Saba-Saba* (later *Nane-Nane*) celebrations, for the *Mwenge* (the Uhuru torch celebrations), at party or Church rallies and for official visitors. In Dar es Salaam local party branches identified and 'employed'⁴⁷ local dance groups, including Matengo *maboma*, for many of the same contexts and to welcome State guests at the airport. The Matengo in both rural and urban areas are strong *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) supporters, thus performance for the party signaled loyalty. Groups expected and received transportation, food and drink, and perhaps a small *per diem* for their performance, but more importantly by aiding CCM goals they positioned themselves to receive party favour.

The largest break with rural performance took place in 1979 (or 1977, informants gave different dates), when a group of Matengo dancers obtained a contract to dance on weekends at the Bahari Beach Hotel.⁴⁸ Mama Raia and Chrisostomous Ndunguru (a bank manager) managed the group, which numbered about 20 performers. Their repertoire consisted of the three main Matengo group dances: *mganda*, *chioda* and *muhambo*. While compensation for performing in certain contexts is expected in the rural homeland, the form of this compensation is only nominally monetary and is given and received as a token of appreciation. There are no professional dance troupes in *Umatengo*. A purely commercial dance venture was an entirely urban phenomenon and, for this group, not entirely satisfying. Group leaders never discussed the financial rewards of performing, but they were likely modest. The late 1970s were a period of failing economics in Tanzania and parastatals, like the beach hotels, also felt the pinch. Whatever the remuneration, the financial side of this enterprise was unsatisfactory for the group. They danced only one season and then quit. Other complaints included the time commitment and discipline needed for professional performance. Most dancers were not interested in performing a dance usually associated with cultural recreation in a regulated, professional context. Broadly in Tanzania, hotel managers and tourist industry professionals had internalized a cosmopolitan ethos that validated the commodification and sale of rural cultural resources. The reality of weekly

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performance for the Matengo dance troupe, however, was unsatisfying. Their experience provides further evidence of how this first generation were ‘half and half’, neither firmly in the new urban mode nor completely rural in their orientation.

The commercial experiment, while short-lived, was a stark departure from rural dancing and points to a new understanding of expressive performance as a potential economic resource. This period also marks a high water mark for the general application of rural musical resources in the city. In terms of dances (*mganda*, *chioda*, *lindeko*, *linguga* [related to *lindeko*] and *muhambo*), performance contexts, and size and frequency of participation, performance at this time was at its peak. Curiously, during this period of great activity no new urban repertory or variations on rural based music developed. As in the earlier period, all rural music performed in Dar es Salaam was imported from the countryside. Simon Mahai indicated that this was because people in the city (the educated) did not have enough ‘*mila*’ (Swahili: customs, culture, traditions) to compose their own music.⁴⁹ This deficiency meant that a truly urban version of *mganda*, *lindeko*, *chioda*, and *muhambo* could never develop. This lack of investment in homeland musical practices, also characteristic of other ethnic communities in Dar es Salaam, and coupled with broader social phenomena — increasing economic demands, other entertainment opportunities, desire for something new — resulted in the decreasing performance of rural dance.

Consolidation and change: rise of the *vijana* (1985 – present)

The history of the Matengo community in this era confirms many stereotypes about urbanized communities, but also holds some surprises. While new immigrants from the rural areas continue to move to Dar es Salaam (two of my main rural informant’s seven sons arrived within the past ten years), the majority of the community is well established. It is now mostly composed of older residents of long duration and their children who have never lived in the rural homeland. On the surface, the maturing of a first generation of urban Matengo *vijana* (youth; *kijana*, singular)⁵⁰ led to a dilution of the importance of rural dance forms, but the situation is far from simple. *Vijana*, ranging in age from children to young adults in their mid-thirties,⁵¹ have followed their parents’ lead by partially rejecting musical practices associated with the older generation, in this case the first generation immigrants.⁵² While the younger generation participates in rural musics, they have developed affinities for a wide range of global Black popular musical forms including American and Tanzanian Hip-Hop and R & B, Jamaican and African Reggae, and British and American House.⁵³ In essence, the *vijana* took advantage of Tanzania’s recent economic and social liberalization and explosion in media outlets to build affinity for and identity around broader flows of global Black music. Their parents accomplished much the same manoeuvre twenty years earlier on a smaller scale through patronage of Congolese rumba (also *soukous*) and related Tanzanian pop musics as an adjunct to *mganda* and *chioda* performance.

The *vijana* today have access to a much broader range of musical genres and exercise this choice freely.

The implication for the *maboma* was stark. By the early 1990s most had disbanded, while a handful are nominally active but no longer practice or perform. Their leaders claim these *maboma* could be reconstituted quickly if need and opportunity arose. *Maboma* no longer compete on weekend afternoons, nor practice for competitions. There are two common reasons given for this change. First, *boma* leaders say community members are no longer interested in committing the time necessary to field a respectable team; and second, the pace of life has increased to such a pitch that many no longer have the time to engage.⁵⁴ Here the differences between rural and urban life are starkest. Work for the educated Matengo elites is identical to work in other cosmopolitan centres, namely white-collar work based on a salary and organized on a 12-month schedule.⁵⁵ This kind of employment differs significantly from rural work, which is seasonal in nature. Matengo dances in the rural homeland take place during the harvest and fallow periods (June – October) when this community has ample time for practice and competition. The urban community has no common period of extended free time when all members are available.

The practical outcome of the abandonment of group dancing is that the Dar es Salaam Matengo community has retrenched and consolidated their use of music. For the last ten years, the most commonly performed Matengo dance has been *lindeko*, and the most frequent venues were community celebrations. *Muhambo* is now absent, *mganda* performed very rarely, *chioda* performed spontaneously, but occasionally, at weddings. *Lindeko* is the ideal dance for an efficient projection of Matengo social identity on the urban stage. Matengo evaluate dance events, in part, on the number of people participating, thus this dance has an advantage over sexually segregated dances in attracting participants. *Lindeko* needs none of the complicated costumes, administration, instrumentation, practice or social contexts (competitions) associated with the group dances. Daniel Mbunda described it in these terms, '[*lindeko*] is so spontaneous that people don't really have to learn it—it's almost really within the blood of the people'.⁵⁶ It is also ideal for both processional and stationary performance, making it more flexible than other dances. Since the dance steps are a simple shuffling step and the lyrics are sung call and response after a song leader, it is openly participatory even for those not fluent in *KiMatengo*, the language of Umatengo. The instruments needed for this dance are readily available in Dar es Salaam and, according to informants, are easy to learn.⁵⁷ Simon Mahai differentiated *chioda* and *lindeko* in these terms, 'the majority of young educated fellows, some of them don't even know how to play *chioda*. And therefore you cannot get it here. *Lindeko* does not have a style, everyone can dance. Even you can dance to it! (Laughs)'.⁵⁸ Although *lindeko* is a modern and slightly modified version of an older celebratory dance *linguga*,⁵⁹ it is a deeply Matengo musical expression. The way the audience reacted to *lindeko* in the epigraph is indicative of its power. *Lindeko* is sung in *KiMatengo*; one of the few times outside the home where this language is spoken in Dar es Salaam.

Building on Bruno Nettl's notion of 'consolidation', this might be called a

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secondary consolidation.⁶⁰ When social, demographic, and economic conditions permitted, the Matengo community in Dar es Salaam consolidated the twenty or so available rural musical expressions into three urban genres (*mganda*, *chioda* and *lindeko*). Over the last 15 years these three genres have been further consolidated into one regularly performed dance (*lindeko*) that potently summarizes the Matengo experience of ethnic identity in the city. A complementary interpretation of the same observations is that as life in the city demanded more time and offered different and more attractive alternatives, this community needed to use the energy marked for displays of ethnic identity more conservatively. To this end, they streamlined the number of dance events supported and genres perpetuated until one rural genre performed only at community celebrations carries the entirety of Matengo urban experience. An obvious question is whether *lindeko* will disappear entirely in one final, fatal consolidation. The answer I propose is fraught with ambiguities, not the resounding certainty many might expect.

Kuchangia au sio kuchangia (to contribute or not to contribute)

By the summer of 2003, during the second of two extended research trips in Dar es Salaam, the situation had not changed significantly from that described above. Participation in *lindeko* is enthusiastic at community celebrations, but there is little performance of either *lindeko* or other Matengo dances outside these contexts. What surprised me was the keen way that the *vijana* signaled their admiration of the rural dances. I spoke with several groups of *vijana* and found them almost unanimous in their appreciation of *lindeko*.⁶¹ I asked whether they considered rural dancing an important part of their lives in the city; affirmation was nearly unanimous. I also asked whether they thought their children would be dancing rural dances in thirty years; again the affirmation was nearly unanimous. Some cogently noted that they could not completely believe that their children would dance *lindeko*, but they assured me that they would dance some identifiable but as yet undeveloped Matengo dance. Curiously, the older generation does not share the *vijana*'s certainty regarding the continuation of rural dancing in the city. Simon Mahai though it 'impossible' that the *vijana* could continue with *lindeko* because they would have no one (that is no older person with significant experience in the rural homeland) to lead it. He agreed, however, that the next generation would likely develop music and dance that would help them negotiate life in the city.⁶²

The single most critical factor impinging on the *vijana*'s continuation with a recognizably rural music into the future is their urban exposure to the dances. Here economics plays a large role. The consolidation of musical practice within the Matengo community into one genre performed primarily at one context developed in parallel with raising expectations of appropriate outlay for public celebrations. Specifically, the amount of money deemed necessary for an appropriately joyful event has increased rapidly upward – to the point where families hoping to celebrate the marriage, first communion, baptism, or confirmation of a child can no longer afford to rent a hall, hire a band, and

provide food and drink in sufficient quantities for all the guests. This led to the expansion of a rural practice called *kuchangia* (Sw. 'to collect for') in the city. When a family announces their intention to hold a celebration, a committee of friends and relatives form in order to handle the administration and budget of the event. The committee books the hall and band, plans the food and drink, and most importantly collects money from the invited guests to defray the cost of the event. Because of the *kuchangia* system, the invitation card sent by the committee is a new marker of prestige and obligation. The number and quality of invitations that one receives clearly indicates a person's prestige within the community. On the obverse, an invitation card brings with it an obligation to contribute money to the event, incurring financial stress in direct proportion to the prestige garnered. It is expected that a family receiving an invitation card will contribute a significant amount (usually Shs. 10,000/- to 20,000/- per head, or about \$10-20) for each family member that will attend. A common decision minimizing familial expense while maintaining contact with the broader community is for only heads of households to attend.

Because community events are now the only place that one can see, learn and participate in dances from the rural homeland, the practical effect is that the community excludes *vijana*—those with the greatest need to learn leadership roles and to absorb the lessons in this music. Some community members decry this practice and have argued that it is necessary to bring the *vijana* into these celebrations. Simon Mahai argued, 'at least as far as *lindeko* is concerned, when people play *lindeko* all the youth tend to come up and dance. So it is an impression for me that they are interested, only that we have not yet got them clearly into the picture.... [W]hich means therefore if we continue to really go together with them, they would probably even appreciate it more'.⁶³ In the end, however, economics play a larger role and one sees relatively few children at community events.

Conclusions

Despite the exclusion of youth from the sole remaining venue for rural Matengo dance in the city, the picture is not entirely bleak. The youth are not, of course, entirely excluded from community celebrations. Family members and children of close family friends do attend and enjoy *lindeko* at celebrations. The ease with which one can learn *lindeko* also plays a significant role. Himo Kapinga, 17-year-old Matengo youth from a family with no strong musical background, nonchalantly told me about playing *lindeko* drums at celebrations. When I asked how he had learned he was confused. It transpired he learned the drumming accompaniment entirely by observing practicing drummers then simply picking up the instruments and playing.⁶⁴ Learning songs is more complicated because the leader must fit stock verses subtly into unfolding performance contexts, but this skill could also be learned. In so far as both genres feature topical, stereotypical lyrics sung repetitively to melodies with a narrow ambit, *lindeko* resembles rap—a genre in which Matengo youth are skilled. A larger impediment is that *lindeko* songs are typically sung in *KiMatengo*,

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a language that most *vijana* in Dar es Salaam do not speak fluently.

Another course that several *vijana* indicated they found promising was to ‘modernize’ Matengo music by playing it on Western instruments in small ensembles and, presumably, for paying audiences.⁶⁵ They pointed to several models of local musicians, Adelgoth Haule from Ruvuma region (*Kingoni*) and Saida from Buhaya (*Kihaya*), who performed rural music sung in local languages in a small group setting with electric instruments to make studio recordings for commercial sale. This combination of rural musical style wedded to urban economics might provide an outlet for pent-up desire for Matengo music. Several young men indicated that they were ready to start such a group, but lacked capital for instruments and studio time. By my departure, no efforts had successfully initiated such a group.

The history of the Matengo community in Dar es Salaam fits common patterns in other African and non-western cities. Initial community formation in the 1940s and 1950s triggered incipient attempts to organize that were opposed by forces pushing community members toward individualism, personal accumulation, and devotion to career and immediate family. The middle period coincided with Independence and Nyerere’s great cultural reformist push toward the development of a new Tanzanian national culture to replace a colonial legacy that emphasized separate ethnic identities. During this period the Matengo community attained a size and disposition that allowed an attempt to replicate rural musical practices in the city. With the collapse of Nyerere’s influence in the cultural realm and failure of the Tanzanian economy, the Matengo retrenched their dancing through consolidation. Finally, the future nature and position of rural dance forms in the city is far from certain. The enthusiasm of the *vijana* and their insistence on the importance of a recognizably rural identity component in their broader cosmopolitan identity indicates that some dance, whether it resembles *lindeko* or not, will continue to enliven Matengo community celebrations and project this identity onto the cityscape for some time to come.

Oral sources

- Hyera, Abel, interview by author, 25-July-03, at interviewee’s home in Ilala, Dar es Salaam, notes and tape in author’s possession
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- Ndunguru, Chrisostomous, interview by author, 12-May-97, interview outside interviewee's home in Mkuwanyi, Mbinga district, TZ, notes in author's possession
- Ndunguru, Dr. Gabriel, interview by author, 22-July-03 and other informal conversations, at interviewee's home in Kigogo, Dar es Salaam, notes and tape in author's possession
- Women of Kigogo, interview by author with Dr. Gabriel Ndunguru, 9-Aug-03, at Dr. Gabriel Ndunguru's house, Kigogo, Dar-es-Salaam, notes and tape in author's possession

Notes

¹ In this paper, 'Matengo' refers to people whom self-identify as Matengo and come from the highlands east of Lake Nyasa in Mbinga District. I wish to avoid confusion between the Matengo and the several ethnic groups lumped under the umbrella 'Nyasa', who are also resident in Dar es Salaam and who perform the same dances as the Matengo.

² A list of interviews appears at the end of this chapter.

³ These are United Nations Population Division terms, not mine. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs [PDDESA] of the United Nations Secretariat (2002). *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision*. 'II. The Prospects for World Urbanization and Rural Population Growth' (POP/DB/WUP/Rev.2001/), data set in digital form.

⁴ PDDESA, p. 18.

⁵ James D. Tarver, *The Demography of Africa*, (Wesport, CN/London, 1996), p. 4; John O. Oucho & William T. S. Gould, 'Internal migration, urbanization and population distribution', p. 279, in K. A. Foote, K. H. Hill & G. Martin (eds.), *Demographic Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington DC, 1993), pp. 256-298.

⁶ United Nations, United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospectus: the 2002 Revision Population Database for the United Republic of Tanzania*; UNEP/GRID-Ardenal (both on-line sources).

"I Am a Partial Person": The urban experience of rural music

⁷ Jacques Jérôme Pierre Maquet, *The Drift to the Towns in Africa*, Astrida, I.R.S.A.C (1954); M.J.B. Molohan, *Detribalization* (Dsm, 1959); Colin M Turnbull, *The Lonely African* (New York, 1962).

⁸ Despite the colonial administration's blind eye, the history of Dar es Salaam points clearly to the reality of urban African populations alongside their peripheral place in urban planning. Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam* (Oxford, 2005); S.S.A. Ngware, and J.M. Lusagga Kironde, *Urbanizing Tanzania: Issues, Initiatives, and Priorities*, (Dar es Salaam, 2000); James R. Brennan, 'Nation, race and urbanization in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1916-76', Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University (2002).

⁹ S. Mahai, 12 July 2003; I. Hyera, 18 July 2003.

¹⁰ D. Mbunda, 14 July 2003.

¹¹ S. Komba, 18 Dec 1997. Political intrigue in the early 1960s branded Kambona, a *Nyasa* from the lakeshore adjacent to the *Matengo* homeland, a traitor. Suspicion fell on all ethnicities from Ruvuma region; a common lay explanation for why the southern regions did not receive government largesse on the scale of the north. Kambona lived 25 years in exile and died in 1997.

¹² A. Hyera, 18 July 2003. Mr. Hyera's statement is a personal reflection. It is likely that *Matengo* migrants made their way to Dar-es-Salaam before the 1940s. Several factors mitigate against record of these immigrants. First, they were likely lumped under the broader rubric 'Nyasa', that contained all people from the Lake Nyasa region. Second, they were probably few in number. Third, there is no indication that they articulated a *Matengo* ethnic identity. Since the formation of a self-identifying *Matengo* community is the beginning of this story, Mr. Hyera's statement serves this chapter well. For a fuller discussion of *Matengo* identity formation see Stephen Hill, 'Mashini Kubwa: Group dancing, modernity and politics in Umatengo, Tanzania', Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois (2002), Ch. 2.

¹³ See John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979). When ethnic associations were required to register in 1954, 51 did so. *Ibid.*, p. 391.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 381, 404.

¹⁵ Komba, 11 July 2003.

¹⁶ B. Mahai, 8 July 2003.

¹⁷ Though the urban *Matengo* community was perhaps particularly dispersed, this was not unusual in Dar es Salaam, which unlike many African cities has not been characterized by residential ethnic concentrations. See e.g., J.A.K. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam* (London, 1963), p. 38.

¹⁸ S. Mahai, 12 July 2003.

¹⁹ Thomas Turino, *Nationalists, Cosmopolitans, and Popular Music in Zimbabwe* (Chicago/London, 2000), pp. 8-9. Turino further points out that it is critical to differentiate between internalization and imitation.

²⁰ I. Hyera, 18 July 2003.

²¹ D. Mbunda, 14 July 2003.

²² B. Mahai, 8 July 2003.

²³ For a discussion of these dances see Hill, *Mashini Kubwa*.

²⁴ Ndunguru, 22 July 2003.

²⁵ Leslie, *Survey*, p. 55.

²⁶ Nettl defines 'consolidation' as 'The establishment of a reasonably compact and, in terms of musical energy, not very demanding style... [that] replace(s) what was once a large variety of ... repertoires.' Bruno Nettl, *The Study of Ethnomusicology: 29 issues and concepts* (Urbana/Chicago, 1983), p. 352.

²⁷ The British colonial government coined this term to collectivize several related, but independent ethnic groups on the Nyasa lakeshore. The Mwera, Mpoto, and Manda are the three main individual groups lumped under Nyasa. Through close proximity, the *Matengo* have had long and intense interaction with the Mpoto.

²⁸ I should note, however, that in the 1990s, lakeshore *mganda* groups occasionally climbed the 1,000 meter escarpment to dance at *Matengo* competitions. I never heard of *Matengo* groups dancing at the lakeshore.

²⁹ R. Mapunda, 28 Dec 1997.

³⁰ K. Mapinga, 29 Mar 2003; S. Mahai, 5 Jan 1998.

- ³¹ A. Hyera, 25 July 2003.
- ³² Husbands of the women in this *boma* danced the men's dance, *mganda*, but not as regularly, nor for an extended period.
- ³³ R. Mapunda, 28 Dec 1997.
- ³⁴ Jane Sugarman, *Engendering Song: Singing and Subjectivity at Presba Albanian Weddings* (Chicago/London, 1997), p. 21.
- ³⁵ Women of Kigogo, 9 Aug 2003.
- ³⁶ See Hill, *Mashini Kubwa*, ch. 5.
- ³⁷ R. Mapunda, 28 Dec 1997 and 30 June 2003.
- ³⁸ Hill, *Mashini kubwa*, ch. 6.
- ³⁹ S. Kapinga, 28 June 2003; S. Mahai, 12 July 2003; G. Ndunguru, 22 July 2003. The efflorescence of *maboma* in the 1970s occurred during a period of broad support of rural musical performance in the city. Simon Mahai recounts that at this time the weekend air in the various neighbourhoods of Dar es Salaam rang with spontaneous *ngoma* from all parts of the country. Iliffe reports that as early as 1954, 58 dance societies were registered in Dar es Salaam [*Tanganyika*, p. 391]. Mahai lamented this has not been the practice for many years (S. Mahai, 12 July 2003).
- ⁴⁰ Turino, *Nationalists*.
- ⁴¹ G. Ndunguru, 22 July 2003; S. Mahai, 12 July 2003.
- ⁴² Turino, *Nationalists*, p. 1; Ernst Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford (1983), p. 1.
- ⁴³ Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity: A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1952-1965* (London, 1966), pp. 186-7, 271.
- ⁴⁴ B. Mahai, 8 July 2003; P. Komba, 11 July 2003, *inter alia*.
- ⁴⁵ P. Komba, S. Mahai, G. Ndunguru *inter alia*.
- ⁴⁶ G. Ndunguru, 22 July 2003 *inter alia*.
- ⁴⁷ The relationship between the party and dance groups was neither purely economic, nor did the groups receive monetary compensation for their performance.
- ⁴⁸ R. Mapunda, 4 Jan 1998; C. Ndunguru, 12 May 1997.
- ⁴⁹ S. Mahai, 5 Jan 1998.
- ⁵⁰ I apply the term to those for whom living in Dar es Salaam forms the core of their life experiences.
- ⁵¹ The term *kijana/vijana* literally translates to 'youth', but in East African usage includes an age range beyond that in Euro-America. Thus, *kijana/vijana* includes individuals from mid-teens, no longer children, to their mid-30s, at which point, if they marry, they are considered mature adults. This term includes both 'youth' and 'young adult' in Western usage, thus Tanzanian 'youth' can be intimately involved in community decision and direction.
- ⁵² See Hill, *Mashini Kubwa*, Ch. 5.
- ⁵³ H. Kapinga, 22 July 2003.
- ⁵⁴ R. Mapunda, 4 Jan 1998; C. Ndunguru, 12 May 1997; D. Komba, 15 July 2003.
- ⁵⁵ Members of this community include a Provost, a worker for the UNDP, several professors, high officials in the ministry of education, journalists, meteorologists, food security specialists, and priests.
- ⁵⁶ D. Mbunda, 14 July 2003.
- ⁵⁷ A. Hyera, 25 July 2003.
- ⁵⁸ S. Mahai, 12 July 2003.
- ⁵⁹ See Hill, *Mashini Kubwa*, Ch. 3.
- ⁶⁰ Nettl, 'Ethnomusicology', p. 352.
- ⁶¹ *Vijana* Kimara, 9 July 2003, *Vijana* Ilala, 24 July 2003, *Vijana* Kigogo, 26 July 2003.
- ⁶² S. Mahai, 12 July 2003.
- ⁶³ S. Mahai, 12 July 2003.
- ⁶⁴ H. Kapinga, 22 July 2003.
- ⁶⁵ *Vijana* Ilala, 24 July 2003; *Vijana* Kigogo, 26 July 2003.

Chapter Eleven

‘Here’s a Little Something Local’: An early history of hip hop in Dar es Salaam 1984-1997

Alex Perullo

In October 1998, members of the hip hop group Kwanza Unit went on stage at the Sheraton Hotel in downtown Dar es Salaam for a TeleFood charity event.¹ In the audience were the First Lady, Mama Anna Mkapa, the Zanzibar President, Dr. Salmin Amour, the media tycoon, Mr. Reginald Mengi, and 250 other influential Tanzanians.² Kwanza Unit had been asked to perform one

Kwanza Unit ³ “Msafiri”	
Mimi msafiri bado niko njiana. Sijui lini nitafika. Na ulizia watu kule ninakakowenda. Sijui lini nitafika.	I am a traveller, still on the way I don’t know when I will arrive I inquire from people wherever I go I don’t know when I will arrive
Hii ndo' picha kabla ya pazia la udongo	This is the picture before the curtain of dirt comes down
Ndani ya futi sita, vita Kila watu tisa kati ya kumi dhidi ya hali duni	At six feet under, war Nine out of ten people living in abject conditions
Naeleke nchi ya ughaibuni Nimezungukwa na dhoruba	I am heading to a foreign place I am surrounded by a hurricane [I am confused]
Nshapagawa, sioni rasi wala ghuba	I am possessed, I don’t see cape or inlet [I don’t see land]
Ya Allah, Jah Jehova Shuhudia jinsi roho inavyoangamia Hali hewa imechafuka Giza lauficha utakatifu Kote sioni kitu Mateso bila chuki mkushi	Ya, Allah, Jah, Jehovah witness the way the soul is destroyed The weather has become rough Darkness is hiding consciousness I don’t see anything Suffering [in the ghetto] without bitterness toward life

of their popular Swahili songs, 'Msafiri' ('Traveller'). Originally a *dansi* song written by the singer King Kiki, it had been rewritten and remixed by Kwanza Unit and turned into a popular rap. While being broadcast live on two television stations (DTV and ITV), Kwanza Unit sang the song to the audience and to the many people watching throughout Tanzania. KBC of Kwanza Unit sang the first chorus, while Rhymson rapped his socially charged verse about the suffering that takes place over the course of one's life. The directness of the lyric was typical of many hip hop songs in Swahili at that time. Further, the mix of 1960s *dansi* with hip hop made the song sound Tanzanian, despite the Western origins of hip hop culture.

'Msafiri' was a major success. Not only did it receive a standing ovation at this event, but it brought Kwanza Unit continued success on the local airwaves.⁶ Yet how did hip hop music, an American phenomenon typically sung in English, turn into such a powerful musical symbol for Tanzanian society? How did it succeed in becoming such an important part of a major media event in 1998? And how was a young rap group allowed to sing about the problems of life in the 'ghetto' in front of the First Lady and other prominent Tanzanians?

In this paper, I trace the rise of hip hop music and culture in Dar es Salaam from 1984 until 1997. Using interviews with artists, promoters, producers, and radio personalities, I present the movement of hip hop in Dar es Salaam from imitation to localization. While many authors criticize the phenomenon of hip hop in Africa as only an infatuation with America, I argue that, over time, artists moved beyond mere imitation of their Western counterparts to creating original lyrics, instrumentals, and immersing hip hop with local cultural knowledge. Hip hop music and culture, now referred to as either *kufokafoka* or *bongo flava*, emerged through Dar es Salaam youth's interest in identifying with African-American culture, power, and wealth, but evolved into an indigenous source of inspiration and meaning.⁷

Many authors, particularly Tanzanian writers, characterize Tanzanian hip hop as a form of cultural imperialism or an extension of Westernization that is occurring throughout Africa.⁸ Certainly, processes of globalization have increased the economic dominance of Western countries (Europe, the USA, Japan) in many parts of Africa. Despite early projections that globalization, with an equalizing of communication, transportation, and trade, would create a stronger balance between the 'west and the rest', the opposite has occurred. Most African countries are now more reliant on Western markets, trade, and aid than ever before.

Yet despite this economic imbalance, people in Tanzania and other African countries remain culturally empowered. In other words, artists, writers, performers, and others have not assimilated aspects of the United States and Europe while disregarding their own cultural practices. Instead, processes of localization are taking place where ideas, styles, and trends from one part of the world are integrated with and adapted to local cultures. This interchange is not predictable or straightforward. Rather, it is a complex result of the increased ease with which Tanzanians can access the music and culture of the West (and vice versa), and draw aspects from what they see and hear into their own traditions.

Further, hip hop's emergence follows a historical pattern of Dar es Salaam youth integrating foreign musical genres with local aesthetics. During the 1920s and 1930s, under British colonialism, Tanzanians listened to and performed Western music, such as ballroom dance, swing, and military marches. Local artists melded these Western styles with other musical forms popular at that time, such as Congolese music and local *ngoma*, to develop the most enduring popular genre in Tanzania, *dansi*. Through the increased availability of records, other Western genres such as jazz, country, and, by the mid 1960s, soul and funk, also became popular. Some bands formed to imitate these genres as precisely as possible, while many others took ideas from these new popular musics to add to the *dansi* sound.⁹ This constant musical borrowing from non-Tanzanian culture continued until the 1970s at which point the government began to limit peoples' access to foreign music under stricter socialist policies.¹⁰

During the early 1980s, however, the socialist practices that limited people's access to foreign music and culture began to break down. Under the presidency of Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985 to 1995), people were given a great deal of economic freedom. Mwinyi dissolved many of the socialist proscriptions on privatization and business, and also ignored some of the duplicitous activities that rose alongside the burgeoning informal and formal economies. The Mwinyi presidency became known as the *Ruksa* years, derived from the word 'ruhusu' or 'to allow'. Mwinyi believed that his economically 'free' policies would create a stronger local market for goods and services, particularly as it became financially difficult to import goods from outside of Tanzania. The result of Mwinyi's liberalization policies was a tremendous growth in the informal economy, increased corruption, and, for many, more opportunities to make a living through any means necessary.¹¹

Another result of liberalization was that many youth returned to foreign styles of music for inspiration. Congolese rumba, reggae, and American pop (such as the music of Michael Jackson) all became popular in this period.¹² These genres represented the otherness and foreignness that many urban Dar es Salaam youth sought in their movement toward a sense of cosmopolitanism. It was hip hop music, however, that garnered the strongest following in subsequent decades. Internationally, hip hop grew in popularity during the 1980s, and it was a culture – of dress, music, and dance – that many Dar es Salaam youth admired. Further, it was a cultural phenomenon that emerged among African-Americans, a group that young Tanzanians have long admired and emulated. Although local musical genres, such as *dansi*, *taarab*, and, in the early 1990s, *mchiriku*, were also popular among youth, it was hip hop, performed by both foreign and local artists that became the most successful musical genre.¹³

Similar to the early years of *dansi*, access to hip hop music had a great deal to do with education and class. Well-educated youth, for instance, who had family members that traveled abroad, had privileged access to imported records, clothing, and magazines. Those that lived in central and more exclusive areas of the city, such as City Centre, Upanga, Kinondoni, and Oyster Bay, had closer connections to the schools, clubs, competitions, and parties that gave rise to hip hop. Youth who came from wealthy families were also able to

see and hear hip hop on home televisions, stereos, and VCRs. Poorer residents of the city were unable to experience hip hop until the local economy caught up with international urban cultures, and with the technology that was needed to bring hip hop to a wider audience.

One consequence of this social differentiation among Dar es Salaam youth is divergent streams of memory about the history of Tanzanian hip hop. Those from upper class or well-educated families tend to conceive of hip hop's emergence much earlier than other youth. They know more about American artists and culture particularly because they have a stronger command of English (and thereby access to foreign radio shows and other media). They also hold to certain pillars of hip hop more in line with American cultural practices. Other youth, however, conceive of American culture as it is filtered through local news media and word of mouth. They identify certain local artists as being the progenitors of a Tanzanian style of rap, and view hip hop as less an American phenomenon than a cultural element that fits naturally with their urban experiences. These different conceptions, based on class, education and access to local and foreign cultural elements, create a complex history—one that shifts and changes depending on an individual's social position. In this chapter, I address these divergent streams of memory while recognizing that many voices remain left out or incomplete.

Rap emerges: 1984-1989

American hip hop culture is often divided into four elements: breakdancing, deejaying (also called mixing), rapping (also called MC-ing), and graffiti art.¹⁴ During the late 1970s and early 1980s, these four pillars of hip hop emerged, mainly in the Bronx borough of New York City.¹⁵ During the rise in popularity of hip hop internationally, youth in different countries incorporated part or all of the hip hop 'expressions'. The Dutch, for instance, incorporated all four elements of hip hop into their scene, while the British and French focused more on rapping and deejaying.¹⁶ In Tanzania, youth were first drawn to hip hop culture through breakdancing.

In 1984, Dar es Salaam youth saw their first images of breakdancing on videocassettes. Within a period of a year, most of the dance community had abandoned earlier styles, such as the robot, for the new American phenomenon.¹⁷ American videos, such as *Wild Styles*, *Breakin'*, and *Breakin' 2: Electric Boogaloo*, were the first visual elements of this American cultural form to appear. The films were shown publicly, such as at the 1984 Saba Saba festival.¹⁸ Since few families in Tanzania had VCRs at this time, the breakdancing trend initially centred on middle and upper class youth.¹⁹ These youth, who mainly lived in the Upanga, Oyster Bay, and City Centre areas, borrowed and traded videos with one another in order to mimic breakdancing moves.²⁰

While breakdancing was the first dominant element of hip hop culture to appear in Dar es Salaam, a handful of youth did rap. These mostly elite youth tended to be well educated and have connections with people abroad that allowed them access to music from the United States. The two most revered

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names of this small group of early rappers were Conway Francis and Fresh X. Francis rapped complete songs of American hip hop, dressed in American-style rap clothing, and used American vernacular in his speech. He was friendly with many of the local deejays, who would pass him the microphone to rap during dance events. Like Francis, Fresh X, known also as Eddo King and as Fresh X E, also had access to American cultural items.²¹ His brother, Franco Mtui, had a sizeable record collection, which gave Fresh X opportunities to study rap music. Fresh X would also fashion his clothing after American rappers, such as Flava Flav from the American group Public Enemy (he even wore the large clock around his neck). Most remarkably, however, Fresh X composed his own lyrics, and wrote some in Swahili. KBC, who lived near Fresh X in Oyster Bay, explains his importance in the local community:

The first person that I ever seen rap, writing his own lyrics was Fresh X. He was older than me—I was going to school with his young brother Franco Mtui. I would come back from school, and stop at Franco's house. The whole neighborhood would want to go to Franco's house because the family was so musical. They used to collect records, so people would go over there to hear new records. And, at that time, Fresh X was just interested with rap music. This was in 1984. They had a group called Badboys—the deejay was Franco, and the rapper was Fresh X. They would throw their own parties, and every party they threw, Fresh X would rap. It was like a house party—that was the spot to hang out. No smoking or drinking, nothing crazy, people would go for the love of music.²²

KBC, who became a well-known rapper himself in the early 1990s, goes on to describe the reverence that many people had for Fresh X. His ability to compose his own songs, tell stories, and 'work a room' made a tremendous impression on many Oyster Bay youth. It also made him an exception in Dar es Salaam, and essentially, an artist many years ahead of the local scene.

Both Conway Francis and Fresh X eventually joined together to form Three Power Crew with another rapper, Young Millionaire. The group performed at disco clubs, and became well known among more elite youth in Dar es Salaam. Other rappers, such as Samia X and Cool Moe C, also from affluent backgrounds, found success in this period. DJ Kim, who met many of these artists in local clubs, describes the early scene:

You know, in the early years [1986-1989], many of the people that rapped were the better educated, the elite. They would be able to imitate songs, such as 'OPP', from the beginning until the end, just like Naughty by Nature. These youth would come to the discos, and they would say, 'DJ play OPP for me.' And, I would play the instrumental of 'OPP' for them, and then they would take the mic, and sing the song. So, they would liven the music by rapping over the instrumental.²³

Since many of these artists, including Fresh X, Samia X, and KBC, left Tanzania for other countries, this group of artists would eventually lose influence in the local scene.

Outside of this elite community of MCs, however, few people attempted to rap in the mid-1980s. At clubs, deejays such as DJ Ice-Q, Master T, and DJ

K, rapped over instrumental music while people danced.²⁴ Yet most Dar es Salaam youth were still a few years away from rapping entire songs, composing their own lyrics, or performing as solo rappers. Where deejays used their short raps to add excitement, full-song rapping entailed an immersion into poetic composition with a focus on putting words together to tell a story. It required skills, such as following the beat and creating an overall flow to the music, which artists had to hone over time. Further, due to the limited availability of American records, rapping remained secondary to dancing, and never grew beyond a few artists who tried to experiment with the music.²⁵

The movement toward more professional rapping was formalized through the frequency of American music heard in Dar es Salaam in the late 1980s and early 1990s. DJ Kim elaborates:

In the cinema, came the rap show *DJs of Music Rap Show* that had rappers such as Run DMC and Public Enemy. So, people in Tanzania saw how these artists moved and rapped from the cinema. From there, Tanzanian youth began to imitate the artists that they saw. But, a lot also came in through the disco [clubs]. We would get rap albums from Tanzanians abroad, and artists would imitate the rappers on those albums. Mostly, this imitation occurred in 1989, 1990, and, in 1991, with local artists copying the music of Naughty by Nature ('OPP'), MC Hammer ('Hammertime'), Bobby Brown, and LL Cool J.²⁶

Though DJ Kim places a great deal of emphasis on the clubs—he was, after all, a well-known disco deejay in Dar es Salaam—youth also learned to rap through listening to music at home, or sitting in front of a store that had music playing. Ramadhani Mponjika remembers:

When I was in secondary, youth would gather at events, like picnics, and you would make contacts with people who had the same interests as you.²⁷ At that time, there were few people that had an interest in rap. So, we all started to get to know each other. Many times, you would find someone with a cassette, borrow it, record it, and return it to him/her. We would make mix cassettes. One person would always get cassettes from WBLS, so we would listen to those.²⁸

Schoolyards, social 'picnics', and parties were all places that youth, often too young for clubs, would learn about rap. As Mponjika states, during this time, only a handful were into the music (breakdancing remained the more popular element of hip hop culture). Yet, these youth actively engaged in the trading of American hip hop, and eventually enticed other youth to try to rap.

By 1989, rapping had become a vital aspect of Dar es Salaam schools. Students imitated American fashion, practiced rapping after school, and took on names modeled after famous American artists.²⁹ Some of the better known artists included D Rob (whose name was taken from the American rapper Rob Base), Tribe X (from A Tribe Called Quest and, possibly, Malcolm X), Eazy B (Eazy E), Fresh G (Doug E. Fresh), Dre B (Dr. Dre), and Nigga One.³⁰ Groups such as Raiders Posse from Oyster Bay, Villain Gangsters from Temeke, and Hardblasters from Upanga also formed in this period. In essence, between 1989 and 1991, Dar es Salaam school age youth embraced American rap as something they wanted to replicate. This was the generation that would bring

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about the genre's most profound integration into Tanzanian culture. Most Tanzanian rappers identify 1989 to 1991 as the formative years of the Dar es Salaam scene.

During this time, imitation remained the best way for Tanzanians to achieve their skills as rappers. Mr. II, a well-known rapper, states, 'When we [Tanzanian rappers] first started, you would listen to someone's song and learn his lyrics. This was the style that we had in the beginning. Then, later, we started to write songs in English'.³¹ Though the use of English was difficult for many, particularly in trying to copy the rapid delivery of American rappers, the imitation process was crucial for Dar es Salaam youth to learn to 'flow' over the music, find the beat of songs, and create a unique sound. Mponjika elaborates:

I'll tell you a funny story. I tried to write the lyrics to one song, 'I Got Soul' by Rakim. I listened to it on the radio [from a cassette] and then I wrote the lyrics for two verses, because, we did not have the original cassette with the lyrics. I learned the song, and then performed it. After about three or four months, I found the original cassette with the lyrics. The lyrics that I learned were completely different than the original. It was not even what Rakim was saying. So, I did not understand the meaning on the songs, but I learned the flow and about following the beats.³²

Although many other artists struggled with the lyrics, particularly American vernacular, the practice of imitation gave artists the skills necessary to rap.

Despite the interest in hip hop during the 1980s, by 1990 only a small number of artists were rapping. Students at schools would often try to mimic popular rap songs, but actual attempts to compose and perform rap were few. Further, the fan base was still small. Cassette tapes did circulate in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere in Tanzania, but youth were still more enamored with American artists than the music of their Tanzanian counterparts. While the popularity of rap was slowly moving outward from the exclusive areas and schools, rap had to go through several changes before it was accepted by a large base of fans and rappers in Dar es Salaam.

Competition and style: 1990-1992

Competitions were an important part of Dar es Salaam's music scene after independence. *Dansi* and *ngoma* bands frequently competed against one another in state sponsored events.³³ During the 1980s, there were regular dance competitions, not just in breakdancing but in other styles of popular dance. The emergence of rap competitions was, therefore, a natural progression. The first such event was at the Lang'ata Club in Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam. Held in 1990, it brought together solo rappers such as Conway Francis, Fresh X, and Dika Shap. Although the event was significant in that it was the first major competition of Tanzanian rap, it is left out of most Dar es Salaam rap histories.³⁴ The reason may be that many of the contestants did not continue to perform rap for very long after the event ended. Alternatively, it arose from the fact that it involved an exclusive group of rappers and not those who

would bring about the most significant changes to the genre. Whatever the reason, the winner of the competition, Dika Shap, is typically not acknowledged as a rap pioneer, even though he apparently won the competition by singing part of a song in Swahili, an innovation that would have the strongest impact in localizing Tanzanian hip hop.

The event generally acknowledged as the first major competition is Yo! Rap Bonanza. Organized by DJ Kim and the Boyz Promotions, the competition was to find the best rapper in the country (although it was mainly restricted to Dar es Salaam youth). The event took place on the seventh floor of the New Africa Hotel, where over three hundred people gathered over two days to witness the best local talent. The competition proved expensive to organise. As a result, the door charge was high and limited attendance to better-off youth. Four judges, including Slim A. Slim (a clothing designer), sat in attendance, scouting for the most talented MC. Yo! Rap Bonanza featured a who's who of young artists such as Nigga One, Eazy B, D Rob, KBC, Y Thang, and Killa B. Most performed American rap songs in English, and strove to precisely imitate the sounds of the original lyricists. Nigga One, for instance, performed a song by the American group N.W.A. (Niggaz with Attitude). According to the rapper Balozzi Dola, who was in attendance during this performance, several of the artists believed that exact imitation was the best way to perform rap music and, as a result, win the competition.³⁵

One artist, however, opted not to directly reproduce an American rap. Saleh Ajabry, a twenty-year-old Dar es Salaam-born artist, took several popular American songs and performed them with his own lyrics. Ajabry, who also went by the name Saleh J, started his rap career in the late 1980s, writing original lyrics over imported hip hop instrumentals. He recorded his first song, 'The Power' by the group Snap, in the late 1980s at his home using a microphone and a dual-cassette tape deck. In 1991, Ajabry recorded 'Ice Ice Baby' after receiving the song's instrumental track from Mr. A, a deejay at the Continental Disco Tech. According to Ajabry, a friend of his took these recordings and sold them to local distributors. Through the release of this rap single, the first by a Tanzanian artist, Ajabry's name gained recognition in Dar es Salaam. As a result, when Yo! Rap Bonanza was being organized, it was important to have Ajabry compete. On the second day of the competition, Ajabry performed two songs. The first was the Heavy D and the Boys' hit, 'Now That We Found Love'. By the time Ajabry arrived on stage for his last song, the audience was shouting for him to perform his new hit, 'Ice Ice Baby'.³⁶ Of all the songs he composed, 'Ice Ice Baby' remains the best remembered, mainly because he added a level of social commentary to his lyrics that would become prominent in Tanzania's future hip hop scene. On the original song, the American rapper Vanilla Ice sings about driving around looking for women, stopping at a party, and then getting involved in a drive-by shooting. He raps, 'Gunshots rang out like a bell/ I grabbed my nine, all I heard were shells/ Falling on the concrete real fast/ Jumped in my car, slammed on the gas.' Ajabry turns Vanilla Ice's verse about cruising for women into a warning:

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Saleh Ajabry ³⁷ “Ice Ice Baby”	
Nipo kweye gari na rafiki yangu Saleh, rollin’ Kweye 504 nasikia kilele, naitwa njoo Mwanamke meusi ana macho kama pussy <i>Did you stop?</i> No, naogopa ukimwi Hauna kinga, ukikipata wala huponi Watu wana dead yo, so ipokanana A-I-D-S.	I’m in the car with my friend Saleh, rollin’ In the 504, I hear some noise, I am called over A black woman with cat eyes <i>Did you stop?</i> No, I am afraid of AIDS There’s is no vaccination, if you get it you don’t get better People are dead yo, so it is known as A-I-D-S.

The poignant message, that one should fear AIDS because there is no cure, took rap songs that had little local significance to most Dar es Salaam youth and imbued it with meaning.


Ajabry was a major success. Not only were his lyrics intelligible, but the message of his song resonated with the local population. During the early 1990s, AIDS was a significant topic of conversation in schools, on the radio, and among youth.³⁸ By taking this prominent social topic and weaving it into a popular song rapped partially in Swahili, Ajabry allowed rap to function according to its original intention: to communicate verbally. Though Ajabry was not the first rapper to use Swahili or even the first to rap about a topical social issue, the popularity of his song and his skills as a lyricist created a significant turning point in Tanzanian rap.³⁹ Most future acts would follow Ajabry’s lead, using Swahili and incorporating socially conscious messages in their music.

It is interesting to note that there was some conflict at the Yo! Rap Bonanza concert. Some contestants believed that Ajabry, who is part Arab, should not have been involved. To these contestants, rap was a black music, and sung in English. If Tanzanians wanted to rap, in other words, they needed to remain ‘true’ to the original form. One contestant derogatorily called Ajabry ‘*muarabu*’ [Arab], proclaiming that he was not black enough to rap.⁴⁰ It is impossible to know how widespread such attitudes were. However, the popular memory of Ajabry and the success of his songs established a new direction for the local scene. Due to his success at communicating with the audience, Ajabry won Yo! Rap Bonanza. Soon after, he released his first, and only, album *Swahili Rap*. The album, which featured all the songs he performed at the competition, influenced many Tanzanian youth. The rapper Inspekta Haroun, from Gangwe Mob, recalled: ‘At that time, we, Tanzanians, had not proved ourselves... But, the thing that [Ajabry] rapped about could be understood by many people, and was very impressive’.⁴¹ Ajabry also inspired Soggy Doggy Anter, another well-known rapper:

So, around this time, I started to listen to Vanilla Ice and, then, came a Tanzanian named Saleh Ajabry who started to sing Vanilla Ice songs in Swahili. At the time, I could rhythm like other rappers, such as Snoop [Doggy Dogg], but with his words. I did not write my own words. But, in 1993, after hearing Saleh Ajabry, I started to write and rap in Swahili. At first, my raps were simple and funny to hear, but [Saleh Ajabry] gave me hope that I could do it.⁴²




*Soggy Doggy Anter rapping at FM Club
April 1998.*




*Cover for the Rough
Niggaz's album
Maisha, which was
released in 1996.
Eddy T is on the left
and Easy S, also
known as Steve 2K, is
on the right.*

'Here's a Little Something Local'



Mac Mooger's 1995 album The Mac-Mooger was the first commercially distributed album of Tanzanian hip hop.



Many rappers who grew up in the mid and later 1990s consider Swahili Rap by Saleh J to be the most influential album in encouraging them to rap in Swahili about issues related to their lives.

Moreover, Ajabry's music provided inspiration beyond Dar es Salaam. According to Mr. II, '[h]is music was able to penetrate into many regions [of Tanzania] because people were able to understand what he said'.⁴³ Ajabry's success had major repercussions. Previously, those who listened to rap or attended events in Dar es Salaam were fellow performers. With the advent of more widely intelligible lyrics, a community of rap aficionados started to form. The key to this social change was the localization of hip hop through the use of Swahili, transforming hip hop from something American to something more Tanzanian.⁴⁴

The Yo! Rap Bonanza and its aftermath document the tensions that existed at that time in Dar es Salaam. Whether it was racially, socially, or linguistically driven, there were at least two conceptions of what hip hop should be. Many of the more privileged youth bonded together to continue their vision of hip hop as a black music sung in English.⁴⁵ The strongest progenitor of this style was Kwanza Unit, a group that drew together members of Villain Gangsters, Raiders Posse, and Tribe X.⁴⁶ As Rhymson (one of Kwanza Unit's central figures) explained, the formation of this group was in response to the outcome at Yo! Rap Bonanza, which they thought was a slight to their version of hip hop. Although Kwanza Unit would eventually write songs in Swahili (see above), the group believed they had an alternative 'mission' for hip hop: a mission that was closer to the genre's American origins. To separate their music from more populist hip hop, Kwanza Unit and similar groups defined their vision of hip hop as 'underground'. Theirs was a decidedly anti-populist, purist vision, catering more toward what they saw as the ideals of the genre. Other members of the rap community were less concerned about the maintenance of a hip hop mission and instead pushed to localize it as a dominant form of popular music. This large body of youth would eventually compose and perform hip hop songs that were more commercially successful than the underground groups. They would also set the standards for instrumental and lyrical styles, which some of the underground groups would eventually follow to gain access to larger commercial markets.

Studios and media: 1993-1995

Despite the success of Yo! Rap Bonanza, Tanzanian rap risked becoming culturally disconnected if artists did not have music composed for them by local producers who could create a more Tanzanian sound. Before 1991, only government facilities recorded Tanzanian artists, and these studios would not record overtly foreign music, such as hip hop. Once interest in rap developed, however, a number of young producers came to the fore. Between 1991 and 2002, fifteen studios formed in Dar es Salaam.⁴⁷ The majority focused on composing rap instrumentals and recording songs for local rappers.

The first rap song produced in Tanzania was 'Msela'. The engineer on the recording was Bonnie Luv who worked for Mawingu Studio, a part of the Clouds Disco organization.⁴⁸ Luv recorded 'Msela' for a group of artists who took the English name of the studio, Clouds, for themselves. The lyricist and

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lead rapper of the group was Othman Njaidi, who was accompanied by Sindila and Pamela. ‘Msela’ literally means charlatan or braggart, but in local vernacular translated as urban sailor. The symbolic meaning of the term, however, was far more complex.⁴⁹ Njaidi’s opening verse tells a more vivid story of *msela* or *wasela* (plural) in Dar es Salaam.

Clouds “Oya Msela”	
Kama unataka kujua jina langu, niulize	If you want to know my name, ask
Kama ninaweza nitakueleza	If I am able to, I will explain to you
Nina washikaje kwenye vipaji	I have talented friends
Now imagine	Now imagine
Wote ni wasela	All are <i>wasela</i>
Hata kama hatuna hela	Even though we do not have money
Hatusikwenda jela	We do not go to jail
...	...
Na tena kila wasi	And still, for every need
Bora kuwa mchizi	It is better to be a crazy friend.
Sitakuwa mwizi	I will not be a thief
Haina siku hizi	There is no day for them
Mambo kwa mazizi	Acting like animals [literally: things of an animal pen]
Usipendekezo	Do not make suggestions
Na usifanya mchezo	And do not play games
Alifuolela mshikaji kuwa msela	That is the way it is, a friend becoming a <i>msela</i> .

Njaidi describes *wasela* as poor youth who rise above their problems without getting involved in drugs or crime. This image of *wasela* as honorable youth who suffer due to the environment they live in, not their own ineptitude or waywardness, conveyed a powerful message in the early 1990s. The chorus, sung by the female singer Pamela, added an allure to the status of *msela*. She sings, ‘I love *msela*/ Even if he has no money’. As the song grew in popularity, it became especially important for urban (mostly male) youth to be called *msela*. The term is still in use today, and often appears in popular rap songs. Moreover, the song had a significant musical impact. As the first instrumental composed for Tanzanian hip hop music, Luv’s accompaniment paved the way for a strong interest by Dar es Salaam artists to rap over an original backing.

Over the next three years at Mawingu Studio, Luv recorded various albums for groups such as Kwanza Unit (*Tucheze*), Hardblasters (*Mambo ya Mjini*), G.W.M. (*Kipe Kitu* and *Yamenikuta*), and Dar Young Mob. Though these albums did not sell well—mainly because there were no distributors willing to take a risk on local rap—they became revered in the Dar es Salaam hip hop community. These artists, as well as Luv, became well known in and beyond the city for establishing a Tanzanian sound. However, in 1996 all of the equipment and several semi-completed albums were stolen from Mawingu Studio. The Clouds organization decided not to purchase new equipment, partly because they were planning to start a local radio station.

Other studios also recorded artists during the early to mid-1990s. These studios, such as Soundcrafters and Don Bosco, tended not to be innovators in

composing instrumentals or in creating a Dar es Salaam hip hop sound as was the case with Mawingu Studio.⁵⁰ Yet both contributed to the first successfully produced and sold hip hop albums. In 1994, the group W.W.A. (Weusi Wagumu Asilia/ The Original Hardcore Blacks) recorded the first full-length album in Swahili at Don Bosco. The album, called *Sauti ya Wagumu* [Voice of the Hardcore], was a moderate success when released the following year. In particular, the song, 'Rumba Kali' (Severe Rumba), which later became the name of a well known African hip hop website, was a hit in Dar es Salaam.⁵¹ Other artists, such as Mac Mooger and Mr. II, also recorded at Don Bosco. Mooger became the first Tanzanian hip hop artist to sell his album, *The Mac Mooger*, to a local distributor.⁵² Bands from other genres of music, such as *dansi* and *taarab*, were already accustomed to bringing their master tapes to local distributors, who were, in the 1990s, entirely of South Asian descent. The distributor bought the cassette for a small sum of money—in the mid 1990s, a cassette could be sold for anywhere between Shs. 20,000/- and Shs. 50,000/-—which gave them the rights to sell copies of the album, indefinitely, anywhere in the world. Despite the negligible compensation, most artists felt that the sale of their cassettes gave them some income and, in the long run, garnered them publicity and recognition. Mooger, who sold his cassette to a local Indian named Mamu in 1995, only made a small amount of money but was able to establish himself as an important rapper, simply because copies of his albums were so widely available.

Marlone Linje produced the recordings at Don Bosco. Marlone was more accustomed to recording choirs and bands rather than hip hop. As a result, most artists had to tell Marlone what they were looking for in the backing music. Mr. II, who used the name II Proud until 1997, recorded his album *Mimi* in 1994 with Marlone. He explains the recording process as follows: 'Marlone did the engineering, but the ideas I would give him. So, I would give him the rhythm and whatever else by mouth. In essence, I was the producer, Marlone was the engineer'.⁵³ Since hip hop instrumentals were still new to most producers, the instrumentation had to be worked out by the artists, giving them a great deal of control over their songs. However, recording time was extremely limited. Engineers or producers would have to record songs quickly in order to meet the demand of customers waiting to record. In 1995, the Rough Niggaz album *Maisha* (which included the hit, "Nani Kama Mama" [No one like Mama]), was recorded and mixed in under two days. The one-day recording of an entire album was not unprecedented in Dar es Salaam in the mid-1990s, which by any recording standards was exceptionally fast.

Several studios offered recording space to rappers free or for delayed payment. Sound Crafters, for example, offered free recording to the Deplowmatz, who formed in 1994 when the original members, Saigon and Trip Dogg, were at Tambaza Secondary School, Dar es Salaam.⁵⁴ The group went to Sound Crafters, then located in Temeke, but realized on arrival they could not afford the studio's costs. One of the owners agreed to sponsor the group and allowed them to record two songs free. Those two songs, 'Word is Born', and 'Turuke kwa Furaha' (Let's Jump for Joy), gave the Deplowmatz radio airplay on Radio One and opportunities to earn money performing concerts at cinema halls, beach

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parties, graduation parties, and at school events.⁵⁵

Youth were well aware of the opportunities that a good studio recording could provide them. A well-recorded track had the potential to receive airplay, which was free promotion. Once a song became popular on the radio, artists were then assured of well-attended concerts and, by the late 1990s, strong album sales. In other words, a strong song, both lyrically and musically, could give a rap artist sufficient exposure to make money from their music. In the early years of hip hop in Dar es Salaam, this money was typically funneled back into recording more songs. However, by the late 1990s several artists had become financially independent through their music.

Through working with local producers, artists were able to compose songs that suited their interest in rap. It allowed the music to develop more organically within the city, and not remain confined to the sounds emanating from the West. Although many producers took their inspiration in musical composition from the United States, artists continually tried to find sounds that fit their vision of Dar es Salaam hip hop. Local rap took on the sounds, experiences, and timbres of their city thereby becoming more meaningful to Tanzanian youth. Moreover, the movement toward locally recorded albums removed some of the social demarcation that existed between different classes of city youth. The localization of rap in Tanzania had a great deal to do with the genre's movement from an elite to a populist art form. Youth from all social classes wanted to participate. While producers came from upper class or educated backgrounds, they worked with a wide diversity of artists from all over Dar es Salaam (and East Africa). Because many artists viewed hip hop as a new cultural form they were unconcerned about class and education: social difference was less important than the musical enterprise taking place.⁵⁶

The message: 1996-1997

Thus far, the two main elements discussed in the movement of Tanzanian hip hop from imitation to original composition were language and instrumentation. Another factor critical to localizing hip hop was the lyrical message. Obviously, not everyone in the Dar es Salaam scene agreed what this should be. Some considered rap to be important for divulging the problems of an individual—a self-reflexive lyrical exercise. In referring to Tanzanian hip hop, KBC states, 'You are supposed to talk on how you live, how you handle your bills. You have to be positive . . . doing positive reality rap'.⁵⁷ Others believed that lyrics should be more directly political. Perhaps the biggest advocate of this style, Mr. II, explains: 'I do not write songs for me, myself. I do not write songs for some individual. I write songs for people, so that they can listen to me'.⁵⁸ The different compositional styles led to divergent messages in songs. Yet what unified all rappers was their refusal, with few exceptions, to use foul language, rap about violence, or use strongly sexual material. The push for clean lyrics that were culturally meaningful came from some of the better-known rappers and local radio announcers. Taji Liundi, a Radio One presenter who played hip hop, explains:

That is because from the very beginning I was the only one playing hip-hop on radio, and I decided that I am not going to put on the songs with the explicit content. If they [the artists] brought music in that had cursing, I would not play it. And at concerts, I would get them off the stage, make a lot of noise, and look disappointed.⁵⁹

John Dilinga, from East Africa FM, took a similar approach: ‘If I think that [a song] is leading society astray, I do not play it. If I think that it is educating society, I play it, promote it’.⁶⁰ While several local artists continued to rap in English, and occasionally use vulgarity in their lyrics, rap in Kiswahili was almost completely free of violent or vulgar content.

Many songs in the mid-1990s had strong messages. SOS B’s ‘Makonda’ (Conductors), which criticized the way local *daladala* conductors treated students who paid reduced fares, and W.W.A’s song ‘Rumba Kali’, which explained the problems of living in Dar es Salaam, are popular examples.⁶¹ The Rough Niggaz song ‘Nani Kama Mama’ was another hit with a message. The song describes the courage that mothers have to raise their families in Tanzania. The second verse even comments on domestic violence and the strength that mothers need to deal with drunken husbands.

Using a high voice for the mother and a low voice for the father, the story that unfolds over the verse forms a compelling narrative delivered over a tight drumbeat, percussive bass line, and the chords of a keyboard. At the time, it was unheard of for young musicians to write so forcefully about domestic violence. Outside of hip hop, groups wrote songs that addressed such issues, but concealed the meaning of their songs in metaphors and double entendres (especially if these groups wanted their songs recorded at the government radio station, which often censored ‘sensitive’ lyrics). By contrast, Rough Niggaz spoke about domestic violence openly, and with a powerful narrative that resonated in the minds of listeners.

Rough Niggaz⁶² “Nani Kama Mama”	
Mababa zetu wapotoka kwenye ulevi uliza “chakula” Wakati aja, ata kitu kidogo ponyumbani Shiriki tosha nini virugu chani Hata nyama haupati Nyumbani kukalika, “Ongeza nyama nimesema.” Dimba anaropoka ovyoovy Wakati haina hela Hela zote kamaliza kwenye pombe [Mother’s Voice] “Jamani, jamani, nyama imekwisha” “Nini,” pigapiga na mpiga na rudia tanga Hurumu, hurumurumu sana kwa mama	Our fathers who sober up ask, “food.” They arrive and cease to do anything in the house How does drunkenness help with anger on [his] back Even meat, one does not get In the home, “Add meat I said.” His opening words are careless nonsense When there is no money All the money has been used on beer [Mother’s voice] “Everyone, the meat is finished.” “‘What,’ he hits her and returns to brag about it. My sympathies for mother.

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Not all lyrics that were meaningful, however, had to be as socially charged. Many songs were about enjoyment, friends, and the importance of rap. Several groups were also caught between rapping in Swahili and English. The Deplowmatz for instance called their style Kiswakinge, a mixture of Swahili and English. Their attitude, according to Balozi Dola, was to 'think local, act global'.⁶³ In other words, Dar es Salaam rap should make sense to Tanzanians but also fit into international concepts of hip hop culture. One of the Deplowmatz most famous songs, 'Are U Down', was released in 1996, had one verse in English and two in Swahili. Dola raps the third verse in Swahili: 'Deplowmatz, We bring serious fever/ Like modern *ngoma*/ For the current generation/ We are hotter than the 'Kiti Moto' program/ And things could get even hotter'.⁶⁴ Although the message was not political, it still bolstered Dar es Salaam culture and values.

By 1997 the progression toward the majority of rap being socially conscious and composed in Swahili came to fruition. The album that provided the final push for Dar es Salaam artists to take notice of this localization of rap was *Ndani ya Bongo* by II Proud (later Mr. II). Recorded at Master J's studio in 1996 but released to the radio in 1997, the album features a variety of songs about love, life and rap music in Tanzania. One song stood out, and was unprecedented in its directness. The song, 'Nimesimama', featured an introduction—a conversation between Mr. II and a police officer—with socially charged commentary.⁶⁵

II Proud⁶⁶ "Intro"	
"We kijana, njoo hapa. Unaenda wapi? Simama hapa." "Pole nimesimama." "Eebu, njoo hapa. Unaitwa nani?" "II Proud" "II Proud? Kitambulisho chako kiko wapi?" "Kitambulisho cha nini?" "Cha kazi." "We afande vipi. Kazi yenyewe ziko wapi hapa Bongo mpaka unamaliza kutambalisho cha kazi. Wewe wenyewe unajua haina ajira sahihi" "Kwa hiyo, wewe ni mzururaji." "Mzururaji vipi? School nimeshaua, nimekwenda shule nimeua. Sahisi niko mtaani tu. Kazini sina, unaelewa?" "Ala, unaleta ujeuri siyo." "Ujuri vipi wakati . . ." "Kaa chini hapa." "Ni kaa chini wakati ninasimama."	"You, kid, come here. Where are you going? Stand here." "Alright, I am standing." "Come here. What is your name?" "II Proud" "II Proud? Where is your identity card?" "Identity card for what?" "For work?" "What are you talking about, cop. Where is there enough work here in Bongo that you can get an identity card. You know that there is no employment now." "So, you are loiterer?" "What do you mean loiterer? I went to school and finished. Now, I am just [hanging out] in town. I don't have work, understand?" "Ah, you are being arrogant." "What arrogance, when . . ." "Sit down here." "How am supposed to sit when I am standing?"

Youth who lack work often hang around on Dar es Salaam streets in areas called *kijiweni*. Many are educated and/or skilled but unable to find employment. Often, these youths are considered scourges and have in the past been arrested or deported for loitering.⁶⁷ Mr. II addresses the issue of urban joblessness and, particularly, the abuses that youth face in the hands of corrupt police officers. Most strikingly, Mr. II outwits the policeman in the final line by pointing out that he asked him to stand first, then told him to sit. Mr. II responds, 'How am I supposed to sit when I am standing?' The reply has a direct significance (mocking the police officer) and a hidden one (telling other youth to stand up for their rights).

The song that followed the introduction, 'Nimesimama', was no less political. In the opening verse, Mr. II, in a condemning voice, rants, 'This life is hard/ This is why so many youth like to go to Europe/ And girls decide to become prostitutes'. These lyrics, which some Tanzanians have argued were too political and too direct, targeted issues that affected youth faced. His words, like those of other popular rap songs, were repeated and rapped by many young people throughout Dar es Salaam. Mr. II garnered a strong following, becoming a voice for disenfranchised urban youth. Not only were the lyrics of 'Nimesimama' important, but the instrumental produced by Master Jay set high standards for local rap. Master Jay used many layers of sound to evoke a relaxed, laid-back vibe. He emphasized the drums, particularly the snare and bass, which were programmed on a drum machine. In one layer, there is a keyboard sound or sample that appears as if it is being played backwards. There are several percussion instruments 'dropping in' during the track. Occasionally, a keyboard chord sounds to give an ethereal quality to the music. Overall, the music provides a backdrop strong enough to be an influential hip hop beat, yet sufficiently distanced on the recording to accentuate the vocal track. The sound that Master Jay created would set the stage for his future studio work and influence a large body of producers in Dar es Salaam.⁶⁸

After the release of *Ndani ya Bongo*, the messages of songs became important in every area of the music scene. There were competitions, such as the National Rap Competition, the Dar es Salaam Music Awards, and the Tanzania Music Awards, where judges were especially interested in socially meaningful songs in Swahili. Promoters were especially aware of hiring groups that were popular on the airwaves and who would, consequently, draw in large crowds. The result of this infrastructure was a rap scene that moved increasingly toward socially conscious Swahili rap. Artists that rapped in English or that used vulgar language found it difficult to make their way into any local media. Although groups such as Kwanza Unit still garnered respect for their English works, their Swahili songs had a stronger impact locally (see, for example, 'Msafiri' discussed at the beginning of this article).

Bongo Hip Hop

The title of this article, 'Here's a Little Something Local,' is taken from the song 'I Shot an MC' by the Dar es Salaam-based artist Hashim. The song is a

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self-reflexive diatribe about Hashim's skills as a rapper.⁶⁹ Hashim raps in English, uses some vulgar language, and has a fairly violent chorus ('I smoked an MC, but I did not smoke his deejay'). As I have argued in this article, the overall progression of rap music in Dar es Salaam from 1984 until 1997 was a movement away from vulgar and violent lyrics in English toward songs in Swahili that were socially meaningful. Hashim's song is, therefore, more of an exception than the rule in Dar es Salaam's hip hop culture.

Yet, due to the inherent irony, his words and the song that follows help describe the Dar es Salaam hip hop scene of the 1990s. They make clear that the scene is far from monolithic, but dynamic. Many artists are 'underground,' meaning that they do not fit into the more popular hip hop movement described in this article. They continue to rely on Western concepts of rap and are interested in connecting with an international subculture. Even the majority of popular local artists continue to search for ideas from international hip hop. At the same time, a process of localization has occurred and is occurring in Dar es Salaam. Artists are consciously attempting to make rap music meaningful to Tanzanians. 'Here's a Little Something Local' depends on one's place in Dar es Salaam society. 'Local' is something without clear boundaries, and that should be understood within the complexities of an urban African city.

Even taking into account both popular and underground movements, however, this chapter counters the homogenization theories of culture within the global economy and emphasizes the processes by which music is localized. Music is not something that simply spreads 'from a center to the periphery, by equalizing youth's musical expressions and styles'.⁷⁰ International musical forms such as hip hop, reggae, and R&B are transformed or 'indigenized' in different places as youth assimilate them into local cultures.⁷¹ To say that the West homogenizes non-Western cultures with its dominance of cultural forms is to lack understanding of local-level mediation that occurs as part of daily confluences of global and local trends. These confluences are dynamic, always occurring, and infinitely complex given the multiplicity of identities, places, and classes contained within modern urban areas. By looking at a history of hip hop culture in one part of the world, this article shows part of that complexity and the processes by which localization evolves.

In the post-1997 period, rap in Dar es Salaam continued to grow in popularity. Numerous independent radio stations started with shows dedicated to local and international rap. More producers trained to compose and record hip hop instrumentals. Newspapers, websites, and magazines formed to provide biographies of artists and producers, and to keep local fans up-to-date. Concerts and competitions also occurred throughout Dar es Salaam and elsewhere in Tanzania. But it was not just the industry that was growing around hip hop music. Artists were also finding success. Between 1999 and 2001, several rappers released albums that sold over 100,000 copies, an enormous amount in Tanzania. With this money, they bought cars, houses, and traveled outside of Tanzania, achievements that few Dar es Salaam musicians have ever accomplished. Rap artists toured East Africa and, in a few cases, performed at festivals in Europe. To add to Dar es Salaam's significance in the African hip hop world, many artists from Uganda and Kenya traveled to record their

albums at the highly regarded Dar es Salaam studios.

More recently, divisions in the hip hop scene have hindered the genre's continued growth. In what one rapper described as the 'east-west battles', verbal attacks have occurred between residents of Dar es Salaam that live in upscale neighborhoods and those that live in poorer areas. Though these largely class-based attacks are rarely taken seriously in the rap community, they emphasize the tension occurring between the upper and lower classes in Dar es Salaam. This tension is based largely on access to the music. Youth from more deprived backgrounds view their wealthier counterparts as trying to control the industry (radio, television, video recording, newspapers, and magazines) that supports rap, and thereby directing the genre's local evolution. More privileged youth see these attacks as the criticism of individuals unable to use their talents to make a name for themselves and, therefore, jealous of those who do make a living from the local scene. Despite this conflict, the sound of rap has remained steadfast in its appeal to a broad spectrum of Dar es Salaam society and hip hop is still the most popular music among youth in the city.

Notes

¹ This event has been organized every year since 1997 in Tanzania through the Food and Agricultural Organization.

² Dramaphile, 'Kwanza Unit: Bongo Hip-Hip [sic] Pioneers.' *Rockers*, no. 2, pp. 3-6, n. d.

³ Kwanza Unit. *Kivanzanians*. Madunia/ Rumba-Kali African Hip Hop: Holland, 2000.

⁴ Takatifu means holy or sacred, but is also a vernacular way of saying consciousness.

⁵ Mkushi literally means African people and is referencing the life of Africans/Tanzanians in this song.

⁶ The song stayed in the top ten for ten months on Radio One. Mponjika, Ramadhani (Rhymson). Interview by author. 31 May 2004. See also, Suleyman, Miguel, "Seventies Music is All the Rage Again." *East African*, 10 May 2004.

⁷ Bongo flava is also written as *bongo flavour*. Bongo, literally, means wisdom, but in local vernacular it has come to refer to the knowledge that one needs to economically and physically survive in Dar es Salaam. The term *bongoland* (the land of bongo) refers to the city of Dar es Salaam and, more recently, Tanzania as a whole.

⁸ Some Tanzanians have been particularly vocal about their dislike of Tanzanian rap music. Gama Mwanga writes that Tanzanian youth are, 'busy aping Western culture,' while Paul Meregesi writes, 'what rap groups need to do is assist society, but not with vulgar language or shameful lyrics'. *Business Times*, 19 April, 2002; *Tanzania Leo*, 19 March, 2001. It should be noted that dislike of foreign music often extends beyond rap. An anonymous author writes broadly about music stating, 'Without being isolationist, something needs to be done to prevent the country being turned into a musical dumping ground.' *East African*, 14 July 1999. Many rappers have also been forbidden to rap because parents view it as music for hooligans.

⁹ For more on the history of *dansi* music, see Werner Graebner, 'Ngoma ya Ukae: Competitive Social Structure in Tanzanian Dance Music Songs', in Frank Gunderson and Gregory Barz (eds.) *Mashindano! Competitive Music Performance in East Africa* (Dar es Salaam, 2000), pp. 295-318; Graebner's chapter in this volume; Alex Perullo, "The Life that I Live": Popular Music, Urban Practices, and Agency in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University (2003).

¹⁰ The government-run radio station, for instance, stopped playing foreign music on its Swahili service and only aired local or African music.

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¹¹ See Aili Mari Tripp, *Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania* (Berkeley, 1997).

¹² It is important to note that many of these styles, such as reggae and Congolese rumba, were popular even before Mwinyi became president. Yet, with increased access to these musical genres, their popularity rose (particularly as private radio stations appeared in the 1990s). See Perullo, 'The Life that I Live'.

¹³ Among the entire Dar es Salaam population, *dansi* was the more popular musical genre during the 1990s (this is based on tape sales and concert attendance). Among youth, however, hip hop was more popular and more in demand. It also dominated local radio stations in comparison to other local musical genres.

¹⁴ Nelson George, *Hip Hop America* (New York, 1999), p. 10.

¹⁵ Many authors point out that hip hop culture drew from many varied elements, such as disco, radio deejays, doo-wop groups, and Jamaican sound system toasters. See David Toop, *Rap Attack 2: African Rap to Global Hip Hop* (London, 1994), and Tricia Rose, *Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary America* (Hanover NH, 1994); Tony Mitchell, 'Introduction: Another Root—Hip-Hop Outside the USA', in *idem.* (ed.), *Global Noise: Rap and Hip-Hop Outside the USA* (Connecticut, 2001). In other words, it is important to realize that hip hop culture did not just emerge in the Bronx, but drew from many previous cultural, political, and social elements.

¹⁶ See Mitchell, *Global Noise*.

¹⁷ Previous dance styles, such as those seen on the 1970s show *Soul Train* and in Western music videos, inspired Dar es Salaam youth to integrate many different styles of American dance into a local idiom. The robot, for instance, first popularized by Michael Jackson in the video 'Dancin' Machine', was one of the most successful dance styles in Dar es Salaam during the early 1980s. Several youth were known only for performing the robot, and competed in robot dance competitions throughout Dar es Salaam. Baucha, Ally Mohamed. Interview by Alex Perullo and James Nindi. Dar es Salaam, 11 May 2004.

¹⁸ Mponjika, Ramadhani (Rhymson). Interview by author. 23 May 2004.

¹⁹ VCRs were considered a luxury item and, therefore, illegal to own during socialism. Nonetheless, many families managed to import these highly prized machines and, in the process, became extremely popular among their peers. See Muhidin Issa Michuzi's article, 'Dar TV Video owners demi-gods', *Daily News*, 16 June 1990.

²⁰ Luv, Bonnie (Boniface Kilosa). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 23 February 2001.

²¹ It is common for Tanzanian artists to change their names once every couple of years. In this paper, I attempt to identify all of the names that an artist has used in his/her career. Yet, for consistency, I only use one name throughout the paper.

²² Singo, Kibacha (KBC). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 27 May 2004.

²³ Magomelo, Abdulhakim (DJ Kim). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 24 April 2004.

²⁴ Magomelo, Abdulhakim (DJ Kim). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 24 April 2004.

²⁵ In particular, the limited availability of instrumental tracks kept artists from rapping over music.

²⁶ Magomelo, Abdulhakim (DJ Kim). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 24 April 2004.

²⁷ Schools often held social picnics to let youth from the city get together. Often, deejays played music and people danced (boys and girls). One of the regular places to hold picnics was at the Kawe Club. Although schools do not hold these types of picnics anymore, youth still gather at places, such as the beach, to hold similar events.

²⁸ Mponjika, Ramadhani (Rhymson). Interview by author. 23 May 2004. WBLS is a New York-based radio station that plays hip hop and R&B.

²⁹ In interviews with youth who grew up in Dar es Salaam between 1989 and 1991, the school that had the strongest reputation for rapping was the American International School, located in Oyster Bay. The most obvious reasons for this were the fluency of English, and the ease of getting recordings from students and their families who often traveled abroad.

³⁰ Often, several artists used the same name. Easy was one of the more popular. In the early 1990s, there was Easy S, Easy B, and Easy T. There was also Fresh E and Fresh G. Generally, these names were created by taking a popular American name, such as Easy and Fresh and using the first letter of one's given name.

³¹ Mr. II (Joseph Mbilinyi). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 6 November 2000.

³² Mponjika, Ramadhani (Rhymson). Interview by author. 23 May 2004.

³³ See Gunderson and Barz, *Mashindano!*; Kelly Askew, *Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania* (Chicago, 2002).

³⁴ In using the phrase 'Dar es Salaam rap histories', I am including interviews with members of the Tanzanian rap community, as well as narratives that appear in local magazines, such as *Kitangoma* and *Rockers*, or on websites, such as africanhiphop.com and darhotwire.com.

³⁵ Dola, Balozi. Interview, New York, 12 May 2004.

³⁶ Ajabry, Saleh. Interview by Thomas Gesthuizen/Africanhiphop.com, October 2001. Used with Permission.

³⁷ Saleh J. *Swahili Rap*. Dar es Salaam, 1994.

³⁸ Articles about AIDS frequently appeared in local papers. See, for example, 'Aids Scourge, 7,000 orphaned in Kagera. Ndugu Mwinyi Adopts Two Children,' *Daily News*, 15 February 1990. There were also contests for educating youth about AIDS and charities for raising money to fight AIDS. See 'The Leopard Cultural Nite with Studio J.O. CO. Ltd. variety Show, Charity for AIDS Victims,' *Daily News*, 28 February 1990.

³⁹ The first artist credited with rapping in Swahili is Fresh G, while Samia X and Cool Moe C are often credited as the first two people to rap in Swahili about significant social events. See Peter Jan Haas and Thomas Gesthuizen, 'Ndani ya Bongo: Swahili Rap Keeping it Real,' in Gunderson & Barz, *Mashindano!*, pp. 279-94.

⁴⁰ Perhaps to respond to these critics, Ajabry rapped, in English, during 'Ice Ice Baby,' 'My mother is white and my father is black/ A father is a father and a mother/ So I don't care if you're black or white.' Through using English, he responded directly to his critics. It should also be noted that 'Ice Ice Baby', which won Ajabry the competition, was originally composed by a white American rapper.

⁴¹ Haroun, Inpekta. Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 16 January 2001.

⁴² Anter, Soggy Doggy. Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 31 October 2000.

⁴³ Mr. II (Joseph Mbilinyi). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 5 October 1999.

⁴⁴ For an extensive discussion of language in Tanzanian hip hop, see Alex Perullo and John Fenn, 'Language Ideologies, Choices, and Practices in Eastern African Hip Hop', in Harry Berger and Michael T. Carroll (eds.), *Global Popular Music: The Politics and Aesthetics of Language Choice* (Mississippi, 2003).

⁴⁵ In interviews with these artists, a few disputed the claim of coming from a privileged background in Dar es Salaam. Though they had family that lived abroad and spoke English, they were not financially wealthy nor did they live in the more exclusive neighborhoods of the city.

⁴⁶ Other groups were also part of forming Kwanza Unit.

⁴⁷ For a history of recording studios in Dar es Salaam, see Perullo, 'The Live that I Live'.

⁴⁸ Bonnie Luv's real name is Boniface Kilosa, and his nickname derives from the 1990s British artist Monie Love. Eric Toroka, n. d., 'DJ Bonny [sic] Luv: Bongo's Turntablist Extraordinaire [sic]', *Rockers*, no.4: 29-30.

⁴⁹ See Pieter Walter Remes, "'Karibu Geto Langu/ Welcome to My Ghetto": Urban Youth, Popular Culture, and Language in 1990s Tanzania', Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University (1998), p. 148.

⁵⁰ Don Bosco, which formed in 1991, was the first independent studio in Dar es Salaam, though it focused on all local music, not just hip hop. Soundcrafters, which formed in 1993, also catered to a wide array of music.

⁵¹ Alongside the website, Thomas Gesthusian also made a mixed tape called 'Rumba-Kali' which was distributed in Holland in 1996. The compilation featured songs by Saleh J and WWA, as well as artists from other African counties. As Gesthusian writes, 'It was probably the first compilation of hip hop from all over Africa' (<http://www.africanhiphop.com/crew/tanzania.htm>).

⁵² Mac Mooger. *The Mac Mooger*. Mamu Stores: Dar es Salaam, 1995.

⁵³ Mr. II (Joseph Mbilinyi). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 5 October 1999.

⁵⁴ Other members, such as Stiggo, Kris Manser, and Sagg Junior, also joined the group. Dola Soul joined in 1996.

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⁵⁵ The Deplowmatz Biography, distributed by the group in 1999.

⁵⁶ This relaxed view of class would change substantially in the late 1990s.

⁵⁷ Dramaphile, n. d., 'Kwanza Unit: Bongo Hip-Hip [sic] Pioneers.' *Rockers*, no. 2: 3-6.

⁵⁸ Mr. II (Joseph Mbilinyi). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 6 November 2000.

⁵⁹ Liundi, Taji. Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 23 October 2000.

⁶⁰ John Dilinga, Interview, Dsm, 2 July 2002.

⁶¹ *Daladala's* are public buses.

⁶² Rough Niggaz. *Maisha*. F.K. Mitha, Wananchi Stores, and Burhani Impex (FKW): Dar es Salaam, 1996.

⁶³ Dola, Balozi (Ahmed Dola). Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 11 November 2000.

⁶⁴ 'Kiti Moto' refers to a popular television program that aired in Dar es Salaam. The program featured politicians and famous people being interviewed by some local critics.

⁶⁵ On the album, the voice of the police officer is Balozi Dola.

⁶⁶ Mr. II (II Proud). *Ndani ya Bongo*. FM Music Bank: Dar es Salaam, 1997.

⁶⁷ For discussions of *kijiweni*, and the problems youth face while loitering, see Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, crime, and colonial order in Dar es Salaam* (Oxford, 2005); Abel. G.M. Ishumi, *The Urban Jobless in Eastern Africa: A study of the unemployed population in the growing urban centres, with special reference to Tanzania* (Uppsala, 1984); Alex Perullo, 'Hooligans and Heroes: Youth identity and rap music in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,' *Africa Today*, 51(4), pp. 74-101; Eileen Moyer, 'In the shadow of the Sheraton: imagining localities in global spaces in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', University of Amsterdam Ph.D. thesis (2003).

⁶⁸ J. Master. Interview by author. Dar es Salaam, 29 November 2000.

⁶⁹ Hashim also goes by the names Dogo and Bongo Psychologist. He was also a member of the group Black Houndz, which formed in the early 1990s.

⁷⁰ Livio Sansone, 'The Localization of Global Funk in Bahia and in Rio', in Charles A. Perrone and Christopher Dunn (eds.), *Brazilian Popular Music and Globalization* (New York/London, 2000), pp. 136-37.

⁷¹ See Arjun Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy', in Jonathan Xavier Inda and Renato Rosaldo (eds.), *The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader* (Malden MA, 2002), p. 50.

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
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From its modest beginnings in the 1860s, Dar es Salaam has grown to become one of Africa's most important urban centres. A major political, economic and cultural hub, the city has also acted as a crucible of local social and cultural innovation, exerting a powerful influence on wider Tanzanian society. Reflecting important contemporary socio-economic trends of urban Africa, it has recently attracted the attention of a diverse range of scholars from several disciplines. This collection draws on the best of this scholarship. The opening chapter provides a detailed overview of the history of the city. Subsequent chapters examine Dar es Salaam's twentieth century experience through the prism of social change and the administrative repercussions of rapid urbanisation; and through popular culture and shifting social relations. Offering a comprehensive and accessible survey of the city's development, this book will be of interest not only to the specialist in urban studies, but also to the general reader with an interest in Dar es Salaam's social and cultural history.

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James Giblin, Professor of African History, University of Iowa

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MKUKI NA NYOTA
PUBLISHERS
P.O. Box 4246,
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
www.mkukinanyota.com

ISBN 978-9987-449-70-5



9 789987 449705